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The Internet is the operating system of global politics. Ideas, messages, news, information,
and money ricochet around the world in minutes, crossing time zones and borders in real
time. Charities, banks, corporations, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and ter-
rorist organizations all use the Internet to do business, to organize, and to speed communica-
tions. Internet technology is implicated in almost everything done in world politics today.
But the Internet is not the free operating zone that its early proponents expected. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, states have shown an increased willingness to intervene to control
communication through the Internet. And they have done so with precision and effectiveness.
At the beginning of the decade, few were aware of the scale of the problem. Advocacy and
rights organizations charged that a handful of countries were blocking access to Web sites,
but they had little evidence to support their claims. Good empirical knowledge of the scope
of the problem did not exist.
Four years ago, a group of scholars at the University of Toronto, Harvard, and Cambridge
(Oxford joined later) came together to begin systematic research on patterns of Internet cen-
sorship and surveillance worldwide. At the time, the project seemed very ambitious. The
researchers proposed to put together a combination of contextual political and legal research
and technical interrogations of the Internet in the countries under investigation. It relied heavily
on the work of partners working in the countries where governments were engaged in active
censorship. The project was extraordinarily challenging; in almost every case, the research
implied a direct threat to national security and put researchers’ personal safety at risk.
The project was ambitious in other ways as well. A transatlantic collaboration among four
universities is difficult to manage at the best of times, but the ONI includes dozens of
researchers and collaboration with nongovernmental, rights, and advocacy organizations all
over the world. The project is also truly interdisciplinary. It involves sociologists, lawyers, inter-
national relations scholars, political scientists, and some of the world’s most skilled computer
programmers.
From 2003 to 2006, the ONI collaboration paid handsome dividends. It has produced
eleven major country reports, reports that revealed a startling trend. States were aggressively
finding ways to filter and control access to information for citizens within their borders. The
reports were detailed, supported by strong evidence that had an immediate impact on policy
worldwide. The ONI’s China report was delivered before two U.S. congressional committees
and was featured in newspapers and on television around the world. The reports highlighted
the embarrassing evidence that major U.S. corporations were implicated in Internet censor-
ship practices. Once, the best and brightest of Silicon Valley were wiring the world; now, they
were profiting from their collaboration with governments who were censoring and blocking
websites. The ONI’s dogged investigations called into question the conventional wisdom
about the Internet’s open architecture.
The significance of the research that ONI has conducted goes beyond its analysis of Inter-
net surveillance and censorship. It speaks to fundamental questions of world politics, its struc-
ture, its power relationships, and its new forms of global control and resistance. The essays in
this volume engage with all these issues. The editors of Access Denied present not only
detailed overviews of their country investigations, but several incisive chapters that probe the
legal, theoretical, and political implications of the growth of Internet-content-filtering practices
worldwide.
Access Denied tells us unmistakably that the Internet is one of the most important—and
most contested—terrains of global politics. It is being fought over by states, civil society
organizations, and corporations. The essays in this volume do a superb job of educating us
about the new battlefield of global politics.
Janice Gross Stein
Director, Munk Centre for International Politics
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Preface
This book is a testament to collaboration. About five years ago, it became clear to several of
us—at the University of Cambridge, Harvard Law School, and the University of Toronto—that
we might accomplish more by working together, across institutions and continents, than we
could by going it alone. Since that time, the Oxford Internet Institute has joined our team,
along with more than fifty researchers around the globe. Collaboration is not easy; we have
had our share of struggles along the way to keep our partnership functioning effectively. Nei-
ther the analytical chapters of this volume nor the new global data set that we have compiled,
on which our analytical work relies, would be possible without the partnership that joins us.
The insight that brought us together as collaborators was the sense that the architecture of
the Internet was changing rapidly—and that these changes would have far-reaching implica-
tions. One of the forces at work is that states are using technical means, in addition to other
kinds of controls, to block access to sites on the Web that their citizens seemed to wish to
access. We set out, together, to enumerate these technical restrictions as they emerged, to
track them over time and across states and regions, and to set them into a broader context.
Though we have published many of our findings to our Web site (http://www.opennet.net) and
will continue to do so, this book is our first effort to tie the many strands of our shared work
together into a single fabric.
Just as we shared a sense of the importance of this area of inquiry, we realized also that
this phenomenon could not properly be understood without bringing to bear a series of aca-
demic disciplines to analyze it and to set it into a fulsome context. The way we have
approached our work, which begins with technical enumeration, required technologists
among us to develop a new methodology for testing for choke points in the Internet. Political
scientists and international relations theorists hold another piece of the puzzle, as do those
with expertise in regional studies. Those of us who study and practice international law
and how it relates to information technologies understand another part of the whole. Our
shared view is that interdisciplinary research is the only way truly to understand our field in all
its complexity.
Most important of all, there are those people on the ground, in the places where the state is
seeking to impose control over the Internet, who have shed particular light upon what is hap-
pening in the places we are studying. Many of these people take risks every day in the interest
of promoting human rights, the rule of law, and other universally good causes. Many of these
people have put themselves in harm’s way, in one fashion or another, to help make this book
possible. It is to these heroes, scattered about the globe and about the Internet, that we ded-
icate this book.
Many good people deserve explicit acknowledgement for their contribution to this book. We
each have been blessed by extraordinary teams at our respective institutions and our net-
works in the field. Some of these contributors are not listed here, at their request; they know
who they are.
The Advanced Network Research Group at the Cambridge Security Programme could not
have done its work without the support of some key individuals within the University. Rafal
Rohozinski, the director of the research effort and ONI Principal Investigator, would like to
thank Professors James Mayall and Christopher Hill at the Centre of International Studies,
who made available the fellowship under which much of the ONI’s work over the past three
years took place. Professor Yezid Sayegh was key to paving the way for the project and has
been a constant supporter of the work, providing intellectual insight and encouragement.
Peter Cavanaugh, the executive director of the Cambridge Security Programme, and Leslie
Fettes were patient and willing to provide support, even when we were forced, by necessity,
to make payments to our partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Middle
East via transfers to questionable financial institutions or, at times, in small currency stuffed
into plain paper envelopes. Professor Ross Anderson, and the Security Group at the Cam-
bridge Computer Laboratory, was extraordinarily supportive and brought to our project Dr.
Steven Murdoch, who has gone on to become the ONI’s chief technology officer. Steven’s
quiet and diligent manner has led to some of the ONI’s more interesting findings, and he con-
tinues to spearhead the development of tools and methods that will keep our work ahead of
the emerging trends.
The work done by Cambridge in mapping and contextualizing emerging information con-
trols in the Commonwealth of Independent States could not have happened without special
partnership with the Eurasia I-Policy Network (EIPN), in particular its dynamic regional coordi-
nator Tattu Mambetalieva (Kyrgyzstan). Under Tattu’s leadership, EIPN members, who repre-
sent NGOs from nine CIS countries, went well beyond the requirements of the yearbook and
engaged policymakers, security actors, academia, and businessmen in examining the emerg-
ing governance and policy of the Internet in their countries. Their commitment not only led to
great research but also helped reverse policies in some countries. Some unfortunately paid
the price for speaking too loudly; during the course of our work over the past three years,
members of our team have been harassed, arrested, and in one case died under question-
able circumstances. Special mention goes out to our country coordinators, only some of
whom we can name: Emin Akhndov (Azerbaijan), Vadim Dryganov (Belarus), Alexsei Marcuic
and Vladislav Spirlenko (Institute for Information Policy, Moldova), Dr. Alexandra Belyaeva
(Russian Federation), and Andriy Paziuk (Privacy Ukraine). For those whom we cannot, thanks
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goes out to the Civil Initiative for Internet Policy in Kazakhstan and the public foundation
‘‘GIPI’’ in Tajikistan. Extraspecial mention goes out to our team in Uzbekistan, who toil under
great personal risk and in total anonymity. Cambridge and EIPN also are supported by a
fantastic in-field administration and technology team from the Civil Initiative for Internet Pol-
icy in Kyrgyzstan, who make working in the CIS seem easy: Alexsei Bebinov, Lira Samyk-
baeva, and Zlata Shramko.
Cambridge also would like to recognize the engagement of the Institute of Information
Security Problems, Moscow State University, for its willingness to engage with the Advanced
Network Research Group around two NATO-sponsored roundtables examining Internet con-
trols, and to bring to the table representatives from the Russian National Security Council as
well as major security organizations and businesses. This engagement has started an impor-
tant public-policy process around these critical issues between representatives of Russian
state institutions, business, and civil society.
In the Middle East, Cambridge partnered with Palestinians and Israelis to conduct testing in
what can be termed ‘‘a highly complex political and security environment.’’ Special thanks go
out to Dr. Michael Dahan (Hebrew University) for his insights on Israeli information society. Es-
pecial thanks to our Palestinian partners, Engineer Wassim Abdullah, Dr. Mashour Abudaka,
His Excellency Dr. Sabri Saidam, and Sam Bahour and the technical staff at the Centre for
Continuing Education, Bir Zeit University, without whom the work in the West Bank and Gaza
would not have been possible.
Finally, the Cambridge team benefited from some excellent past and present researchers:
Dr. David Mikosz, Deirdre Collings, and Joanna Michalska, all of whom undertook much of the
grounded foundational research upon which our present work in the CIS and Middle East
depends.
Dr. Robert Faris at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School has led
the research staff, at Harvard Law School and also across all institutions, with grace and
poise. Rob deserves as much credit as anyone for the quality and integrity of the research
that underlies this work, as well as for a great deal of the text in this book.
Rob Faris has been joined and supported by an unusually strong group of research fellows
on the Berkman Center’s team. Among these Berkman fellows, Derek Bambauer, now a law
professor, stands out. Derek spent more than two years, as a student and as a research fel-
low, developing the methodology, gathering earlier versions of these data, and drafting
reports that form the core of much of what we conclude in this book. Jeffrey Engerman, now
a lawyer in private practice, contributed a great deal of wisdom as to our methods and the
way we handle and analyze our data. Derek and Jeff also coordinated a generation of re-
search assistants who helped us to produce the first versions of many of the state-specific
reports on which our work is grounded. Stephanie Wang, a terrific lawyer and researcher,
brought exceptional regional understanding to our work in East Asia. Vesselina Haralampieva
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lent similar expertise to our work in the region encompassing the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States. Helmi Noman and Elijah Zarwan ably led our work in the Gulf and North Africa
regions, respectively. Our partners in the Cyberlaw and International Human Rights Clinics at
Harvard Law School—fellows Phil Malone, Matt Lovell, and Bonnie Docherty, and Professor
Jim Cavallaro—have co-led missions with exceptional students from our respective clinics to
Southeast Asia and Russia as we gathered data for this project.
An extraordinary cadre of student researchers from Harvard Law School and the surround-
ing academic community has been responsible for pulling together much of the detail that has
gone into this project. Kevin O’Keefe, a graduate student in East Asian studies, is first among
equals. The first student to work on Internet filtering at the Berkman Center, Benjamin Edel-
man, now a professor at Harvard Business School, deserves thanks for his important role in
the early days of this research.
The country profiles were produced under the guidance and authorship of principal investi-
gator Rafal Rohozinski and Vesselina Haralampieva for the Commonwealth of Independent
States, Helmi Noman and Elijah Zarwan for the North Africa and Middle East region, and Ste-
phanie Wang and Kevin O’Keefe for Asia. Many people contributed to the research, writing,
and editing of these profiles, including: James Ahlers, Aisha Ahmad, Anna Brook, Chris Con-
ley, Evan Croen, Matthieu Desruisseaux, Charles Frentz, Anthony Haddad, Christina Hayes,
Joanna Huey, Samuel Hwang, Sajjad Khoshroo, Jehae Kim, Saloni Malhotra, Katie Mapes,
Miriam Simun, Tobias Snyder, Elisabeth Theodore, and Christina Xu. The following individuals
made important contributions to the research in the field: Shahzad Ahmad, Shanti Alexander,
Tatyana Bezuglova, Srijana Bhattarai, Alexander Blank, Matt Boulos, Xiao Wei Chen, Yee
Yeong Chong, Lino Clemente, Kathleen Connors, Peter Daignault, Shubhankar Dam, Elliott
Davis, Siddharth Dawara, Charles Duan, Bipin Gautam, Nah Soo Hoe, Tina Hu, Ang Peng
Hwa, Mary Joyce, Randy Kluver, David Levenson, Eitan Levisohn, Saloni Malhotra, Efrat Mini-
vitski, Ron Morris, Caroline Nellemann, Jeff Ooi, Sai Rao, David Rizk, Sajan Sangraula, Katie
Smith, Amine Taha, Lokman Tsui, Allison Turbiville, Neha Viswanathan, Dinesh Wagle, Sally
Walkerman, Naaman Weiss, Aaron Williamson, K. H. Yap, and Jeffrey Yip. We are grateful to
those who took the time to read and comment on our work, including: Markus Breen, Silke
Ernst, Peyman Faratin, Daniel Haeusermann, Nancy Hafkin, Luis Muñoz, Eric Osiakwan, Rus-
sel Southwood, and James Thurman. We also would like to offer our thanks to the following
individuals for their valuable guidance and help with our research: Ananta Agrawal, Roby
Alampay, Cherian George, Tyler Giannini, Chandrachoodan Gopalakrishnan, Rishikesh Karra,
Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Arun Mehta, Parishi Sanjanwala, Xiao Qiang, and Zaw Zaw.
Hope Steele expertly edited each of the country profiles and regional overviews for this
book with great care, grace, and patience. Ha Nguyen designed the country profiles and re-
gional overviews, performing multiple miracles on short notice with true poise and artistic skill.
A number of people participated in the writing, editing, research, and testing anonymously.
We undoubtedly have not included others who deserve our thanks.
xii John Palfrey
The Berkman Center’s work on this project drew upon many within the Berkman Center’s
community for whom the OpenNet Initiative is not their sole obsession. Colin Maclay, the
Center’s managing director, contributed both substantive insights and a steady hand. Cather-
ine Bracy and Seth Young, with the backing of the Center’s wonderful administrative staff, kept
the relevant trains running on time, despite plenty of events that could have thrown them off
the rails. Andrew Heyward, Peter Emerson, Evan Croen, Amanda Michel, Andrew Solomon,
and Patrick McKiernan—along with a group of volunteer advisors—have assisted us in shap-
ing the way that we communicate the findings of our study. Wendy Seltzer and Urs Gasser,
fellows of the Center and also professors of law, each challenged our thinking at many stages
of this research and offered helpful feedback on various drafts that became parts of this book.
Research fellows Ethan Zuckerman, Michael Best, David Weinberger, and Rebecca MacKin-
non (now a professor of journalism) went out of their way, as did many other Berkman fellows,
to lend hands and contacts, along with welcome critiques of our methods and our conclu-
sions. A group of our colleagues from around Harvard (Joseph Nye) and at neighboring MIT
(Eric von Hippel) also reviewed drafts and participated in an informal peer review session. We
also have learned much from the participants in the global process to develop a set of ethical
guidelines for corporations operating in regimes that practice censorship and surveillance.
Dunstan Hope and Aron Cramer of Business for Social Responsibility; Leslie Harris of CDT;
Andrew McLaughlin and Bob Boorstin of Google; Michael Samway of Yahoo!; Ira Rubinstein
of Microsoft; Orville Schell, Xiao Qiang, Deirdre Mulligan, and Roxanna Altholz at the Univer-
sity of California-Berkeley; and others have offered valuable commentary and guidance.
Jonathan Zittrain and I thank especially our faculty colleagues associated with the Berkman
Center and Harvard Law School, who in many respects are the reasons we do what we do for
a living. We are grateful to Charlie Nesson, the founder of the Berkman Center; Terry Fisher,
the Center’s faculty director; Jack Goldsmith, one of the most insightful contributors to our
field; Larry Lessig, whose ideas about the regulation of cyberspace through code infuse all
our work; and Yochai Benkler, who keeps reminding us why this all matters.
At the Oxford Internet Institute at the University of Oxford, Sangamitra Ramachander con-
tributed helpful research assistance, and Bill Dutton and the Institute’s research staff partici-
pated in a number of workshop sessions that helped us test and refine our hypotheses. The
Institute generously has hosted two ONI-related conferences, and its investment of intellectual
capital in the project is much appreciated.
At the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre at the University of Toronto, a dynamic team of ex-
traordinary ‘‘hacktivists’’ has contributed immensely to the technical and other research work
of the ONI. Nart Villeneuve’s pioneering methods of remote network interrogation laid the ba-
sis for the ONI’s technical methodology. His dogged pursuit of network anomalies, question-
able practices, and seemingly intractable problems helps drive the engine of the ONI on a
daily basis. Michelle Levesque worked alongside Nart in the early years of the ONI to develop
and refine the ONI’s suite of testing tools. Both of them have approached their responsibilities
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with great enthusiasm and spirit to hunt down and document patterns of Internet content filter-
ing and surveillance worldwide. They are truly Net Ninjas.
As a Citizen Lab senior research fellow responsible for the ONI’s ‘‘deep dives’’ into Asia, Dr.
Francois Fortier has helped convene and lead a dynamic group of researchers in the region.
Although relatively new to the project, his tremendous organizational and intellectual skills
already have contributed invaluably, and we look forward to his ongoing and expanding role
in the project in the years to come.
Over the years, numerous programmers and researchers have worked at the Citizen Lab,
bringing ingenuity and dogged determination to the ONI’s forensic investigations. These in-
clude, in no particular order, Graeme Bunton, Sarah Boland, James Nicholas Tay, Eugene
Fryntov, Anton Fillipenko, Michael Hull, Pat Smith, Tim Smith, Oliver Day, Julian Wolfson, Stian
Haklev, Konstantin Kilibarda, David Wade-Farley, Peter Wong, and Liisa Hyyrylainen.
Jane Gowan, of Agent5 design, has brought her remarkable creativity and artistic sensi-
bilities to help enrich and enliven the ONI’s presentation of its work, including our 2006 poster
of Internet censorship, many of the graphics and other visualizations included herein, and the
striking cover art that frames this volume. Her professionalism, enthusiasm and creativity are
much appreciated.
As Director of the Citizen Lab, Ron Deibert would like to thank the staff at the Munk Centre
for International Studies for providing such a supportive environment for the Lab and the
ONI’s research activities, in particular its director, Janice Stein, and Marketa Evans, Wilhelmina
Peters, and Penny Alford, as well as the Munk Centre’s technical support staff. Thanks also to
the University of Toronto’s Computing and Network Services, in particular Eugene Sicunius,
for tolerating and supporting our (at times) unconventional methods.
As the list of the contributors makes plain, the OpenNet Initiative is an expensive project to
operate. There would be no global data set and no book were it not for the vision of our pro-
gram officers and the willingness to take risks of the boards of their foundations. We owe
deep thanks to all at the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for a multiyear,
$3 million grant that has provided the bulk of the funding for this book project. In particular,
the foundation’s president, Jonathan Fanton, its vice president Elspeth Revere, and program
officer John Bracken have provided invaluable counsel and, of course, financial support. The
Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation provided the ONI its first grant; it was Jona-
than Peizer, then the OSI’s chief technology officer, who connected us—fittingly enough, by
e-mail—in the first place. Darius Cuplinskas and Vera Franz of the OSI’s Information Program
have earned our unending thanks for their loyal support of the ONI and its work. Ron Deibert
and Rafal Rohozinski owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Anthony Romero and the Ford
Foundation for seed funding that helped contribute to the realization of the Citizen Lab and
the Advanced Network Research Group. We are very grateful to the International Development
Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada for providing funding for ONI’s continuing engagement in
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the Asia, Africa, and Middle East regions, and support for the ONI’s mapping and other visu-
alization projects.
Most of all, we each thank our families and friends who have supported us as we have
traveled the world to compile these data and spent long hours away in writing them up.
John G. Palfrey
on behalf of the OpenNet Initiative Principal Investigators
OpenNet Initiative
opennet.net
Citizen Lab, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto
Berkman Centre for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School
Advanced Network Research Group, Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge
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A Tale of Two Internets
Tens of thousands of international travelers descended upon the Tunis airport for the World
Summit on the Information Society in 2005. The summit brought together policy-makers, jour-
nalists, nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, academics, and others to consider the
present and future of information and communications technologies. Polite Tunisian handlers
in crisp, colorful uniforms guided arriving summit attendees to buses that took those with cre-
dentials to one of several sites nearby.
The capital, Tunis, hosted the main conference facilities. The seaside town of Yasmine-
Hammamet, with boardwalks, theme parks, casinos, and breathtaking sunsets, housed dele-
gates who could not find lodging in the city. Within the main conference facilities in Tunis, they
would experience the Internet as though they were in a Silicon Valley start-up: unfettered ac-
cess to whatever they sought to view or write online.
But those by the sea in Yasmine-Hammamet, outside the United Nations–sponsored con-
ference facilities, encountered a radically different Internet—the one that is commonplace for
Tunisians. If attendees sought to view a site critical of the summit’s proceedings or mentioning
human rights—for instance, a site called Citizen’s Summit, at www.citizens-summit.org/—they
would see a page indicating that a network error had occurred. Among other curious things,
the page was written in French, not the native Arabic. The blockpage is partially accurate:
something in the network had caused that information never to reach the surfer’s laptop.1
But it was not an error.
The blockage is intentional, one of thousands put in place daily by the government of Tuni-
sia. The ad hoc filtering of information underway in Tunisia is flatly at odds with the ideals
touted by World Summit participants. Tunisia’s filtering system was implemented long before
the World Summit kicked off, and it was unaffected by the attention the summit brought to
Tunisia.
A filtering system is meant to stop ordinary citizens from accessing some parts of the Inter-
net deemed by the state to be too sensitive, for one reason or another. The information
blocked ranges from politics to sexuality to culture to religion. As user-generated content has
gained in popularity and new tools have made it easier to create and distribute it, filtering
regimes have pivoted to stop citizens from publishing undesirable thoughts, images, and
sounds, whether for a local or an international audience. The system that facilitates a state’s
Internet filtering can also be configured to enable the state to track citizens’ Web surfing or to
listen in on their conversations, whether lawful or unlawful.
A Tale of Many Internets
Tunisia is not a special case. More than three dozen states around the world now filter the
Internet. This book contains the results of the first systematic, academically rigorous global
study of all known state-mandated Internet filtering practices. Previously, the OpenNet Initia-
tive and others have reported only anecdotally or sporadically on the scope of Internet filtering.
Our first goal in writing this book is to present the data from this global study, allowing others
to make use of it in their own empirical work, or to place it within a normative framework.
Second, in addition to state-by-state test results, we have commissioned a series of essays
analyzing these test results and related findings from a variety of perspectives—what this
emerging story means from the standpoint of technology, as a matter of international law, in
the context of corporate ethics, and for the vibrant activist and political communities that
increasingly rely upon Internet technologies as a productivity enhancer and essential commu-
nications tool.
For this first global study, we have sought to find those places in the world that practice
state-mandated technical filtering. The definition of what we are and are not covering here is
important to set forth at the outset: we seek to describe technical blockages of the free flow of
information across the Internet that states put in place or require others to institute. To deter-
mine where to test for such blockages, we have drawn upon our own technical probes and
forensic analyses of networks, published reports of others who track these matters, and cred-
ible unpublished reports that we received either through interviews or over the transom. Our
emphasis on state-mandated technical filtering underscores our own sense that ‘‘West Coast
Code,’’ in Lawrence Lessig’s terms (computer code), is more malleable, more subtle, more
effective in many contexts, and less easily noted, changed, or challenged than ‘‘East Coast
Code’’ (ordinary law and regulation), which is typically less opaque in its operation.2 Straight-
forward state regulation of speech without technological components can, of course, result in
censorship; our work here is designed to focus on regulation that, when implemented through
code, seems more a force of nature than an exercise of political or physical power.
Thus it is entirely possible that a state that does not require or inspire technical filtering can
possess a set of regulations or social norms or market factors that render its information envi-
ronment less free than a state with fairly extensive technical filtering. A rich and comprehen-
sive picture of what a truly ‘‘free’’ or ‘‘open’’ information environment looks like can rely only
in part on conclusions about Internet filtering. The essays that accompany our presentation
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of the data are intended to provide some, though by no means all, of the relevant context. A
shrewd observer might well make a case that the extensive regulatory regimes for speech in
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom—from which states the majority of our
researchers hail—result in a more constrained information environment than a state with tech-
nical filtering but little else by way of law, norms, or markets to constrain an Internet user. We
map out filtering practices, and the law and regulation behind them, so that they may take
their place within a larger mosaic of assessing and judging the flow of information within and
across the world’s jurisdictions.
The states that practice state-mandated filtering are predominantly clustered in three
regions of the world: east Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and central Asia. A handful
of states outside these regions also encourage or mandate certain forms of filtering. Someone
in the United States, for instance, may encounter state-mandated Internet filtering on some
computers in libraries and schools. A citizen in northern Europe might find child pornography
blocked online. In France and Germany, content that includes imagery related to Nazism or
Holocaust denial is blocked in various ways and at various levels. The emerging trend points
to more filtering in more places, using more sophisticated techniques over time. This trend
runs parallel to the trajectory of more people in more places using the Internet for more impor-
tant functions in their lives.
We find that filtering implementations, and their respective scopes and levels of effective-
ness, vary widely among the states that filter. China institutes by far the most extensive filtering
regime in the world, with blocking occurring at multiple levels of the network and spanning a
wide range of topics. Singapore, by contrast, despite a widely publicized filtering program, in
fact blocks access to only a handful of sites. Each of the sites blocked in Singapore is porno-
graphic in nature. Several states, including some in central Asia, filter only temporarily when
elections or other key moments make the control of the information environment most impor-
tant to the state. Most states implement filtering regimes that fall between the poles of China
and Singapore, with significant variation from one to the next. Each of these state-mandated
filtering regimes can be understood only in the political, legal, religious, and social context in
which they arise. It is just this context that we seek to provide in the chapters that follow our
presentation of the data.
Our aim in this volume is to document, with the greatest degree of precision possible, tech-
nical Internet filtering wherever we have been able to find it, and to set it in a context that
acknowledges the nuances and complexity of this matter. We have relied upon an extensive
network of researchers in each of the regions of the world that we have studied, as well as
area-studies experts based outside those regions. We chose to study and report on the states
covered in this volume, as well as other states that appear not to be filtering but are on
our ‘‘watch list,’’ because our researchers, members of the press, or others in this field—
Reporters Sans Frontières or Human Rights Watch, for instance—have identified these states
as potentially carrying out state-level filtering. The lists used in the testing that forms the core
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of our set of findings are the product of study of the political, social, cultural, and religious
issues in each of the states we have reviewed. While there is no doubt filtering underway in
places around the world that we have yet to uncover, our goal in this volume is to be as com-
prehensive as possible.
The core of the data we present is found in short reports covering each state that we have
studied in depth, with an overview for each of the three regions—east Asia, the Middle East
and North Africa, and central Asia—identifying themes and trends across states. The section
on testing results for each state sets forth the types of content blocked by category and
includes documentation of the most noteworthy content-specific findings.
We intend to update this study annually. Our intention is to develop a publicly accessible
online database of filtering test results worldwide over time. Taken together, these reports rep-
resent a starting point in understanding the nature and future of global Internet filtering.
In addition to the state-specific data, we present a series of chapters that builds arguments
grounded in our empirical findings about Internet filtering. The first short chapter, by Robert
Faris and Nart Villeneuve, includes a set of issues that emerge from the data: trends and
themes from a global perspective. Our chapter 2 gives an overview of the politics and practice
of Internet filtering. The third chapter, by Ross Anderson and Steven Murdoch, considers the
technology that powers the Internet filtering and highlights its strengths and limitations. The
fourth chapter, by Mary Rundle and Malcolm Birdling, takes up the extent to which interna-
tional law might bear on Internet filtering. Our chapter 5 examines the ethical issues for corpo-
rations seeking to avail themselves of markets in states that filter. The final chapter, by Ronald
Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, looks in depth at the impact of Internet filtering upon the activist
community that increasingly relies upon the Internet for mission-critical activities.
While we bring our own normative commitments to this work—those of us who have con-
tributed to this work tend to favor the free flow of bits as opposed to proprietary control of in-
formation, whether by states or companies or both—our goal is not to point fingers or assign
blame, but rather to document a trend that we believe to be accelerating and to set that trend
in context. We seek to prompt further conversation across cultures and disciplines about what
changes in Internet filtering practices mean for the future of the Internet as well as the future of
markets, social norms, and modes of governance around the world. We look forward to the
conversations as others put these data into the proper, broader context—into the larger mo-
saic of political and cultural freedom—into which they belong.
Notes
1. For one of many contemporaneous accounts, see John Palfrey, On Being Filtered in Tunisia, or, What WSIS Should
Really Focus On, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/palfrey/2005/11/14/on-being-filtered-in-tunisia-or-what-wsis-should-
really-focus-on/.
2. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 53–54.
4 Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey
1
Measuring Global Internet Filtering
Robert Faris and Nart Villeneuve
The Scope and Depth of Global Internet Filtering
In this chapter, we set out to provide an overview of the data regarding Internet filtering that
the OpenNet Initiative1 has gathered over the past year. Empirical testing for Internet blocking
was carried out in forty countries in 2006. Of these forty countries, we found evidence of tech-
nical filtering in twenty-six (see table 1.1). This does not imply that only these countries filter
the Internet. The testing we carried out in 2006 constitutes the first step toward a comprehen-
sive global assessment. Not only do we expect to find more countries that filter the Internet as
we expand our testing, but we also expect that some of the countries that did not show signs
of filtering in 2006 will institute filtering in subsequent years.2
Conceptually, the methodology we employ is simple. We start by compiling lists of Web
sites that cover a wide range of topics targeted by Internet filtering. The topics are organized
into a taxonomy of categories that have been subject to blocking, ranging from gambling, por-
nography, and crude humor to political satire and Web sites that document human rights
abuses and corruption. (See table 1.2.) Researchers then test these lists to see which Web
sites are available from different locations within each country.3
The states that filter the Internet must choose which topics to block (the scope of filtering)
and how much of each topic to filter (the depth of filtering). The results of these decisions are
summarized in figure 1.1, comparing the breadth and depth of filtering for the countries where
evidence of filtering was found.
The number of different categories in which Internet filtering was found to occur is shown on
the horizontal axis. We put this forward as a measure of the scope of Internet filtering in each
country. (The categories are shown in table 1.2.)
The vertical axis depicts the comprehensiveness of filtering efforts as measured by the high-
est degree of content blocked in any of the topical categories. This captures a markedly dif-
ferent angle on filtering. If the breadth of filtering represents the ambition of censors to limit
information related to a range of topics, the depth of filtering measures the success in actually
blocking content. This might correspond to the level of sophistication of the filtering regime
and amount of resources devoted to the endeavor, or it may be a reflection of the resolve and
political will to shut down large sections of the Internet.
The countries occupying the upper right of figure 1.1, including Iran, China, and Saudi Ara-
bia, are those that not only intercede on a wide range of topics but also block a large amount
of content relating to those topics. Myanmar and Yemen cover a similarly broad scope,
though with less comprehensiveness in each category. South Korea is in a league of its own.
It has opted to filter very little, targeting North Korean sites, many of which are hosted in
Japan. Yet South Korea’s thoroughness in blocking these sites manifests a strong desire to
eliminate access to them. There is a cluster of states occupying the center of the plot that
Table 1.1
Filtering by state

























*Testing in Russia was limited to a selection of ISPs in Moscow; these preliminary results may not extend
beyond this sample.
6 Robert Faris and Nart Villeneuve
Table 1.2
Categories subject to Internet filtering
Free expression and media freedom
Political transformation and opposition parties
Political reform, legal reform, and governance
Militants, extremists, and separatists
Human rights
Foreign relations and military




Sensitive or controversial history, arts, and literature
Hate speech










Religious conversion, commentary, and criticism
Anonymizers and circumvention
Hacking
Blogging domains and blogging services
Web hosting sites and portals






Groups and social networking
Commercial sites
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are widely known to practice filtering. These countries, which include Syria, Tunisia, Vietnam,
Uzbekistan, Oman, and Pakistan, block an expansive range of topics with considerable depth.
Ethiopia is a more recent entrant into this category, having extended its censorship of political
opposition into cyberspace.
Azerbaijan, Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, and Tajikistan filter sparingly, in some cases as
little as one Web site or a handful of sites. The evidence for Belarus and Kazakhstan remains
inconclusive at the time of this writing, though blocking is suspected in these countries.
Of equal interest are the states included in testing in 2006 in which no evidence of filtering
was uncovered (see table 1.1). We make no claims to have proven the absence of filtering in
these countries. However, our background research supports the conclusion drawn from the
technical testing that none of these states are currently filtering Internet content.4
Later in the book we turn our attention to the question of why some countries filter and
others do not, even under similar political and cultural circumstances.
Figure 1.1
Comparing the breadth and depth of filtering. AE—United Arab Emirates; BH—Bahrain; CN—China;
ET—Ethiopia; IR—Iran; JO—Jordan; KR—South Korea; LY—Libya; MM—Burma/Myanmar; OM—
Oman; PK—Pakistan; SA—Saudi Arabia; SD—Sudan; SY—Syria; TH—Thailand; TH—Tunisia; UZ—
Uzbekistan; VN—Vietnam; YE—Yemen. A number of countries that filter a small number of sites are
omitted from this diagram, including Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Singapore,
and Tajikistan.
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The Principal Motives and Targets of Filtering
On September 19, 2006, a military-led coup in Thailand overthrew the democratically elected
government headed by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thailand is not unfamiliar with
such upheavals. There have been seventeen coups in the past sixty years. This time, however,
Internet users noticed a marked increase in the number of Web sites that were not accessible,
including several sites critical of the military coup.5 A year earlier in Nepal, the king shut down
the Internet along with international telephone lines and cellular communication networks
when he seized power from the parliament and prime minister. In Bahrain, during the run-up
to the fall 2006 election, the government chose to block access to a number of key opposition
sites. These events are part of a growing global trend. Claiming control of the Internet has be-
come an essential element in any government strategy to rein in dissent—the twenty-first cen-
tury parallel to taking over television and radio stations.
In contrast to these exceptional events, the constant blocking of a swath of the Internet has
become part of the everyday political and cultural reality of many states. A growing number of
countries are blocking access to pornography, led by a handful of states in the Persian Gulf
region. Other countries, including South Korea and Pakistan, block Web sites that are per-
ceived as a threat to national security.
Notwithstanding the wide range of topics filtered around the world, there are essentially
three motives or rationales for Internet filtering: politics and power, social norms and morals,
and security concerns. Accordingly, most of the topics subject to filtering (see table 1.2) fall
under one of three thematic headings: political, social, and security. A fourth theme—Internet
tools—encompasses the networking tools and applications that allow the sharing of informa-
tion relating to the first three themes. Included here are translation tools, anonymizers, blog-
ging services, and other Web-based applications categorized in table 1.2.
Protecting intellectual property rights is another important driver of Internet content regula-
tion, particularly in western Europe and North America. However, in the forty countries that
were tested in 2006, this is not a major objective of filtering.6
Figure 1.2 compares the political and social filtering practices of these same twenty-seven
countries. On one extreme is Saudi Arabia, which heavily censors social content. While there
is also substantial political filtering carried out in Saudi Arabia, it is done with less scope and
depth. On the other fringe are Syria and China, focusing much more of their extensive filtering
on political topics. Myanmar and Vietnam are also notable for their primary focus on political
issues, which in the case of Vietnam contradicts the stated reason for filtering the Internet.7
Iran stands out for its pervasive filtering of both political and social material.
Filtering directed at political opposition to the ruling government is a common type of block-
ing that spans many countries. Politically motivated filtering is characteristic of authoritarian
and repressive regimes. The list of countries that engage in substantial political block-
ing includes Bahrain, China, Libya, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia,
Measuring Global Internet Filtering 9
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.8 Thailand and Ethiopia are the most recent additions to this group
of countries that filter Web sites associated with political opposition groups. Yet in other coun-
tries with an authoritarian bent, such as Russia and Algeria, we have not uncovered filtering of
the Internet.
The perceived threat to national security is a common rationale used for blocking content.
Internet filtering that targets the Web sites of insurgents, extremists, terrorists, and other
threats generally garners wide public support. This is best typified by South Korea where
pro–North Korean sites are blocked, or by India where militant and extremist sites associated
with groups that foment domestic conflict are censored. In Pakistan, Web sites devoted to
the Balochi independence movement are blocked. Similarly, the Web sites of separatist or
radical groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood are blocked in some countries in the Middle
East.
Social filtering is focused on those topics that are held to be antithetical to accepted soci-
etal norms. Pornographic, gay and lesbian, and gambling-related content are prime examples
Figure 1.2
Political and social filtering. AE—United Arab Emirates; BH—Bahrain; CN—China; ET—Ethiopia; IR—
Iran; JO—Jordan; KR—South Korea; LY—Libya; MM—Burma/Myanmar; OM—Oman; PK—Pakistan;
SA—Saudi Arabia; SD—Sudan; SY—Syria; TH—Thailand; TH—Tunisia; UZ—Uzbekistan; VN—Vietnam;
YE—Yemen. A number of countries that filter a small number of sites are omitted from this diagram,
including Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Singapore, and Tajikistan.
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Box 1.1
Identifying and documenting Internet filtering
Measuring and describing Internet filtering defies simple metrics. Ideally, we would like
to know how Internet censorship reduces the availability of information, how it hampers
the development of online communities, and how it inhibits the ability of civic groups to
monitor and report on the activities of the government, as these answers impact gover-
nance and ultimately economic growth. However, this is much easier to conceptualize
at an abstract level than to measure empirically. Even if we were able to identify all the
Web sites that have been put out of reach due to government action, the impact of
blocking access to each Web site is far from obvious, particularly in this networked
world where information has a habit of propagating itself and reappearing in multiple
locations. Nevertheless, every obstacle thrown into the path of citizens seeking out in-
formation bears a cost or, depending on how one views the contribution of a particular
Web site to society, a benefit. With this recognition of the inherent complexity of evalu-
ating Internet censorship, we set out with modest goals—to identify and document
filtering.
Two lists of Web sites are checked in each of the countries tested: a global list and a
local list. The global list is a standardized list of Web sites that cover the categories
listed in table 1.1. The global list of Web sites is comprised principally of internationally
relevant Web sites with English content. The same global list is checked in each of the
countries in which we have tested. A separate local list is created for each of the coun-
tries tested; it includes Web sites related to the specific issues and context of the study
country.
These testing lists encompass a wide variety of content including political topics such
as human rights, political commentary and news, religion, health and sex education,
and Web sites sponsored by separatists and militant organizations. Pornography, gam-
bling, drugs, and alcohol are also represented in the testing lists. The lists embody por-
tions of the Web space that would be subject to Internet filtering in each of the countries
being tested. They are designed to unearth filtering and blocking behavior where it
exists. Background research is focused on finding sites that are likely to be blocked. In
countries where Internet censorship has been reported, the lists include those sites that
were alleged to have been blocked. These are not intended to be exhaustive lists of the
relevant subject matter, nor do we presume to have identified all the Web sites that are
subject to blocking.
The actual tests are run from within each country using software specifically designed
for this purpose. Where appropriate, the tests are run from different locations to capture
the differences in blocking behavior across Internet service providers (ISPs). The tests
are run across multiple days and weeks to control for normal connectivity problems.
The completion of the initial accessibility testing is just the first step in the evaluation
process. Additional diagnostic work is required to separate normal connectivity errors
from intentional tampering. As described in further detail later, there are a number of
technical alternatives for filtering the Internet, some of which are relatively easy to dis-
cover. Others are difficult to detect and require extensive diagnostic work to confirm.
Measuring Global Internet Filtering 11
of what is filtered for social and cultural reasons. Hate speech and political satire are also the
target of Internet filtering in some countries. Web sites that deny the Holocaust or promote Na-
zism are blocked in France and Germany. Web sites that provide unflattering details related to
the life of the king of Thailand are censored in his country.
An emergent impetus for filtering is the protection of existing economic interests. Perhaps
the best example is the blocking of low-cost international telephone services that use Voice-
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and thereby reduce the customer base of large telecommunica-
tions companies, many of which enjoy entrenched monopoly positions. Skype, a popular and
low-cost Internet-based telephone service, has been blocked in Myanmar and United Arab
Emirates, which heavily block VoIP sites. The Web sites of many VoIP companies are also
blocked in Syria and Vietnam.
Many countries seek to block the intermediaries: the tools and applications of the Internet
that assist users in accessing sensitive material on the Internet. These tools include translation
sites, e-mail providers, Weblog hosting sites, and Web sites that allow users to circumvent
standard blocking strategies. Blogging services such as Blogspot are often targeted; eight
countries blocked blogs hosted there, while Syria, Ethiopia, and Pakistan blocked the entire
domain, denying access to all the blogs hosted on Blogspot. Fourteen countries blocked ac-
cess to anonymity and censorship circumvention sites. Both SmartFilter, used in Sudan, Tuni-
sia, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, and Websense, used in Yemen, have filtering categories—called
‘‘Anonymizers’’ and ‘‘Proxy Avoidance,’’ respectively—used to block such sites.
A handful of countries, including China, Vietnam, and states in the MENA region (the Middle
East and North Africa), block Web sites related to religion and minority groups. In China, Web
sites that represent the Falun Gong and the Tibetan exile groups are widely blocked. In Viet-
nam, religious and ethnic sites associated with Buddhism, the Cao Dai faith, and indigenous
hill tribes are subject to blocking. Web sites that are aimed at religious conversion from Islam
to Christianity are often blocked in the MENA region. Decisively identifying the motives of filter-
ing activity is often impossible, particularly as the impact of filtering can simultaneously touch
a host of social and political processes. That being said, it probably would be a mistake to
attribute the filtering of religious and ethnic content solely to biases against minority groups,
as these movements also represent a political threat to the ruling regimes.
A Survey of Global Filtering Strategies, Transparency, and Consistency
There are many techniques used to block access to Internet content. Each of these tech-
niques can be used at different levels of Internet access within a country. Internet filtering is
most commonly implemented at two levels: at the ISPs within the country and on the Internet
backbone at the international gateway. These methods may overlap; an ISP may filter content
using one particular technique while another technique is used at the international gateway.
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Pakistan is an example of a country that blocks at both the international gateway and at the
ISP level.
There are a few principal techniques used for Internet filtering including IP blocking,
DNS tampering, and proxy-based blocking methods. (For blocking behavior by country, see
table 1.3.) These techniques are presented in further detail by Anderson and Murdoch in
chapter 3.
IP blocking is effective in blocking the intended target and no new equipment needs to be




























Blocking behavior included in this table may include international gateway level filtering, and filtering tech-
niques used by different ISPs.
* In Uzbekistan, the blockpage does not clearly indicate that filtering is occurring but rather redirects users
to a third-party Web site.
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readily available. Depending on the network infrastructure within the country it may also be
possible to block at or near the international gateways so that the blocking is uniform across
ISPs.
Countries new to filtering will generally start with IP blocking before moving on to more ex-
pensive filtering solutions. ISPs most often respond quickly and effectively to blocking orders
from the government or national security and intelligence services. Therefore they block what
is requested in the cheapest way using technology already integrated into their normal net-
work environment. Blocking by IP can result in significant overblocking as all other (unrelated)
Web sites hosted on that server will also be blocked.
China uses IP blocking to obstruct access to at least three hundred IP addresses. This
blocking is done at the international gateway level affecting all users of the network regardless
of ISP. The IPs blocked among the two backbone providers, China Netcom and ChinaTele-
com, are remarkably similar.9
The ISP ETC-MC in Ethiopia uses IP blocking to block, among other sites, Google’s Blog-
spot blogging service. This results in all Blogspot blogs being blocked in Ethiopia. Pakistan
implements IP blocking at the international gateway level. In addition to blocking the IP for
Blogspot, they also block Yahoo’s hosting service, which results in major overblocking. For
example, in targeting www.balochvoice.com they are actually blocking more than 52,000 other
Web sites hosted on that same server.
DNS tampering is achieved by purposefully disrupting DNS servers, which resolve domain
names into IP addresses. Generally, each ISP maintains its own DNS server for use by its cus-
tomers. To block access to particular Web sites, the DNS servers are configured to return the
wrong IP address. While this allows the blocking of specific domain names, it also can be eas-
ily circumvented by simple means such as accessing an IP address directly or by configuring
your computer to use a different DNS server.
In Vietnam, the ISP FPT configures DNS to not resolve certain domain names, as if the site
does not exist. The ISP Cybernet in Pakistan also uses this technique. The ISP Batelco in Bah-
rain uses this technique for some specific opposition sites. Batelco did not, however, com-
pletely remove the entry (the MX record for e-mail still remains). In India, the ISP BHARTI
resolves blocked sites to the invalid IP address 0.0.0.0 while the ISP VSNL resolves blocked
sites to the invalid IP address 1.2.3.4. The South Korean ISP, Hananet, uses this technique
but makes the blocked Web site resolve to 127.0.0.1. This is the IP address for the ‘‘local-
host.’’ Another South Korean ISP, KORNET, makes blocked sites resolve to an ominous
police Web site. This represents an unusual case in which DNS tampering resolves to a block-
page.10
Our tests revealed that there is often a combination of IP blocking and DNS tampering. It
may be a signal that countries are responding to the outcry concerning the overblocking asso-
ciated with IP blocking and moving to the targeting of specific domain names with DNS tam-
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pering. In India, for example, the Internet Service Providers Association of India reportedly has
sent instructions to ISPs showing how to block by DNS instead of by IP.11
In proxy-based filtering strategies, Internet traffic passing through the filtering system is
reassembled and the specific HTTP address being accessed is checked against a list of
blocked Web sites. These can be individual domains, subdomains, specific long URL paths,
or keywords in the domain or URL path. When users attempt to access blocked content they
are subsequently blocked. An option in this method of filtering is to return a blockpage that
informs the user that the content requested has been blocked.
Saudi Arabia uses SmartFilter as a filtering proxy and displays a blockpage to users when
they try to access a site on the country’s block list. The blockpage also contains information
on how to request that a block be lifted. Saudi Arabia blocks access to specific long URLs.
For example, www.humum.net/ is accessible, while www.humum.net/country/saudi.shtml is
blocked. United Arab Emirates, Oman, Sudan, and Tunisia also use SmartFilter. Tunisia uses
SmartFilter as a proxy to filter the Internet. But instead of showing users a blockpage indicat-
ing that the site has been blocked, they have created a blockpage that looks like the Internet
Explorer browser’s default error page (in French), presumably to disguise the fact that they are
blocking Web sites.
A proxy-based filtering system can also be programmed such that Internet traffic passing
through the filtering system is reassembled and the specific HTTP address requested is
checked against a list of blocked keywords. No country that ONI tested blocked access to a
Web site as a result of a keyword appearing in the body content of the page, however, there
are a number of countries that block by keyword in the domain or URL path, including China,
Iran, and Yemen.
China filters by keywords that appear in the host header (domain name) or URL path. For
example, while the site http://archives.cnn.com/ is accessible, the URL http://archives.cnn
.com/2001/ASIANOW/east/01/11/falun.gong.factbox/ is not. When this URL is requested,
reset (RST) packets are sent that disrupt the connection, presumably because of the keyword
falun.gong. Iran uses a filtering proxy that displays a blockpage when a blocked Web site is
requested. On some ISPs in Iran, such as Shatel and Datak, keywords in URL paths are
blocked. This most often affects search queries in search engines. For example, here is a
query run on Google for naked in Arabic (www.google.com/search?hl=fa&q=%D9%84%
D8%AE%D8%AA&btnG=%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8) that was blocked. Ynet in
Yemen blocks any URL containing the word sex. The domain www.arabtimes.com is blocked
in Oman and the UAE but the URL for the Google cached version (http://72.14.235.104/
search?q=cache:8utpDVLa1yYJ:www.arabtimes.com/+arabtimes&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1) is
also blocked because www.arabtimes.com appears in the URL path.
Filtering systems can also be configured to redirect users to another Web site. In most
cases, redirection is identical to blockpage filtering, the only difference being the route used
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to produce the blockpage. ISPs in Iran, Singapore, Thailand, and Yemen all use redirection to
a blockpage. Uzbekistan uses redirection but instead of redirecting to a blockpage the filters
send users to Microsoft’s search engine at www.live.com, suggesting that the government
wishes to conceal that fact that blocking has taken place.
There are thus various degrees of transparency in Internet filtering. Where blockpages are
used, it is clearly apparent to users when a requested Web site has been intentionally
blocked. Other countries give no indication that a Web site is blocked. In some cases, this is
a function of the blocking technique being used. Some countries, such as Tunisia and Uzbe-
kistan, appear to deliberately disguise the fact that they are filtering Internet content, going a
step farther to conceal filtering activity beyond the failure to inform users that they are being
filtered.
Another subset of countries, including Bahrain and United Arab Emirates, employ a hybrid
strategy, indicating clearly to users that certain sites are blocked while obscuring the blocking
of other sites behind the uncertainty of connection errors that could have numerous other
explanations. In Bahrain, users normally receive a blockpage. However, for the specific site
www.vob.org, Bahrain uses DNS tampering that results in an error. In United Arab Emirates
all blocked sites with the exception of www.skype.com returned a blockpage. There is an ap-
parent two-tiered system in place. They are willing to go on the record as blocking some sites,
and not for others.
Providing a blockpage informing a user that their choice of Web site is not available by
action of the government is still short of providing a rationale for the blocking of that particular
site, or providing a means for appealing this decision. Very few countries go this far. A small
group of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates, and some ISPs
in Iran, allow Internet users to write to authorities to register a complaint that a given Web site
has been blocked erroneously.
Centralized filtering regimes require all Internet traffic to pass through the same filters. This
results in a consistent view of the Internet for users within the country; all users experience the
same degree of filtering. This is most commonly implemented at the international gateway.
When filtering is delegated to the ISP level, and hence decentralized, there may be significant
differences among ISPs regarding the filtering techniques used and the content that is filtered.
In this case, access to Web sites may vary substantially depending on the blocking choices of
individual ISPs. (Table 1.4 presents the use of centralized and/or decentralized filtering strat-
egies across the countries in the study, and the resulting consistency in filtering within each
country.) In Iran there is considerable variation in the blocking among ISPs. For example, one
ISP blocks considerably less political content than the other six ISPs tested. Only one ISP out
of the five tested in Azerbaijan, AzNet, blocks access to a considerable amount of social con-
tent, most of which is pornographic, while the others block access to only a single IP address.
In Myanmar, there is substantial variation in the filtering between the two ISPs tested. One fil-
ters much more pornography, while the other blocks a significantly greater portion of politically
oriented Web sites. In the United Arab Emirates, an ISP that serves primarily the free-trade









Azerbaijan D Low Medium
Bahrain C High Yes Low
China C and D Medium Yes Low
Ethiopia C High Yes Low
India D Medium High
Iran D Medium Medium
Jordan D High Low
Libya C High Yes Low
Morocco C High Yes Low
Myanmar D Low Medium
Oman C High High
Pakistan C and D Medium Yes High
Saudi Arabia C High High
Singapore D High High
South Korea D High High
Sudan C High High
Syria D High Medium
Tajikistan D Low Medium
Thailand D Medium Medium
Tunisia C High Yes Low
United Arab Emirates D Low Medium
Uzbekistan C and D High Yes Low
Vietnam D Low Yes Low
Yemen D High Medium
The Locus of filtering indicates where Internet traffic is blocked. C indicates that traffic is blocked from a
central location, normally the Internet backbone, and affects the entire state equally. D indicates that
blocking is decentralized, typically implemented by ISPs. (Note that this study does not include filtering
at the institutional level, for example, cybercafés, universities, or businesses.)
Consistency measures the variation in filtering within a country across different ISPs where applicable.
Concealed filtering reflects either efforts to conceal the fact that filtering is occurring or the failure to
clearly indicate filtering when it occurs.
Transparency and accountability corresponds to the overall level of openness in regard to the practice
of filtering. It also considers the presence of concealed filtering, the type of notice given to users regarding
blocking, provisions to appeal or report instances of inappropriate blocking, and public acknowledgement
of filtering policies.
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zone has not historically filtered the Internet, while the predominant ISP for the rest of the
country has consistently filtered the Internet.
Modifications can be made to the blocking efforts of a country by the authorities at any
time. Sites can be added or removed at their discretion. For example, during our tests in Iran
the Web site of the New York Times was blocked, but for only one day. Some countries
have also been suspected of introducing temporary filtering around key time periods such as
elections.
Hosting modifications can also be made to a blocked site resulting in it becoming acces-
sible or inaccessible. For example, while Blogspot blogs were blocked in Pakistan due to IP
blocking, the interface to update one’s blog was still accessible. However, Blogspot has since
upgraded its service and the new interface is hosted on the blocked IP, making the interface
to update one’s blog inaccessible in Pakistan. The reverse is also possible. For example, if the
IP address of a Web site is blocked, the Web site may change its hosting arrangement in
order to receive a new IP address, leaving it unblocked until the new IP address is discovered
and blocked.
Summary Measures of Internet Filtering
To summarize the results of our work, we have assigned a score to each of the countries we
studied. This score is designed to reflect the degree of filtering in each of the four major the-
matic areas: 1) the filtering of political content, 2) social content, 3) conflict- and security-
related content, and 4) Internet tools and applications. Each country is given a score on a
four-point scale that captures both the breadth and depth of filtering for content of each the-
matic type (see table 1.5).
 Pervasive filtering is defined as blocking that spans a number of categories while blocking
access to a large portion of related content.
 Substantial filtering is assigned where either a number of categories are subject to a me-
dium level of filtering in at least a few categories or a low level of filtering is carried out
across many categories.
 Selective filtering is either narrowly defined filtering that blocks a small number of specific
sites across a few categories, or filtering that targets a single category or issue.
 Suspected filtering is assigned where there is information that suggests that filtering is
occurring, but we are unable to conclusively confirm that inaccessible Web sites are the
result of deliberate tampering.
The scores in table 1.5 are subjective evaluations based upon the quantitative information
gathered during a year of testing and research. In 2006, we tested thousands of Web sites
across more than 120 ISPs in 40 countries, creating a database with close to 200,000 ob-
servations. Each observation is in turn based on the conclusion of an average of ten ac-
cessibility tests. Despite the breadth of this data, a purely quantitative reporting might be








Azerbaijan f — — —
Bahrain ff f — f
Belarus b b — —
China fff ff fff ff
Ethiopia ff f f f
India — — f f
Iran fff fff ff fff
Jordan f — — —
Kazakhstan b — — —
Libya ff — — —
Morocco — — f f
Myanmar fff ff ff ff
Oman — fff — ff
Pakistan f ff fff f
Saudi Arabia ff fff f ff
Singapore — f — —
South Korea — f fff —
Sudan — fff — ff
Syria fff f f ff
Tajikistan f — — —
Thailand f ff — f
Tunisia fff fff f ff
United Arab Emirates f fff f ff
Uzbekistan ff f — f
Vietnam fff f — ff
Yemen f fff f ff
fff Pervasive filtering; ff Substantial filtering; f Selective filtering; b Suspected filtering; — No evidence
of filtering.
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misleading unless we were able to effectively measure the relative importance of each Web
site. For example, the blocking of BBC or Wikipedia represents far more than the block-
ing of a less prominent Web site. Similarly, blocking a social networking site or a blogging
server could have a profound impact on the formation of online communities and on the
publication of user-generated content. While Internet users will eventually provide alterna-
tives to recreate these communities on other sites hosted on servers that are not blocked,
the transition of a wide community is unlikely given the time, effort, and coordination required
to reconstitute a community in another location. At the other extreme, the blocking of one
pornographic site will have a minor impact on Internet life if access to thousands of similar
sites remains unimpeded. For these reasons, we have decided to summarize the results of
testing categorically, considering both the scope and depth of the quantitative testing results,
in conjunction with expert opinion regarding the significance of the blocking of individual Web
sites.
It is tempting to aggregate the results by summing up the scores in each category. Yet do-
ing so would imply that the blocking of political opposition is equivalent to filtering that sup-
ports conservative social values or the fear of national security risks. These competing sets
of values suggest that a number of different weighting schemes might be appropriate. In any
case, the results are generally quite clear, as the most pervasive filtering regimes tend to filter
across all categories.
Country-specific and Global Filtering
A comparison between the blocking of country-specific sites and the blocking of internation-
ally relevant Web sites provides another view of global filtering. Not surprisingly, we found that
Box 1.2
Where we tested
The decision where to test was a simple pragmatic one—where were we able to safely
test and where did we have the most to learn? Two countries did not make the list this
year because of security concerns: North Korea and Cuba. Learning more about the
filtering practices in these countries is certainly of great interest to us. However, we
were not confident that we could adequately mitigate the risks to those who would col-
laborate with us in these countries.
A number of other countries in Europe and North America that are known to engage
in filtering to varying degrees were not tested this year. This decision again was a fairly
easy practical choice. The filtering practices in these countries are better understood
than in other parts of the world and we therefore had less to contribute here. Many of
the countries in Europe focus their Internet filtering activity on child pornography. This is
not a topic that we will test for ethical and legal reasons.
20 Robert Faris and Nart Villeneuve
the incidence of blocking Web sites in our testing lists was approximately twice as high for
Web sites available in a local language compared to sites available only in English or other
international languages. Figure 1.3 shows that many countries focus their efforts on filtering
locally relevant Web content. Ethiopia, Pakistan, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are examples
of countries that extensively block local content while blocking relatively few international Web
sites. China and Myanmar also concentrate more of their filtering efforts on country-specific
Internet content, though they block somewhat more global content. Middle Eastern filtering
regimes tend to augment local filtering with considerably more global content. This balance
mirrors the use of commercial software, generally developed in the West, to identify and block
Internet content.
Table 1.6 shows an alternative view of filtering behavior, looking at the blocking of differ-
ent types of content providers rather than content. The apparent prime targets of filtering
are blogs, political parties, local NGOs, and individuals. In the case of blogs, a number
Figure 1.3
Filtering targeted at local sites and global sites. AE—United Arab Emirates; BH—Bahrain; CN—China;
ET—Ethiopia; IR—Iran; JO—Jordan; KR—South Korea; LY—Libya; MM—Burma/Myanmar; OM—
Oman; PK—Pakistan; SA—Saudi Arabia; SD—Sudan; SY—Syria; TH—Thailand; TH—Tunisia; UZ—
Uzbekistan; VN—Vietnam; YE—Yemen. A number of countries that filter a small number of sites are
omitted from this diagram, including Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Singapore,
and Tajikistan.
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of countries, including Pakistan and Ethiopia, have blocked entire blogging domains,
which inflates these figures. Logically, these assessments represent more accurately the re-
sult of filtering rather than the intention. Establishing the intention of blocking is never as
clear. The blocking of this wide array of blogs could be the result of a lack of technical so-
phistication or a desire to simultaneously silence the entire collection of blogs hosted on the
site.
The other prominent target of filtering is political parties, followed by NGOs focused on a
particular region or country, and Web sites run by individuals. The implications of targeting
civic groups and individual blogs are addressed by Deibert and Rohozinski in chapter 6 of
this volume.
First Steps Toward Understanding Internet Filtering
In this chapter, we summarize what we have learned over the past year regarding the inci-
dence of global Internet filtering. Taking an inventory of filtering practices and strategies is a
necessary and logical first step, though still far from a thorough understanding of the issue.
The study of Internet filtering can be approached by asking why some states filter the Internet
or by asking why others do not. The latter question is particularly apt in countries that maintain
a repressive general media environment while leaving the Internet relatively open. This is not
Table 1.6
Blocking by content provider
Content provider type Portion of content filtered
Academic 0.02
Blogs 0.20
Chat and discussion boards 0.05
Government 0.03
Government media 0.02
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an uncommon circumstance. Pointing simply toward the absence of a solid rule of law does
not seem promising. As seen in figure 1.4, there is no simple relationship between the rule of
law and filtering, at least not as rule of law is defined and measured by the World Bank.12
A country can maintain a better-than-average rule of law record and still filter the Internet. Sim-
ilarly, many countries suffer from a substandard legal situation while maintaining an open
Internet.
Comparing filtering practices with measures of voice and accountability is more telling. The
countries that actively engage in the substantial filtering of political content also score poorly
on measures of voice and accountability. This is true for both political and social Internet
blocking, as shown in figures 1.5 and 1.6. Yet many of the anomalies persist. We are still far
from explaining why some countries resort to filtering while others refrain from taking this step.
This does stress the diversity of strategies and approaches that are being taken to regulate
Figure 1.4
Filtering and the rule of law. AE—United Arab Emirates; AF—Afghanistan; AZ—Azerbaijan; BH—Bahrain;
BY—Belarus; CN—China; DZ—Algeria; EG—Egypt; ET—Ethiopia; HK—Hong Kong; IL—Israel; IN—
India; IR—Iran; IQ—Iraq; JO—Jordan; KG—Kyrgyzstan; KR—South Korea; KZ—Kazakhstan; LY—
Libya; MA—Morocco; MD—Moldova; MM—Burma/Myanmar; MY—Malaysia; NP—Nepal; OM—Oman;
PK—Pakistan; PS—Gaza/West Bank; RU—Russia; SA—Saudi Arabia; SD—Sudan; SG—Singapore;
SY—Syria; TH—Thailand; TH—Tunisia; TN—Tunisia; TJ—Tajikistan; UA—Ukraine; UZ—Uzbekistan;
VE—Venezuela; VN—Vietnam; YE—Yemen; ZW—Zimbabwe.
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the Internet. We are also observing a recent and tremendously dynamic process. The view we
have now may change dramatically in the coming years.
The link between repressive regimes and political filtering follows a clear logic. However, the
link between regimes that suppress free expression and social filtering activity is less obvious.
Part of the answer may reside in that regimes that tend to filter political content also filter social
content.
Figure 1.7 demonstrates that few states restrict their activities to one or two types of con-
tent. Once filtering is implemented, it is applied to a broad range of content. These different
types of filtering activities are often correlated with each other, and can be used as a pretense
for expanding government control of cyberspace.
Vietnam, for example, uses pornography as its publicly stated reason for filtering, yet blocks
little pornography. It does, however, filter political Internet content that opposes one-party rule
Figure 1.5
Political filtering and voice and accountability. AE—United Arab Emirates; AF—Afghanistan; AZ—
Azerbaijan; BH—Bahrain; BY—Belarus; CN—China; DZ—Algeria; EG—Egypt; ET—Ethiopia; HK—
Hong Kong; IL—Israel; IN—India; IR—Iran; IQ—Iraq; JO—Jordan; KG—Kyrgyzstan; KR—South Korea;
KZ—Kazakhstan; LY—Libya; MA—Morocco; MD—Moldova; MM—Burma/Myanmar; MY—Malaysia;
NP—Nepal; OM—Oman; PK—Pakistan; PS—Gaza/West Bank; RU—Russia; SA—Saudi Arabia; SD—
Sudan; SG—Singapore; SY—Syria; TH—Thailand; TH—Tunisia; TN—Tunisia; TJ—Tajikistan; UA—
Ukraine; UZ—Uzbekistan; VE—Venezuela; VN—Vietnam; YE—Yemen; ZW—Zimbabwe.
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in Vietnam. In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, filtering does not end with socially sensitive material
such as pornography and gambling but expands into the political realm.
Once the technical and administrative mechanisms for blocking Internet content have been
put into place, it is a trivial matter to expand the scope of Internet censorship. As discussed in
subsequent chapters, the implementation of filtering is often carried by private sector actors—
normally the ISPs—using software developed in the United States. Filtering decisions are thus
often made by selecting categories for blocking within software applications, which may also
contain categorization errors resulting in unintended blocking. The temptation and potential for
mission creep is obvious. This slope is made ever more slippery by the fact that transparency
and accountability are the exception in Internet filtering decisions, not the norm.
In the following chapter, Zittrain and Palfrey probe in further detail the political motives and
implications of this growing global phenomenon, with subsequent chapters elaborating on
technical, legal, and ethical considerations.
Figure 1.6
Social filtering and voice and accountability. AE—United Arab Emirates; AF—Afghanistan; AZ—
Azerbaijan; BH—Bahrain; BY—Belarus; CN—China; DZ—Algeria; EG—Egypt; ET—Ethiopia; HK—
Hong Kong; IL—Israel; IN—India; IR—Iran; IQ—Iraq; JO—Jordan; KG—Kyrgyzstan; KR—South Korea;
KZ—Kazakhstan; LY—Libya; MA—Morocco; MD—Moldova; MM—Burma/Myanmar; MY—Malaysia;
NP—Nepal; OM—Oman; PK—Pakistan; PS—Gaza/West Bank; RU—Russia; SA—Saudi Arabia; SD—
Sudan; SG—Singapore; SY—Syria; TH—Thailand; TH—Tunisia; TN—Tunisia; TJ—Tajikistan; UA—
Ukraine; UZ—Uzbekistan; VE—Venezuela; VN—Vietnam; YE—Yemen; ZW—Zimbabwe.
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Notes
1. The OpenNet Initiative is a collaboration of four institutions: the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, the Oxford
Internet Institute at Oxford University, the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, and the
University of Cambridge. More information is available at http://www.opennetinitiative.net.
2. A number of countries are currently debating strategies and legislation to filter the Internet, including Norway, Rus-
sia, and many countries in Latin America.
3. Each set of tests is performed on different Internet service providers within the country.
4. The Internet filtering tests carried out in Russia in 2006 were limited to ISPs accessible in Moscow. These results
therefore do not necessarily reflect the situation in other areas of the country.
5. The blocking of two sites garnered most of the attention: one devoted to opposition to the September 19 coup
(http://www.19sep.com/) and another hosted by Thai academics (http://www.midnightuniv.org/).
6. The strategies for addressing alleged intellectual property rights violations can vary significantly from standard Inter-
net filtering. Rather than blocking Web sites that continue to be available from other locations, efforts generally fo-
cus on taking down the content from the Web sites that have posted the material and on removing the sites from
the results of search engines. Moreover, takedown efforts are often instigated by private parties with the threat




26 Robert Faris and Nart Villeneuve
7. The ONI Vietnam report is available at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/vietnam/ONI_Vietnam_Country
_Study.pdf.
8. We were not able to test in Cuba or North Korea. Both countries are reported to engage in pervasive filtering in
addition to curtailing access to the Internet. See ‘‘Going Online in Cuba: Internet under Surveillance,’’ http://
www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_gb_md_1.pdf, and Tom Zeller, ‘‘The Internet Black Hole That Is North Korea,’’ New
York Times, 23 October 2006.
9. There are two principal ISPs in China—one that covers the north and one the south. The smaller ISPs in China that
serve Internet users connect to the Internet backbone through one of these large ISPs.
10. It also demonstrates that the use of DNS tampering does not necessitate a lack of transparency in filtering. If it were
deemed important, users could be informed that the Web site they were seeking was being intentionally blocked.
11. See Shivam Vij, ‘‘Blog Blockade Will Be Lifted in 48 Hours,’’ Rediff India Abroad, http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/
jul/19blogs.htm.
12. Information on the compilation and estimation of the ‘‘rule of law’’ and ‘‘voice and accountability’’ measures are
available at the World Bank Governance and Anti-Corruption Web site, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. Their
definitions of these indicators are: ‘‘Voice and Accountability includes in it a number of indicators measuring various
aspects of the political process, civil liberties, political and human rights, measuring the extent to which citizens
of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments.’’ ‘‘Rule of Law includes several indicators which
measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include per-
ceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of
contracts.’’
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2
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms
of Control
Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey
It seems hard to believe that a free, online encyclopedia that anyone can edit at any time
could matter much to anyone. But just as a bee can fly despite its awkward physiognomy,
Wikipedia has become wildly popular and enormously influential despite its unusual format.
The topics that Wikipedians write about range more broadly than any other encyclopedia
known to humankind. It has more than 4.6 million articles comprising more than a billion
words in two hundred languages.1 Many Google search queries will lead to a Wikipedia
page among the top search results. Articles in Wikipedia cover the Tiananmen Square pro-
tests of 1989, the Dalai Lama, the International Tibet Independence Movement, and the Tai-
wan independence movement. Appearing both in the English and the Chinese language
versions of Wikipedia—each independently written—these articles have been written to speak
from what Wikipedia calls a ‘‘neutral point of view.’’2 The Wikipedians’ point of view on some
topics probably does not seem so neutral to the Chinese authorities.
Wikipedia has grown so influential, in fact, that it has attracted the attention of China’s cen-
sors at least three times between 2004 and 2006.3
The blocking and unblocking of Wikipedia in China—as with all other filtering in China, with-
out announcement or acknowledgment—might also be grounded in a fear of the communal,
critical process that Wikipedia represents. The purpose of Wikipedia is ‘‘to create and distrib-
ute a multilingual free encyclopedia of the highest quality to every single person on the planet
in their own language,’’4 and the means of creating it is through engagement of the public at
large to contribute what it knows and to debate in earnest where beliefs differ, offering sources
and arguments in quasiacademic style.
While its decentralization creates well-known stability as a network, this decentralization
reflected at the ‘‘content layer’’ for the purpose of ascertaining truth might give rise to radical
instability at the social level in societies that depend on singular, official stories for their legiti-
macy. Wikipedia makes it possible for anyone to tell one’s own story about what happened—
and, more threateningly to a regime intent on controlling the information environment, to
compare notes with others in a process designed to elicit truth from competing perspectives.
The once stable lock of a regime accustomed to telling its citizenry how things happened—
where states have controlled their media environments for a long time—is threatened.
Wikipedia is the poster-story of a new iteration of the Internet, known as the read-write Web,
or Web 2.0 in Silicon Valley terms, or the semantic Web in MIT terms. This phenomenon—in
which consumers of information can also easily be creators—threatens to open and to desta-
bilize political environments that were previously controlled tightly by those in power. In a world
where Wikipedia is accessible, citizens not only can read different versions of the story than
the version that the state would have them read, they can help to create them. And not just
in their own language: as automated translation tools come into their own, they can interact
in many languages.
This version of the Internet also continues the process of breaking down geographic bar-
riers between states by allowing information to flow easily from one jurisdiction to another.
The editors of a Wikipedia article are telling the story not just for the benefit of their neighbors
in their own country, but for anyone in any place to see. The destabilization that Wikipedia
makes possible is also a threat to the ability of a given state to control how its own ‘‘brand’’
is perceived internationally.
So why and how would the Chinese state block—and then unblock—Wikipedia repeatedly?
That question lies at the heart of this book. Internet filtering is a complex topic, easy to see
from many vantage points but on which it is hard to get a lasting fix. As a practical matter, it
is easy for a state to carry out technical Internet filtering at a simple level, but very tricky—if not
plain impossible—for a state to accomplish in a thorough manner. As a policy matter, are
states putting in place filtering regimes because they are concerned that their own citizens
will learn something they should not learn? Or that their citizens will say something they should
not say? Or that someone in another state will read something bad about the state that is fil-
tering the Net? Where is filtering merely a ministerial task, taken on because the state bureau-
cracy feels it must at least look like it is making an effort, and where is it a central instrument of
policy, initiated if not orchestrated at the highest levels of power?
As a normative matter, broad, informal Internet filtering seems like an infringement of the
civil liberties—or, put more forcefully, the human rights—of all of us who use the free, public,
unitary, global network of networks that the Internet constitutes. But states have a strong argu-
ment that they have the right to control domestic matters, whether or not they occur in cyber-
space, and there is often little that other states can do to influence them. The future of the
Internet, if not all geopolitics, hangs in the balance.
We are still in the early stages of the struggle for control on the Internet. Early theorists, reflect-
ing the libertarian streak that runs deep through the hacker community, suggested that the
Internet would be hard to regulate. Cyberspace might prove to be an alternate jurisdiction
that the long arm of the state could not reach. Online actors, the theory went, need pay little
heed to the claims to sovereignty over their actions by traditional states based in real space.
As it turns out, states have not found it so very hard to assert sovereignty when and where
they have felt the need to do so. The result is the emergence of an increasingly balkanized
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Internet. Instead of a World Wide Web, as the data from our study of Internet filtering makes
plain, it is more accurate to say we have a Saudi Wide Web, an Uzbek Wide Web, a Pakistani
Wide Web, a Thai Wide Web, and so forth. The theory of ‘‘unregulability’’ no longer has cur-
rency, if ever it did. Many scholars have described the present reality of the reassertion of
state control online, despite continued hopes that the Internet community itself might self-
regulate in new and compelling ways.5
A key aspect of control online—and one that we prove empirically through our global study
of Internet filtering—is that states have, on an individual basis, defied the cyberlibertarians by
asserting control over the online acts of their own citizens in their home states. The manner in
which this control is exercised varies. Sometimes the law pressures citizens to refrain from
performing a certain activity online, such as accessing or publishing certain material. Some-
times the state takes control into its own hands by erecting technological or other barriers
within its confines to stop the flow of bits from one recipient to another. Increasingly, though,
the state is turning to private parties to carry out the control online. Many times, those private
parties are corporations chartered locally or individual citizens who live in that jurisdiction. In
chapter 5, we describe a related, emerging problem, in which the state requires private inter-
mediaries whose services connect one online actor to another to participate in online censor-
ship and surveillance as a cost of doing business in that state.
The dynamic of control online has changed greatly over the past ten years, and it is almost
certain to change just as dramatically in the ten years to come. The technologies and politics
of control of the Internet remain in flux. As one example of this continued uncertainty, partici-
pants in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), an open global body chartered via the process
that produced two meetings of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), continue
to wrestle with a broad set of unanswered questions related to control of the online environ-
ment. At a simple level, the jurisdictional question of who can sue whom (and where that
lawsuit should be heard, and under the law of which jurisdiction decided, for that matter), re-
mains largely unresolved, despite a growing body of case law. A series of highly distributed
problems—spam, spyware, online fraud—continues to vex law enforcement officials and
public policy–makers around the world. Intellectual property law continues to grow in com-
plexity, despite some degree of harmonization underway among competing regimes. Each
of these problems leaves many unresolved issues of global public policy in its wake. Internet
filtering, the core focus of this book, and the related matter of online surveillance, present an
equally, if not more, fraught set of issues for global diplomats to address.
Suppressing and Controlling Information on the Internet
The idea that states would seek to control the information environment within their borders
is nothing new. Freedom of expression has never been absolute, even in those liberal democ-
racies that hold these freedoms most dear. The same is true of the related freedoms of
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association, religion, and privacy. Most states that have been serious about controlling the in-
formation environment have done so by holding on to the only megaphones—whether it takes
the form of a printing press, a newspaper, a radio station, or a television station—and banning
anyone from saying anything potentially subversive.
The rise of the Internet, initially seen as little more than an information delivery mechanism,
put pressure on this strategy of control. Early in the twenty-first century, the Saudi state was
one of the first to grapple publicly with what the introduction of the Internet might mean. Rather
than introducing the Internet in its unfettered—and fundamentally Western—form, the Saudi
authorities decided to establish a system whereby they could stop their citizens from access-
ing certain materials produced and published from elsewhere in the world. As an extension of
its longstanding traditional media controls, the Saudis set up a technical means of filtering the
Internet, buttressed by a series of legal and normative controls. All Internet traffic to and from
Saudi citizens had to pass through a single gateway to the outside world. At that gateway, the
Saudi state established a technical filtering mechanism. If Saudi citizens sought to access a
Web page that earlier had been found to include a pornographic image, for instance, the
computers at the gateway would send back a message telling them, in Arabic, that they
have sought to access a forbidden page—and, of course, not rendering the requested
page. At a fundamental level, this basic form of control was initially about blocking access to
information that would be culturally and politically sensitive to the state.
The issue that the Saudi state faces, of desiring to keep its citizens from accessing subver-
sive content online, is an issue that more and more states are coming to grips with as the
Internet expands. The network now joins more than one billion people around the world. At
the same time, new issues are arising that are prompting states to establish Internet filter-
ing mechanisms. The read-write Web, exemplified by Wikipedia and the phenomena of
blogging, YouTube, podcasting, and so forth, adds a crucial dimension—and additional
complexity—as states now grapple with the ease with which their own citizens are becoming
publishers with local, national, and international audiences.
How Internet Filtering Works: Law, Technologies, and Social Norms
When states decide to filter the Internet, the approach generally involves establishing a pha-
lanx of laws and technical measures to block their citizens from accessing or publishing infor-
mation online. The laws are ordinarily extensions of pre-existing media or telecommunications
regulatory regimes. Occasionally, these laws take the form of Internet-specific statutes and
regulations. These laws rarely explicitly establish the technical filtering regime, but more com-
monly establish a framework for restricting certain kinds of content online and banning certain
online activities.
There are at least five levels of Internet legal control with respect to content control online.6
States have employed content restrictions, which disallow citizens from publishing or access-
ing certain online content. Licensing requirements call for intermediaries to carry out certain
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Internet filtering, as well as surveillance activities. Liability placed on Internet service providers
and Internet content providers can ensure that intermediaries affirmatively carry out filtering
and surveillance without a license requirement. Registration requirements establish the need
to gather data about citizens accessing the Internet from a certain IP address, user account,
cybercafé location, and so forth. And self-monitoring requirements—coupled with the percep-
tion, real or imagined, of online surveillance—prompt individual, corporate, and other users to
limit their own access and publication online. At the same time, some states are experiencing
international pressure to pass Internet-related laws, including omnibus cybercrime statutes
that include reference to eliminating access to certain types of banned sites.7
The interplay among these types of regulations is a key aspect of this narrative. China, for
instance, bundles Internet content restrictions with its copyright laws. This set of regulations
sets a daunting web of requirements in front of anyone who might access the Internet or
provide a service to another Internet user. These rules create a pretext that can be used to
punish those who exchange undesirable content, even though the law may not be invoked in
many instances it might cover—including copyright infringement. Vietnam has taken a similar
approach, assigning a number of different relevant ministries and agencies a piece of the re-
sponsibility to limit what can be done and accessed online. Much of the legal regulation that
empowers state agencies to carry out filtering and surveillance tends to be very broadly and
vaguely stated, where it is stated at all.
A theme that runs through this book is that Internet regulation takes many forms—not just
technical, not just legal—and that regulation takes place not just in developing economies but
in some of the world’s most prosperous regimes as well. Vagueness as to what content
is banned exists not just in China, Vietnam, and Iran, but also in France and Germany, where
the requirement to limit Internet access to certain materials includes a ban on ‘‘propaganda
against the democratic constitutional order.’’8 Often, these local legal requirements strike a
dissonant chord when set alongside international human rights standards, a topic covered in
greater detail, and from two different perspectives, in chapters 5 and 6 of this book.
As our global survey shows, and as Faris and Villeneuve set forth in chapter 1 of this vol-
ume, several dozen states have gone beyond a legal ban on citizen publication or access of
undesirable material online and have set up technical means of filtering its citizens’ access
to the Internet. In establishing a technical filtering regime, a state has several initial options:
domain name system (DNS) filtering, Internet protocol (IP) address filtering, or URL filtering.9
Most states with advanced filtering regimes implement URL filtering, as this method can be
the most accurate (see ‘‘Filtering and Overbreadth’’ section later in this chapter).10
To implement URL filtering, a state must first identify where to place the filters. If the state
directly controls the Internet service provider(s), the answer is clear. Otherwise, it may require
private or semiprivate ISPs to implement the blocking as part of their service. The technical
complexities presented by URL filtering become nontrivial as the number of users grows to mil-
lions rather than tens of thousands. Some states appear to have limited the number of people
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who can access the Internet, as Myanmar has, in order to keep URL filtering manageable—or
to be able to shut off access to the network entirely, as the military junta appears to have done
in September 2007.
Technical Internet filtering is not perfect in any jurisdiction. Even the most sophisticated
technical filtering regimes can have difficulty covering those cases where users are intent on
getting or publishing certain information, and willing to invest effort and risk to do so. Every
system suffers from at least two shortcomings: a technical filtering system either underblocks
or overblocks content, and technically savvy users can circumvent the controls with a modi-
cum of effort. Citizens with technical knowledge can generally circumvent any filters that a
state has put in place. Some states acknowledge as much: the overseer of Saudi Arabia’s
filtering program admits that technically savvy users simply cannot be stopped from access-
ing blocked content.11 While no state will ultimately win the game of cat-and-mouse with those
citizens who are resourceful and dedicated enough to employ circumvention measures, many
users will never do so.
For some states, like Singapore, the state’s bark is worse than the bite of the filtering sys-
tem. The widely publicized Singaporean filtering system blocks only a small handful of porno-
graphic sites. The Singapore system is more about sending a message, one that underscores
the substantial local self-censorship that takes place there, than it is about blocking citizens
from accessing or publishing anything specific. For other states, like those with the most thor-
ough and sophisticated filtering regimes—for instance, China, Iran, and Uzbekistan—the un-
dertaking is far more substantial and has far-reaching consequences.
Locus of Filtering
Most state-mandated filtering is effected by private ISPs that offer Internet access to citi-
zens under licenses to operate in that jurisdiction. These licenses tend to include require-
ments, explicit or implicit in nature, that the ISPs implement filtering at the behest of the
state. Some states partially centralize the filtering operation at private Internet exchange points
(IXPs)—topological crossroads for network traffic—or through explicit state-run clearing
points established to serve as gatekeepers for Internet traffic. Some states implement filter-
ing at public Internet access points, such as the computers found within cybercafés or in pub-
lic libraries and schools, as in the United States. Such filtering can take the form of software
used in many American libraries and schools for filtering purposes, or normative filtering—
government-encouraged social pressure by shop proprietors, librarians, and others as citi-
zens surf the Internet in common public places.
The exercise of traditional state powers can have a powerful impact on Internet usage with-
out rendering all content in a particular category inaccessible. China, Vietnam, and Iran,
among others, have each jailed ‘‘cyber-dissidents.’’12 Against this backdrop, the blocking of
Web pages may be intended to deliver a message to users that the government monitors
Internet usage. This message is reinforced by methods allowing information to be gathered
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about what sites a particular user has visited after the fact, such as the requirement that a user
provide passport information to set up an account with an ISP and tighter controls of users at
cybercafés, as in Vietnam. The on-again, off-again blocking of Wikipedia in China might well
be explained, in part, by this mode of sending a message that the state is watching in order to
prompt self-censorship online.
While our research can tell us what Web sites a regime has targeted for filtering, the real
extent to which the information environment is ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘open’’ is sharply limited. It is not
as easy to determine, for instance, the extent of citizens’ attempts to reach blocked sites, the
degree to which citizens are deterred by the threat of arrest or detection, and how much the
invisibility of specific content actually affects the regime’s internal dialogue. Our research pro-
vides the data to draw conclusions about the choices made by states as to the content to be
filtered, how these decisions are affected by the mechanisms for filtering they have employed,
and how these governments attempt to balance the overblocking or underblocking that is
today inherent in any filtering regime.
Types of Content Filtered
As Faris and Villeneuve describe in chapter 1, states around the world are blocking access to
Internet content for its political, religious, and social connotations. Sensitivities related to spe-
cific content within these broad categories vary greatly from state to state, tracking, to large
extent, local conflicts. The Internet content blocked for social reasons—commonly pornogra-
phy, information about gay and lesbian issues, and information about sex education—is more
likely to be the same across countries than the political and religious information to which ac-
cess is blocked.
Web content is constantly changing, of course, and no state we have studied in the past
five years seems able to carry out its Web filtering in a comprehensive manner—at least not
through technical means. In other words, no state has been able to consistently block access
to a range of sites meeting specified criteria. The most thorough job of blocking might be the
high rate of blocking online pornography in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states—a fairly
stunning achievement given the amount of pornographic material available online—and one
managed with the ongoing help of a U.S. firm, Secure Computing, that also assists schools
in keeping children away from such Web sites. China has the most consistent record of
responding to the shifting content of the Web, likely reflecting a devotion of the most re-
sources to the filtering enterprise. Our research shows changes among sites blocked over
time in some states, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China. As we repeat this global survey
in future years, we expect to be able to describe changes over time with greater certainty.
The Reality and Perception of Internet Surveillance and Other Soft Controls
Just as these several dozen states use technical means to block citizens from accessing con-
tent on the Internet, each state also employs legal and other ‘‘soft’’ means of control. Most
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states use a combination of media, telecommunications, national security, and Internet-
specific laws and regulatory schemes to restrict the publication of and access to information
on the Internet. Most states that filter require Internet service providers to obtain licenses
before providing Internet access to citizens. Some states place pressure on cybercafés and
ISPs to monitor Internet usage by their customers. With the exception of a few places, no state
seems to communicate much at all with the public about its process for blocking and un-
blocking content on the Internet. Most states, instead, have only a series of broad laws that
cover content issues online. The effect of these regimes is to put citizens on notice that they
should not publish or access content online that violates certain norms and to create a sense
that someone might be paying attention to their online activity.
Our global survey of Internet filtering in 2006 turned up instances where the Internet is not
subject to online filtering, but where the state manages to dampen online dissidence through
other means. In Egypt, for instance, the Internet is not filtered (reports suggest that Egypt at
one time blocked the Muslim Brotherhood site, but did not appear to do so during our test-
ing),13 but security forces have detained people for their activities online.14 The perception
that the online space is subject to extensive state surveillance leads to a broad fear of access-
ing or publishing information online that may be perceived to be subversive—though bloggers
and other online activists cross the perceived lines with regularity.15
The Spectrum from Manual to Automatic Filtering
Most of the filtering regimes we studied, with the exception of parts of the Chinese filtering re-
gime, appear to rely on the preidentification and categorization of undesirable Web sites. As
the Web grows in scope as well as form, it is likely that states with an interest in filtering will
attempt to develop or obtain technology to automatically review or generalize about the con-
tent of a Web page as it is accessed, or other Internet communication as it happens. The Web
2.0 phenomenon only makes this challenge harder, as citizens have the ability to publish on-
line content on the fly and to syndicate that content for free.
The job of the censor in a Web 2.0 world might or might not be accomplished by looking for
certain keywords in the title of the page or on its link—its URL. While URLs are clearly not as
determinative of content as the name of a television channel or a newspaper, they may be in
some situations (consider what generalizations one might draw about a URL of www.google
.com/search?q=tiananmen). In others, a URL may serve as an adequate proxy—URLs con-
taining particular obscene words are more likely to have obscene content. If the goal is to
block all content coming from a particular state, the top-level domain structure makes this re-
markably simple. On the other end of the spectrum, however, are blogging sites or generic
free Web-hosting sites like www.geocities.com, where the presence of a page within the gen-
eral site provides little information about the content or authorship of other pages on the site.
Despite the obvious imperfections of filtering via URLs, we have found little evidence that
the states in which we tested, with the exception of China, attempted a dynamic assessment
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of the content of a Web page instead of the URL at the time of request by a user. China may
be the sole exception to this rule. Our research has documented an elaborate network of con-
trols including keyword-based URL filtering; it may be the case that Chinese filtering systems
can be triggered based upon the presence of keywords within a Web page’s content. Open-
Net Initiative researcher Steven Murdoch along with his colleagues Richard Clayton and Ro-
bert N. M. Watson have published a paper that describes in detail the workings of the ‘‘Great
Firewall of China,’’ including this dynamic filtering based on Web page content. As Clayton,
Murdoch, and Watson note, ‘‘We have demonstrated that the ‘Great Firewall of China’ relies
on inspecting packets for specific content.’’16 Yemen and Iran also have the capacity to block
sites based on keywords in URLs. Commercial software packages such as SmartFilter make
such URL filtering trivial. As a general rule, with the possible exception of China, access to a
site is based on its URL; if a URL has triggered a block, one could take down the offensive
content within the page and replace it with the most innocuous material possible, and the
original link will continue to trigger a block.
URL-based blocking does not, however, require the identification of every page that is to
be blocked. Our research indicates that the most prevalent form of blocking is at the domain
level. Once a state has identified www.playboy.com as undesirable, the logical step is to deny
all requests to that domain, whether http://playboy.com/playmates/2003/may.html or playboy
.com/articles/interviews/index.html.
The parallel between the URL-based approach with the approach of the traditional censor is
that the domain is deemed on the whole undesirable, and the censor makes no effort to dis-
aggregate the content within. The decision is most complicated when a single domain hosts
truly disparate content, such as free hosting sites like Geocities or Angelfire, blogging do-
mains like Blogspot or Blogger, community sites like Google or Yahoo! groups, or university
sites like mit.edu that can include student home pages about subjects like Tibet. Within these
realms, our research found ample evidence of both blocking of the entire domain and
selected blocking of subsites, or pages within the domain. Such blocking is discussed in the
respective state reports in the appendix to this book. The Berkman Center’s Web site at http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu was blocked in China in 2002 after our first report of Internet filtering
was placed there. (The powers that be in Harvard’s central university administration declined
to repost the study at www.harvard.edu.)
We have also observed several other means of URL-based filtering. As the results presented
in chapter 1 show, several states—including China, Iran, Myanmar, and Yemen—block access
to all URLs containing particular strings of letters (such as ‘‘ass’’), whether such banned terms
appear in the domain or in superfluous characters at its end. Those sites’ IP addresses are
independently blocked, as blocked domains could otherwise be accessed via this method.
Some blocking approaches are cruder still. We observed that the United Arab Emirates and
Syria blocked every site found within the Israeli top-level country code domain: no pages from
any domain ending in ‘‘.il’’ were accessible there.17
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This last example demonstrates the dramatic difference between URL-based filtering and
content-based filtering. The structure of the Internet makes it very easy to block all sites end-
ing in .il, but extremely hard, if not impossible, to block all sites containing content about
Israel, a project that our data indicates was never seriously undertaken within the country. It
may be that the purpose of blocking ‘‘.il’’ was more a statement about the Syrian and UAE
view on Israel, rather than an attempt to prevent its citizens from discovering particular infor-
mation. Also, the block likely operates in both directions: someone from a ‘‘.il’’ address may
have a hard time accessing content in the UAE as a result of the filtering there.
The Role of Commercial Software in State-Mandated Internet Filtering
Commercial services, including the U.S.-based Secure Computing’s SmartFilter, Websense,
and Fortinet, appear to assist, or to have assisted, states that filter with the implementation
and management of block lists. These services provide extensive lists of URLs categorized
using proprietary methods. The commercial services typically fall in the middle of a spectrum
between manual and automated filtering. The URL for a site found to contain content related
to gambling will be offered as a digital update to the ‘‘gambling’’ block list of those states sub-
scribing to the filtering services’ lists.
For topics such as pornography or drugs, few states appear to invest the resources
required to maintain active block lists where they can procure a list from commercial Internet
filtering companies. The challenge in doing so is compounded by multiple means of typically
accessing such Web sites—http://www.norml.com, http://norml.com, http://www.norml.org,
and http://209.70.46.40 all bring the user to the home page of the National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws. Each of these means of accessing the site (and others)
must be added to the block list in order to block citizens’ access in a thorough manner.
The task is further complicated when site operators realize that they are being filtered and
attempt to evade simple filtering techniques by changing their URLs; for instance, Iran
has blocked the site at www.pglo.org, but in a subsequent test, it had not blocked the
same content on www.pglo1.org.18 Additionally, since filtering on a national scale requires
complex infrastructure, making sure that the same list of blocked sites is present on each
machine performing the filtering, at either a centralized or ISP-specific level, is no simple
task.
A state subscribing to such a service is limited to the categories made available by the
commercial software providers. While generally useful for content targeted according to the
common desires of parents, schools, and companies in the West (such as ‘‘pornography,’’
‘‘drugs,’’ or ‘‘dating’’), these products also include broad categories such as ‘‘religion’’ and
‘‘politics’’ that are not fine-tuned enough to match state-specific goals. These categories will
not, in the off-the-shelf version of the software, include filtering of content critical of Islam or
opposing the government of Vietnam. To account for the generality of these categories, each
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of the installations of filtering software we observed appears to allow a state to augment a
commercial block list with its own URLs.
Aside from such fine tuning, however, states using commercial filtering services must
choose between allowing or blocking all URLs within a category. For example, a previous
version of the SmartFilter service provides the choice of blocking or allowing all URLs in the
‘‘anonymizer/translator’’ category. Even though a state may wish to block anonymizers in
order to prevent circumvention, that same state may wish to preserve access to translators
as a useful tool.19 Language presents an additional problem, as all the commercial filtering
software we observed is produced by American companies. The blocking in states using
these commercial filters therefore tilts heavily toward evaluating—and in turn prompting
blocks of—English-language sites. This tilt leans precisely the opposite way from the tilt of
those states that develop their own blocking systems, which generally seek to block content
in local languages more than content in foreign languages. In some of the states using com-
mercial filtering software, we have observed heavy filtering of English language content
in some categories, while the same content appeared to be freely available in the local
language—likely the inverse of what the state was seeking to accomplish through its filtering
regime.20
When commercial filtering software is in use, a given second-level domain—for instance,
cnn.com—may include some sites that are blocked and other sites that are unblocked. Our
testing of SmartFilter has determined that the software attempts a more exact match first,
and in its absence falls back to categories assigned more generally to areas of a domain or
the domain itself. For instance, SmartFilter categorizes the Sports Illustrated home page at
sportsillustrated.cnn.com as ‘‘sports.’’ The default categorization for any Web page located
within this site, as shown by the category SmartFilter assigns to a request for http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/does_not_exist, will also be ‘‘sports.’’ However, the page for the
most recent swimsuit edition, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/2006_swimsuit, is
categorized as ‘‘provocative attire/mature.’’ Thus, it appears that any Web page within the
Sports Illustrated site will, logically enough, be assigned to the ‘‘sports’’ category whether or
not SmartFilter has analyzed the content of the page, unless this default has been overridden
with a page-specific categorization.21
Commercial filtering software may alleviate some of the difficulties of filtering presented by
the technical structure of the Internet. Our data show that states using such software are
much less likely to miss alternative means of accessing blocked sites, for instance, visiting
http://ifex.org to get around a block of http://www.ifex.org, as was possible in Vietnam during
our testing. Commercial software companies have refined their filtering techniques to antici-
pate, detect, and prevent these relatively simple methods of evading blocking. There are
others, as Deibert and Rohozinski note in chapter 6 of this volume, who seek to achieve just
the opposite. A game of cat and mouse is well underway.
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Filtering and Transparency
As Faris and Villeneuve document in chapter 1 of this book, states adopt a range of practices
in terms of how explicitly they discuss their filtering regime with the public and the amount that
citizens can learn about it. No state that we have studied in the past five years makes its block
list generally available, though partial information has found its way to the surface in a few
instances. In India, through freedom of information filings, some citizens have obtained infor-
mation as to the list of those sites filtered. In Bahrain, citizens have compiled a partial block list
and posted it to the Internet. In Thailand, prior to the 2006 coup, a list of many thousand Web
sites had been posted online, plausibly leaked by the state, but not mapping closely to the
facts we have observed. A combination of citizen efforts and the circulation of Pakistan Tele-
communication Authority blocking orders on the Internet have resulted in a partial list of
blocked sites in Pakistan coming to our attention.22
Saudi Arabia is the most transparent state in terms of Internet filtering. The Saudi state sets
forth the rationale and practices related to filtering on an easily accessible Web site in both
Arabic and English. (In our first round of testing, in 2002, Saudi Arabia enabled us to run
tests directly against its system, but would not show us the list that it was using to determine
which sites it was blocking at any given moment; since publication of our first report on
this topic, the Saudis have disallowed us such easy and direct access to their system.) In
Saudi Arabia, citizens may suggest sites for blocking or for unblocking, in either Arabic or
English, via a public Web site. Access to most of these sites prompts a blockpage to ap-
pear, indicating to those seeking access to a Web site that they have reached a disallowed
site. Most states have enacted laws that support the filtering regime and provide citizens
with some context for why and how it is occurring, though rarely with any degree of precision.
However, among the states we studied, some of the central Asian states that practice just-
in-time filtering on sensitive topics—as well as China, whose officials sometimes deny the
presence of Internet filtering—obscure the nature and extent of their filtering regimes to
the greatest extent.23
Some states, such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, make an effort to suggest that their citizens
are largely in support of the filtering regime, particularly when it comes to blocking access to
pornographic material. For instance, the agency responsible for both Internet access and fil-
tering in Saudi Arabia conducted a user study in 1999 and reported that 45 percent of
respondents thought ‘‘too much’’ was blocked, 41 percent thought the amount blocked was
‘‘reasonable,’’ and 14 percent found it ‘‘not enough.’’24 We have not delved into the veracity of
these findings.
Citizens may, in some instances, participate in the decision making as to whether a site
may be filtered or not. Three of the states in which we tested (Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen)
respond to a request for a blocked site with a page that includes a mechanism for suggesting
that the particular URL may be blocked in error. However, to make such a suggestion requires
the user to have knowledge of the content of the Web page not able to be visited—and the
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confidence, perhaps not well-placed, that such self-identification would not put the user in
jeopardy of state sanction.
Trends in Internet Filtering
Researchers associated with the OpenNet Initiative have been collecting empirical data on
Internet filtering since 2001. Our methodology circa 2006 is far more sophisticated than it
has been in the past. The coverage of our research is far broader, now covering every state
known or credibly suspected to carry out Internet filtering. During this five-year period, we have
observed the following trends:
 The overall trend in Internet filtering is toward more states adopting filtering regimes. The
states with the most extensive filtering practices fall primarily in three regions: east Asia,
the Middle East and North Africa, and central Asia. State-mandated, technical filtering
does occur in other parts of the world, but in a more limited fashion, such as the Internet
filtering common in libraries and schools in the United States, child pornography filtering
systems in northern Europe, and the filtering of Nazi paraphernalia and Holocaust denial
sites in France and Germany.
 Some of the newest filtering regimes, such as those coming online in the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), appear to be more sophisticated than the first-generation
systems still in place in some states. The early means of filtering—such as Saudi Ara-
bia’s early system, with a heavy emphasis on pornography and offering citizens a clear
blockpage—are no longer the only ways to accomplish Internet filtering. The net result is
greater variation in what it means to filter content online.
 In the Commonwealth of Independent States and in parts of the Middle East and North
Africa, the filtering we are seeing is highly targeted in nature and carried out ‘‘just-in-
time’’ to block access to information during sensitive time periods. ONI principal investi-
gator Rafal Rohozinski and his coauthor Deirdre Collings predicted such an eventuality:
‘‘In democratically-challenged countries, we are likely to see increasing constraints on
the ‘openness’ of the Internet during election periods, and these constraints may be
more subtle than outright filtering and blocking.’’25
The ONI has monitored three elections to date, one in Kyrgyzstan (2005), one in Belarus
(2006), and one in Nigeria (2007). As Rohozinski and Collings wrote,
The February 2005 elections in Kyrgyzstan marked the ONI’s first foray into election
monitoring. During the Kyrgyz elections ONI researchers were able to document two
major Denial of Service (DoS) attacks directed against ISPs hosting major opposition
newspapers. The attacks were commissioned from a commercial ‘‘bot herder’’ and
traced back to a group of Ukrainian hackers-for-hire. ONI was not able to identify who
was ultimately responsible for these attacks. Direct links to the Kyrgyz authorities could
not be established. Thus, while no direct filtering took place, the DoS attack resulted in
the indirect censorship of websites while exonerating the Kyrgyz authorities of any di-
rect responsibility. The Kyrgyz case also raised the issue of who benefits most from
this kind of indirect filtering. In Kyrgyzstan, the target of the DoS attacks—opposition
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newspaper websites—continued to publish print editions while claiming that they were
being ‘‘censored’’ by the government.
Of the Belarus election, Rohozinski and Collings wrote,
[T]he quality and consistency of access to some sites varied considerably, and on crit-
ical days, up to 37 opposition and independent sites across 25 different ISPs were in-
accessible from within the state-owned Beltelecom network. On election day and after
the website of the main opposition candidate (Aleksandr Milinkevich) was ‘‘dead,’’ as
was another opposition site—Charter 97. On the day that the police cleared the last
remaining protesters from October Square (25 March) Internet connectivity by way of
Minsk telephone dial-up services failed.
And, there were three instances of confirmed ‘‘odd DNS errors’’ affecting opposition
websites. While no case yielded conclusive evidence of government inspired tamper-
ing, the pattern of failures as well as the fact that mostly opposition and independent
media sites were affected, suggests that something other than chance was afoot.26
The just-in-time filtering phenomenon has reared its head in the Middle East region as
well. Bahrain blocked several Web sites in the run-up to the country’s parliamentary elec-
tions in 2006 and Yemen banned access to several media and local politics Web sites
ahead of the country’s 2006 presidential elections. Bahrain also briefly blocked access to
Google Earth in 2006, citing security reasons. For about a month in 2006, Jordan blocked
access to the VoIP Web site skype.com, also citing security concerns.
 Our most recent data, collected in 2006 and 2007, suggest that we may also be seeing,
for the first time, the emergence of in-stream filtering. This process involves entities based
in large states—possibly including Chinese, Russian, and Indian ISPs—that provide Inter-
net service to other states, passing along the filtering practices to their customer states.
While the data are inconclusive that such in-stream filtering is taking place extensively, the
hallmarks of such activity are present in our recent findings. We will continue to monitor
closely for the emergence of this phenomenon, as it might point to a new series of secu-
rity concerns.
 There is a continued growth in the creation of online information by citizens, including cit-
izen journalism, in many parts of the world, but filtering is having an impact on how people
carry it out. In some cases, the existence of a filtering regime leads these citizen journal-
ists to limit the topics that they cover. For instance, environmental activists writing online in
China have tended to stick closely to the issues related to the environment, which tend
not to be blocked, while steering clear of related political topics that are censored. In other
cases, such as the Middle East region, citizens banter with the censors. In the Common-
wealth of Independent States we may be witnessing a backlash, in the form of Internet
filtering, because of the perceived influence of citizen media on the outcome of elections
there.27
 Citizens and citizen journalists practice self-censorship. For example, moderators of on-
line discussion forums remove contributions that could lead to the blocking of the forums.
On the other hand, cyberactivists exploit alternative technologies to circumvent filtering
systems. Many Web sites that discuss sensitive issues use online groups such as Yahoo!
Groups as part of their contingency plans, so once a Web site is blocked, users continue
the discussion and the exchange of content via the group e-mails.
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 We have evidence of more filtering at the edges than in a centralized manner, especially in
the Commonwealth of Independent States. One might also consider the cybercafé-based
controls in China, say, as compared to the approach of setting up the ‘‘Great Firewall’’ at
the state’s geopolitical boundaries. Those states that have not developed centralized fil-
tering systems may find it more effective to build them at the edges. This phenomenon
suggests that those who lobby against network blockages may have to expand their
view of the network to include the devices that attach to it.
 We have observed an increase in alternative modes of filtering, both in engineering tech-
nique and through increased licensing, registration, and reporting requirements in some
states.
 We have uncovered evidence of filtering undertaken by some Internet sites depending
on where they believe their users to be located. In these instances, the entity that is pub-
lishing the sites—rather than the state where the person accessing or publishing the in-
formation is located—is limiting who can access its site. This process, combined with
geolocation of the source of a request for a Web page, has occasionally been prompted
in the past by a legal proceeding, such as the French insistence that Yahoo! not provide
its citizens with access to certain Nazi-related items in the Yahoo! auction sites. More
recently, our data show that gambling sites, U.S. military Web sites in the ‘‘.mil’’ domain,
and some dating sites are filtered from the server side.
 States continue to be most concerned with blocking of sites in the local language, as
opposed to sites in nonlocal languages—even though commercial filtering software
sometimes accomplishes the inverse. In the Commonwealth of Independent States,
blocking is almost exclusively of local-language sites. In the Middle East and North Africa,
much of the blocking focuses on local-language sites, with some blockage of English
sites—especially where commercial filtering systems developed in the United States are
in use.
 Internet filtering is increasingly being used to block access to certain online applications
beyond Web sites accessed by Web browsers. This trend is particularly important as soft-
ware transitions toward more and more of an online service model. Google Earth and
Skype, among other Voice-over Internet Protocol services, are blocked in some states.
Other online applications, such as non-Web-based anonymizers that allow anonymous
Internet usage, are consistently blocked in many places.
Normative Analysis of Internet Filtering
Few would condemn all those who would seek to filter Internet content; in fact, nearly every
society filters Internet content in one way or another. Certainly all states regulate the informa-
tion environment in some fashion, as Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu’s work makes plain.28 The
purpose of this research is to provide the empirical data needed to understand this form of
state control online, what it means for the future of the Internet, and what choices are involved
in a state’s decision to filter the Internet.
The perspective in support of state-mandated Internet filtering is straightforward. States
have the sovereign right to carry out Internet filtering as they see fit. The same goes for
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Internet-based surveillance. Internet filtering and surveillance, this argument goes, is no more
a matter for international decision making than any other domestic policy concern. The nature
of the network and its potential uses are irrelevant to the analysis. The Internet is not
exceptional.
There are several possible critiques of Internet filtering. First, one might argue that technical
filtering is fatally flawed from the outset; because it cannot be carried out in a manner that
is not over- or under-broad, it cannot be done in a way that is sufficiently protective of civil
liberties. Second, as a related critique, Internet filtering implicates human rights concerns, par-
ticularly the freedom of expression, and extends to the freedom of association, of religion, and
of privacy in some instantiations. Finally, one might conclude that Internet filtering is unwise on
public policy grounds because it is anathema to the good things to which ICTs can give rise,
such as innovation, creativity, and stronger democracies.
The hardest cases are those that some would argue are acts of law enforcement while
others contend that they are clear violations of international norms. Consider a sovereign, jeal-
ous of the opposition’s power, that disables access to opposition Web sites in the lead-up
to an election—and then relents once the threat of losing control is abated—as some of our
findings from central Asia would suggest happens. Or a state that routinely uses censorship
and surveillance as a key element of a campaign to persecute a religious minority group. Or a
state that relies upon online surveillance for the purpose of jailing political dissidents whose
acts the state has committed to respect pursuant to international human rights norms. What
about when a state is trying to protect public morals by keeping citizens from looking at
garden-variety online pornography, but in so doing also block information on culturally sensi-
tive matters, such as HIV/AIDS prevention or gay and lesbian outreach efforts? We set forth
three primary critiques here. These cases, each real, put the normative problem of Internet fil-
tering into sharp relief.
The Argument in Favor of Internet Filtering: Legitimate State Control Online
The need for states to be able to exercise some measure of control online is broadly
accepted. Likewise, states ought to be able to provide rights of action—ordinarily, the right
to sue someone—to their citizens to enable them to seek redress for harms done in the online
environment. Though one might disagree, these core presumptions are not challenged in this
book. The easiest, perhaps most universal case is the common abhorrence of child pornog-
raphy. Most societies share the view that imagery of children under a certain age in a sexually
compromising position is unlawful to produce, possess, or distribute. The issue in the context
of child pornography is less whether the state has the right to assert control over such mate-
rial, but rather the most effective means of combating the problem it represents, and the prob-
lems to which it leads, without undercutting rights guaranteed to citizens. The prevention of
online fraud or other crimes, often targeting the elderly or disadvantaged, likewise represents
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a common purpose for some measure of state control of bits online. Some would argue that
intellectual property protection represents yet another such example, though the merits of that
proposition are hotly contested.
One of the key findings of our research is the extent to which states cannot do the job of
content control alone, which in turn adds another layer of complexity to the analysis of Internet
filtering as a public policy matter. Where the state cannot effectively carry out its mandate in
these legitimate circumstances, the state reasonably turns to those best positioned to assert
control of bits. Often, though not always, the state turns to Internet service providers of one
flavor or another. The law enforcement officer, for instance, calls upon the lawyers represent-
ing ISPs to turn over information about users of the online service who are suspected of com-
mitting a common crime, such as online fraud. As criminals use the Internet in the course of
wrongdoing, states need to be able to access the increasingly useful store of evidence col-
lected online.
The strongest form of this argument is that online censorship and surveillance is a legiti-
mate expression of the sovereign authority of states. As we have described, Saudi Arabia,
which implements one of the most extensive and longest-running filtering regimes, did not in-
troduce Internet access to its citizens until the state authorities were comfortable that they
could do so in a manner that would not be averse to local morals or norms. In particular, the
Saudi regime has concerned itself with blocking access to online pornography, which it has
done with a startlingly high degree of effectiveness over the past five years—though the
scope of its filtering has grown over time, now including more political information than when
we first began testing there in 2002.
A state has a right to protect the morality of its citizens, the argument goes, and unfettered
access to and use of the Internet undercuts public morality in myriad ways. Many regimes,
including those in Western states (including the United States), have justified online surveil-
lance of various sorts on the grounds of ordinary law enforcement activities, such as the pre-
vention and enforcement of domestic criminal activity. Most recently, states have begun to
justify online censorship and surveillance as a measure to counteract international terrorism.
Put more simply, Internet filtering and surveillance, in an environment where the Internet is
considered a form of territory alongside land or sea or air, are an expression of the unalterable
right of a state to ensure its national security.
Counterarguments: The Infirmities of Technical Filtering
One of the enduring facts of technical filtering of the Internet is that no state has managed to
implement a perfect system. The primary deficiency of any technical filtering system is that the
censor must choose between two shortcomings: either the system suffers from overbreadth,
that is, sites that are not meant to be filtered are filtered, or underbreadth, that is, not all
sites meant to be filtered are filtered. In most instances, the filtering regime suffers from a
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control 45
combination of these two deficiencies. Coupled with the extent to which savvy Internet users
can evade the filtering regime, state authorities undertaking technical filtering know that they
cannot succeed completely.
The public policy questions to which these problems give rise are many and complex. If a
filtering regime cannot be implemented in an accurate manner, should it be undertaken at all?
Under U.S. law, these shortcomings make any such system constitutionally suspect, if not
outright infirm, but other legal systems would likely draw a different conclusion. Is overbreadth
or underbreadth preferable in a filtering regime? States often respond by turning more and
more to intermediaries—search engine providers, ISPs, cybercafé owners, and so forth—to
make these decisions on the fly.
Filtering and Overbreadth Internet filtering is almost impossible to accomplish with any
degree of precision. A country that is deciding to filter the Internet must make an ‘‘overbroad’’
or ‘‘underbroad’’ decision at the outset. The filtering regime will either block access to too
much or too little Internet content. Very often, this decision is tied to whether the state opts to
use a home-grown system or whether to adopt a commercial software product, such as
SmartFilter or Websense, two products made in the United States and licensed to some
states that filter the Internet. Bahrain, for instance, has opted for an underbroad solution for
pornography; its ISPs appear to block access to a small and essentially fixed number of
blacklisted sites. Bahrain may seek to indicate disapproval of access to pornographic material
online, while actually blocking only token access to such material, much as Singapore does.
United Arab Emirates, by contrast, seems to have made the opposite decision by attempting
to block much more extensively in similar categories, thereby sweeping into its filtering basket
a number of sites that appear to have innocuous content by any metric.
Most of the time, states make blocking determinations to cover a range of Web content,
commonly grouped around a second-level domain name or the IP address of a Web service
(such as www.un.org or 66.102.15.100), rather than based on the precise URL of a given Web
page (such as www.un.org/womenwatch/), or a subset of content found on that page (such
as a particular image or string of text). This approach means that the filtering process will
often not distinguish between permissible and impermissible content so long as any imper-
missible content is deemed ‘‘nearby’’ from a network standpoint. In the case of the above ex-
ample, the WomenWatch site was unavailable in Vietnam not because of the state attempts to
block all sites relating to gender equality issues ( judged by the availability of all other similar
sites we tested), but because of a block placed on the entire www.un.org domain.
Because of this wholesale acceptance or rejection of a particular site—which may or may
not correspond to a given speaker or related group of speakers—it becomes difficult to know
exactly what speech was deemed unacceptable for citizens to access. Bahrain, a state in
which we have found a handful of blocked sites, has blocked access to a discussion board
at www.bahrainonline.org. The message board likely contains a combination of messages
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that would be tolerated independently and those that are explicitly meant to be subject to filter-
ing. Likewise, we found minimal blocking for internal political purposes in UAE, but the state
did block a site that essentially acted as a catalog of criticism of the state. Our tests cannot
determine whether it was the material covering human rights abuses or discussion of histori-
cal border disputes with Iran, but in as much as the discussion of these topics is taking place
within a broad dissention-based site, the calculation we project onto the censor looks signifi-
cantly different than that for a site with a different ratio of ‘‘offensive’’ to approved content.
For those states using commercial filtering software and update services to try to maintain a
current list of blocked sites matching particular criteria, we have noted multiple instances
where such software has mistaken sites containing gay and lesbian content for pornography.
For instance, the site for the Log Cabin Republicans of Texas has been blocked by the United
States–based SmartFilter as pornography, apparently the basis for its blocking by United
Arab Emirates. Our research suggests that gay and lesbian content is itself often targeted for
filtering; one might surmise that, even when it is not explicitly targeted, states that implement
related filters are not overly concerned with its unavailability due to overbreadth.
As content changes increasingly quickly on the Web and generalizations become more dif-
ficult to make by URL or domain name—thanks in part to the rise of simpler, faster, and
aggregated publishing tools such as Weblogging (blogging) services—accurate filtering is
likely to get trickier for filtering regimes to address over time unless they want to take the
step of banning nearly everything. For example, free Web-hosting domains tend to group an
enormous array of changing content and thus provoke very different responses from state
governments. In 2004, Saudi Arabia blocked every page we tested on http://freespace.virgin
.net and www.erols.com.29 However, our research indicated the www.erols.com sites had
been only minimally blocked in 2002, and the http://freespace.virgin.net sites had been
blocked in 2002, but accessible in 2003 before being reblocked in 2004. In all three tests,
Saudi Arabia practiced URL blocking on www.geocities.com (possibly through SmartFilter
categorization), blocking only 3 percent of more than one thousand sites tested in 2004. Viet-
nam blocked all sites we tested on the www.geocities.com and http://members.tripod.org
domains.
Contrast this last example with Yahoo! Groups, which Vietnam appears to filter on a group-
by-group basis. We found that the state blocks access to the pages of two groups discussing
the Cao Dai religion in general, but our testers were able to access the page of a California
Cao Dai youth group. Two factors may play a role in this decision. Groups may provide more
‘‘benefit’’ to the censor, due to their interactive nature, and thus implicate the social and pos-
sibly economic impacts of the Internet. Groups, too, may have a limited, albeit large, num-
ber of possibilities—a single group could, in theory be monitored at the group level where
there is much more metadata about the content contained therein, whereas Geocities could
be grouped by user, but a particular user may offer large numbers of pages on very varied
topics.
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In our 2005 testing, we located 115 Weblogs within 3 large blogging domains (blogsky,
blogspot, and persianblog) that were blocked in Iran. This blocking corresponded to only 24
percent of all blogs tested within those domains, and our testing was designed to locate
blocked sites. Clearly, Iran desires to block access to some blogs, but has not seen fit to
block all blogs. Our empirical data do not help to explain why filtering authorities in Iran
made this decision, but it clearly was the result of a deliberate action. Also note that the site
for www.movabletype.org, an application designed to allow blogging to take place on any do-
main, was blocked. Perhaps this indicates a policy of containing the blogs by restricting them
to the large blogging domains, where they can then be reviewed and potentially filtered on a
one-by-one basis.
China’s response to the same problem provides an instructive contrast. When China be-
came worried about bloggers the state shut down the main blogging domains for a period of
weeks—much as they have, periodically, for Wikipedia. When the domains came back online,
they contained filters that would reject posts containing particular keywords.30 In effect, China
moved to a content-based filtering system, but determined that the best place for such con-
tent evaluation was not the point of Web page access but the point of publication, and pos-
sessed the authority to force these filters on the downstream application provider. Most of
these providers coded these restrictions into the software provided to bloggers. This ap-
proach is similar to that taken with Google to respond to the accessibility of disfavored con-
tent via Google’s caching function. Google was blocked in China until a mechanism was put
in place to prevent cache access.31 In the fall of 2005, Saudi Arabia was reported to have
blocked access to all blogs on the Blogger network, which plainly represented an overbroad
set of blocks. These examples make clear the length to which regimes can go to preserve
‘‘good’’ access instead of simply blocking an entire service.
Alternate approaches that demand a finer-grained means of filtering, such as the use of
automated keywords to identify and expunge sensitive information on the fly, or greater man-
ual involvement in choosing individual Web pages to be filtered, are possible so long as a
state is willing to invest the time and resources necessary to render them effective. China in
particular appears to be prepared to make such an investment, one mirrored by choices
made by the Chinese state in the context of traditional media. For example, China allows
CNN to be broadcast within the country with a form of time delay so the feed can be tempo-
rarily turned off when, in one case, stories about the death of political reformer Zhao Ziyang
were broadcast.
Filtering and Underbreadth One of the primary surprises in our data over the past several
years is the infrequency with which plainly sensitive pages were blocked within otherwise ac-
ceptable sites. For instance, we found no cases where specific articles were blocked on major
news sites, except in China. In fact, the regimes in which we tested very rarely made an at-
tempt to block www.cnn.com, www.nytimes.com, http://bbc.co.uk, or others. (Exceptions to
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this rule include the Voice of America news site at www.voanews.com. It was blocked in both
Iran and China, and China also blocks the entire BBC news site.) In fact, not only was CNN’s
international news site at edition.cnn.com generally accessible in our China testing, a page
within that domain dedicated to the massacre in Tiananmen Square was also not filtered. Sev-
eral factors might be at work here—the sheer volume of news stories produced by major out-
lets may make thorough review impossible, or the speed at which new stories are posted may
simply be too quick for an update across all the necessary filtering technology.
One instance where such URL-specific blocking had been applied in the past was Saudi
Arabia’s treatment of Amnesty International’s Web site. In 2002, we tested twenty-five hundred
pages within the amnesty.org domain and found nineteen blocked; all were within the direc-
tory www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/saudi, corresponding to a report entitled ‘‘Saudi Arabia: A
Secret State of Suffering.’’ However, these same pages were tested in 2003, 2004, and 2006
and were accessible in each instance.
Human Rights Concerns Related to Internet Filtering
Internet censorship and surveillance prompt legitimate legal and normative concerns. Some
state-mandated acts of online control are not straightforward acts of local law enforcement.
As the practice of Internet filtering—and its close cousin, Internet surveillance—become
more commonplace and more sophisticated, human rights activists and academics tracking
this activity have begun to question whether some regimes of this sort violate international
laws or norms. Quite often, the states that carry out online censorship and surveillance are
signatories to international human rights convenants or have their own rules that preserve cer-
tain civil liberties for their citizens. The United States is home to a controversy of this sort as
well, as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and others have filed a class-action lawsuit against
telecommunications giant AT&T for collaborating with the National Security Agency in a wire-
tapping program.
The most straightforward of the critiques of Internet filtering and surveillance are grounded
in concerns for individual civil liberties against the encroachment of overbearing states. The
online environment is increasingly a venue in which personal data is stored. Personal commu-
nications increasingly flow across the wires and airwaves that compose the Internet. The basic
rights of freedom of expression and individual privacy are threatened by the extension of state
power, aided by private actors, into cyberspace. When public and private actors combine to
restrict the publication of and access to online content, or to listen in on online conversations,
the hackles of human rights activists are understandably raised. As Mary Rundle and Malcolm
Birdling argue in chapter 4 of this book, one might contend that the right of free association
is likewise violated by certain Internet-censorship and surveillance regimes that are emerg-
ing around the world. Most complaints cite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as grounding ideals—if not binding
commitments—to which many states have agreed to hold themselves.
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Concerns about Imposing Restrictions on the Internet
Even if one agrees with the strong form of the state sovereignty argument and sets aside
objections based on international laws and norms, one might still contend that these filtering
regimes are unwise from a public policy vantage point. Internet censorship and surveillance,
the technologist might argue, violate the so-called end-to-end principle of network design and
therefore risk stunting the future growth of the network and the innovation that might derive
from it. This argument is typically grounded in adherence to the end-to-end principle. The
end-to-end principle stands for the proposition that the ‘‘intelligence’’ in the network should
not be placed in the middle of the network, but rather at the end-points. Technologists often
chalk up the extraordinarily rapid growth of Internet throughout the world to this simple idea.
By imposing control in the middle of the network—say, at the ‘‘Great Firewall’’ that surrounds
China, proxy servers in Iran, or ISPs in dozens of states around the world—rather than at the
user level, the censors are stymieing the further growth of the network.
The importance of ‘‘generative’’ information platforms also counsels against unwarranted
state intrusion into the online environment.32 Rather than hewing to the original design of the
network, the decision-maker should favor those technical decisions that enable acts of inno-
vation on top of the existing layers in the ecosystem—including not just the middle of the net-
work, but also at the edges. The kinds of individual creativity made possible by the personal
computer (PC), including self-expression in the form of the creation of user-generated content,
might be thwarted by the presence of a censorship and surveillance regime. The on-again,
off-again blockage of the user-generated encyclopedia, Wikipedia, makes this case clearly.
The sporadic use of filtering regimes to block the use of Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP),
often to protect the monopoly in voice communications of a local incumbent, also stands for
this proposition.
These filtering regimes, along with surveillance practices that often go hand in hand with
them, pose a danger in terms of having an adverse impact on the emergence of democracies
around the world. The Internet has an increasing amount to do with the shape that democra-
cies are taking in many developing states. As Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski argue in
chapter 6 of this book, activists make use of the Internet in ways that are having a substantial
impact on their societies.
The Internet is a potential force for democracy by increasing means of citizen participation
in the regimes in which they live. The Internet is increasingly a way to let sunlight fall upon the
actions of those in power—and providing an effective disinfectant in the process. The Internet
can give a megaphone to activists and to dissidents who can make their case to the public,
either on the record or anonymously or pseudonymously. The Internet can help make new net-
works, within and across cultures, can be an important productivity tool for otherwise under-
funded activists, and can foster the development of new communities built around ideas.
The Internet can open the information environment to voices other than the organs of the state
that have traditionally had a monopoly on the broadcast of important stories and facts, which
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in turn gives rise to what William Fisher refers to as ‘‘semiotic democracy.’’33 Put another way,
the Internet can place the control of cultural goods and the making of meaning in the hands of
many rather than few. The Internet is increasingly an effective counterweight to the consolida-
tion in big media, whether the Internet is controlled by a few capitalists or the state itself.
The Internet also can be a force for economic development, which is most likely the factor
holding back some states from filtering the Internet more extensively or from imposing outright
bans on related technologies. The Internet is widely recognized as a tool that is helping to lead
to the development of technologically sophisticated, empowered middle classes. Entrepre-
neurship in the information technology sector can lead to innovation, the growth of new firms,
and more jobs.
This critique of Internet filtering boils down to a belief in the value of a relatively open infor-
mation environment because of the likelihood that it can lead to a beneficial combination of
greater access to information, more transparency, better governance, and faster economic
growth. The Internet, in this sense, is a generative network in human terms. In the hands of
the populace at large, the Internet can give rise to a more empowered, productive citizenry.
An Alternate Viewpoint: The ‘‘Slope of the Freedom Curve’’
As our colleague Charles Nesson has pointed out, another vantage point altogether might
lead to the best conclusion about Internet filtering. The point is not whether a single snapshot
of an Internet filtering regime reveals a ‘‘bad’’ or a ‘‘good’’ system. Two jurisdictions, after all,
could filter in exactly the same way, yet one could be moving toward freedom and the other
toward further control of the online environment. In Professor Nesson’s articulation, the issue
is not the absolute extent of filtering at a given moment but rather the ‘‘slope of the freedom
curve’’ that is most relevant. If the value at issue is whether an ICT environment is relatively
open or relatively closed, then the key fact is whether a state is headed toward a more open
system or a more closed system. The extent to which the Internet filtering picture is in constant
flux lends further appeal to this vantage point.
Looking Ahead: The Future of Filtering, Weblogs, and Wikis
Regardless of whether states are right or wrong to mandate filtering and surveillance, the
slope of the freedom curve favors not the censor but the citizens who wish to evade
the state’s control mechanisms. Most filtering regimes have been built on a presumption that
the Internet is like the broadcast medium that predates it: each Web site is a ‘‘channel,’’
each Web user a ‘‘viewer.’’ Channels with sensitive content are ‘‘turned off,’’ or otherwise
blocked, by authorities who wish to control the information environment. But the Internet is
not a broadcast medium. As the Internet continues to grow in ways that are not like broadcast,
filtering is becoming increasingly difficult to carry out effectively. The extent to which each per-
son using the Internet can at once be a consumer and a creator is particularly vexing to the
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broadcast-oriented censor. Combined with the absence of scarcity in terms of the number of
channels or spectrum and the fast-dropping cost of accessing Internet from a wide range
of devices including shared terminals and mobile devices, the changes in the online envi-
ronment give an edge to the online publisher against the state’s censor in the medium- to
long-run.
Along with Wikipedia, Weblogs offer a poignant example of these growing challenges for
the censor. No current filtering regime appears designed to address content developed on
blogs, podcasts, and Wikis and accessed via Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds in aggre-
gators, next-generation peer-to-peer networks, BitTorrent, and so forth. The most effective
model demonstrated to date may be China’s moves in the past few years to require blog ser-
vice publishers to block keywords in blog posts, though even this approach can be only a par-
tial means of blocking subversive content over time. Chinese bloggers routinely turn to
broadly understood code words to evade the censorship built into the tools.
As online content changes very quickly and can be accessed through new means, the pro-
cess of prescreening content and establishing a blockpage—akin to updating one’s static
virus definitions as new viruses are isolated and defined—breaks down. The process must
become an heuristic one to function properly, if at all. Multimedia content, which is harder to
screen and is accessed in different ways than through the World Wide Web, poses similar
challenges for filtering regimes. Those states that are intent on filtering the Internet will have
to adapt quickly if they intend to keep up. These adaptations might take the form of more ag-
gressive filtering, or a shift to surveillance of user behavior with legal sanction for those who
receive or transmit forbidden material.
In light of the prevalence of structural-based blocking in the states we studied, the trajectory
of the Internet to a more dynamic environment will continue to create new problems for filter-
ing regimes. The use of Weblogs by citizens—human rights activists, for instance—as a
means of self-publishing is sharply on the rise in many cultures around the world. The general
trend on the Internet is the divorcing of content from structure through the syndication of blogs
via RSS and similar technologies. Syndication allows the text of a blog to be easily reproduced
on other Web sites anywhere34 in a way that circumvents filtering—since the retrieval of con-
tent from a blocked URL is done by the site the user is visiting, potentially located in a country
with little or no filtering, instead of by the user’s machine. While such mirroring of content has
always been possible on the Internet, syndication represents a dramatic decrease in the
amount of time and level of technical skill required to easily replicate content. In many ways,
this freeing of content from structure mirrors how large sites are internally managed. The rea-
son that CNN can easily display the same article at multiple URLs is that the text of the article
can be retrieved from a single location, eliminating the need to separately create each HTML
page on which it displays. Through this means, the acceptance or rejection of a large site in
its entirety may in itself be a partial reaction to the problem created for URL-based structural
filtering when content is not strictly tied to location.
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Consider the implications for the censor of this technological change. The rise of publishing
through blogs has caused concern in China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia at a minimum, judging
from the reaction of their filtering regimes to block some blog-hosting services wholesale for
a period of time. Assume that all blogs within the persianblog domain are available via RSS
feed. The publisher could create a Web site specifically for the purpose of evading blocking,
listing and displaying all such blocked blogs. This site itself could become a target for block-
ing by the Iranian government, since any mechanism for making this site known to users
would also make it known to the filtering authorities.35
But using widely available aggregation tools, a user who wants to read this information
does not need to go to a single URL to access the information published there. Instead, the
user only needs to know the place where the XML feed is located at any given moment—
which need not, ultimately, be at a stable location, so long as the user has a means of being
updated as to its location at any given moment. In this version of the Web—trivial, using
today’s technologies—anyone can make any such blogs they choose available on any Web
page or in an e-mail in-box or on a mobile device.
Another approach that citizen journalists might take would be to seek to bury the blocked
blogs within a much larger number of blogs. The publisher could then establish a site or a
feed that aggregates this larger number of blogs. Then, still using simple technologies, the
readers could either read the full set of aggregated information or could run a filter of their
own against the aggregated group of blogs to distill the information that the publisher wanted
them to be able to access. Though these methods add a layer of complexity that would no
doubt dissuage some Internet users, the net effect would be a publication mode that would
be extremely difficult for the state to filter using current methods.
The state’s censor would still have several options for responding to syndication methods
of dissemination. First, the state could attempt to ban syndication, aggregation, and peer-to-
peer technologies that might make these circumvention efforts easy to carry out. States have
not, however, tended to pursue such a heavy-handed mode of regulation. Second, the state
could seek to block the sites where the information is published and where the aggregation
takes place. However, the potentially unlimited proliferation of such blogs and aggregator
sites makes this unfeasible. A last option could involve a fallback to more traditional forms of
state coercion—threatening both bloggers, readers, and those who provide them services
with sanction. The difficulty of anonymous access leaves open the alternative of identifying
users after they have accessed banned content. It is this last option that seems most in keep-
ing with previous filtering and surveillance practices, especially since intermediaries closer to
the user can be pressed into service to help.
The enduring point of this glimpse not so far into the future is that as Internet technologies
continue to evolve, so too will state censors have to evolve their methods of Internet filtering
if they wish to keep up. ONI’s early election monitoring efforts in Kyrgyzstan and Belarus,
combined with some of the most recent test results from the Commonwealth of Independent
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States, suggest that some states are already seeking to turn on and off the Internet-filtering
spigot at key moments. The simple proxy-based model, with a corresponding blockpage, will
soon look as dated as a 1980s mainframe computer in a peer-to-peer world. If states persist
in mandating filtering of the Internet, the narrative of China’s on-again, off-again blocking of
Wikipedia will be played out over and over as more citizens of the world build upon the gener-
ative Internet.
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Tools and Technology of Internet Filtering
Steven J. Murdoch and Ross Anderson
Internet Background
TCP/IP is the unifying set of conventions that allows different computers to communicate over
the Internet. The basic unit of information transferred over the Internet is the Internet protocol
(IP) packet. All Internet communication—whether downloading Web pages, sending e-mail, or
transferring files—is achieved by connecting to another computer, splitting the data into pack-
ets, and sending them on their way to the intended destination.
Specialized computers known as routers are responsible for directing packets appropri-
ately. Each router is connected to several communication links, which may be cables (fiber-
optic or electrical), short-range wireless, or even satellite. On receiving a packet, the router
makes a decision of which outgoing link is most appropriate for getting that packet to its ulti-
mate destination. The approach of encapsulating all communication in a common format (IP)
is one of the major factors for the Internet’s success. It allows different networks, with dispa-
rate underlying structures, to communicate by hiding this nonuniformity from application
developers.
Routers identify computers (hosts) on the Internet by their IP address, which might look like
192.0.2.166. Since such numbers are hard to remember, the domain name system (DNS)
allows mnemonic names (domain names) to be associated with IP addresses. A host wishing
to make a connection first looks up the IP address for a given name, then sends packets to
this IP address. For example, the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) www.example.com/
page.html contains the domain name ‘‘www.example.com.’’ The computer that performs
the domain-name-to-IP-address lookup is known as a DNS resolver, and is commonly oper-
ated by the Internet service provider (ISP)—the company providing the user with Internet
access.
During connection establishment, there are several different ways in which the process can
be interrupted in order to perform censorship or some other filtering function. The next section
describes how a number of the most relevant filtering mechanisms operate. Each mechanism
has its own strengths and weaknesses and these are discussed later. Many of the blocking
mechanisms are effective for a range of different Internet applications, but in this chapter we
concentrate on access to the Web, as this is the current focus of Internet filtering efforts.
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of how a Web page (http://www.example.com/page.html) is
downloaded. The first stage is the DNS lookup (steps 1–4), as mentioned above, where the
user first connects to their ISP’s DNS resolver, which then connects to the Web site’s DNS
server to find the IP address of the requested domain name—‘‘www.example.com.’’ Once
the IP address is determined, a connection is made to the Web server and the desired
page—‘‘page.html’’—is requested (steps 5–6).
Filtering Mechanisms
The goals of deploying a filtering mechanism vary depending on the motivations of the orga-
nization deploying them. They may be to make a particular Web site (or individual Web page)
inaccessible to those who wish to view it, to make it unreliable, or to deter users from even
attempting to access it in the first place. The choice of mechanism will also depend upon the
Figure 3.1
Steps in accessing a Web page via normal Web browsing without a proxy.
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capability of the organization that requests the filtering—where they have access to, the peo-
ple against whom they can enforce their wishes, and how much they are willing to spend. Oth-
er considerations include the number of acceptable errors, whether the filtering should be
overt or covert, and how reliable it is (both against ordinary users and those who wish to
bypass it). The next section discusses these trade-offs, but first we describe a range of mech-
anisms available to implement a filtering regime.
Here, we discuss only how access is blocked once the list of resources to be blocked is
established. Building this list is a considerable challenge and a common weakness in
deployed systems. Not only does the huge number of Web sites make building a comprehen-
sive list of prohibited content difficult, but as content moves and Web sites change their IP
addresses, keeping this list up-to-date requires a lot of effort. Moreover, if the operator of the
site wishes to interfere with the blocking, the site could be moved more rapidly than it would
be otherwise.
TCP/IP Header Filtering
An IP packet consists of a header followed by the data the packet carries (the payload).
Routers must inspect the packet header, as this is where the destination IP address is
located. To prevent targeted hosts being accessed, routers can be configured to drop pack-
ets destined for IP addresses on a blacklist. However, each host may provide multiple serv-
ices, such as hosting both Web sites and e-mail servers. Blocking based solely on IP
addresses will make all services on each blacklisted host inaccessible.
Slightly more precise blocking can be achieved by additionally blacklisting the port number,
which is also in the TCP/IP header. Common applications on the Internet have characteristic
port numbers, allowing routers to make a crude guess as to the service being accessed.
Thus, to block just the Web traffic to a site, a censor might block only packets destined for
port 80 (the normal port for Web servers).
Figure 3.2 shows where this type of blocking may be applied. Note that when the blocking
is performed, only the IP address is inspected, which is why multiple domain names that
share the same IP address will be blocked, even if only one is prohibited.
TCP/IP Content Filtering
TCP/IP header filtering can only block communication on the basis of where packets are
going to or coming from, not what they contain. This can be a problem if it is impossible to
establish the full list of IP addresses containing prohibited content, or if some IP address con-
tains enough noninfringing content to make it unjustifiable to totally block all communication
with it. There is a finer-grained control possible: the content of packets can be inspected for
banned keywords.
As routers do not normally examine packet content but just packet headers, extra equip-
ment may be needed. Typical hardware may be unable to react fast enough to block the
infringing packets, so other means to block the information must be used instead. As packets
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have a maximum size, the full content of the communication will likely be split over multiple
packets. Thus while the offending packet will get through, the communication can be dis-
rupted by blocking subsequent packets. This may be achieved by blocking the packets
directly or by sending a message to both of the communicating parties requesting they termi-
nate the conversation.1
Another effect of the maximum packet size is that keywords may be split over packet
boundaries. Devices that inspect each packet individually may then fail to identify infringing
keywords. For packet inspection to be fully effective, the stream must be reassembled, which
adds additional complexity. Alternatively, an HTTP proxy filter can be used, as described later.
DNS Tampering
Most Internet communication uses domain names rather than IP addresses, particularly for
Web browsing. Thus, if the domain name resolution stage can be filtered, access to infringing
Figure 3.2
IP blocking.
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sites can be effectively blocked. With this strategy, the DNS server accessed by users is given
a list of banned domain names. When a computer requests the corresponding IP address for
one of these domain names, an erroneous (or no) answer is given. Without the IP address, the
requesting computer cannot continue and will display an error message.2
Figure 3.3 shows this mechanism in practice. Note that at the stage the blocking is per-
formed, the user has not yet requested a page, which is why all pages under a domain
name will be blocked.
HTTP Proxy Filtering
An alternative way of configuring a network is to not allow users to connect directly to Web
sites but force (or just encourage) all users to access Web sites via a proxy server. In addition
to relaying requests, the proxy server may temporarily store the Web page in a cache. The
advantage of this approach is that if a second user of the same ISP requests the same
Figure 3.3
DNS tampering via filtering mechanism.
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page, it will be returned directly from the cache, rather than connecting to the actual Web
server a second time. From the user’s perspective this is better since the Web page will ap-
pear faster, as they never have to connect outside their own ISP. It is also better for the ISP, as
connecting to the Web server will consume (expensive) bandwidth, and rather than having to
transfer pages from a popular site hundreds of times, they need only do this once. Figure 3.4
shows how the use of a proxy differs from the normal case.
However, as well as improving performance, an HTTP proxy can also block Web sites. The
proxy decides whether requests for Web pages should be permitted, and if so, sends the re-
quest to the Web server hosting the requested content. Since the full content of the request is
available, individual Web pages can be filtered, not just entire Web servers or domains.
An HTTP proxy may be nontransparent, requiring that users configure their Web browsers
to send requests via it, but its use can be forced by deploying TCP/IP header filtering to block
normal Web traffic. Alternatively, a transparent HTTP proxy may intercept outgoing Web
Figure 3.4
Normal Web browsing with a proxy.
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requests and send them to a proxy server. While being more complex to set up, this option
avoids any configuration changes on the user’s computer.
Figure 3.5 shows how HTTP proxy filtering is applied. The ISP structure is different from fig-
ure 3.1 because the proxy server must intercept all requests. This gives it the opportunity of
seeing both the Web site domain name and which page is requested, allowing more precise
blocking when compared to TCP/IP header or DNS filtering.
Hybrid TCP/IP and HTTP Proxy
As the requests intercepted by an HTTP proxy must be reassembled from the original pack-
ets, decoded, and then retransmitted, the hardware required to keep up with a fast Internet
connection is very expensive. So systems like the BT Cleanfeed project3 were created, which
give the versatility of HTTP proxy filtering at a lower cost. It operates by building a list of the IP
addresses of sites hosting prohibited content, but rather than blocking data flowing to these
Figure 3.5
HTTP proxy blocking.
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servers, the traffic is redirected to a transparent HTTP proxy. There, the full Web address is
inspected and if it refers to banned content, it is blocked; otherwise the request is passed on
as normal.
Denial of Service
Where the organization deploying the filtering does not have the authority (or access to the
network infrastructure) to add conventional blocking mechanisms, Web sites can be made
inaccessible by overloading the server or network connection. This technique, known as a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, could be mounted by one computer with a very fast network
connection; more commonly, a large number of computers are taken over and used to mount
a distributed DoS (DDoS).
Domain Deregistration
As mentioned earlier, the first stage of a Web request is to contact the local DNS server to find
the IP address of the desired location. Storing all domain names in existence would be infea-
sible, so instead so-called recursive resolvers store pointers to other DNS servers that are
more likely to know the answer. These servers will direct the recursive resolver to further DNS
servers until one, the ‘‘authoritative’’ server, can return the answer.
The domain name system is organized hierarchically, with country domains such as ‘‘.uk’’
and ‘‘.de’’ at the top, along with the nongeographic top-level domains such as ‘‘.org’’ and
‘‘.com.’’ The servers responsible for these domains delegate responsibility for subdomains,
such as example.com, to other DNS servers, directing requests for these domains there.
Thus, if the DNS server for a top-level domain deregisters a domain name, recursive resolvers
will be unable to discover the IP address and so make the site inaccessible.
Country-specific top-level domains are usually operated by the government of the country in
question, or by an organization appointed by it. So if a site is registered under the domain of a
country that prohibits the hosted content, it runs the risk of being deregistered.
Server Takedown
Servers hosting content must be physically located somewhere, as must the administrators
who operate them. If these locations are under the legal or extra-legal control of someone
who objects to the content hosted, the server can be disconnected or the operators can be
required to disable it.
Surveillance
The above mechanisms inhibit the access to banned material, but are both crude and possi-
ble to circumvent. Another approach, which may be applied in parallel to filtering, is to monitor
which Web sites are being visited. If prohibited content is accessed (or attempted to be
accessed) then legal (or extra-legal) measures could be deployed as punishment.
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If this fact is widely publicized, it will discourage others from attempting to access banned
content, even if the technical measures for preventing it are inadequate. This type of publicity
has been seen in China with Jingjing and Chacha,4 two cartoon police officers who inform
Internet users that they are being monitored and encourage them to report suspected rule-
breakers.
Social Techniques
Social mechanisms are often used to discourage users from accessing inappropriate content.
For example, families may place the PC in the living room where the screen is visible to all
present, rather than somewhere more private, as a low-key way of discouraging children
from accessing unsuitable sites. A library may well situate PCs so that their screens are all
visible from the librarian’s desk. An Internet café may have a CCTV surveillance camera. There
might be a local law requiring such cameras, and also requiring that users register with
government-issue photo ID. There is a spectrum of available control, ranging from what
many would find sensible to what many would find objectionable.
Comparison of Mechanisms
Each mechanism has different properties of who can deploy systems based around them,
what the cost will be, and how effective the filtering is. In this section we compare these
properties.
Positioning of System and Scope of Blocking
No single entity has absolute control of the entire Internet, so those who wish to deploy filter-
ing systems are limited in where they can deploy the required hardware or software. Likewise
a particular mechanism will block access only to the desired Web site by a particular group of
Internet users.
In-line filtering mechanisms (HTTP proxies, TCP/IP header/content filtering, and hybrid
approaches) may be placed at any point between the user and the Web server, but to be re-
liable they must be at a choke point—a location that all communication must go through. This
could be near the server to block access to it from all over the world, but this requires access
to the ISP hosting the server (and they could simply disconnect it completely).
More realistically, these mechanisms are deployed near or in the user’s ISP, thereby block-
ing content from users of its network. For countries with tightly controlled Internet connectivity,
these measures can also be placed at the international gateway(s), which makes circumven-
tion more difficult and avoids ISPs being required to take any special action. The positioning
of surveillance mechanisms share the same requirements.
DNS tampering is more limited, in that it must be placed at the recursive resolver used
by users and is normally within their ISP. The actual list of blocked sites could, however, be
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managed on a per-country basis by mandating that all ISPs look up domain names through
the government-run DNS server.
Server takedown must be done by the ISP hosting the server and domain deregistration by
the registry maintaining the domain use by the Web site. This will usually be a country top-
level domain and so be controlled by a government. The physical location of the server need
not correspond to the country code used.
Denial-of-Service attacks are the most versatile in terms of location, in that the attacker may
be anywhere and an effective attack will prevent access from anywhere.
Finally, social influence is most effectively applied by the country that can impose legal
sanctions on the people who are infringing the restrictions, be that people accessing banned
Web sites or people publishing banned content.
Error Rate
All the mechanisms suffer from the possibility of errors that may be of two kinds: ‘‘false
positives’’—where sites that were not intended to be blocked are inaccessible, and ‘‘false
negatives’’—where sites are accessible despite the intention that they be blocked. There is
commonly a trade-off between these two properties, which are also known as overblocking
and underblocking. The trade-off between false positives and false negatives is a pervasive
issue in security engineering, appearing in applications from biometric authentication to elec-
tronic warfare. The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is the term given to the curve that
maps the trade-off between false negative and false positive. Tweaking a parameter typically
moves the operating point of the system along the curve; for example, one may obtain fewer
false negatives but at the cost of more false positives. In general, the way to improve this
trade-off is to devise more precise ways of discriminating between desired and undesired
results. This will, in general, shift the ROC curve, so that false negatives and false positives
may be reduced at the same time.
TCP/IP header filtering is comparatively crude and must block an entire IP address or ad-
dress range, which may host multiple Web sites and other services. Taking into account the
port number makes the discrimination more precise in that it might limit the blocking to only
Web traffic, but this still will often include several hundred Web sites.5 Server takedown makes
the discrimination less precise, in that it will also make all content on the server inaccessible
(including content not served over the Web at all).
DNS tampering and domain deregistration will allow individual Web sites to be blocked but,
with the exception of e-mail, which may be handled differently at the DNS level, all services on
that domain will be made inaccessible. Both may be more precise than packet header filter-
ing, as multiple servers may be hosted on one machine, and blacklisting that machine may
take down many Web sites other than the target site.
TCP/IP content filtering allows particular keywords to be filtered, allowing individual Web
pages to be blocked. It does run the risk of missing keywords that are split over multiple pack-
ets, but this would be unusual for standard Web browsers.
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HTTP proxy and hybrid approaches give the greatest flexibility, allowing blocking both by
full Web page URL and by Web page content.
Denial-of-Service attacks are the most crude of the options discussed. Since they normally
make sites inaccessible by saturating the network infrastructure, rather than the server itself,
many servers could be blocked unintentionally, and perhaps the entire ISP hosting the prohib-
ited content.
Surveillance and the threat of legal measures can be effective, as the human element
allows much greater subtlety. Even if the authorities have not discovered a site that should
be blocked, self-censorship will still discourage users from attempting to access it. However,
such measures are also likely to result in overblocking by creating a climate of fear.
Detectability
Given adequate access to computers that are being blocked from accessing certain Web
sites, it is possible to reliably detect most of the mechanisms already discussed. Mechanisms
at the server side are more difficult. For example, although the server being blocked can de-
tect Denial of Service, it may be difficult to differentiate from a legitimate ‘‘flash crowd.’’ Simi-
larly, a server that has been taken down, or whose domain name has been deregistered for
reasons of blocking, appears the same as one that has suffered a hardware failure or DNS
misconfiguration.
Surveillance is extremely difficult to detect technically if it has been competently imple-
mented. However, the results of surveillance (arrests or warnings) are often made visible in
order to deter future infringement of the rules. So it may be possible to infer the existence of
surveillance, but law enforcement agencies may choose to hide precisely how they obtained
the information used for targeting.
Circumventability
Although the mechanisms discussed will block access to prohibited resources to users who
have configured their computers in a normal way, the protections may be circumvented. How-
ever, the effort and skills required vary.
DNS filtering is comparatively easy to bypass by the user selecting an alternative recur-
sive resolver. This type of circumvention may be made more difficult by blocking access to
external DNS servers, but doing so would be disruptive to normal activities and could also
be bypassed.
TCP/IP header filtering, HTTP proxies, and hybrid proxies may all be fooled by redirecting
traffic through an open proxy server. Such servers may be set up accidentally by computer
users who misconfigure their own computers. Alternatively, a proxy could be specifically
designed for circumventing Internet filtering. Here, the main challenge is to discover an open
proxy as many are shut down rapidly due to spammers abusing them, or blocked by organ-
izations that realize they are being used for circumvention.
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TCP/IP content filtering will not be resisted by a normal HTTP proxy as the keywords will still
be present when communicating with the proxy server. However, encrypted proxy servers
may be used to hide what is being accessed through them.
Server takedown, Denial of Service, and domain deregistration are more difficult to resist
and require effort on the part of the service operator rather than those who access the Web
site. Moving the service to a different location is comparatively easy, as is changing the do-
main name—particularly if the service has planned for this possibility. More difficult is to notify
their users of the new address before the attack is repeated.
Reliability
Even where users are not attempting to circumvent the system, they may still be able to ac-
cess the prohibited resource. Provided they are implemented correctly and the hardware is
capable of handling the required processing, all except Denial of Service and social tech-
niques will block all accesses. The problem with Denial-of-Service attacks is that when
systems are overloaded, they will drop some requests at random. This results in some con-
nections, which the censor intended to block, getting through. With social techniques, if some-
one is simply unaware of the risks they may visit the banned site regardless.
Organizations implementing technical filtering systems must also build a list of sites and
pages to block. This is a considerable undertaking if the content to be blocked is a type
of content, such as pornography, rather than a specific site, such as an opposing political
party. There are commercial filtering products that contain a regularly updated list of material
commonly objected to, but even this is likely to miss significant content. Keyword filtering
(whether at TCP/IP packet level or by HTTP proxy) mitigates this partially, as only the prohib-
ited keywords need to be listed, rather than enumerating all sites that contain them, but sites
aware of this technique can simply not use the offending keyword and select an equivalent
term.
Cost and Speed
The cost of deploying a filtering mechanism depends on the complexity of the hardware
required to implement it. Also, due to the limited market, specialized Internet filtering equip-
ment is comparatively expensive, so if general purpose facilities can be used to implement
filtering, the cost will be lower.
Both of these factors result in TCP/IP header filtering being the cheapest option available.
Routers already implement logic for redirecting packets based on destination IP address and
adding so-called null routing entries, which discard packets to banned sites, is fairly easy.
However, routers can only handle up to a maximum number of rules at a time, so this could
become a problem in routers working near their limit. Adding port numbers to these rules
requires some additional facilities within the router, but as only the header needs to be
inspected, the speed penalty of enabling this is small.
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TCP/IP content filtering requires inspecting the payload of the IP packet, which is not ordi-
narily done by routers. Additional hardware may be required, which, for the data rates found
on high-speed Internet links, would be expensive. A cheaper option, which reduces reliability
but would considerably decrease cost, is for the filter to examine IP packets as they pass,
rather than stopping them for the duration of the examination. Now the filtering equipment is
not a bottleneck and may be slower, at the cost of missing some packets. When an infringe-
ment of policy is detected, the filtering hardware could send a message to both ends of the
connection, requesting that they terminate.
DNS tampering is also very inexpensive as recursive resolvers need not respond par-
ticularly rapidly and existing configuration options in DNS servers can be used to implement
filtering.
HTTP proxies require connections to be built by reassembling the constituent packets—
which requires substantial resources, thereby making this option expensive. Hybrid HTTP
proxies are more complex to set up, but once this is done, they are only slightly more expen-
sive than IP filtering despite their much higher versatility. This is because the expensive
stage—the HTTP proxy—receives only a small proportion of the traffic, and so need not be
particularly powerful.
The cost of Denial-of-Service attacks is difficult to quantify as the scale required depends
on how capable the target server is and how fast its Internet connection is. Also, it will likely
be illegal to mount this attack, at least on the territory of another country. Legality also affects
surveillance, domain deregistration, and server takedown; while easy to do, these mecha-
nisms require adequate legal or extra-legal provisions before ISPs will perform them.
Insertion of False Information
If access to a prohibited Web site is blocked, depending on the mechanism, the user experi-
ence will vary. For TCP/IP header and content filtering and Denial of Service it will appear as if
there has been an error, which may be desirable if the filtering is intended to be covert. The
other options, DNS tampering, proxy and hybrid proxy, domain deregistration, and server
takedown all give the option of displaying replacement content. This could be a notification
that the site is blocked, to be open about the filtering regime, or it could be a spoofed error
message, to be covert. Also, it could be false information, pretending to be from the authors
of the content, but actually from somewhere else.
Strategic and Tactical Considerations
It can be useful to compare filtering for censorship with filtering for other purposes. Wiretap-
ping systems, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems share many of the same attributes
and problems. In general, such systems may be strategic or tactical. A country may col-
lect strategic communications intelligence by intercepting all traffic with a hostile country
regardless of its type, source, or destination using a mechanism such as a tap into a cable. It
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may also collect tactical communications intelligence in the context of a criminal investigation
by wiretapping the phones of particular suspects or by instructing their ISPs to copy IP traffic
to an analysis facility.
Similarly, censorship can be strategic or tactical. Strategic censorship may include perma-
nent blocking of porn sites, or of news sites such as the BBC and CNN; this may be done at
the DNS level or by blocking a range of IP addresses. An example of tactical censorship might
be interference during an election with the Web servers of an opposition group; this might be
done by a service-denial attack or some other relatively deniable technique.
Censorship systems interact in various ways with other types of filtering. Where communi-
cations are decentralized, for example, through many blogs and bulletin boards, the censor
may use classic communications-intelligence techniques such as traffic analysis and snowball
sampling in order to trace sites that are candidates for suppression. (Snowball sampling refers
to tracking a suspect’s contacts and then their contacts recursively, adding suspects as a
snowball adds snow when rolling downhill.) Countersurveillance techniques may therefore be-
come part of many censorship resistance strategies.
The interaction between censorship and surveillance is not new. During the early 1980s, the
resistance in Poland used radios that operated in bands also used by the BBC and Voice of
America; the idea was that the Russians would have to turn off their jammers in order to use
radio-direction finding to locate the dissidents. Today, many news sites have blogs or other
facilities that third parties can use to communicate with each other; so if a censor is reluctant
to jam The Guardian newspaper, then its dissidents could use blog posts on The Guardian
site to talk to each other, using pseudonyms. But many of the novel and interesting interac-
tions have to do with applications.
Discussion
Communication is now a part of more and more applications. Some of these are designed
for communication, such as Skype, but bring new capabilities; in Skype’s case, it provides
encrypted communications and is also widely used. Previously, users of cryptography would
be likely to draw attention to themselves, especially in authoritarian countries. Today, Skype
and other voice-over IP (VoIP) products are used to save money on telephone bills, and pro-
vide voice privacy as a side effect.
Another example is given by Google Docs & Spreadsheets. Google purchased an online
word-processor product (Writely) and now makes it available to Internet users in many coun-
tries as Google Docs & Spreadsheets. People keep their private documents on Google’s
servers and edit them online via a Web-based interface. Such a document can be shared
instantly with other users; this provides a convenient channel for communications. In this
case, the communications are the side effect; the reason people use Google Docs & Spread-
sheets is to avoid spending money on Microsoft Office.
70 Steven J. Murdoch and Ross Anderson
The general picture is that censors—and wiretappers—perpetually lag behind the wave of
innovation. In the 1960s, computer companies fought with telephone companies for less
restricted access to the network, and the telephone companies called government agencies
to their aid so as to protect their business models (which involved owning all network-attached
devices). By the mid-1980s only a few authoritarian states banned the private ownership of
modems, and the security agencies of developed countries had acquired the capability to in-
tercept data communications. The explosion in popularity of fax machines in the mid-1980s
put the agencies on the back foot again; a handwritten fax still gives reasonable protection
against automated surveillance. When e-mail and the Web took off in the mid-1990s, the
agencies scrambled to catch up, with proposals for laws restricting cryptography, which
turned out to be irrelevant to the real problems that emerged, and more recent proposals for
the retention of communications data. Modern Google users may be largely unaffected by
all this—their searches, e-mails, word processing, and group communications may all be
cohosted.
It will be interesting, to say the least, to see how states deal with the move to edge-based
computing. Developed countries tend to observe a distinction between wiretapping that gives
access to content, and traffic analysis that gives access merely to traffic data. Most countries
require a higher level of warrantry for access to the former. However, the move to the edge
blurs the distinction between traffic and content, and there must eventually be a question as
to whether this might undermine the existing controls on state interference with communica-
tions. Other countries may be less limited by legal scruples than by technical capability and
by access. Application service providers such as Google and Yahoo! have to cooperate with
the authorities in countries like China where they maintain a physical presence, but may not
make all applications available. Small authoritarian states, that enjoy neither the physical pres-
ence of the main service providers nor the technological capability, may find their ability to
exert technical control over information flows seriously compromised, and may have to rely
largely on legal and social mechanisms.
To sum up, the Internet has borders—just like meatspace—and the quality of the borders
depends on the situation of the country that erects them.
Conclusion
Ten years ago, Internet utopians like John Perry Barlow held out the prospect that state-
sponsored barriers to communication would be swept away, leading to a significant improve-
ment in the human condition. Some less-developed countries denounced this as ‘‘U.S.
Information Imperialism.’’
The Internet is more complex than previous mechanisms (such as the postal system and
telephones). Control is not impossible, but it requires more sophistication, and the censors are
continually playing catch-up as technological innovation changes the game. The migration of
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communications into the application domain will increase complexity further, and raise
interesting policy questions—but there may be different questions in developed and less-
developed countries.
The utopians are sometimes seen as having lost; the Internet does have borders now. How-
ever, information is much more free than it was ten years ago, and the real question is whether
one sees the glass as being half empty or half full. There is no doubt that modern communi-
cations technologies—including the mobile phone as well as the Internet—have greatly facili-
tated the dissemination of news, cultural exchanges, and political activism. Even in developed
countries, new technologies from blogs to videophones have increased the potential for sur-
veillance, but have also helped people hold officials to account.
Notes
1. Richard Clayton, Steven J. Murdoch, and Robert N. M. Watson, ‘‘Ignoring the Great Firewall of China’’ in 6th Work-
shop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (Cambridge, England, 28–30 June 2006).
2. Maximillian Dornseif, ‘‘Government Mandated Blocking of Foreign Web Content,’’ in Security, E-Learning,
E-Services: Proceedings of the 17, ed. J. von Knop, W. Haverkamp, and E. Jessen (DFN-Arbeitstagung über
Kommunikationsnetze, 2003).
3. Richard Clayton, ‘‘Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System,’’ in Fifth Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technol-
ogies (Dubrovnik Cavtat, Croatia, 30 May–1 June 2005).
4. Xiao Qiang, ‘‘Image of Internet Police: Jingjing and Chacha Online,’’ China Digital Times, http://chinadigitaltimes
.net/2006/01/image_of_internet_police_jingjing_and_chacha_online_hon.php (accessed February 19, 2007).
5. Ben Edelman, ‘‘Web Sites Sharing IP Addresses: Prevalence and Significance,’’ Berkman Center for Internet and
Society (September 2003).
72 Steven J. Murdoch and Ross Anderson
4
Filtering and the International System: A Question
of Commitment
Mary Rundle and Malcolm Birdling
Introduction
This book reflects a certain skepticism about filtering trends. Behind this skepticism is both
an acceptance that freedom of expression (including the right to seek, receive, and impart in-
formation and ideas) is a basic human right under international law, and a sense that many
governments’ filtering practices represent an obstruction of this right. To ground these as-
sumptions, this chapter seeks first to set out generally what constitutes international law, to
whom it applies, and in what contexts, and second to consider how these concepts relate to
filtering. At the heart of the matter is the question of if and how legal means can be used
to regulate Internet filtering at an international level to protect freedom of expression.
This chapter introduces several elements in considering filtering from a human rights
perspective—including international law as commitments among state actors, the setting out
of human rights in international law, and filtering as a potential obstruction of the human right
to freedom of expression. This chapter finds that international human rights agreements pro-
vide a valuable framework for determining what constitutes permissible and impermissible fil-
tering, but that these instruments fall short on the enforcement end due to widespread filtering
and states’ apparent reluctance to take action against one another. The chapter then turns
to consider domestic approaches for holding private actors accountable internationally, but
notes that these approaches are inadequate on their own. Finally, the chapter points to the
promise of international standards for enabling nonstate actors to prevent broadscale filtering
and thereby facilitate the exercise of freedom of expression.
The Backdrop
The modern international system dates from the Peace of Westphalia (1648),1 which estab-
lished the principles of 1) state sovereignty2 and the right of self-determination; 2) legal equal-
ity among states; and 3) nonintervention of states in one another’s internal affairs. In this
system, states are the actors, giving life to international law as they create it together and
agree to be mutually bound by it. As such, international law rests on the consent of sovereign
states.
States as Intermediaries
Since nonstate actors in current international law are understood to fall under the jurisdiction
of states, it is states that have the authority to spell out rules and to bind both themselves and
these subordinate actors. If states want international law to apply directly to nonstate actors
such as citizens or businesses, they may commit to creating common obligations within their
respective jurisdictions; they may also establish international rules and designate bodies to
deal directly with nonstate actors.
For the most part3 states have not created obligations that bind nonstate actors at the inter-
national level. Instead, states have been intermediaries between citizens and the international
system.
Trend toward Disintermediation
A certain disintermediation may be taking place as international bodies are increasingly deal-
ing directly with citizens. As discussed in some depth here, the primary international treaty
addressing civil and political rights carries with it an optional instrument that states may sign
onto if they wish to allow private parties to bring complaints to an international body. In addi-
tion to that avenue, the Internet may be ushering in a new trend whereby individuals enjoy rec-
ognition at the international level. Just as the Internet has reduced the role of middlemen in
many areas of e-commerce, so it may be allowing citizens of the world’s diverse jurisdictions
to interact directly with international institutions. For example, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) has established an Arbitration and Mediation Center4 to resolve Internet
domain name disputes. Here, individuals are recognized as having standing, or the right to
bring a case to the tribunal, and so do not have to rely on national governments to do so.5
By providing a similar type of process that an agency at the national level would, mechanisms
for Internet governance are spurring international integration.
Reflecting changing attitudes toward the role of nonstate actors in the global Information
Society, forums have been established under the United Nations to foster dialogue among a
full range of ‘‘stakeholders’’ on issues relating to the Information Society. The World Summit
on the Information Society represented an extensive effort along this line, bringing together
thousands of stakeholders for meetings in Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005).6 As a result of
the Geneva meeting, the U.N.’s Secretary-General convened a Working Group on Internet
Governance to feed analysis into the Tunis meeting.7 While the Working Group was com-
posed of a limited number of individuals from government, the private sector, and civil society,
it held open consultations to hear views from a full range of stakeholders. Among issues
studied by this group were the roles of all actors in the Information Society.
Continuing in this vein, the U.N.’s Internet Governance Forum, a product of the Tunis meet-
ing, now takes submissions from any contributor and offers an open forum for multistake-
holder discussion on matters relating to Internet governance. While this body has not been
endowed with decision-making power, it nonetheless can be seen as representing new at-
tempts to factor views of nonstate actors directly into international policy–making.
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Despite these signs of nonstate actors’ gaining recognition at the international level, for-
mally the international system still treats states as the relevant actors, and others enjoy status
only to the limited degree to which states choose to confer it upon them.
Empowering International Institutions
When states consider the prospect of empowering an international agency to serve as a
forum for setting and administering global rules, they face the danger that they will create an
institution that will eventually gain enough credibility that it in effect becomes freestanding. As
that new authority amasses influence at the international level, its authority is no longer con-
sciously considered to derive from the agreement of the individual member states that com-
prise it, and instead this authority is simply presumed to accompany the institution. At this
stage, the authority of the member states themselves may even be questioned if their direc-
tion deviates from the central institution’s course.8 Indeed, this tendency is apparent in many
people’s conceptions today, where international law is perceived to have moral authority due
to its international quality. It is no wonder, then, that a state may be wary of assigning powers
to an international institution in the first place.
Public International Law and Modern Human Rights
Human rights law in large part concerns the relationship of the individual and groups of indi-
viduals to the state. At a fundamental level, it carries questions concerning the source of
rights. For example, some people contend that human rights are ‘‘natural rights’’ that are uni-
versal as part of the world’s inherent nature, or that derive from higher, religious authority and
do not stem from mere human beliefs or actions; people subscribing to this view tend to be-
lieve that natural rights exist regardless of what a government or society might establish and
enforce. Others, such as utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham, have categorically rejected the
notion of natural rights.9
Debates on the source of human rights multiply when considering the application of these
rights in an international context. International legal instruments relating to civil and political
rights were heavily influenced by the West in the midtwentieth century and reflect a Judeo-
Christian heritage. As such, human rights were presented as stemming from the fact that all
people have been created by God, and hence all should be on equal footing. Because other
regions (e.g., Asia) have not historically had this orientation, there has been an ongoing de-
bate as to whether the rights are truly ‘‘universal’’ at all.
In essence, this international twist is a variation of the question of whether human rights
stem from natural rights or from positive acknowledgment of them by the state. If human
rights are thought to stem only from their recognition by the state, international human rights
are just a matter of negotiation among states as to what they deem priorities to be in light of
state interests. On the other hand, if human rights are thought to exist independently of the
state, they have a place of their own in the international system and therefore should not be
subject to horse trading.
Filtering and the International System 75
Global Citizens
Some people might argue that society is already so integrated internationally that the relation-
ship between a state and citizens is no longer hierarchical; rather, the relationship is seen as
transformed to one of overlap, where a state is ascribed with authority over those ‘‘global citi-
zens’’ who happen to fall within its territorial jurisdiction. Given the amorphous boundaries of
cyberspace, this territorial distinction begins to appear murky.
Meanwhile, the Internet lends support to newly emerging forms of transnational, ‘‘post-
sovereign’’ political communities. Such groups, including diaspora and aboriginal commun-
ities, fit poorly within either a state or a global citizen network framework. Demands for
increased autonomy and self-determination by such communities defy the old paradigm of
state sovereignty, while particularistic claims challenge the paradigm of universal human
rights. Although such communities may have existed previously, the Internet has given them
new political life as they can more rapidly create transnational polities that exercise relatively
substantial influence. How these new forms of political interaction interrelate with human rights
in general, and freedom of expression in particular, is a complex matter.10
Quasigovernmental Private Action
In the midst of these ambiguities, additional quandaries arise when the behavior of private,
nonstate actors resembles state action. Private actors such as corporations may provide ser-
vices that people usually conceive of as the state’s responsibility. For example, a private actor
might build infrastructure (providing water, electricity, roads, or, arguably, an Internet infra-
structure). When private actors take on governmental functions—either through direct delega-
tion or mandate by government or as a result of government simply allowing them to carry out
activities—should they be considered agents of the state, bound by the same obligations to
which the state is bound?
Of course, if a private actor were performing governmental functions across jurisdictions, it
could prove challenging to assess on whose behalf it was acting as a state agent. For the
sake of maintaining accountability to the public, the international system may need to find a
way to hold private actors to a similar standard as states when they act internationally in gov-
ernmental capacities.
Practical Implications
The questions presented here are not merely esoteric. Rather, their answers very well may de-
termine the kind of regulatory regimes that the Information Society puts in place. More funda-
mentally, the questions go to the heart of relationships among individuals, states, overlapping
polities, multinational enterprises, the international system, and the Information Society as a
whole.
The subject of filtering demonstrates some very practical implications of these theoretical
issues. For example, filtering poses problems in that a state may claim a sovereign right to
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determine what constitutes acceptable content that people within its jurisdiction may seek, re-
ceive, or impart, whereas the international system may assert a role in overseeing the exercise
of human rights, including freedom of expression. Similarly, filtering exemplifies the definitional
challenge that presents itself when private action amounts to state action. If a corporation has
an effective monopoly on the supply of an Internet service, is it assuming a governmental
function if it controls access to information according to what it determines to be acceptable
content? Does it matter whether the corporation is doing so of its own accord or whether it is
doing so in response to a government mandate? Should such corporations be considered
agents of the state, bound by the same freedom of expression obligations to which the state
is bound? What responsibilities does a state have for filtering by private actors operating with-
in its jurisdiction? What rights does a person or a group of people have in this mix? How
should jurisdiction for filtering be determined in cyberspace?
Before such questions can be approached, it is helpful first to consider the current interna-
tional legal landscape.
Key International Legal Instruments
Since the end of World War II, ‘‘human rights’’ in the international arena have moved from be-
ing largely a tool of political rhetoric to a substantive set of concrete legal obligations among
states. The most obvious evidence of this development is the enshrining of rights in a number
of binding international documents. At the regional level, countries within several geographical
areas have grouped together to form human rights institutions and to create human rights
obligations applicable within these areas. Alongside these formations has been the develop-
ment of a truly international set of human rights, established under the United Nations frame-
work. These rights find form in a set of treaties creating legal obligations on states to do, or to
refrain from doing, certain activities. Because these international instruments offer a global
approach and enjoy wide ratification in a way that maps well to the Internet’s international na-
ture, they are the basis of discussion in this chapter.
The applicability of pre-existing legal instruments to the realm of the Internet has been
affirmed by international bodies. The World Summit on the Information Society (referenced
earlier) endorsed a Declaration of Principles that, among other things, proclaims that freedom
of expression in an Internet context is indeed protected by pre-existing instruments. The ques-
tion then becomes precisely what do these instruments provide, and are they appropriate for
the regulation of filtering in this ‘‘new’’ medium?
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The starting point for this consideration is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the
UDHR), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. Passed
in the shadow of World War II, the Declaration is not a treaty, but rather an authoritative
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statement by the international community of certain values that are said to be so universal in
character as to qualify as ‘‘human rights’’—rights all humans, irrespective of their geographi-
cal locations, are said to possess. The preamble entreats all individuals and organs of society
to ‘‘strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recog-
nition and observance.’’11
Article 19 of this seminal document contains the broadly worded statement that ‘‘everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opin-
ions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers.’’12
This statement’s significance should be understood in the wider context of the importance
that the UDHR itself has been accorded across all spheres of human activity. While the UDHR
has not been without controversy, today, almost sixty years after its adoption, it is still cited
and relied upon on a daily basis by individuals, organizations, and governments across the
globe. At the very least it has been used as a firm touchstone by which to measure the moral-
ity of individual and governmental action.
The inclusion of a broad, unfettered guarantee of freedom of expression in such a weighty
document is a clear statement of international acknowledgment of such a right. The U.S.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law goes as far as to say that a breach of the
UDHR may actually amount to a breach of the United Nations Charter, meaning that the pro-
tection of the right to freedom of expression may be a legal obligation on all states, irrespec-
tive of whether they have ratified any of the international human rights treaties described
below.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Most of the rights enumerated in the UDHR have now received concrete legal form in a series
of treaties created, monitored, and enforced under the auspices of the United Nations. Preem-
inent among these instruments is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which provides in part the following:
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
a. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
b. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
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Article 20
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrim-
ination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.13
The ICCPR was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966 and
entered into force a decade later. As a treaty, its provisions have direct legal application only
in those countries that have voluntarily opted to become parties. This ratification has been ex-
tensive. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
160 states are party to the ICCPR.14 Among them are the following countries whose filtering
practices are covered in studies by the OpenNet Initiative: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Belarus, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, North Korea, the Russian Federation, South Korea,
Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.15
As with the declaration, the ICCPR is significant as a statement of a fundamental, minimum
set of conditions for the observance of human rights. The legitimacy of the ICCPR in this re-
gard can be seen not only in its widespread ratification, but also in the myriad bodies that refer
to it. A number of domestic courts, legislatures, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
international bodies frequently refer to the ICCPR directly when making decisions in which the
rights are implicated.
It is important, then, that the ICCPR also contains a broad, unquibbling guarantee of free-
dom of expression. Its provisions guarantee, subject to certain limits (discussed later), the
‘‘freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.’’
The breadth of this conception is best appreciated by making comparisons to the way sim-
ilar rights are framed in other documents and interpretations. Many domestic constitutions
draw distinctions, for example, between different forms of speech, and afford varying levels
of protection depending on the nature of the content. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example,
once considered that advertising was outside the scope of constitutional protection accorded
to freedom of speech. While the Court has now softened that absolutist position, advertising is
still not entitled to the same protection under the U.S. Constitution as other forms of expres-
sion. A similar stance has been articulated with regard to ‘‘obscene’’ speech. This tapered
rendition of freedom of expression differs from the conception in the ICCPR; indeed, the very
words with which the ICCPR right is expressed precludes such a narrow interpretation and
demands an expansive understanding of the right.
This broad reading has been confirmed by the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC), a body of experts established under the ICCPR to scrutinize state compliance with
the ICCPR. In considering a challenge to laws restricting commercial advertising, the UNHRC
held that the right ‘‘must be interpreted as encompassing every form of subjective ideas and
opinions capable of transmission to others . . . [including] news and information, of commercial
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expression, of works of art, etc.; it should not be confined to means of political, cultural or ar-
tistic expression.’’16 Further, the Committee did not agree that different kinds of expression
can be subjected to greater restrictions than others.
However, the rights elaborated in the ICCPR are expressed as being held by natural per-
sons—that is, they pertain to individual human beings rather than explicitly extending as well
to legal, or juridical, persons (e.g., corporations). The UNHRC has avoided any difficulties in
the freedom of expression context by stating that the right is by its nature ‘‘inalienably linked to
the person,’’ and that individuals enjoy freedom of expression with respect to their businesses,
for example, having a right to use the language of their choice. As such, an individual person’s
right to freedom of expression should hold even if the primary purpose of the expression is to
promote a company.
Article 19 also provides that this right is to apply ‘‘regardless of frontiers and through any
media.’’ This express lack of qualification is particularly important as it underscores the fact
that the right extends across a wide variety of media.17 As such, arguments that the Internet
is somehow different in nature, and immune from scrutiny, should fail.
As a document of some decades’ standing, the ICCPR has seen many changes in the
structure and organization of the mass media, and its machinery has responded accordingly.
The UNHRC has noted that a completely state-controlled media is inconsistent with the right,
as are restrictive licensing regimes for television and radio stations.18 Given the medium-
neutral nature of the right, the ICCPR would also be likely to prohibit a similarly restrictive
system of state registration for Internet publishers—for example, a system requiring video
bloggers to submit to an unduly rigorous licensing regime.
The right to freedom of expression as articulated in these international documents is ex-
tremely broad and was intended to be applicable to all types of media—existing now or in
the future. Hence, any state restrictions on the distribution of information via the Internet would
seem to constitute a restriction (although not necessarily a breach) of the right to freedom of
expression under the ICCPR.
Limitations on the Right
The right to freedom of expression as set out in the ICCPR is not absolute, however. The text of
Article 19 states that the exercise of the right carries with it ‘‘special duties and responsibilities’’
and that it ‘‘may therefore be subject to certain restrictions.’’ While critics of the ICCPR may
argue that the exceptions to the right are so broadly drawn as to render the right meaningless,
this characterization is not accurate. The permissible scope of such restrictions is in fact narrow.
Article 20 of the ICCPR spells out the most straightforward cases in which restrictions are
appropriate; indeed, the language even creates a positive obligation on states to restrict ex-
pression in relation to war propaganda and advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence. States are obliged to pro-
hibit these in their domestic legal systems. In other words, filtering of this form of information
would not only be permitted but arguably required by the ICCPR.
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Another positive obligation to restrict expression appears in Article 17(2), which obliges
states to protect individuals from intentional interference with their honor and reputation.19
These Articles cover affirmative requirements to restrict freedom of expression. Outside
such cases, it falls to individual states to determine which restrictions they wish to place on
the right. The ICCPR does curb the exercise of this power by states by providing in Article
19(3) that such restrictions must be 1) provided by law and 2) necessary for ensuring the
respect of the rights or reputations of others, or for the protection of national security, public
order, public health, or public morals. It should be emphasized that this is an exhaustive list of
the situations in which restrictions are allowed—there are no other grounds on which limita-
tions on freedom of expression are permissible, and states are not permitted to invent further
grounds. Similarly, a state cannot cite inconsistent domestic laws as a reason for noncompli-
ance with the human rights provisions of the ICCPR.
The requirement that any limitation must have its basis in law means that there must be
some affirmative lawful basis for filtering (whether it be a clearly worded statute, or a similarly
clear judicial decision or series of decisions). Vaguely worded statutes will not suffice, nor will
the vague exercise of administrative discretion. This precision is important as it allows individ-
uals to understand the restrictions to which their expression may be subject.
The requirement that restrictions must be shown as necessary for a legitimate purpose trig-
gers an inquiry into the proportionality between the extent of the interference with freedom of
expression and the importance of the purpose of the restriction. It is not sufficient for a state to
make a bare assertion that its actions are necessary to achieve the purpose.
A review of the situations under which the UNHRC has upheld restrictions on freedom of
expression, as well as general guidance issued by U.N. bodies, reveal a number of principles
that can guide states in determining whether a proposed action meets the ICCPR necessity
test.
First, the application of restrictions is to be narrow. This narrowness requirement is particu-
larly important where justifications for restrictions are offered on the basis of alleged national
security or public order imperatives. The UNHRC has noted that justifications on these
grounds are the most frequently abused by invocation to protect the position of the govern-
ment of the day, rather than truly to protect citizens’ rights.20 In the filtering context, if a state
were to block all political Web sites during an election in the name of public order, it is dubious
whether the restrictions would meet the standard of necessity.
Limitations on the freedom of expression in the name of public morals raise similar con-
cerns. The UNHRC initially suggested that states possessed a certain ‘‘margin of appre-
ciation’’ with respect to what was necessary to protect ‘‘public morals’’ in any given
jurisdiction.21 However, the concept of such a margin was expressly rejected by the Commit-
tee in a subsequent case concerning other rights.22 This would tend to suggest that states
cannot rely on such a margin when considering their obligations under the ICCPR.
Second, the necessity of restrictions must be convincingly established by the state. In addi-
tion to narrowly tailoring exceptions, a state must provide adequate justification for restrictions
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it imposes. This second principle in showing necessity is generally applicable to all instances
where states seek to justify limitations on rights. A state limiting the freedom of expression has
a duty to demonstrate convincingly that the measures taken are necessary and proportionate
in pursuing legitimate aims.23 In this regard, the UNHRC has pronounced that ‘‘the legitimate
objective of safeguarding and indeed strengthening national unity under difficult political cir-
cumstances cannot be achieved by attempting to muzzle advocacy of multi-party democracy,
democratic tenets and human rights.’’24
The UNHRC has clearly stated that any restrictions must ‘‘not put in jeopardy the right
itself.’’25 In other words, a total clampdown on freedom of expression—even if imposed in
the name of ensuring the respect of the rights or reputations of others, or protecting national
security, public order, public health, or public morals—would never be deemed justifiable.
Reservations
A final word is warranted before leaving the general subject of limitations. As international law
is based on the consent of sovereign states, it is possible for a state to place reservations on
international treaties it ratifies in some circumstances. These reservations will limit the extent of
the reserving state’s obligations under the relevant treaty. It is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter to undertake a review of such reservations in the context of the ICCPR, but one salient
point is worth noting: A number of states specifically made a reservation to Article 19 to the
effect that they retained the power to regulate radio and television broadcasts. These states
became parties to the ICCPR before mass communication via the Internet emerged. Accord-
ing to the UNHRC, states will not be permitted to extend a specific reservation to provide a
more general exception from the ICCPR rights.26 Thus, it would be highly unlikely that the
UNHRC would accept that a state’s reservation with regard to radio and television broadcasts
permitted it, by analogy, to regulate the Internet in a similar fashion.
Applying International Law to Filtering
In light of the provisions spelled out above, the vast majority of current filtering practices would
seem to fall short of the requirements of international law since 1) most filtering measures are
not specifically provided by law, and 2) it is unlikely that these measures would meet the
ICCPR necessity test.
Nevertheless, to give some concrete examples of how filtering practices might comply with
certain ICCPR provisions procedurally or substantively, this section refers to some specific
practices by states.
Measures Provided in Law
With respect to ICCPR requirements that any limitations on the freedom of expression be
expressly ‘‘provided in law,’’ a state might establish procedures for making its filtering prac-
tices open and transparent. Disclosing that such filtering practices are in effect, according to a
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specific law or court order, is a step in the right direction. An example in this regard is the way
that Iran has created a Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Sites, which is le-
gally empowered to identify sites containing prohibited content. To meet the ICCPR standard,
the law under which the filtering is carried out should be clear and nonarbitrary.
Ironically, a state can use procedures to impose content restrictions, and these procedures
(again, if sufficiently clear and nonarbitrary) can help that state comport with ICCPR obliga-
tions to specify policies in precise law. A state may impose licensing requirements—for exam-
ple, the way Uzbekistan requires cybercafes to comply with a ‘‘standardization procedure’’
carried out by a government agency before starting operation. A state also may enact regis-
tration requirements—for example, the way South Korea requires bloggers and Web content
developers, or even cybercafes and end users, to associate their online activities with their
real-world identities. In addition, a state may assign liability to Internet service providers
(ISPs) for content that is delivered to users—for example, the way Iran holds ISPs criminally
liable for content. Self-monitoring requirements are another form of procedures that a state
can use to restrict activity—for example, the way China drills the message that ‘‘the Internet
is a public space’’ to warn people to check their own behavior. In each of these procedural
moves, if specific laws are set out, states may in fact be complying with one of the ICCPR’s
conditions for limitations—even as they erect filtering mechanisms.
Complying with the requirement that restrictions be provided in law does not guarantee that
the processes as a whole are compatible with the ICCPR; rather, in imposing the restrictions,
states still must comply with the requirement that restrictions be necessary.
Measures Necessary
With respect to the requirement that limitations on the freedom of expression be ‘‘necessary,’’
states also can use procedures to target filtering for specific objectives, so that the scope of
the filtering is not too broad. Procedures that allow public oversight and accountability act in
this vein. For example, Pakistan has established a Deregulation Facilitation Unit to redress
grievances in the event of errors or overblocking.
Seeking to comply with the ICCPR requirement that limitations on freedom of expression be
justified as necessary, states naturally emphasize the substance of filtering measures, or what
they are targeting. States sometimes assert that measures are undertaken for the purpose of
respecting the rights or reputations of others (one of the permitted grounds for limitation). For
example, China partially justifies its use of rights management tools by saying this filtering
helps to enforce intellectual property rights. Similarly, Malaysia’s Internet regulatory authority
explicitly targets abusive or harassing content.
So, too, states justify limitations as being necessary for the purpose of protecting national
security, public order, public health, or public morals. For example, United Arab Emirates cites
these goals in justifying its legislation on hacking, the accessing of illegal sites, and the use of
digital signatures.
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Text box 4.1 breaks this process down into basic elements so as to offer guidance for how
a filtering state might avoid violating international law even as it limits freedom of expression. It
is important to remember, however, that a state’s compliance with these requirements is nec-
essary, but not in itself sufficient, to satisfy the state’s obligations. To be compliant, the mea-
sures must be actually necessary for the purposes the state asserts that they are necessary
for—the state’s bare assertion that this is the case will not be sufficient.
None of the filtering regimes covered in studies by the OpenNet Initiative appear to
have been crafted to meet international commitments on freedom of expression. As states
grow more aware of their obligations, it will be interesting to see whether they modify their fil-
tering practices to honor these commitments. In the meantime, it seems the international sys-
tem is struggling with extensive filtering habits that are out of proportion with legitimate
objectives.
When considered in light of technology’s tendency to act as a sort of ‘‘law’’ that can govern
society,27 requirements that filtering be provided in law and be necessary are marked with an
extra nuance. Surely the idea behind these requirements is to promote precision, to allow peo-
ple to know what measures apply, and to promote government accountability to the public.
Does it not follow that the technologies used in filtering should be precise, transparent, and
justifiable as well?
Problem of Enforcement
Having examined obligations that states have agreed upon at the international level, and hav-
ing briefly explored how these obligations mesh with filtering practices, it is logical next to
examine the machinery by which these obligations can be enforced. It is here that the weak-
nesses of the international system become apparent.
The international human rights instruments rely largely on states themselves to implement
their commitments at a domestic level. International enforcement also falls on states them-
selves. To this end, the ICCPR contains express obligations on states to ensure that this
occurs (Article 2).
However, due to political realities, such guarantees are of little use unless they are accom-
panied by sanctions for violations. It is here that the UNHRC has the potential to play a critical
role.
Monitoring under the ICCPR
The ICCPR requires states, upon request by the UNHRC, to provide a report on their compli-
ance with obligations under the treaty. According to the rules of the Committee, a state must
prepare a written report, which the UNHRC then examines. State representatives are usually
present to answer questions, and the UNHRC also hears from relevant NGOs and other civil
society organizations. At the conclusion of the process, the UNHRC issues a report containing
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Box 4.1
An unofficial guide to filtering legally
To filter in a way that honors international human rights commitments on freedom of ex-
pression, a government can use the following as an unofficial guide:
1. PURPOSE
The state believes restrictions on freedom of expression are necessary to .
[Example: . . . prevent people from using the Internet to stir up violence against a par-
ticular ethnic group.]
2. STATEMENT OF WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
Therefore, the government decides to pass a law to .
[Example: . . . limit hate speech.]
3. SPECIFIC EXPLANATION OF HOW FILTERING WILL BE CARRIED OUT
To ensure that people can understand the law and can check to see that its applica-
tion is not arbitrary, the government spells out .
[Example: . . . what exactly is beyond the limits of acceptable speech and how it will
be filtered.]
4. PERMITTED LIMITATION AS LISTED IN ICCPR ARTICLE 19 OR 20
In grounding this action in a justification acceptable by international law, the govern-
ment indicates that this restriction is necessary .
[Check all that apply:]
r for respect of the rights or reputations of others;
r for the protection of national security;
r for the protection of public order;
r for the protection of public health;
r for the protection of morals;
r for the prohibition of propaganda for war;
r for the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that consti-
tutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.
5. PROCESS TO TELL PEOPLE WHAT IS HAPPENING AND CORRECT ANY PROBLEMS
To help ensure that the law is not implemented in an arbitrary or overly broad man-
ner, the state provides a mechanism whereby .
[Example: . . . if a Web site is blocked, Internet users receive a message 1) indicating
why this filtering has occurred, according to what specific law, and 2) telling them
how they can report a problem and receive a response.]
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‘‘concluding observations’’ on the state’s compliance including areas of concern and recom-
mendations for action.
The effectiveness of this process is contingent on cooperation by states. Noncooperation
has been a frequent problem with the system, and one which the UNHRC is taking an increas-
ingly active role in monitoring. However, the presence of NGOs provides a very real opportu-
nity for the human rights issues experienced in a given jurisdiction to be identified, thereby
reducing the ability of a state to subvert the process by providing inaccurate information.
That said, the UNHRC’s recommendations under this procedure are simply that—
recommendations—and are not binding. Additionally, the institutional constraints and chronic
underresourcing endemic within the U.N. system limit the ability of the Committee to conduct
searching and comprehensive analysis of the situations within states.28
This reporting process is the only supervisory mechanism that applies automatically under
the ICCPR. Article 41 of the treaty provides that states may take complaints against other
states to the UNHRC if both states have previously agreed that the UNHRC has jurisdiction
to do so. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this procedure has never been utilized.
Complaints from Individuals
A potentially more effective procedure is one that allows individuals to make complaints to the
UNHRC about a state’s failure to secure their rights under the ICCPR. The process is signifi-
cant because it gives direct enforcement rights to affected people. This standing is in marked
contrast to the traditional model of international law, which recognizes only states as actors.
Of course, this process is only available if the state concerned has previously become a party
to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (Optional Protocol), a separate treaty that provides
jurisdiction for this process.
In this Optional Protocol process, the UNHRC begins by determining if the complaint is ad-
missible. This essentially involves a determination of whether the complaint is from a victim of
an alleged violation of rights in the ICCPR, whether the individual has exhausted all available
domestic remedies, and whether the state concerned is a party to the Optional Protocol.
If a complaint is admissible, the merits are then considered, and the Committee subse-
quently issues its ‘‘views.’’ The use of the term views is significant: the UNHRC’s role in adju-
dicating such complaints is to ensure consistency with the ICCPR, and the body is not
intended to function as an international court. As a consequence of this arrangement, its
decisions are not binding and have normative status only. History has shown that in many
cases a state party against whom there has been a ruling will comply with the Committee’s
recommendations—whether that compliance entails offering recompense to an affected indi-
vidual or repealing an inconsistent piece of legislation.29
A starting point when examining the effectiveness of the Optional Protocol mechanism is to
examine which states are even party to this supplemental instrument. To date, there are some
109 state parties.30 Among countries whose filtering practices are studied by the OpenNet Ini-
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tiative, the following are party to the Optional Protocol: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyz-
stan, Libya, Moldova, Nepal, the Russian Federation, South Korea, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.
While the number of state parties may give the impression of a large degree of support for
the Optional Protocol, and while in many cases state parties comply with recommendations,
Committee views that are issued under this instrument are often outright ignored by errant
states. Two states (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) that have frequently found themselves
on the receiving end of adverse views from the UNHRC have denounced the Optional Proto-
col altogether.31 In the absence of stronger enforcement powers, a decision to flout the views
issued by the UNHRC may simply be a political calculation.
Moreover, the Optional Protocol expressly requires that a complaint come from an individ-
ual victim. This limits the ability of NGOs or other representative groups to challenge state
practices in the abstract. It would not be possible, therefore, for a group such as Amnesty In-
ternational to challenge a state’s filtering practices before the Committee—the challenge
would have to come from an affected individual. This requirement poses problems, especially
in light of the fact that in several documented cases individual petitioners faced further perse-
cution from their governments for having exercised their right to petition.32
Finally, the limitations of the U.N. system already noted have a constraining effect on the
ability of the Committee to conduct thorough analyses of claims brought under the Optional
Protocol.
Overall, then, the Optional Protocol mechanism provides a good way for individuals to hold
some states to account for incursions on the right to freedom of expression. For Internet filter-
ing policies, it is theoretically possible for provisions of the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to
have significant effect. However, given the practical difficulties mentioned here, it is doubtful
that this treaty represents an adequate means for deterring and punishing states that oppres-
sively filter Internet content.
The Overall Ineffectiveness of International Law
To summarize: States cannot claim that their obligations under international law surrounding
Internet filtering are unclear. To the contrary, the obligations are quite clear. Comprehensive
filtering of Internet content amounts to a violation of the broadly conceived right to freedom
of expression. For filtering to be permissible under the ICCPR, measures must be grounded
in specific law and necessary. However, state compliance remains difficult to secure. The
UNHRC affords some possibility for redress, but correction relies to a large extent on the
goodwill and political situation of the state that has violated its commitments. While many
states may refrain from filtering in order to honor freedom of expression (either because they
value this right or because they wish to avoid domestic and international pressure), for errant
states, there is little incentive to comply with international law in this area. In short, the weak
enforcement capabilities of international human-rights institutions send a message that the
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international system will tolerate flagrant filtering abuses and fail to defend freedom of
expression.
Filtering Curbs through Trade Policy
Taking as a given the notion that freedom of expression is desirable and deserving of pro-
tection, but questioning the ability of the international system to enforce commitments under
the ICCPR in a meaningful way, one might look to other avenues for enforcement. Because
agreements under the World Trade Organization (WTO) include the possibility for dispute set-
tlement backed by economic remedies, it has been suggested that one way to enforce free-
dom of expression would be to cast it as a market access issue and to seek redress by
bringing a case before a WTO panel.33
In a nutshell, the theory of such a case would be as follows: If a member had committed to
giving market access for the production, distribution, marketing, sale, or delivery of content,
but nonetheless was filtering in a way that obstructed this trade, another member whose
economy had suffered from the action would request the WTO to establish a panel to hear
the case.
The case would not necessarily be clear-cut, however. Similar to the way that the ICCPR
allows limitations, Article XIV of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
permits members to make exceptions to their market-access commitments if taking measures
necessary to protect public morals, health, or safety; to maintain public order; or to bolster
consumer protection. Article XIVbis extends these exceptions to include measures in the inter-
est of security.
The WTO case Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Ser-
vices34 brought by Antigua and Barbuda against the United States demonstrates how these
provisions would be understood to interact with market access commitments. In this chal-
lenge, the United States relied in part on GATS Article XIV in defending restrictions on the sup-
ply of gambling and betting services via the Internet.35 In determining whether the measures
were necessary, the Appellate Body indicated:
The standard of ‘‘necessity’’ provided for in the general exceptions provision is an objective
standard. To be sure, a Member’s characterization of a measure’s objectives and of the ef-
fectiveness of its regulatory approach—as evidenced, for example, by texts of statutes, leg-
islative history, and pronouncements of government agencies or officials—will be relevant
in determining whether the measure is, objectively, ‘‘necessary.’’
A panel is not bound by these characterizations, however, and may also find guidance in
the structure and operation of the measure and in contrary evidence proffered by the com-
plaining party. In any event, a panel must, on the basis of the evidence in the record, inde-
pendently and objectively assess the ‘‘necessity’’ of the measure before it.36
The Appellate Body then explained how it applies this standard:
The process begins with an assessment of the ‘‘relative importance’’ of the interests or
values furthered by the challenged measure. Having ascertained the importance of the
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particular interests at stake, a panel should then turn to the other factors that are to be
‘‘weighed and balanced.’’
A panel then considers two main factors as it continues in its determination of a measure’s
necessity: ‘‘One factor is the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued
by it; the other factor is the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce.’’37
According to this interpretation, it is the WTO panel itself that is to determine whether a
member’s exceptions are justified. Although a panel pays deference to a member’s decision
to invoke Article XIV,38 the panel makes its own assessment of the importance of the objective
and evaluates the measure’s effectiveness in accomplishing that objective when balanced
against the measure’s restrictive effect on trade.39
Extrapolated, the implication is that future trade panels could rule illegal a member’s filtering
practices if the measures conflicted with another member’s trade interest. So, for example,
China’s use of filters to prevent its citizens from accessing Web sites displaying the word de-
mocracy could be struck down if a panel did not find the purpose of the measure compelling,
or if it found the approach too heavy-handed given the negative effects on trade.
In light of these WTO provisions, one could argue that the multilateral trading system sup-
ports freedom of expression. While a nice effect, it is important to bear in mind that the WTO’s
competence is in the area of market access. In this particular international context, the value
that governments have embraced and empowered panels to adjudicate concerns open trade,
and the effects on freedom of expression are mere offshoots.
To the degree that the institution and its members’ acting through it delve into these social
questions, they do so reluctantly. For one reason, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has as
its purpose to handle disputes relating to market access; a member is not supposed to bring
a claim for the sake of protecting human rights, and indeed government agencies responsible
for conducting trade policy are typically focused on economic relationships.
Practically speaking, for a filtering case to come to the WTO, a company would need to lob-
by its home government to bring the case on the basis that another government’s measures
were hurting the home country’s economic interests.40 However, if a company were hurt eco-
nomically by the host country’s measures, that economic harm might be due to damage suf-
fered from bad public relations in another market. It would be challenging for a home-country
government to argue that the host government’s measures directly caused these side effects,
and it would be difficult to prove the amount of injury in monetary terms.41 Moreover, the
home-country government might not wish to spend its international negotiating capital and
dispute settlement resources on such a case.
Although a government might not be inclined to bring such a case before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, it is feasible that in the future such a hearing might not be so dependent on
a government’s decision to bring it. For several years now experts have argued that private
parties deserve to have standing before tribunals for WTO-related matters.42 Such an ar-
rangement could result in a deluge of dispute settlement cases, as states would no longer
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select which disputes to bring according to overall political or economic importance for their
economy. Indeed, if states ceased to play this intermediary role, WTO agreements would
result in a very extensive regulatory framework for the Information Society.43
Viewing this scenario as a matter of using international trade law to enforce human rights,
one might ask if the concern were for freedom of expression, or for market access. If it were
for market access but the effect were that freedom of expression enjoyed protection, would
that be sufficient for those people desiring to see enforcement of human rights by the interna-
tional system? No doubt privacy advocates would be chagrined at the prospect of the same
logic requiring a striking down of limitations designed to protect privacy, with market access in
that case hurting the cause of civil liberties.
All in all, dispute settlement in the trade context appears a rather blunt and indirect in-
strument for enforcing freedom of expression among states. Although the WTO offers an in-
teresting example of enforcement capabilities at the international level, the system has been
designed for promoting commerce rather than for protecting human rights. A liberalized trad-
ing system may promote the exercise of freedom of expression, but relying on trade policy to
protect this fundamental human right could send a message that freedoms are subordinate to
trade.
More systemically, integration may eventually bring such issues to a head as value systems
are forced to reconcile. By making it possible for people in different places to interact with one
another and spurring common institutional approaches, the Internet is causing integration to
occur at a pace more rapid than ever experienced. As the distinction between cyberspace
and the real world fades with technology’s incorporation into nearly all facets of life, this inte-
gration arguably will be a fact. In this sense, institutions at the center of interactions over the
Internet—including the WTO—may experience a sort of triumph as states become dependent
on them instead of granting them piecemeal authority.44
The Need for a Different Approach
Reinforcing human rights by targeting states is often unsuccessful because the international
system lacks effective enforcement mechanisms.45 Meanwhile, with respect to freedom of ex-
pression in particular, empirical studies by the OpenNet Initiative have shown that the practice
of government filtering is on the rise globally, and, as discussed earlier, it is questionable
whether such filtering comports with the requirements of the ICCPR. As more and more
governments adopt such practices, it seems that countries may be legitimizing these substan-
dard (and arguably unlawful) measures and letting them become part of accepted interna-
tional practice. Should the international system instead move toward penalizing filtering
practices that do not fit within the permissible limitations of the ICCPR?
Fundamentally, states’ commitments to enforce protections for human rights are weak be-
cause there are still relatively few economic drivers and other factors of state interest. States
see little reason to raise state-to-state conflict over the issue of freedom of expression. When it
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comes to the question of doing so in a neutral, international body designed for this purpose,
states do not wish to give up sovereignty by setting up a solid international regime, even if
enforcement of human rights is faltering.
Assuming that states consciously are refraining from pushing for stronger international hu-
man rights protections, one might ask if there is a tension between the rights of people and
the interests of the state.46
But is this the end of the story? Might private actors be brought into the equation?
Shifting the Emphasis to Private Actors
Again, in the traditional international system, states have not wanted to negotiate treaty terms
to hold companies and other private actors accountable for human rights violations. Generally
speaking, states see a sovereign interest in mediating between persons under their jurisdic-
tion and persons elsewhere (including juridical persons). In the filtering context, the home gov-
ernment does not want to pressure its own citizens or companies, even if the state generally
favors freedom of expression; meanwhile, the host government often is trying to compel com-
panies to repress freedom of expression (or simply withdraw from its market). Under these
conditions, there is little to bring such states to the negotiating table in the name of freedom
of expression.
Given the increasingly governmental role played by private actors—for example, providing
the means for Internet filtering, or carrying out such filtering themselves—many groups are
now seeking ways to hold these private actors accountable. The possibility, in some jurisdic-
tions, of bringing entities before domestic courts for involvement in human rights violations in
a third country has received significant attention as a potential tool for protecting the right to
freedom of expression in the face of restrictive filtering practices.
The United States’ Alien Tort Claims Act
Usually domestic courts will concern themselves only with the application of domestic law and
will not consider cases that allege violations of international law. Despite this predominant
practice, some countries have adopted legislation to allow domestic courts to consider cases
arising under international law. Legal systems that do so to a greater or lesser degree incor-
porate international law into domestic law. Perhaps the best example of such a process is the
United States’ Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). Passed in 1789, ATCA provides U.S. federal
courts with jurisdiction to award damages where an alien sues for a tort (i.e., a civil wrong)
committed in violation of ‘‘the law of nations’’ or ‘‘a treaty of the United States’’—even if the
wrong occurred outside the United States.
While the ATCA has been on the statute books for more than two centuries, it is only in the
past twenty-five years that it has sprung to life.47 This vitalization occurred largely as a result
of a 1980 Federal Appeals Court decision that held that the ‘‘law of nations’’ included
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‘‘established norms of the international law of human rights,’’ and that such norms could
therefore form the basis of an ATCA claim.48 Since then, the ATCA has led to some sizeable
awards against perpetrators of human rights abuses. Awards typically have been in the mil-
lions of dollars.49
Whereas international law treats states as actors, a development in the ATCA has been the
extension of liability to private actors who have been responsible for assisting with violations.50
In the domestic context, states themselves are immune from liability under the ATCA.51
These developments—targeting nonstate actors in the enforcement of international
norms—have prompted academic discussion of the possibility of using the ATCA as a tool
for punishing corporations who assist states with Internet filtering; attention has focused in
particular on U.S. corporations’ involvement with Internet filtering in China.52 While this pros-
pect is interesting theoretically, it should be noted that any such claims would face several sig-
nificant hurdles.
At the outset, it would first be necessary to convince a federal court that the right to freedom
of expression is actionable under the ATCA. Making this argument would be complicated
given the conclusions of the U.S. Supreme Court in its first judgment concerning the ATCA in
2004: the Court concluded that while caution was necessary, claims for breaches of rights
were possible, provided that they were defined with specificity as were the limited number of
international law rules in the late eighteenth century (when the ATCA was passed), and that
they were based ‘‘on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world.’’53
This double hurdle need not be insurmountable. Regarding specificity, freedom of expres-
sion in an international context is clearly defined and admits only limited exceptions. While
there is room for debate about some borderline cases, the existence of a breach should be
clear where a state has a legal culture of wholesale filtering. However, the Supreme Court
was skeptical as to whether the UDHR and the ICCPR had achieved sufficient acceptance to
allow actionable claims under the ATCA. Such a precedent would inform the deliberations of a
court considering a claim that a nonstate actor who had engaged in filtering violated the right
to freedom of expression. The court would have the responsibility of determining whether the
requisite standard of clarity and acceptance was met in the freedom of expression provisions
of the UDHR and the ICCPR. It would seem that a convincing argument could be made that
freedom of expression is indeed actionable under the ATCA.54
Next the defendant would have to establish the connection between the activities of the cor-
poration and the breach of the right. There has been considerable debate over what standard
of involvement is appropriate, and it is not entirely clear what test would be applied by a court
adjudicating a potential claim.55 However, the present leading authority is a 2002 federal
Court of Appeals decision, which rejected an argument that it was necessary to show that
the company in question was an active participant in the abuse for liability to occur under the
ATCA, and which instead held that it was only necessary for the company to give ‘‘knowing
practical assistance or encouragement’’ that had ‘‘a substantial effect’’ on the perpetration of
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the abuse.56 One leading commentator has suggested that this looser standard is only appro-
priate where the conduct amounts to a violation of international criminal law (such as torture),
rather than international human rights law (such as a violation of the right to freedom of
expression).57
The standard that is ultimately applied by a court will have a significant impact on the scope
of behavior that is potentially captured by the ATCA. It has been suggested that corporations
that facilitate state Internet filtering by providing the required software or hardware may be lia-
ble,58 or that liability may occur where an Internet content provider transfers to a repressive
regime information that allows the regime to punish individuals for statements they have
made on the Internet.59 In the latter situation, the connection between the company’s actions
and the repressive act by the state is clear. However, if the company’s actions were more
passive—say, agreeing to filter results according to certain government criteria—meeting the
test of a connection between the company’s activities and the breach may be more difficult.
All in all, there is a very real possibility that this process could be used to enforce the right to
freedom of expression by giving individuals standing, and holding companies liable, under the
ATCA for their involvement in Internet filtering.
In addition to the ATCA in the United States, there are signs that similar enforcement tech-
niques are being developed in other major jurisdictions—notably within the European Union
(EU). In this regard, Professor Dinah Shelton has noted a 1999 resolution of the European Par-
liament ‘‘on EU standards for European enterprises operating in developing countries,’’ which
refers to a European Community law that provides that ‘‘a corporate decision or policy caus-
ing harm abroad may permit tort suits in EU courts against the parent company or branch of
the company responsible for the decision.’’60 This resolution is significant in that it raises the
possibility of ATCA-style claims within the EU system.
In terms of what impact such suits may have, the prospects for successful claims may not
be as important as the existence of a formal venue for laying bare the extent of corporate co-
operation in filtering activities. It has been suggested that the value of these processes lies not
so much in the way the suits award vast damages, but rather in the way they generate suffi-
cient adverse publicity so as to force corporations to cease the impugned activities.61 As with
state actors under the UNHRC process, some companies will be more susceptible to this
pressure than others.
These examples may point to a new trend of countries creating mechanisms whereby inter-
national law can be enforced domestically, thereby enabling private actors to be subject to
claims or to bring them. These approaches may be the most immediate way of accounting
for private actions and giving persons a mechanism for seeking redress. Moreover, given the
reluctance of states to hold each other to agreed-upon standards, the best hope of reinforcing
international human rights may be to make private actors accountable. Nonetheless, these
domestic approaches still leave gaps in that they are limited jurisdictionally and cannot afford
equal treatment to all people around the world.
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Indeed, the ATCA approach is far from the ideal of human rights standards applying equally
to all persons around the world. After all, why should today’s global citizens suffer disparate
enforcement of their rights, with redress available only in limited jurisdictions that in any event
are applying a variant of law originally designed to address actions of different (i.e., state)
actors?
Corporations could ask similar questions: Why should competing companies be held to dif-
ferent standards, with those having ties to jurisdictions that value freedoms confronting costs
that others do not, and with a state applying standards to them that it has failed to require the
intended subjects (i.e., its treaty partners) to follow?
International Antibribery Conventions
Of course, the idea of holding corporations to account in one jurisdiction for actions done
elsewhere is not new, and valuable lessons for the filtering context can be learned in particular
from past attempts to promote ethical behavior among corporations acting internationally. In
particular, a hybrid process involving both domestic and international enforcement has devel-
oped in recent years in another area pertaining to ethical behavior of private actors, namely, in
the area of bribery. Antibribery conventions represent the one area where binding rules have
been put in place by states acting jointly to regulate responsibilities of transnational corpora-
tions and related business enterprises with regard to human rights.62
The fight against bribery stands out for its lessons on the futility of single-country attempts
to hold companies accountable at the domestic level for their international activities, on the
one hand, and the success of broader-based efforts to do so in multiple jurisdictions act-
ing in concert, on the other hand. In 1977 the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) to make it a crime for U.S. corporations to offer bribes for interna-
tional contracts. While the FCPA may have given a company a credible reason to refuse to
comply with a foreign official’s demand for a bribe, that company ended up losing contracts
to foreign competitors who not only were permitted to pay this extra expense but also
were allowed to take a tax deduction for it. Simply stated, the FCPA put U.S. companies at
a tremendous disadvantage vis-à-vis others in their global activities involving foreign direct
investment.
At the time, most foreign direct investment was flowing from countries that were members
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As corporations
began to be plagued by international corruption scandals and increasingly large bribery
demands in the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a political willingness in the OECD to join
the United States in standing against corruption. The OECD and five nonmember countries63
adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention) in 1997.64 By doing so together, these countries
agreed to hold their companies to a common standard and so helped to level the playing field
for more ethical conduct. They also adopted the Revised Recommendations of the Council on
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Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions to flesh out details in the following
areas: international cooperation; the non-tax-deductibility of bribes; accounting, auditing, and
public procurement; and measures to deter, prevent, and combat bribery.65
Once this critical mass was met in the foreign direct investment community, introducing the
idea into an even wider, multilateral setting became quite feasible, and proponents were able
to achieve the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (U.N. Conven-
tion) in 2005. By July 2006, the U.N. Convention had 140 signatories and 60 ratifications or
accessions.66
Beyond addressing the problem of questionable corporate conduct in foreign jurisdictions,
the antibribery conventions also suggest a shifting identity of the state in the international sys-
tem. The arrangements under both the OECD and the U.N. entail similar components includ-
ing the following:
 Harmonizing domestic law in states that are party to the convention.
 Tailoring domestic law to criminalize undesirable activities on the part of private actors
operating abroad.
 Involving civil society to help bring violations to the attention of state parties.
 Establishing transparency and accountability mechanisms for questionable activities of
private actors operating abroad.
 Giving international processes central oversight over convention implementation (i.e., pre-
vention, investigation, and prosecution of crimes), with a monitoring of state parties’ en-
forcement of the convention in their respective jurisdictions to ensure rigor.
 Setting out a process whereby state parties may sort out disputes among themselves and
bring them before an international body should they not be able to settle the matter.
 Allowing additional mechanisms to be created for further international cooperation under
the convention.
Through this international cooperation, states are more able to govern entities under their ju-
risdiction by holding them to ethical standards while not disadvantaging them vis-à-vis com-
petitors in markets around the world; however, states do so at a price—that is, they are
pooling power in a joint body to avoid a race to the bottom. Arguably they are upholding their
societies’ ethical standards for the sake of their own citizens, but at the same time they may
be diluting the relative political power of citizens within their polity as degrees of sovereignty
are conceded. As such, perhaps states are giving credit to the concept of global citizenship
in the Information Society.
The experience with antibribery conventions suggests international cooperation can help
overcome the difficulty that a state faces in holding companies to ethical standards when
other markets are governed by different rules. Companies had a tough time under one
country’s law requiring higher ethical standards until their counterparts elsewhere in the
world—that is, the main companies they had to compete against—became subject to similar
standards. Once a critical mass of states agreed to a common approach, companies were
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able to refuse to give in to corruption pressure elsewhere, and they saw their public images
and profit margins improve.
This model could provide a viable avenue forward for the area of filtering. In particular, it
offers hope that states can cooperate in developing international standards for private actors
in the area of freedom of expression, especially as private actors feel pressured to submit to
host-country government demands to carry out filtering programs.
Might states cooperate in this way to hold private actors accountable for operations affect-
ing freedom of expression?
The Promise of International Standards
This chapter suggests that international legal instruments designed to protect human rights by
holding states accountable have been norm-setting but toothless. The prospects for change
in these instruments are not strong because it is difficult for states acting collectively through
the international system to establish effective remedies for violations by states. Given this
lack of enforceability, the cause of international human rights suffers from a chronic legal
deficiency.
Because international law generally does not directly bind private actors, companies today
can violate international human rights standards with relative assurance that they will not face
charges in an international tribunal. Nonetheless, this apparent impunity may work against
those that wish to comply with international human rights standards when governments try to
compel companies to restrict freedom of expression through techniques like filtering.
Companies complain they are stuck between Scylla and Charybdis in cases where a host-
country government requires a breach of international law by imposing broad filtering man-
dates that contradict international standards for freedom of expression. Naturally, a company
must comply with the laws of the different jurisdictions where it operates, and it is not for the
company to decide what the law should be or to straighten out the failures of international law.
Rather, the decision for the company to make is whether or not to do business in a given mar-
ket. However, given the competitive economic pressures brought by globalization, a company
may in fact need to do business in certain markets if it is to survive.
Guiding a company’s decisions on whether to do business in a market are factors such as
the company’s charter or management and the potential for profits, though these factors are
not rigid. If the company’s charter or management calls for certain ethical conduct, and if the
jurisdiction where it would like to operate has lower standards, the company might neverthe-
less choose to do business there in hopes of making a positive difference. If the company’s
charter or management does not itself call for certain ethical conduct, the company might
nonetheless choose to follow higher standards in response to loud calls issued by groups try-
ing to affect company behavior, even if those calls hail from another market altogether. (For
example, outcries by loud individuals in the west in 2006 affected the course of western
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Internet-related companies operating in China.) In this sense, a company’s commitment
to higher standards might be displayed for public relations purposes with a view to pre-
serving the company’s image (even to stave off negative public relations in other markets),
or it could be shown as a manifestation of that company’s sincere desire to protect human
rights.67
While international law as agreed among sovereigns may protect human rights by setting
norms only, there may be an additional route to bolstering freedom of expression; that is,
states may be willing to draw up a new treaty to apply standards to private actors, and private
actors meanwhile could proactively pledge themselves through commitments that they take
on voluntarily.
Drawing on the ATCA and antibribery examples, an effective enforcement mechanism could
prompt companies to follow international legal standards for the sake of limiting their own lia-
bility and exposure to adverse publicity; companies could cite the threat of liability as an ex-
cuse when they wished to refuse to comply with mandates to repress freedom of expression.
If such an approach were applied on a global level (as in the case of the U.N. Convention
against Corruption), it could help avoid the clash of conflicting legal regimes and instead pro-
vide companies with a global standard they could say they were obliged to follow.
In this regard, states could begin negotiating a binding treaty complete with domestic har-
monization requirements and international cooperation in prevention, investigation, and en-
forcement. While they do so (a process that will take considerable time), corporations could
develop their own codes of ethical conduct for freedom of expression. Such voluntary commit-
ments would allow companies to align themselves in support of human rights and equip
themselves with a valid response when asked by repressive regimes to suppress communica-
tions; the force of a treaty reinforcing these obligations through legal harmonization and inter-
national cooperation would send an added signal to those regimes.
In this sense, then, international law could provide a set of internationally recognized mini-
mum standards that would help reconcile tensions. Since international human rights principles
already have been agreed upon and have enjoyed a transnational stamp of legitimacy over
the years, these same principles could provide a minimum standard for corporate responsibil-
ity. Because additional commitments to follow these standards would be voluntary, they would
allow companies to choose to bind themselves in taking an even stronger stand against re-
pressive practices.
Given the tendency of the Internet to push global rules, and given the expectation that the
distinction between the real and virtual worlds will fade, a good starting point perhaps would
be to pare down the ambition to Internet-related practices. Efforts are already underway in this
regard. For example, one of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society
was the tasking of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) with facilitating work on ‘‘ethical dimensions of the Information Society.’’ This man-
date was spelled out in the Geneva Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action and elaborated
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in the Tunis Agenda. Under the framework of this mandate, UNESCO has begun developing a
code of ethics. Interestingly, the first draft of what they are calling a ‘‘Code of Ethics for the
Information Society’’ envisions a reporting mechanism, similar to the OECD’s Anti-Bribery
Convention and the U.N. Convention against Corruption. In addition, the draft instrument
affords a mechanism whereby additional, voluntary ‘‘Specific Ethical Commitments’’ may be
offered by private actors, who may join states in signing onto the general document.
While this effort is going on in that forum, another process stemming out of the World
Summit on the Information Society—that is, the Internet Governance Forum—affords the
opportunity for all stakeholders to consider freedom of expression in the Information Society
and possibly to articulate shared values. A ‘‘Dynamic Coalition on Freedom of Expression’’
has spontaneously formed following the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum
(Athens, autumn 2006).
By working through state-established intergovernmental organizations, the approaches
would avoid chipping away at the institutional groundwork already laid for the international
protection of human rights, and instead would enable future human rights endeavors to build
upon this foundation. Meanwhile, by paving avenues for nonstate actors to have a meaningful
voice in the development and implementation of these protections, the approaches would
help operationalize the Geneva Declaration of Principles, which called for technical and public
policy issues of Internet management to ‘‘involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovern-
mental and international organizations’’ and to be handled in a way that is ‘‘multilateral, trans-
parent and democratic.’’68
Such simultaneous approaches offer the hope of allowing citizens of the world to experi-
ence equal human rights in the global Information Society.
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5
Reluctant Gatekeepers: Corporate Ethics on a
Filtered Internet
Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey
Introduction
Picture a corporate boardroom in the headquarters of a large information technology com-
pany in the north of Europe. The chief business development executive has just made a pitch
to the board: the company should offer its Internet-based service, delivered over a variety of
devices, in east Asia. Her plan is that the firm should start with the white-hot Chinese market
and then turn to Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore. Each of these new markets promises
enormous growth.
In each case, the plan calls for a strategy of first entering into joint ventures with local Inter-
net companies, then seeking local investors to set up a stand-alone subsidiary once each trial
is successful. Competitors, she argues, will not be far behind. The company might well find
itself in the posture of the follower if it does not move quickly. Several board members, each
of them outside investors, sound a note of approval.
The general counsel, though, has a few words of warning before the board takes a vote on
the proposal. He is concerned about the regulatory requirements that the corporation will face
in these new markets. The company needs to be prepared to censor the content it is offering,
to disallow users to publish certain information through the service, and to turn over informa-
tion about the identities of its subscribers upon demand. These are typical requirements when
operating almost anywhere—even liberal democracies identify information to be removed,
such as that which infringes copyright, or meets some test of obscenity. They require help
identifying users at times, and some impose blanket data retention requirements for these
purposes.
But in more authoritarian places like China the practices have extra bite. The information the
government seeks to censor can relate to civic dialogue and freedom, and the people they
seek to identify might be political dissidents or religious practitioners. Often, the requirements
to redact or block will be stated or implied only generally without specific requests for individ-
ual cases, which means that the company must be prepared to operate in something of a
gray zone, trying to divine what the regulators have in mind—and act to censor without explicit
orders to do so.
To support his case, the general counsel notes that some of America’s most prominent
Internet companies have found trouble trying to follow local law against a backdrop of interna-
tional criticism. Yahoo! has been faulted for turning over information about a journalist that
allegedly led to his arrest and imprisonment—for no crime that a court in Yahoo!’s home juris-
diction of California could recognize. Cisco has been attacked for selling the routers and
switches that make censorship and surveillance possible. So, too, has Microsoft, for offering
a blog service that generates an error rejecting ‘‘profanity’’ when a user includes the word de-
mocracy in the title of a blog. Google has come under fire for offering a search product in
China that omits certain search results compared to what its other offerings provide. Side-by-
side comparisons of a Google image search for Tiananmen Square in http://google.com and
http://google.cn starkly show the results of censorship; for anyone who can see both sets of
images, the latter lacking any shots of a person staring down a tank in 1989, is forced to con-
sider what it would be like to live under an authoritarian regime. There is no reason why we
should be any different, he concludes.
Successful technology companies must now focus on more than simply implementing great
ideas that people will pay for. In the earliest days of the Internet, the relevant markets were
modest in size and close to home. A local Internet Service Provider once could profit by offer-
ing a dialup Internet access service over plain old telephone lines to people who lived near the
corporate headquarters. Few of the big players involved were large, publicly traded entities.
Revenue projections commonly looked like hockey sticks pointing toward bright blue skies.
And, most important for the purposes of this chapter, states left alone the Internet and the
companies that built it and its many services. The prevailing orthodoxy was that a regulator
that required too much of companies doing business on the Internet would unduly restrict
the early growth of online activity, and might find associated high-tech jobs going elsewhere.
Few states placed any kind of liability or responsibility on intermediaries for troubles arising
from the activities and transactions they facilitated.
More than ten years into the Internet revolution, these are no longer the facts on the ground.
The Internet is big business in which entrenched players—and not just what were once called
dot-coms—with colossal market capitalizations compete with one another over multi-billion-
dollar revenue streams. Their markets span much of the globe. Most important, some states
have increasingly forced companies that provide Internet services to do more to regulate
activity in the Internet space. This approach applies a new kind of pressure on nearly every
corporation whose business involves information and communications technologies (ICTs),
especially when the pressure is piecemeal or downright contradictory from one jurisdiction to
another, and when the desired regulation contravenes the values of the company’s owners or
customers. While liberal democracies have so far remained remarkably hands-off as the Inter-
net has matured, the desire of more closed regimes to tap the Internet’s economic potential
while retaining control of the information space confines the options for these firms.
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As this book makes plain, over the past five years there has been a steady rise of Internet
filtering practices from a handful of states in 2002 to over three dozen states in 2007. The
most extensive of these filtering regimes are found in states in the Middle East and North
Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The job of on-
line censorship and surveillance is difficult for the state to manage itself, if not altogether
impossible.
To carry out these practices, states turn to private firms to provide the tools and services
necessary to effect the censorship and surveillance. Most of the high-profile incidents of this
type have involved well-known technology companies based in the United States and their
efforts to enter the Chinese markets. But this issue is about more than a few companies and
about more than one emerging market. Almost any business in the information technologies
or telecommunications space might find itself in this position. These private firms include
hardware manufacturers, software firms, online service providers, and local access providers,
among others.
The shareholders in large technology companies reasonably expect continued growth of
market volume or share, and improved profit margins. The pull of markets farther from home
is powerful. The shares in these firms are often publicly traded by investors in the state in
which they are chartered. In many instances, the social norms and conceptions of civil liber-
ties in the new target market are dissonant with the norms and liberties enjoyed where the se-
nior executives and most powerful shareholders of the corporation live. An everyday act of law
enforcement in an authoritarian market looks like a human rights violation to a more liberal
one. That act may in fact contravene international human rights standards—and some share-
holders, concerned about matters beyond growth and profits, are starting to ask hard ques-
tions of corporations about their involvement in such practices.
The ethical problem arises when the corporation is asked to do something at odds with the
ethical framework of the corporation’s home state. Should a search engine agree to censor its
search results as a condition of doing business in a new place? Should an e-mail service pro-
vider turn over the names of its subscribers to the government of a foreign state without know-
ing what the person is said to have done wrong? Should a blog service provider code its
application so as to disallow someone from typing a banned term into a subject line?
These questions—prompted by the hard cases that lie between simple acts of law enforce-
ment and clear violations of international norms—are not easily answered through legislation
or international treaty. Laws fashioned in this fast-moving environment to lay out what orders
corporations must resist in authoritarian states—really, laws about laws—may function as a
hopelessly trailing indicator. The firms involved in this quandary should not be seen as a
single bloc. They represent a range of levels and types of involvement in censorship and sur-
veillance regimes.
In the context of the cyberlaw literature, these questions ask us to assess ‘‘second-order’’
regulation of the cyberenvironment. From a public policy angle, the question is not whether to
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impose any control over private actors online, but rather what constraints might be placed on
those private actors with respect to the first-order regulation. When states disagree with each
other, private actors chartered in one state and operating in the other can become proxies in
the fight.
The most efficient and thorough way to address this conundrum is for the corporations
themselves to take the lead. The corporations, as an industry, are best placed to work to-
gether to resolve this tension by adopting a code of conduct to govern their activities in these
increasingly common situations. This approach could, at a minimum, clarify to end-users what
they need to know about what companies will and will not do in response to demands from
the state. At best, the industry might be able to resist the most excessive first-order demands
of the state with a corresponding benefit for civil liberties online. The corporations should call
upon the knowledge and goodwill of NGOs, academics, public officials, and others to help
frame this code of conduct. The drafters of the code should consider neither the firms nor
the markets to be singular in terms of their respective ethical obligations, but rather consider
them to be disaggregated. The goal of drafting and putting in place a code should be to
establish a meaningful, flexible, and lasting solution to the problem of corporate ethics on
a filtered Internet, a solution that may be as much process as substance, creating mecha-
nisms for the resolution of questions as they arise that earn the acquiescence of their first-
order regulators, and the respect of their customers and their second-order regulators.
First-Order Regulation of the Online Environment
The initial debate over the regulation of the online environment, as we describe in chapter 2,
was whether or not states could regulate online activity. Cyberlibertarians—often derided as
cyberutopians—took the provocative view that cyberspace was so different that states could
not reach it. That debate is now settled. The answer is that they can, more or less in the ways
that they have regulated offline activity. Whether or not states should regulate the online envi-
ronment in comparable manner to how they have regulated in the past is a more complicated
matter.
We refer here to ‘‘first-order regulation’’ of the Internet as this first generation of questions.
The large issues covered in Lawrence Lessig’s Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, the de-
finitive text in this area, comprise a reliable list.1 Should the state regulate speech online—
whether hate speech, political speech, or otherwise? Should the state step in to protect user
privacy? Or listen in on the conversations of citizens in the service of law enforcement? What
is the proper role of the state in granting and enforcing intellectual property rights in ideas and
expression, or brand and trade secrets, in the online environment? In each instance, virtually
every state with a significant population online has exerted some control of this ordinary sort.
The story of this chapter, though, is about whether regulation should come into play in re-
sponse to this first-order regulation of private actors doing business in other jurisdictions. The
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relevant first-order regulation is the extent to which states have required corporations to cen-
sor search results, to configure software in such a manner as to block certain expression, to
collect and turn over data, and so forth.
Second-Order Regulation of the Online Environment: More State Control, Greater
Pressure on Private Parties
As more states place pressure on intermediaries to help control the online space, other states
may try to prevent such control, often by imposing their own regulations—a form of second-
order regulation of the online environment. This notion of second-order regulation presents
a new issue: how to evaluate the regulation that some states place on some firms, based in
other jurisdictions, when it comes to activity in the online environment.
This issue has arisen most prominently in the context of the United States Congress inquir-
ing into the activities of several of its most prominent technology firms in the Chinese markets,
though as we argue in this chapter, the issue is much broader than such a precise frame
would suggest. The first-order regulation is China’s requirement that a search engine censor
the results that are presented to users in response to a search query, as part of broader prac-
tices prohibiting online service providers from disseminating information that may ‘‘jeopardize
state security and disrupt social stability.’’2 At issue is not simply whether the first-order regu-
lation is warranted, but rather whether the United States should regulate the activity of the firm
chartered in its jurisdiction when it competes in the Chinese markets. In some cases, no first-
order regulation has yet been applied, but regulation of the second-order type—of the export
control variety—has been proposed.
One reason for focusing on this ethical problem at an early stage of its development is that
in a global technology marketplace, such second-order regulatory issues are likely to continue
to arise. A mode of responding to these issues in the context of online censorship and surveil-
lance may pay dividends over time as structurally similar quandaries come to the fore.
New Markets, New Modes of Control, New Challenges
As Faris and Villeneuve’s review of the data in chapter 1 indicates, Internet filtering occurs pri-
marily in three regions of the world: the Middle East and North Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and
the Commonwealth of Independent States. China continues to be the case that garners the
most public attention, given the size of its market and the extent to which the state has set
in motion the world’s most sophisticated filtering regime. But China is far from alone, as
more than two dozen states carry out some form of Internet censorship and surveillance on-
line. Further, large, regionally powerful states—China, the Russian Federation, and India, for
instance—that provide downstream Internet service to smaller states are poised to pass
along their filtering as well.
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To add to the complexity of the matter, the mode and extent of censorship and surveillance
varies substantially from one state to another as the data in this book make plain. There are
several ways for states to filter and monitor. The most direct means is through the use of tech-
nology. In its simplest form, the state requires the reprogramming of the routers that lie be-
tween the individual end-user and the broader network. The job of the new code is to block
certain packets from reaching their destination or simply to learn and record the contents of
those packets and who is sending or receiving them. Sometimes it is apparent to the end-
users that their requests for certain Web pages have been blocked by the state thanks to spe-
cial messages substituted for the destinations the users have sought; more often, it is not so
apparent. The manner and extent to which censorship takes place online is easier to prove,
while surveillance is more elusive.
Online censorship and, potentially, surveillance, is carried out through nontechnical means
as well. These controls are sometimes imposed by law: end-users might be prohibited from
accessing or publishing certain information that is deemed to undermine public order or other
state interests. Such laws are typically very broad, hard to understand, and even harder to fol-
low with any degree of precision. These controls are also imposed most effectively as part of a
package of soft controls, whereby cultural norms drive censorship or surveillance into the
home or local community, often resulting in extensive self-censorship.
Integrated Modes of Online Control: Combining the Technical and the Legal
The most salient form of filtering is direct technical control implemented by legal controls
trained on private actors who lie between an end-user and the network at large.3 The state,
unable to carry out filtering effectively on its own, requires private actors to carry out the cen-
sorship and surveillance for them. This requirement comes as a formal or informal condition of
holding a license to provide Internet-related services in that state.
So, for a large search engine like Google, the mandate from the state may be to ensure that
search results provided to citizens of that state do not include links to online content banned
in that jurisdiction. In some cases, like insistence by the German and French governments
that search results to Nazi propaganda be excised, Google’s censorship of search results is
controversial only to die-hard civil libertarians, especially when the ways to circumvent such
filtering are open secrets. (Germans wishing to search for Nazi propaganda can simply use
google.com instead of google.de.) In other cases, like China, where a much broader range
of politically and culturally sensitive results are excluded, the public response is one of broader
concern.
Likewise, the provider of a blog publishing tool may be prompted to include controls that
disallow an individual publisher from including certain words in the title of a blog post. Micro-
soft found itself in this quandary in 2005. After a successful launch of its MSN Spaces product
in the United States market, Microsoft rolled out a Chinese version of the service. MSN
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Spaces operated differently in China than it did in the United States, however. If a blogger
using the U.S.-branded version of the service decided to type democracy into the title of a
blog post, there is no problem. In China, that same blogger is presented with an error mes-
sage: ‘‘You must enter a title for your space. The title must not contain prohibited language,
such as profanity. Please type a different title.’’ Automated screening of content is also
coupled with specific interventions: in 2006, MSN abruptly pulled the blog of a Chinese-based
journalist using the pseudonym Michael Anti, apparently at the behest of Chinese authorities.4
Corporations hosting blogs told ONI researchers in interviews of the persistent fear of being
asked to perform one-off censorship tasks of this sort. It is plain that these firms do not relish
this job, but fear retribution if they do not comply with the local mandates.
An Internet service provider might be required to keep records of the online activity of all or
some of its subscribers, or to monitor who seeks to access certain kinds of content. The pro-
vider of a Web-based e-mail service might be required to turn over the e-mail messages of a
user identified by the government. Yahoo! has been faced with this dilemma several times. In
the United States, Yahoo!’s lawyers routinely respond to law enforcement requests for infor-
mation about subscribers, pairing an IP address or an e-mail name with other subscriber in-
formation. But in China, the stakes are different for the same activity: in at least two instances,
Yahoo!’s local affiliate, now Alibaba, has turned over information about users of its e-mail ser-
vice that allegedly has landed journalists in jail. The crime involved, related apparently to polit-
ical dissent, would be no crime at all if committed in the state where Yahoo! is chartered.
Though less of a concern to multinational firms, cybercafés can be required to maintain
logs of who uses their computers. The cybercafé owner can be called upon to report on the
identity of a certain Web surfer who used a given PC during a given time interval. Some are
asked to call a special number on the fly if the online activity of a customer sets off certain
alarms bells.5 As Internet connectivity increases, often through broad access at shared termi-
nals, this mode of control continues to become more effective over time.
Two Taxonomies of Private Actors Facing This Quandary
Different technology firms are called upon by states to carry out quite different online censor-
ship and surveillance tasks. In seeking to fashion a policy response, it helps to disaggregate
the firms implicated in this matter. Two taxonomies, one more helpful than the other, offer
ways to disaggregate these firms and those firms that may soon join them in this awkward
position.
The first approach is to consider the nature of the firms’ business, which is most useful for
determining the firms that might get drawn into an ethical controversy of this sort. We include
this taxonomy primarily as it is the orientation that casual observers ordinarily bring to the
issue. While useful for the purpose of determining to whom this issue is relevant, this taxon-
omy is far less helpful in terms of informing what to do about it.
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The more useful taxonomy considers the nature and level of involvement of the firms in the
online censorship and surveillance regimes. The second taxonomy points the way forward
more clearly toward a solution by identifying the various ways in which firms are implicated in
these regimes and offering means of distinguishing the different types of ethical obligations
they may bear.
Types of Firms
Several types of corporations might find themselves called upon to act as gatekeepers. The
first corporations to find themselves involved in the censorship and surveillance controversy
were technology hardware providers that sold the switches and routers involved in these
regimes. In many parts of the world, Internet security firms sell the services and products
used in the censorship and surveillance regimes. More recently, content and online service
providers, whose customers are typically end-users, have been implicated. Looking ahead,
other telecommunications service providers may well find themselves in a similar position as
technologies and forms of digital content converge.
Hardware Providers First, technology hardware manufacturers face scrutiny for their sales
of routers, switches, and related services to the regimes that carry out online censorship and
surveillance practices. According to the critique of human rights activists, companies like
Cisco and Nortel that profit from the sale of the hardware that blocks the flow of packets
online or enables states to trap and trace online communications are acting unethically. The
problem, the critique goes, is akin to the Oppenheimer problem in the context of nuclear tech-
nologies. While nuclear technologies can provide energy efficiently to those who need it, the
same means can also power weapons of mass destruction of unprecedented power. The
hardware manufacturers respond that the technologies sold to regimes that censor and prac-
tice surveillance are precisely the same as those technologies sold to firms and governments
in states that do not carry out such regimes. This issue is not new, these firms respond. Dual-
use technologies present this issue in an untold number of contexts. And the blame should be
placed on those who implement the dual-use technologies in the suspect manner, not on
those who produce the ‘‘neutral’’ technologies.
Software Providers The second class of firms implicated in this matter includes those cor-
porations that sell the software and services that determine what gets blocked, recorded, or
otherwise impeded. Internet security firms—such as Secure Computing, Websense, Fortinet,
and others—often serve states, corporations, and other institutions that seek to impede the
free flow of packets for one reason or another. A library, for instance, might wish to block
underage patrons from accessing pornography online. A similar software package could
enable a state to configure a proxy server between a citizen and the wider Internet to block
or track certain packets. Many of the states in the Middle East and North Africa that have filter-
ing regimes in place rely upon software packages, and corresponding lists of banned sites,
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developed and compiled in the United States. These firms make similar arguments to those of
the hardware providers: their technologies and services are dual-use in nature. The tool that
can protect a child from seeing a harmful image can also keep a citizenry away from politically
or culturally sensitive information online. The human rights critique, the firms argue, should be
trained on the regimes that apply the services in a manner that violates laws and norms, not at
the service providers who make the tools and update the lists. But the lists of banned sites
include some nongovernmental organizations that observers suggest have no place there, if
in fact, for instance, the notion is just to protect children.
Online Service Providers Most recently, the providers of Internet-based applications have
found themselves facing hard questions about their activities in such regimes. A wide range of
firms fall in this category: ISPs, e-mail service providers, blog-hosting firms, search engines,
and others. ISPs are asked to route traffic in certain ways to prevent citizens from accessing
or publishing certain content; likewise, ISP data retention policies are a hot topic of debate in
many jurisdictions, as the personal data they keep about citizens is at once sensitive and po-
tentially useful in the context of law enforcement activities. E-mail service providers, such as
Yahoo!’s local partner in the Chinese context, are routinely asked to turn over information re-
lated to subscribers. The makers of Weblog software and hosting services, such as Micro-
soft’s MSN unit, are asked to block certain information from being published and told to take
down the postings or entire blogs of subscribers. Search engines, including Google, are
required to limit the results that appear in response to certain queries entered by citizens.
The nature of the ethical questions each of these types of firms face varies with the nature
of the service they provide and the type of participation the state asks of them. In most in-
stances, corporations respond that they have an obligation to obey local law with respect to
services they offer in all jurisdictions.
Corporations often perceive that they do not have the option of resisting the demands of
law enforcement officials, for fear that the corporation or their local employees will face sanc-
tions or that their license to operate will be revoked. Some corporations, recognizing the risks
inherent in doing business in certain regimes, have limited the types of services that they offer
in those contexts to avoid being placed in an uncomfortable role. Google, for instance, de-
cided not to introduce its popular blogging and e-mail tools in the Chinese markets to avoid
the possibility of being forced to turn over much information about subscribers, other than
possibly basic search query data. In an ironic twist, in Iran, Google has been accused locally
of ‘‘censorship’’ for failing to bring all of its services into the Iranian market.
Online Publishers Corporations that publish information online are also caught up in this
issue, though their situation is somewhat more straightforward. As a general matter, online
publishers are treated as other publishers in the states in which they operate, so the ordinary
media restrictions that attach to newspapers and other traditional media also attach in the on-
line space. The notion of providing a single news or information service from one place in the
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world that is accessible at any other place, so long as it is not censored, remains a viable
model. Large media companies, such as the BBC or CNN, tend to adopt this posture. The
BBC pays a price for this approach: everything it publishes is blocked in China. When their
content is filtered at the destination by the state, they are not complicit.6 The ethical issue
arises only for those firms with local offices and offerings specifically targeting a state that
censors online material.
Telecommunications and Other Content Delivery Providers Additional classes of cor-
porations soon could be recruited as gatekeepers. For instance, as mobile telecommunica-
tions providers continue to thrive and begin to function as digital content providers, it is only
a matter of time before these intermediaries will be pressed into service by states as a require-
ment of their licenses to operate. Providers of Voice-over Internet Protocol services have al-
ready found that their services are sometimes blocked, as in United Arab Emirates. Filtering
and surveillance, though posing new technical challenges, may follow. Firms that serve other
businesses in delivering online content—including rich media, such as streaming audio and
video, in addition to traditional Web pages—also may be subject to such restrictions. Any
large-scale intermediary that plays a role in delivering digital information to an end-user might
find itself an arm of the state in the online environment—and will have to answer to the same
questions as their peers in the hardware, software, and Internet services industries.
Types of Involvement
Another way to categorize the firms that face increasingly difficult ethical questions in this con-
text is to assess not the type of firm, but the type of involvement that a given firm has in the
censorship or surveillance regime in question. Though the first taxonomy is simpler, this sec-
ond taxonomy draws the ethical questions into greater relief. This second taxonomy provides
a basis for the different types of ethical obligations that might apply to various firms.
Direct Sales to States of Software or Services to Filter Online Content This category
includes those firms that seek to profit from the sale of software or online services, including
constantly updated block lists, that states use to implement their online censorship regime.
Since these services typically require updates related to the lists used for blocking and since
the revenues track directly to the censorship service itself, these firms are the most intertwined
with online censorship. An important further distinction emerges between those firms that pro-
vide software and those that provide software plus the service of an updated list of sites to
block.
Direct Sales to States of Software or Services for Surveillance This category includes
those firms that seek to profit from the sale of software or online services, including suites of
Internet security systems, that states use to implement their online surveillance regime.
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Direct Sales of Dual-use Technology Used in Filtering Online Content This category
includes those firms that seek to profit from the sale of Internet-related hardware, including re-
lated software and services, that states use to implement their online censorship regime.
Direct Sales of Dual-use Technology Used in Online Surveillance This category
includes those firms that seek to profit from the sale of Internet-related hardware, including
related software and services, that states use to implement their online surveillance regime.
Often, this hardware is sold with related software and services, such as training and support.
The more the hardware provider is aware of the usage of the equipment and the more the
revenues from services are recurring (rather than a one-time sale of hardware), the more com-
plex the ethical posture the company faces.
Offering a Service that Is Subject to Censorship This category includes those firms that
seek to profit from the provision of online services that result in a citizen of a state access-
ing information in a manner that is censored, such as through a search engine with results
omitted or an ISP that refuses access to certain parts of the Internet.
Offering a Service that Censors Publication This category includes those firms that seek
to profit from the provision of online services that disallow a citizen of a state from publishing
certain information online or that takes down published information at the behest of a state.
Offering a Service with Personally Identifiable Information, Subject to Surveillance
This category includes those firms that seek to profit from the provision of online services that
capture personally identifiable information about a citizen of a state and where that information
may be monitored, searched, or turned over to state authorities upon request.
In certain contexts, the executives of a firm in any of these categories might argue that they do
not face a hard ethical question. For instance, in the case of an e-mail service provider that
turns over information to a law enforcement officer about a subscriber in a manner that pre-
vents commission of a crime—or, in the most extreme example, an act of terrorism—the cor-
poration may not only have no qualms about its actions, but in fact be proud of its role. By
contrast, when the information sought by the state is related to a political dissident whose
every action is lawful, or protected by international norms, the ethical landscape is trans-
formed. The same is true with respect to censorship: the blocking or taking down of hate
speech, in the context of Germany and France, may well be viewed differently than the block-
ing or taking down of the expression of certain religious beliefs, for instance. The ethical ques-
tion in any given instance may ultimately turn less on the precise role of the corporation in the
digital ecosystem and more on the nature of the information or the manner in which it is
requested of the corporation.
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Potential Responses
Reasonable people disagree as to the best means of resolving these emerging ethical con-
cerns. One might thus contend that there is no ethical problem here—or, at least, that the eth-
ical problem is nothing new. If an Internet censorship and surveillance regime is entirely
legitimate from the perspective of international law and norms, the argument goes, then a pri-
vate party required to participate in that regime has a fairly easy choice. If the executives of
our hypothetical corporation based in Europe disagree on a personal level with a censor-
ship and surveillance regime, then they should simply exercise their business judgment and
refuse to compete in those markets. Alternatively, those executives could decide to refuse to
comply with the demands that they believe put their firm in a position in which their ethics are
compromised—and then accept the consequences, including possibly being forced to leave
the market, that befall them as a consequence of their resistance.
One option from a public policy angle, then, is to do nothing—to accept the status quo,
and to let the trend play itself out. In the unlikely event that online censorship and surveillance
were to cease across the globe, or if states were to stop calling upon private actors to get the
job done, or if corporations were to stop expanding into other markets, the problem might be
most cleanly resolved. But absent such changes in the facts as they stand, the stakeholders
in these issues have a series of possible ways to move forward to resolve the conflicts.
Industry Self-Regulation
The most likely—and most desirable—means of resolving this problem in the near-term
would be for the relevant corporations themselves to come up with a sustainable manner of
ensuring that they operate ethically in these charged contexts. It is surprising that no major
firm has gone public with such an ethical code before entering a market, such as China,
where such problems are sure to present themselves. With firms now competing in those mar-
kets, the need to do so is no less acute, whether or not legislative or other action follows.
In the simplest form, individual firms could each develop their own principles, much like a
privacy policy on today’s Internet; statements could clarify to users, shareholders, and others
how the firm will handle these situations. Microsoft set forth a partial version of such a policy at
a speech by General Counsel Brad Smith in 2005, in which he pledged the company to follow
a ‘‘broad policy framework’’ for responding to restrictions on the posting of blog content.7 The
policy included three specific commitments:
Explicit standards for protecting content access: Microsoft will remove access to blog con-
tent only when it receives a legally binding notice from the government indicating that the
material violates local laws, or if the content violates MSN’s terms of use.
Maintaining global access: Microsoft will remove access to content only in the country
issuing the order. When blog content is blocked due to restrictions based on local laws,
the rest of the world will continue to have access. This is a new capability Microsoft is imple-
menting in the MSN Spaces infrastructure.
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Transparent user notification: When local laws require the company to block access to
certain content, Microsoft will ensure that users know why that content was blocked, by
notifying them that access has been limited due to a government restriction.8
Microsoft’s step to set forth these three commitments is laudable. And despite putting in
place these commitments, which sets the firm apart from most competitors, Microsoft’s exec-
utives have continued to exercise leadership in the industry in the effort to come up with a
common set of principles.
But as a policy matter, a firm-by-firm model of this sort, though potentially an expeditious
way forward, would suffer from the variation among approaches bound to ensue. Users would
be forced to sort through legalese, much as privacy policies and terms of use force the curi-
ous to do on today’s Internet, and to compare policies of the relevant firms—a task few
people are prepared to invest the time to undertake, and which would disadvantage those
who cannot easily parse fine print. And by not standing together, the firms would only have
as much leverage as each firm has to begin with.
The more promising route would be for one or more groups of industry members to come
up with a common, voluntary code of conduct that would govern the activities of individual
firms in regimes that carry out online censorship and surveillance. Such a process is under-
way, coordinated by the Center for Democracy and Technology and by Business for Social
Responsibility. Google, Microsoft, Vodafone, and Yahoo! are actively working together on a
code. This process profitably includes additional nonstate actors such as NGOs and academ-
ics, including the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School and the Uni-
versity of St. Gallen in Switzerland. Regulators with relevant expertise and authority have been
actively involved in the drafting process. The code is intended to set out common principles
with enough detail to inform users about what to expect, but without being so prescribed as to
make the code impossible to implement from firm to firm and from state to state. The code
might also provide a roadmap for when a firm might refuse to engage in regimes that put
them in a position where they cannot comply with both the code and with local laws.
If the industry itself does not succeed through such an approach, the likelihood increases
that an outside group will come up with a set of principles that will gain traction and place
pressure on the companies to act. The Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontières have drafted
such a set of principles, as have a group of academics with their base at the University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley. An outsider’s code might be something to which firms could be encouraged
to subscribe, on the model of the Sullivan Principles and the Apartheid-era South Africa.
An institution might emerge to support the principles and the companies that subscribe to
them.
Whether drafted by industry members, outsiders, or a combination thereof, the elements of
such a code might either be general in nature—a set of core commitments such as transpar-
ency, rule of law, the rights of free expression and individual privacy, and so forth—or more
specific, according to a taxonomy of the second sort described earlier. The more specific the
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code, the more useful, almost certainly, though the reality of getting competing businesses to
agree to detailed business practices of this sort is daunting.
As a substantive matter, the code might address censorship and surveillance together, or
might disaggregate these topics. Sales to governments of technologies that enable censor-
ship and surveillance presents yet another set of problems that might be taken up in such a
code.
By way of example, the framework for such principles on censorship and surveillance might
take the following form:
Censorship: Commitment and Guiding Principles At the core of the censorship frame-
work is a company’s commitment to the right to free expression. Specific elements of such a
commitment might include the following:
1. Formalization. A commitment to establish and carry out formal internal processes for
responding to all requests for censorship, whereby the company will respond to requests to
censor online information only when presented with formal, written requests from state officials
at the appropriate level of authority to make such a demand.
2. Limitation of Scope. Where one state requires that certain online content must be cen-
sored, a company will make its best efforts to publish that content in all other markets that
the company serves where the content is permitted to be accessed or published online.
3. Reduction of Collateral Censorship. A commitment to make an active effort to uncover
instances in which online content that is censored does not fit local legal definitions of what
is meant to be censored. A company will work with local authorities to remove from lists of
sites to be censored, or otherwise ensure that customers and employees can access, inad-
vertently blocked online sites or information. A company will maintain a policy for processing
complaints about overcensored sites and will take action where complaints are determined to
be meritorious.
4. Awareness. The net result of a company’s activities in a given country is greater awareness
of censorship and filtering by users and lawmakers than if the company were not offering its
services in that country. A company seeks to indicate when information that otherwise would
have been available is not made available to a user. When one of the company’s users is a
source of information censored online, the company will seek to inform that user that informa-
tion they published has been censored. The company will publish, or work with others to pub-
lish, information about how censorship works in practice in countries where the company
does business and will share data with researchers who study these matters. The company
is also committed to supporting the efforts of the international community to uphold universal
human rights.
State Demands for User Information: Commitment and Guiding Principles At the core
of the framework related to state demands for user information is a company’s commitment to
the rights of its users to privacy. Specific elements of such a commitment might include the
following:
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1. Protection from Forced Disclosure. A commitment to establish and uphold rigorous proce-
dural protections to ensure that the company only discloses user information to foreign gov-
ernments when absolutely necessary under local law.
2. User Notification and Education. A commitment to providing general information about the
risks to the company’s users of using the company’s services on a worldwide basis, as well
as specific information about the risks of specific activities in certain settings where those risks
are particularly high.
3. Consciousness of Data Location. A commitment to locating servers in places that are
unlikely to result in the unethical, forced disclosure of user information. Server location will
be based, where possible, in countries with a demonstrated commitment to due process of
law and to reliable and consistent rule by legitimate governments. A company will disclose
to users the location of its servers hosting their personally identifiable information where
possible.
A critical part of such a voluntary code, regardless of its substantive terms, would be to de-
velop an institution that would be charged with monitoring adherence to the code and enforc-
ing violations. One way to accomplish this goal would be for states to adopt the code as law,
by passing ordinary legislation and then bringing to bear the full law enforcement capabilities
of the state to back it up. Another way could be to imagine an institution—perhaps not a new
institution, but a pre-existing entity charged with this duty—that would include among its par-
ticipants representatives of NGOs or other stakeholders without a direct financial stake in the
outcome of the proceedings. This institution may or may not have state regulators involved as
partners to ensure compliance. The institution would play an essential role in ensuring that the
voluntary code of conduct not only has force over time, but also that it continues to address
the ethical issues as they change.
The development of the code itself solves only a small part of the problem; it is in the suc-
cessful application of the code that a long-term solution lies. In the context of other instances
of corporate codes of ethics implicating human rights, such as the sweatshops issue, getting
to the code was the easy part.
Law
The legal system might provide one or more ways to resolve the ethical dilemmas facing cor-
porations in the context of states that censor or carry out surveillance online. That said, classic
state-based regulation—of the second-order variety—is unlikely to be the most effective
means of addressing this particular problem over time. Individual states might require corpo-
rations chartered in their jurisdiction to refrain from certain activities when operating in other
states.
The analogy in the United States context runs to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
disallows corporations chartered in the United States from bribing foreign officials and other
business dealings that would violate U.S. law if carried out in the home market. A ‘‘hands-
tying’’ regulation of this sort might be combined with other approaches—including the voluntary
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code, whether or not embodied in formal law—that might attack parts of the problem, but
would unlikely resolve the conflict outright. Such approaches might include funding for pro-
democracy activities in the online context, banning the sale of certain technologies, banning
the location of servers in certain places, or applying pressure in the context of trade negotia-
tions on those states that are placing the corporations in the hard position.
A member of the United States Congress, Rep. Chris Smith of New Jersey, introduced the
Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA) in 20069 and again in 2007.10 This proposed legislation
would establish ‘‘minimum corporate standards for online freedom’’ and would impose export
controls on the sales of any item ‘‘to an end user in an Internet-restricting country for the pur-
pose, in whole or in part, of facilitating Internet censorship.’’ The legislation’s intent is laudable:
to limit the extent to which United States–based corporations participate in censorship and
surveillance in other states.
The shortcomings of GOFA point to the difficulty of enacting second-order regulation on
this topic at this moment in history. Some of the provisions, such as the requirement that no
servers are to be located within the borders of a state deemed to be ‘‘a designated Internet-
restricting country,’’ might well achieve the statute’s aims by simply disallowing most compa-
nies from competing in the foreign market in question; providing a service from abroad will
often be too slow or too limited by state-level firewalls or filtering to provide a compelling ser-
vice to the targeted customers, as Google learned in China.11
GOFA would also require a United States–based corporation to check with the State De-
partment before providing ‘‘to any foreign official of an Internet-restricting country information
that personally identifies a particular user of such content hosting service.’’ When combined
with a private right of action for any citizen aggrieved by a violation of that section, these pro-
visions are likely to be such an administrative burden on both private and public parties as to
be unworkable. The export controls are impossible to evaluate on the merits, since the legis-
lation simply calls upon the secretary of state and the secretary of commerce to work out reg-
ulations within ninety days of enactment of the Act. Given the fact that no specifics are
provided on the export controls in the proposed Act after months of formal and informal hear-
ings, drafting, and discussion, one is led to believe that coming up with such regulations in
ninety days will be a substantial challenge.
Another reason not to rely upon traditional legal mechanisms in this context is that a glob-
ally coordinated set of standards will almost certainly take so long to put in place that the
contours of the problem will have changed beyond recognition by the time of enactment.
Changes to the relevant statutes or treaty may be equally hard-won. The challenge of coordi-
nating adjustments over time across multiple regimes would be enormous. Laws fashioned
in this fast-moving environment will function as a hopelessly trailing indicator, especially if an
industry-led process does not precede the legislative approach to the problem. The GOFA
drafting experience in the United States suggests that law should be seen as a component
of a solution, and perhaps the way to memorialize what the relevant industry members adopt,
but not the initial approach.
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One possibility for a viable long-term solution would be for the industry consensus to be
given the status of law over time. This approach would help to address three of the primary
shortcomings of the industry self-regulation model. First, self-regulation can amount to the
fox guarding the chicken coop. Second, self-regulation permits some actors to opt out of
the system and to gain an unfair competitive advantage as a result. Last, the self-regulatory
system could collapse or be amended, for the worse, at any time—and may or may not per-
sist in an optimal form, even if such an optimal form could be reached initially.
This mode of ratifying an industry self-regulatory scheme has instructive antecedents. Most
immediately relevant, the Sullivan Principles—proposed initially by one man—eventually be-
came incorporated into U.S. law: the Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 that embodied the Sullivan
Principles passed over President Reagan’s veto.12 In the technology context, a series of pro-
posed laws in the United States—some more advisable as public policy than others—have
had a similar history. In the case of the Security Systems Standards and Certification Act of
2001 (SSSCA), the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act of 2002
(CBPTPA), and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), the industry came to con-
sensus as to a feasible solution to a common problem, which the Congress then took up as
possible legislation. The analogy here is not to the merits of each proposal, each of which
suffered from deep flaws. The analogy runs instead to the process of the industry working
through the details of a common problem, with lawmakers coming along thereafter to ratify
the agreement.
The advantages of such a process are several. This approach would lead to a more stable
regulatory regime, bringing with it the benefits of administrative, enforcement, and appellate
mechanisms. Depending on what emerges from the process, the Congress or their col-
leagues in other jurisdictions could decline to ratify the agreement if the industry had not
moved the bar high enough. This approach would also solve possibly the toughest problem
of industry self-regulations, whereby industry outliers who do not opt in may enjoy an unfair
advantage, especially in a context like this one where the behavior is hard to codify as good
or bad. The function of ratifying the industry-led agreement ex post facto would be to level the
playing field for all relevant firms. Local firms might retain their advantage—they would have
only the first-order regulation to contend with, not the second-order—but that is another prob-
lem of globalization altogether.
International Governance
Problems in cyberspace rarely have been solved through coordinated international action,
though there is no inherent reason to believe that international cooperation or governance
could not play a meaningful role in resolving these ethical dilemmas. The United Nations has
not been involved in extensive regulation of the online space. The primary U.N.-related entity
to play a regulatory role in anything related to the Internet is the International Telecommuni-
cation Union (ITU), which has a long history in the coordination between states and private
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parties in the telecommunications sector. The ITU’s role has included the coordination of
country codes to facilitate international telephone dialing, which parallels the port allocation
process in Internet governance generally handled by the nonprofit Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Put in the ITU’s own expansive terms, its role ranges
‘‘from setting standards that facilitate seamless interworking of equipment and systems on a
global basis to adopting operational procedures for the vast and growing array of wireless
services and designing programmes to improve telecommunication infrastructure in the
developing world.’’13 But these activities have generally focused on interoperability within
the telecommunications sector broadly, and have not extended far into the Internet gover-
nance realm.
Other than the ITU, the U.N.’s work relevant to this problem has been handled through the
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), chaired by Nitin Desai and under the secretariat of Markus
Kummer. The IGF has the authority to conduct an international dialogue on issues related to
the Information Society, which has provided a forum for broaching issues but is neither char-
tered, nor likely, to accomplish any degree of change. An international treaty process, though
cumbersome, could emerge as the way ahead. Some activists have considered litigation
under existing human rights agreements. More likely than a treaty process, though, the IGF
could be called upon to raise this issue squarely with the global community to determine the
most promising course of action. Unlike the analogous Sullivan Principles process, though,
the technical aspects of the Internet filtering and surveillance issue make it unlikely that a true
global community conversation would ensue. Rundle and Birdling have taken up related
issues in much greater detail in chapter 4 of this volume.
Other Modes of Pressure
Human rights activists, academics, and shareholder advocates have played an important role
to date in the public discourse related to this issue. The United States Congress has held
hearings on this matter to draw attention to the actions of large technology firms. The New
York City Comptroller has recently filed shareholder actions with certain technology firms to
prompt action on these topics. Human rights organizations and investor groups around the
world have hosted forums related to corporate involvement in such regimes. While the involve-
ment of NGOs and other outsiders in the process of addressing these ethical issues is not a
solution in itself, it is clear that these stakeholders play an important role in any next steps.
Conclusion
The most promising approach to addressing the ethical dilemma facing multinational corpo-
rations doing business in states that carry out online censorship and surveillance is for the rel-
evant community to develop a voluntary code of conduct, with the possibility that such a code
be redacted into formal law at some later stage. The code can emphasize procedural safe-
120 Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey
guards so that Internet users will know the extent to which their communications have been
restricted, altered, or censored due to the contributions of a signatory. The code can bind
firms to act only where required, and only where the demands placed upon it are specific
and formal. That code must be coupled with the establishment of a reliable mechanism for
monitoring and compliance assurance. This approach could, at once, be responsive to the
nuanced issues involved, flexible over time as the technologies and politics shift, and sustain-
able over the long-term. Such a process ought to include at the table the NGO community in a
supportive, nonadversarial, mode. State regulators might also be drawn into the process in
constructive ways. The affected industry need not—and ought not—go it alone.
Though the environment is too complex and unstable for the standard modes of lawmaking
to work in the near-term, states do have a role to play in helping to resolve this tension. A
patchwork of competing state laws that restrict corporations chartered in one locale in how
they do business in this regard could be counterproductive in others. The challenges inherent
in framing the Global Online Freedom Act of 2006 and 2007, in the United States context,
point to some of the many hazards of this approach.
The proper role of the state in the context of addressing this problem is twofold. First, those
states that are more concerned with what their corporations are doing elsewhere should
support and encourage the corporations as they seek to work together to raise the bar for
themselves and their competitors. That support might come in the form of involvement and
encouragement as the industry works with the NGO and academic communities to derive a
set of ethical guidelines. Support might also mean using leverage in trade negotiations to
lessen the extent that corporations are placed in this position in the first place—in other
words, true state-to-state battles against first-order regulation so that second-order regulation
is not necessary. Where constructive, states might consider rule-making that ties the hands of
their corporations to provide support for their refusal to operate outside of the bounds of these
ethical constraints. But states are unlikely to be able to lead constructively and quickly enough
to address this problem alone. States may in fact play their role best as ‘‘fast-followers’’ to en-
sure that the industry-led process results in meaningful and effective second-order regulation
of corporate action in these contexts.
On a fundamental level, the states that are increasing Internet filtering and surveillance
themselves are best positioned to resolve this tension. In some instances, the primary driver
for change might be a careful review of the human rights obligations, whether through treaty
or otherwise, that place limits on state sovereignty to act in this manner. Human rights activ-
ists may prompt this review through litigation if states do not undertake it themselves. In other
instances, the driver might be economic; there is little argument that the development of a
competitive environment for businesses using ICTs is a positive factor in economic growth,
particularly of developing economies. In either event, states that place restrictions on Internet
usage and seek to leverage network usage for purposes of surveillance outside the bounds of
human rights guarantees do so at some political and economic peril.
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Multinational corporations have every incentive to work hard toward an industry-led, collab-
orative approach to resolving the tension, regardless of how states act. An industry-led
approach could have, at a minimum, the benefit of improved clarity. If the code is well-drafted
and well-implemented, users of Internet-based services would know what to expect in terms
of what their service provider would do when faced with a censorship or surveillance demand.
The benefit of such an approach could well extend further. By working together on a common
code, and harnessing the support of their home states, the NGO community, investors, aca-
demics, and others, the ICT industry might well be able to present a united front that would
enable individual firms to resist excessive state demands without having to leave the market
as a result of noncompliance. The ICT industry should strive to provide the best possible ser-
vices without compromising civil liberties, the generativity of the network, and its democratiz-
ing potential.
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Good for Liberty, Bad for Security? Global Civil
Society and the Securitization of the Internet
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
Introduction
The spectacular rise and spread of NGOs and other civil society actors over the past two de-
cades is attributable in part to the emergence and rapid spread of the Internet, which has
made networking among like-minded individuals and groups possible on a global scale. Pow-
erful search technologies like Google, ‘‘me-media’’ tools such as blogs and MySpaces, and
communicative systems like Skype make it easy to form virtual communities, mobilize sup-
port, and effect political change. Widespread access to inexpensive digital cameras, editing
systems, and distributional channels allows anyone with desire and a few hundred dollars to
become a potential Spielberg or Riefenstahl. Causes of all shapes and sizes seek and find
moral and financial support on a global basis and, consequently, local politics now plays itself
out on a planetary scale.
But the technological explosion of global civil society has not emerged without unintended
and even negative consequences, particularly for nondemocratic and authoritarian states. The
Internet has raised new, nimble, and distributed challenges to these regimes, manifest in vig-
orous opposition movements, mass protests, and in some cases even revolutionary changes
to long-established political authority. Even among democratic states, the explosion of global
civil society has presented serious challenges, though of a slightly different nature. Just as
progressive and social justice groups have made use of the Internet to advance global norms,
so too have a wide variety of resistance networks, militant groups, extremists, criminal orga-
nizations, and terrorists. Whereas once the promotion of new information communications
technologies (ICTs) was widely considered benign public policy, today states of all stripes
have been pressed to find ways to limit and control them as a way to check their unintended
and perceived negative public policy and national security consequences.
In this chapter we examine the ways in which states have targeted the Internet and have
begun to assert their power in cyberspace as a means to control and limit global civil society.
While global civil society is used often and widely today, there is no consensus as to its mean-
ing or significance, particularly among social scientists.1 Typically, the concept is used to
describe those collective associations that citizens have formed to influence public policy,
whether domestic or international, such as Amnesty International, the World Wildlife Fund,
or the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Most, though not all, ascribe to global civil
society a positive association, and see networks of global civil society reigning in sovereign
states while simultaneously pushing for rights, justice, and environmental rescue. Critics, on
the other hand, often question the significance, ideological bias, and/or inherently democratic
nature of global civil society.2
Although important, it is not the intent of our chapter to engage fully these conceptual
debates around global civil society, other than to agree with John Keane when he says that
‘‘[l]ike all other vocabularies with a political edge, its meaning is neither self-evident nor auto-
matically free of prejudice.’’3 We take, therefore, as a definitional starting point that the London
School of Economics’ (LSE) Civil Society Project has developed:
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, pur-
poses and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family
and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and mar-
ket are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity
of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and
power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, de-
velopment non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations,
faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social
movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.4
The LSE definition captures some of the most important elements of civil society, particularly
the theoretical (though not always practical) distinction from the state and market, the recog-
nition of collective associations around shared political purposes, and the diversity of its many
manifestations. Adding the term global to civil society simply acknowledges those associa-
tions whose political activities take them beyond the confines of their own sovereign state.
Following Keane, it is important to note that, in spite of the ‘‘progressive’’ bias that influ-
ences the organizational examples given in the LSE definition, global civil society itself can
comprise a wide range of contrary ideological positions. What is less than clear is whether
the concept has normative content that excludes groups, like Al Qaeda, for example, that em-
ploy violence to further their ends. Historically, civil society has been strongly associated with
minimizing violence, furthering dialogue, and expanding spheres of peace. Whether and where
‘‘uncivil’’ society groups fit into this equation is a debate that falls outside of the purview of this
chapter; yet it has been precisely those militant and extremist actors that have been both sig-
nificant beneficiaries and employers of the Internet, and have in turn been identified by author-
ities as a putative justification for policies aimed at reigning in and securing cyberspace.
To address these issues, we breakdown global civil society into three spheres of agency:
civic networks, resistance networks, and dark nets. Civic networks refer to progressive environ-
mental, peace, and social justice movements that are most typically associated with the term
civil society. Resistance networks include those more radical groups who are opposed to the
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status quo and whose activities can be considered illegal in some jurisdictions, making them
the target of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Groups advocating electronic civil
disobedience, for instance, are examples of resistance networks. A third form of agency
is the least well known, and has tended to fall outside of the scope of most scholarship on
global civil society. This category, which we call dark nets, includes armed social move-
ments, criminal networks, and the underground economy linking diaspora communities world-
wide. Although it is the latter two forms of agency that are most often used as justifications
for assertions of state power in cyberspace and are the primary targets of filtering, one of
the main contentions of our chapter is that such targeting can have collateral impacts on
civic networks as well. In other words, state filtering policies and practices are altering the dy-
namic ICT environment not just for resistance networks and dark nets, but for civic networks
as well.
Global Civic Networks in the Internet Environment
The past several decades have witnessed a rapid expansion of global civic networks. The
source of this expansion is undoubtedly complex, and reflects a variety of independent factors
having to do with the end of the Cold War, the rise of a set of global values and political
causes, the decline of civic participation in traditional structures of political participation, the
increase of development initiatives, and no doubt other factors as well. However, there should
be no doubt that this expansion also has been the result of the enabling role played by the
new media environment, and in particular the growing use of the Internet by civic networks be-
ginning in the 1990s.
Global civic networks were among the earliest adopters of Internet technologies for their
collective activities, and have been at the forefront of innovative uses of new media, like
SMS, VoIP, and blogs. The medium’s constitutive architecture—distributed, decentralized,
and relatively cheaply and easily employed—fits with the organizational and political logics of
global civic networks. As John Naughton observes, by facilitating access to published data,
information, and knowledge; lowering the barrier to information dissemination and overcoming
traditional gatekeepers in media; facilitating rapid communication and information sharing on
a global scale; and helping to form virtual communities of people with shared interests, the
Internet’s material properties (how they were constituted in the 1990s) fueled a remarkable
and unprecedented expansion of global civic networks.5 In short, global civic networks both
contributed to and were empowered by the evolving environment of Internet communications.
The origins of civic networks’ use of the Internet can be traced back to the early 1980s when
social change and activist groups began to employ computer networks as a mode of informa-
tion dissemination and organization.6 These early networks were largely ‘‘basement opera-
tions’’ with individuals donating their time and computing equipment to assist in the activities
of their NGOs. By the late 1980s, more formal links had been established among some of
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these networks in England (GreenNet) and the United States (PeaceNet and EcoNet), and
then later Sweden (NordNet), Canada (Web), Brazil (IBASE), Nicaragua (Nicarao), and Austra-
lia (Pegasus). In 1990, the networks jointly founded the Association for Progressive Communi-
cations (APC), a global umbrella network that still exists as a coordinating and advocacy NGO
with a significant presence in Internet governance forums throughout the world today.
Perhaps the earliest demonstration of the Internet’s facilitation of civic networks’ organiza-
tional and networking capacities can be found at the 1992 U.N. Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro. The Earth Summit was a unique event involving the extensive and official participation
of numerous NGOs from around the world. Leading up to the summit, the U.N. and the APC
established a network to facilitate communications among NGOs and disseminate official
summit information. As Rory O’Brien and Andrew Clement note: ‘‘Backgrounders to the
issues, draft policies, country briefings, and logistical bulletins were posted by the UN to a
set of computer conferences shared internationally on all APC networks. This allowed several
thousand civil society groups around the world to be kept informed at very little cost to the
UN.’’7 The global, distributed nature of the NGO participation—in other words, the fact that
groups not physically present at Rio nonetheless were able to participate—was instrumental
in the formulation of the several ‘‘alternative treaties’’ that were put forth from the parallel NGO
summit, called ‘‘the Global Forum,’’ held simultaneously with the Earth Summit.
The type of civic networking demonstrated at the Earth Summit recurred throughout the
1990s, having a tangible impact on local, regional, and international rule-making forums. For
example, according to scholarly observations and those of the participants themselves, the
Internet played a critical role in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).8 Al-
though the campaign did not employ computer networks in any substantial sense until about
1995, from that point on the Internet was vital to collecting and disseminating information and
forming strategy in the ICBL across its membership in more than seventy countries. The net-
works were, according to participants, crucial in lowering organizational costs and integrating
into decision-making structures members from poorer, developing countries. More impor-
tantly, it dramatically augmented the intellectual capacity of the ICBL-member NGOs, who
were able to bring analytically and empirically informed analyses to the table when meeting
with states on the landmines issue. It also knit the diverse participants together into a relatively
coherent unit, particularly with regard to the ICBL strategy.9
Although perhaps the most prominent, the ICBL was not the only instance of global civic
networks being empowered by the Internet, nor was the model it supplied—working within
legitimate processes of political participation, albeit in very novel, challenging ways—
generalized elsewhere. Indeed, the 1990s also saw the Internet employed by a growing num-
ber of resistance networks—anarchist, antiglobalization, environmental justice, and political
opposition movements.10 In the landmark case of the opposition to the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI) negotiations, for example, civic networks organized a multipronged cam-
paign of resistance and protest across numerous countries and involving hundreds of loosely
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linked autonomous groups and individuals.11 Their activities broadsided state policy-makers
involved in the negotiation process and by some accounts led to the eventual cessation of
the MAI negotiations. The MAI campaign, in turn, morphed into a broader platform of civic
networking around antiglobalization, most notably characterized by the street demonstrations
of Seattle, Quebec City, Genoa, and elsewhere.12 Today, this broadly distributed network of
individuals concerned with economic and social justice continues to bristle with Internet-
based political activity, although street demonstrations have been mitigated in the post–9/11
security environment.
Another celebrated networking campaign of resistance occurred in support of the Zapatista
liberation movement.13 The Zapatistas are a revolutionary national liberation group based in
the Mexican province of Chiapas. Beginning in the early 1980s, the Zapatistas formed an
armed independence movement that attracted an international web of support among anti-
globalization and other activists. Hacktivists in support of the Zapatista cause developed dis-
tributed Denial-of-Service tools that were employed as mechanisms of protest against the
Mexican government, and brought forth one of the first instances of online civil disobedi-
ence.14 The methods of the Zapatista electronic civil disobedience campaign were, in turn,
duplicated in other similar acts directed against perceived injustice and corporate power
throughout the 1990s, with ambiguous but always controversial results.15 The rise of resis-
tance networks, in turn, drew the attention of state intelligence and law enforcement
worldwide.16
Over the past several decades, the Internet has provided a technological foundation and
material support for the massive flourishing of advocacy, rights, and justice movements world-
wide. These movements have pressed upon traditional structures of political participation in
ways that many believe are contributing to a fundamental change in world order. At the very
least, these network-enabled transnational social movements have altered the operational en-
vironment for states, international organizations, and corporations who have been forced to
address civil society stakeholders in all policy arenas. In some cases, such as the so-called
color revolutions of the former Soviet Union, civic and resistance networks have actually
been responsible for the overthrow of long-established authority structures.
Internet Protection and Hacktivism
The importance of the Internet as a material foundation and explosive engine for civic and re-
sistance networks has not gone unnoticed. Within a dynamic, technologically savvy sector of
civil society, a transnational social movement has emerged around what might be called Inter-
net protection—that is, collective securitization whose aim is to uphold the Internet as a forum
of free expression and access to information through advocacy, training, policy development,
and technological research and development.17 Though coming at the problem from differ-
ent backgrounds, Internet protection advocates are beginning to network around a shared
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agenda of communications security and privacy, freedom of expression, equal access, the
protection of an open public domain of knowledge, and the preservation of cultural diversity.
The participants in this social movement include local, regional, and global nongovernmental
organizations, activists, and policy networks including major international rights organizations
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as the OpenNet Initiative
(and its partner institutions) itself.
Critical to the constitution of this social movement has been the support provided by major
nonprofit research and advocacy foundations such as the Ford Foundation, Markle Founda-
tion, Open Society Institute, and the MacArthur Foundation. The support of these nonprofit
foundations has included not only financial resources but also networking opportunities, ven-
ues for collaboration, and research and development coordination. To be sure, this type of
support has had an important impact. However, the resources provided by these donor
agencies do not rival the collective financial capacities that can be marshaled by states. Nor
do they always come without unintended consequences. Scholars have noticed funding of
this sort can promote the emergence of patron-client ties between donors and recipients,
rather than horizontal links among civic networks.18 They may also create a hostile environ-
ment for civic networks due to the impression of outside ‘‘interference’’ and ‘‘meddling’’—
particularly if the NGOs are perceived as a thin vehicle for one state’s foreign policy within
the jurisdiction of another state. One recent study found that nineteen countries, concentrated
mostly in Africa, the Middle East, and the former Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
have enacted or proposed laws over the past five years that restrict the activities of civil
society.19
One area where the asymmetric capacities of civic networks may be most tangibly felt is in
building code, software, and other tools explicitly designed with an Internet protection para-
digm in mind. From the outset, the Internet’s character has been shaped not only by states
and corporations but also by the distributed base of users themselves. Skilled computer
geeks, hacktivists, and other individuals have been responsible for some of the most innova-
tive Internet technologies, from open source/free software platforms to P2P networks and
encryption systems. Although ‘‘Internet protection’’ technologies go back decades, in recent
years there has been a more concerted and organized research and development effort,
working in tandem with the policy, governance, and awareness efforts described earlier.
These efforts include tools to support anonymous communications online, such as the Tor
system; tools that circumvent Internet censorship, such as psiphon or Peacefire; and tools
that support privacy online, such as PGP, ScatterChat, and others. These tools are, in turn,
increasingly localized to different country contexts, distributed via nongovernmental organiza-
tions and human rights networks, and built into training and advocacy workshops organized
by the Internet protection civic networks described above.20 As we show in a later section,
however, state filtering efforts have deliberately targeted these Internet protection tools as a
way to control and limit networking activities of civic and resistance networks.
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Toward Uncivil Society Networks and the Rise of Dark Nets
The bulk of scholarship on the rise and spread of civic networks has tended to focus on those
elements of civil society that are explicitly nonviolent in nature and liberal in outlook and spirit.
These characteristics reflect, in large part, the ‘‘peace dividend’’ of the immediate post–Cold
War era that provided a hiatus from decades of interstate conflict, and where the bulk of visi-
ble or public sphere transnational networks tended to center on issues of social justice, envi-
ronment, and universal rights and values. Of these elements, even the most extreme forms,
such as the anticorporate resistance networks described earlier, were still largely character-
ized by nonviolent methods and centered in and around Western industrialized activist circles.
However, outside the focus of mainstream scholarship, other social movements and resis-
tance groups discovered and began to appropriate the Internet, recognizing the unprece-
dented capabilities it offered for organization, communication, mobilization, and action. These
actors, ranging from militants, insurgents, criminal elements, and diaspora and migrant com-
munities, expanded exponentially, aided by the largely unfettered and unregulated growth of
the Internet throughout the developed and developing world. Much less was said or known
about these networks—whose activities and aims were facilitated by the Internet in much the
same way as were global civic and resistance networks, but whose aims were often criminal,
covert, and sometimes violent. These dark nets can be divided roughly into three categories.
The first and most well known of the dark nets are the armed social movements. Armed so-
cial movements can represent a multiplicity of local causes, but their ability to share tactics,
contacts, and at times drink from the same ideological well make them appear as a unified
global network. In the post–9/11 era, Al Qaeda and the jihad movements represent perhaps
the most visible manifestation of this kind of armed-social-movement dark net. However, they
are by no means the first and only networks of this kind. In the 1990s, the old paradigm
of wars among nation states was displaced by a new form of warfare—what Mary Kaldor
calls ‘‘new wars.’’21 What sets ‘‘new wars’’ apart from the previous generation of Cold War–
era armed struggles is the participants’ ability to leverage the emerging global networked
economy—in particular the illicit global economy—to become self-reliant for the arms,
money, and political support required to pursue armed struggle against state and nonstate
actors. Many of the ‘‘new wars’’ that occurred during the 1990s, particularly those in the devel-
oping world where First World militaries were neither involved as supporters or peacekeepers,
were fought essentially as transnational civil wars where armed formations pursued both gue-
rilla and conventional warfare against government and rival groups. In conflicts that included
Sri Lanka, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, western Africa, and Chechnya, ‘‘new wars’’ demon-
strated that globalization had made armed social movements capable of challenging and at
times defeating state actors without the need of state-based patrons or backers.
More importantly, this new generation of armed social actors also increasingly embraced
the Internet, recognizing the capacity afforded to affect both their supporters and opponents.
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Significantly, it was these groups, rather than First World militaries, that were the first to lever-
age the Internet as a means to wage information operations that redefined the main field of
battle away from the military and toward the political sphere.22 Beginning with the first Che-
chen war, the videotaping of attacks on the Russian military became more important than
the military significance of the attacks themselves. When shown to supporters, as well as the
Russian public (via rebroadcast on Russian television, and later on the Internet), their shock
value was enough to convey the impression that the Russian military was being defeated.
Similar tactics were adopted and further refined by Hezbollah in its resistance against Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon prior to their withdrawal in 2001. Hezbollah produced reports
in the form of music videos that were both broadcast across Hezbollah’s terrestrial television
station (al Manar), as well as made available for download from Web sites the movement had
established as part of its strategic communications and information warfare strategy.
These video shorts proved highly effective, and have since undergone several significant
evolutions, paralleling the spread and popularity of such online resources as YouTube and
Indymedia that are used regularly by global civic networks and resistance groups. They are
now one of the key instruments used by these movements to attract interest in their causes
and are a significant feature of the more than 4,500 active jihad Web sites, chat rooms, and
forums. As the resources necessary for producing multimedia technologies continue to fall,
and access to inexpensive digital cameras and editing software increases, the threshold and
number of video and other multimedia products in circulation has grown exponentially. Mean-
while, the age of the producers has sharply declined. During the early months of the second
Intifada, for example, several of the more compelling PowerPoint slides circulating on the
Internet depicting the brutality of the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank were produced by
a fourteen-year-old living in a refugee camp in Lebanon.23
In addition to changing the nature of the conflicts, the video clips have also served to
change the nature of the movements themselves. They have eliminated the need for strict
command and control, especially for smaller and more marginal movements which can now
claim legitimacy for their actions by virtually piggybacking on the perceived effectiveness and
success of others. They also give the impression of a unity and scale among groups that in
reality simply does not exist. As a result, much as the discourse of human rights and other
universal values provides a moral center that binds many of the civic networks together, the
depictions of resistance, wrapped in religious undertones, provide a means for smaller, more
local struggles to identify with and benefit from a broader ideological pool. When networked in
this way, this ideological pool serves to demonstrate that resistance is not only possible, but
also positively effective.
The Internet is only one of the tools used by armed social movements in the pursuit of their
cause, but it is certainly the one that, because of its largely unregulated character and relative
freedom of access, causes the greatest concern for states under threat from such actors. It is
seen, at least in part, as the sea in which global militants find sanctuary of the kind that Mao
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postulated in his classical treatise on People’s War. The difficulty, then as it is now, is how to
effectively separate the insurgents from the people, or armed social movements from the
Internet, in a manner that does not destroy the latter.
Transnational criminal networks are a second form of dark nets. These actors, who can be
large or small, local or transnational, exploit the relative anonymity offered by the Internet, as
well as the absence of harmonized national laws defining cybercrime, to circumvent or avoid
prosecution. Much of the activities of these actors involve old crimes, such as fraud and
theft, which have been adapted to the new possibilities offered by the emergence of the e-
economy. In other cases, jurisdictions with poorly functioning or nonexistent laws are used to
hide otherwise criminal activities, such as distribution of child pornography, out of the reach of
authorities in jurisdictions where such activities are clearly criminalized.
Globally, the incidences of reported cybercime is increasing in both developed and devel-
oping economies. In the Russian Federation, for example, acknowledged as a source of some
of the most imaginative forms of cybercrime, incidences reportedly grew by almost 300 per-
cent between 2003 and 2006.24 Yet accurate comparative statistics makes measuring global
cybercime difficult. For example, in the United States—an economy in which losses caused
by cybercrime were cited by one Treasury Board official as exceeding $105 billion—only in
2006 did the Department of Justice belatedly begin the process of establishing a baseline for
measuring cybercrime. In part, the absence of reliable statistics reflects the difficulty faced by
local police and justice institutions who have to police activities that may not be defined or
considered criminal in their jurisdiction (or against which they have few tools). Quite simply
the globalization of criminality has far exceeded the capacity of states to define or harmonize
an effective global mechanism to contain or police it. Consequently, despite notable efforts
such as the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, criminal activity and networks
continue to multiply and expand into new regions and activities. Russian hackers are impli-
cated with identity theft and credit card fraud in the United States and Europe. Nigerian gangs
have become omnipresent in a variety of scams and wire fraud, while Chinese and Israeli
gangs preside over a global distribution network of pirated DVDs and software. The result of
this criminal use of the Internet is that in local jurisdictions the first real awareness of Internet
use in their local community comes accompanied with a request for prosecution. In one par-
ticularly egregious case that occurred in the late 1990s, the entire ‘‘.tj’’ domain was registered
by a U.S.-based entity that used it to host child pornography. Local Tajik authorities were
forced to pursue legal action to claim the domain, a fact that did little to portray the social
benefits of an unregulated Internet to the morally conservative Tajik society.
A third dark net, and perhaps the hardest to define, consists of the multitude of private so-
cial networks that exist among migrant and diaspora communities and that play an important
function in supporting the economic and social ties that bind these communities to their kin
and communities of origin. These ‘‘private interest’’ networks are the least well known and
analyzed, as penetrating them requires gaining the trust of the communities. Often these
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet 131
networks serve specific social functions, circumventing cultural or social taboos, or serving
highly specific economic interests. As a consequence, they are often deliberately ‘‘closed,’’
and thus may even be denied or downplayed by the communities they serve.25
These networks are, nonetheless, among the most active of the dark nets, and hence tend
to get labeled with the same negative image as armed social movements or criminal net-
works because they appear to support or even appropriate the same means used by the lat-
ter. For example, diaspora communities are often used to facilitate the movement of funds
outside of the formal banking system, especially among migrant communities in the Gulf,
South Asia, and the Horn of Africa. So-called hawala networks, underground banking net-
works that in some counties carry a volume of funds equal to or larger than the official banking
system, have fallen under suspicion as having been the source of funds ending up in the
hands of local militant groups.26 While this may be the case, both the number of hawala trans-
fers used by terrorist groups as well as the amounts needed for carrying out terrorist attacks
are relatively small given the overall volume of hawala transfers, and could just as easily have
been hidden in regular banking or other online transactions (e.g., PayPal).
Although not often analyzed together by scholars with the civic networks described earlier,
the ‘‘uncivil’’ dark nets are as much a part of global civil society as are the former. Following
the LSE definition employed in our chapter, they constitute an arena of uncoerced collective
action around shared interests, purposes, and values. Their institutional forms are distinct
from those of the state, family, and market, though in practice, the boundaries between them
are often complex, blurred, and negotiated. What differentiates them from the civic networks
is, of course, their perceived illegitimacy, making them the target of state security and law en-
forcement. In the following section we turn to the ways in which states have attempted to con-
trol and contain the challenges presented by civic networks, resistance networks, and dark
nets through Internet filtering, surveillance, and control.
Assertions of State Power Over Civic, Resistance, and Dark Nets in Cyberspace
As the other chapters and the country summaries of this volume make clear, the problem of
Internet filtering and censorship is growing in scope, scale, and sophistication worldwide.
What began as a practice confined to a small handful of nondemocratic regimes has
expanded to countries throughout every region of the globe, and includes nondemocratic,
transition, and democratic countries. How much of this filtering can be attributed to attempts
by states to control the challenges presented by civic, resistance, and dark networks? Here
there is no plain answer, as the motivations for Internet filtering and censorship vary among
states and are often shrouded in secrecy and deceit. We can, however, identify several areas
from our research where states are asserting control over the Internet as a means to limit the
threats posed by the varied elements of global civil society. As we show, even in those cases
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where the targets are clearly dark nets, there can be collateral impacts on the communica-
tions environment for civic networks.
Filtering Data Analysis
The results of the ONI’s testing as outlined in this volume present a wide array of categories
targeted for filtering, in both English and local languages, across numerous countries and
several regions. In this section, we highlight several categories of filtering where it can be
imputed that states are deliberately targeting content or communication channels of civic, re-
sistance, and/or dark nets. We also note those instances of collateral filtering, where filtering of
content or communications channels of dark and resistance networks impact civic networks
as well.
Human Rights
One area of importance to civic networks, both as a normative underpinning and a source of
content produced by those networks, is human rights. As many civic networks are critical of
states’ records in the areas of human rights, many of the affected states have been targeting
the sources of that content for filtering. Pakistan, Myanmar, India, Iran, Uzbekistan, Algeria,
Ethiopia, Tunisia, Vietnam, China, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand all block access to at
least one Web site categorized by the ONI as ‘‘human rights.’’ Among those countries, China,
Vietnam, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Iran are all pervasive filterers of human
rights–categorized content. Among the forty-eight sites that the Chinese government blocks in
this category are the Web sites of Chinese Rights Defenders, Human Rights in China, the
Asian Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Olympic
Watch—essentially the full panoply of international and country-specific organizations with an
interest in China’s human rights record. Iran’s coverage is similar to China’s, although it also
singles out prominent individuals for filtering, such as the infamous blogger, Hoder. Vietnam
tends to focus on country-specific human rights NGOs operating in the Vietnamese language,
Tunisia strikes a balance between ‘‘international’’ and ‘‘country-specific,’’ as does Myanmar,
while Uzbekistan targets mostly independent media, television, and radio Web sites related
to Uzbek human rights. For its part, Pakistan targets almost exclusively those human rights
sites related to the Balochistan liberation movement. Furthermore, eight states (Algeria, Ethio-
pia, Iran, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan Tunisia, and Yemen) block at least one women’s
rights site on the ONI’s testing lists, with one state, Iran, blocking the highest amount (seven-
teen of seventy tested). Additionally, seven states (China, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan,
Syria, and Tunisia) all have at least one blocked in the category ‘‘minority rights,’’ with China
blocking all sites tested related to Tibet. Overall, the ONI’s testing results show a concerted
effort among many states to target human rights–related content.
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet 133
Independent Media and Free Expression
In many states, control over major media, like television and radio, is seen as an important
lever of power that can be tightly regulated and controlled, leaving independent media as
one of the only sources of news and free expression for civic and resistance networks. A total
of seventeen states (Algeria, Bahrain, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Oman,
Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen)
blocked at least one Web site categorized by the ONI as a content provider in the ‘‘indepen-
dent media’’ category. Not surprisingly, there is a strong degree of overlap among those
countries that block a high amount of human rights content and independent media content.
Other notable instances of filtering of independent media occurred in countries during election
periods, a point discussed in more depth later in this chapter. Nineteen states (Algeria, Azer-
baijan, Bahrain, China, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen) blocked at least
one site in the ‘‘free expression’’ category. Of those countries, Syria, China, Iran, Myanmar,
Tunisia, and Vietnam block a high amount, with Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia block-
ing a moderate amount.
Internet Protection and Hacktivist Tools
As mentioned earlier, civic and resistance networks have been actively developing software
tools to protect and preserve freedom of speech and access to information online. The ONI
ran tests to capture filtering targeted against these tools and found several significant country
cases. China, Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia all block access to a
high amount of URLs in the ONI’s ‘‘anonymizers and circumvention’’ category. Uzbekistan
blocks access to a relatively few though significant number of anonymizer and proxy sites,
as does Vietnam, Myanmar, and Syria. China blocks access not only to known circumvention
sites, but sites that are known to provide information and tutorials about censorship circum-
vention. In the cases of other states, we conclude that some of this filtering is the result of
the use of categories built into commercial filtering products used by these regimes. Sudan,
Tunisia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia all use SmartFilter, which has an ‘‘anonymizer’’ blocking cat-
egory, while Yemen uses Websense, which has a ‘‘proxy avoidance’’ category. The filtering
system used in Iran varies between ISPs and the specific product used is currently unknown.
The targeting of anonymizers and circumvention tools used by civil society (civic, resistance,
and dark) suggests states are moving to counter the Internet protection efforts described in
this chapter.
Tools of Communication
States have also blocked some of the major media of communication used by all spheres of
civil society, including free e-mail services and VoIP. In both cases, the filtering may be moti-
vated by concerns over economic protection and monopoly preservation. However, the collat-
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eral impact of the filtering is felt strongly by civil society networks that rely on such low-cost
means of communicating. Iran, Syrian, Yemen, and Myanmar all block access to a small but
significant number of popular free e-mail services. United Arab Emirates (UAE) highly targets
VoIP Web sites for filtering. UAE and Myanmar both block the popular VoIP tool Skype and
UAE is joined by Syria in blocking www.dialpad.com and www.iconnecthere.com. Vietnam
also blocks two sites in the ONI’s VoIP category (www.evoiz.com and www.mediaring.com).
Jordan blocked access to Skype in 2006, citing national security concerns.
Hacking and WAREZ
Both resistance and dark nets (and to a lesser degree civic networks) can occasionally make
use of Web sites found in the ONI’s ‘‘hacking’’ and ‘‘WAREZ category.’’ For civic and resis-
tance networks, some of these Web sites and resources provide tools, information, and strat-
egies associated with hacktivism that can be useful to their networking, social mobilization,
and political activism. For dark nets, the Web sites of most interest are found in the ‘‘WAREZ’’
category and relate to illicit trade in pirated software and other material, although other dark
nets make use of hacker tools as well. Iran, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, and China all block a high amount of ONI’s ‘‘WAREZ’’ and ‘‘hacking’’ categories,
Tunisia blocks a somewhat lesser amount, while South Korea, Oman, Myanmar, and Azerbai-
jan all target a minimal amount. Hacktivist groups, such as cultdeadcow.com (Algeria, China,
Iran, and Yemen), hacktivismo.com (Tunisia and Yemen), nmrc.org (Algeria and Yemen), and
thehacktivist.com (Iran and Yemen) are also caught in the ‘‘hacking’’ and ‘‘WAREZ’’ net and
blocked in some of these countries. In ONI’s 2005 tests, Yemen did not block any sites in our
‘‘hacking’’ category. Now, one of the two ISPs tested, YNET, blocked access to twenty of
forty-six URLs we tested, most likely as a result of enabling the ‘‘hacking’’ category on their
Websense filtering system.
Miltancy, Extremists, and Armed Separatist Movements
Many states justify their filtering practices as a way to target those members of dark nets that
are armed social movements—that is, either militants, extremists, or armed separatist move-
ments. Eleven states, (Algeria, Azerbaijan, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) all block at least one URL that the ONI categorized as a
content provider in the ‘‘militancy, military group’’ category. Most of these Web sites relate to
country-specific security issues involving extremist groups or organizations advocating or be-
ing associated with violent change. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan blocks all Web sites related
to the Balochistan insurgency.
The results of the ONI’s testing strongly suggest a concerted effort among some states to
target the content and communicative infrastructure of global civil society, including civic, re-
sistance, and dark nets. Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the states that do so tend to be de-
mocratically challenged or nondemocratic regimes, as these states face the stiffest challenges
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet 135
from these networks. In the following two sections, we turn to a more detailed examination of
evidence from blogging and blocking efforts around key periods such as elections.
Securing and Filtering Blogs
As tools of individual self-expression, blogs and blogging have important implications for civic
networks, resistance networks, and even some dark nets.27 First, blogs can provide a source
of independent and alternative news from traditional mainstream media. This is especially
important in light of the fact that many countries in the world strictly control traditional print
and broadcast media, but it is also relevant to areas of the world where such controls are
absent. In the United States, for example, the relationship between blogging and traditional
forms of journalism has been prominently debated. In nondemocratic and repressive coun-
tries, blogging can provide a window into events and issues not covered by the mainstream
or government-controlled media. Not surprisingly, many dissidents and activists have been
attracted to blogging.
Second, blogging can provide an easy tool for individuals and organizations to disseminate
information to a global constituency, that is, for coordination and organizational purposes. In
this respect, blogging does not differ fundamentally from traditional Web sites, which also pro-
vide the means to publicize information worldwide. Rather, what makes blogs unique is the
ease of posting and syndication. Individuals who have no expertise in computer programming
and HTML editing can very easily update their blogs, opening Web publication to a wide audi-
ence. Additionally, those living in regions of the world with low-bandwidth connections to the
Internet can more easily edit blogs than Web sites. Indeed, new technologies allow people to
update their blogs using only cell phone text messages.
Third, blogs can provide NGOs and other groups with a new means to attract support for
their organizations, particularly in the area of fund-raising and recruiting. Civil society networks
continually struggle to get their message out, and often have a difficult time penetrating the
mainstream media, particularly regarding their successes. Potential donors and suppor-
ters can acquire, through the window of blogging, a sense of immediacy and detailed under-
standing of the nature and operations of collective activities direct from the source and the
field.
However, blogs and blogging do not come without potential negative implications. Because
blogging can threaten state control of media, and have become a popular tool of dissidents,
militants, and activists, bloggers can find themselves the object of threats, physical violence,
and arrests. As shown below, blogging has become a focus of attention by authorities in non-
democratic and repressive regimes, with many bloggers being silenced through arrest or in-
timidation. Additionally, states that filter Internet communications are beginning to target blogs
with increasingly refined forms of censorship, including parsing through entries and removing
objectionable keywords and phrases.
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The intention of the research in this section is to examine the global effort to silence blog-
gers. We assess where bloggers are targeted by authorities, for what reasons, and using what
mechanisms of silencing (e.g., arrest). As part of the collection of information from Web sites,
news articles, and blogs, a number of assumptions have emerged that inform our analysis.28
First, the actions of states create fundamental challenges to a thorough and quantifiable ex-
amination into the issue of silencing bloggers. This is largely due to states’ unwillingness
to publicize the actions taken against bloggers.29 Second, because bloggers at risk tend to
be located in nondemocratic regimes, accused bloggers are often burdened by limited or no
access to legitimate justice systems. Those detained may be held without charge for an indef-
inite period of time, without knowledge of the charges against them or access to legal repre-
sentation. When faced with a trial, it is often illegitimate. Third, repressive regimes, such as
China and Iran, are the primary perpetrators of blogger targeting. Bloggers in these two states
are the least likely to be informed of the charges against them, and the most likely to face
lengthy detention, although other countries are following suit.
The targeting of bloggers by authorities has increased on an annual basis over the past five
years. We examined many cases of blogger arrests dating back to 1995, although as blog-
ging is a new and growing medium we assume that few cases would have arisen before
2002. The first case of a blogger facing charges by a state was an Egyptian blogger in
2003.30 The blogger was charged with violating Egypt’s religious laws. He was sentenced
for an undisclosed prison term and remains incarcerated. Since that time, the number of
bloggers arrested has increased on a yearly basis, with a large jump in the rate of arrests
beginning toward the end of 2004 (see figure 6.1).
The cause for the increase in arrests of bloggers is likely due to blogging being an increas-
ingly popular medium, particularly for dissidents and activists. As the rate of blogging has
increased, so has the threat by blogs to state authorities. Most nondemocratic regimes place
stringent controls on media and freedom of expression, including the Internet. Over the past
three years, bloggers and the practice of blogging have created an alternative, independent
source of news and media. Quite apart from the content of what is published by bloggers
(which itself can be threatening), the very independence of blogging undermines state control
over media. Hence it is not surprising to find an increasing amount of attention paid to blog-
gers and blogging by nondemocratic and repressive regimes.
While one might assume that states target bloggers for challenging the legitimacy and au-
thority of the state itself, we found that there are a number of key declared causes for the
arrest and detention of bloggers. The most common declared cause of blogger arrests is
‘‘antistate activity.’’ This tends to include bloggers who challenge or insult the leadership of
the state or incite antigovernment activity, such as protests or violence. Inciting racial hatred
and espionage are the second and third highest stated causes of blogger arrests. (See figure
6.2.)
The limitation of this analysis is the reliance on information provided by state authorities
themselves on the cause of a blogger’s arrest. In numerous cases, those closely linked to
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the blogger have argued that the state falsified claims or made their case on trumped-up
charges, and did so for the sole purpose of silencing unwanted views. It is not easy to assess
the validity of these claims. It should be noted that on a number of occasions those making
the claims were also charged and imprisoned soon afterward.31
While Iran and China are key perpetrators of threats against bloggers, the effort to silence
bloggers is widespread. Bloggers are facing sentences throughout Asia, Europe, North Africa,
and Europe (see figure 6.3). As figure 6.3 illustrates, bloggers are facing charges throughout
the world. While Iran remains by far the largest contributor to worldwide blogger arrests,
Bahrain has prosecuted the second largest number of bloggers. China, Malaysia, and the
United States are not far behind.
We also found that a preponderance of sentences handed down to bloggers found guilty of
a crime is for undisclosed periods of time. While the increase in the number of bloggers facing
charges and arrest is in and of itself a worrying trend, perhaps more alarmingly is the finding
that 40 percent of those arrested face charges and sentences that are not made public. Most
bloggers arrested will be detained without access to legal recourse until the state, of its own
volition, chooses to release information on the blogger’s sentence and occasionally release
the blogger either outright or pending a trial or retrial.
Of those bloggers whose sentences are public, the majority spend a maximum of one year
incarcerated. Often among this group, a longer sentence was set and then shortened during
appeals through the justice system. (See figure 6.4.)
Figure 6.1
Blogger arrests over time.
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Blog Filtering
One of the best indications of the political nature of blogging can be found in the extent to
which blogs are subject to unlawful Internet filtering. Among two of the states that monitor
and control Internet communications that the ONI has investigated, namely China and Iran,
blogging has become one of their major focuses of attention, although a number of other
countries filter blogs and blogging services as well.
Blogging has become especially popular in China. Although it is difficult to determine with
precision the number of blogs hosted in the country, one source indicates that Chinese
servers host more than twenty million bloggers.32 These bloggers post content on topics
ranging from daily diaries to political commentary, both critical and supportive of the Chinese
state. However, dissidents and human rights activists have been particularly drawn to the me-
dium of blogging. Given the nature of China’s Internet filtering and surveillance regime, and
the way in which blogging’s instantaneous publication threatens the restrictions placed on
freedom of speech in that country, it is no surprise that Chinese authorities have intensified
Figure 6.2
Stated causes of blogger arrests.
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Figure 6.3
Numbers of bloggers arrested by country.
Figure 6.4
Lengths of blogger sentences.
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their efforts to monitor and control blog content. These efforts have ranged from shutting
down blogging services entirely to filtering blogging services for objectionable content.
In March 2004, the state closed three popular domestic blog Web sites—www.blogcn.com,
www.blogbus.com, and www.blogdriver.com—reportedly because a blogger posted a con-
troversial letter regarding the Tiananmen Square incident and the SARS outbreak. All three
providers were eventually allowed to reopen, but were required to implement filtering mecha-
nisms. These filtering systems search for sensitive keywords when users attempt to post ma-
terial. The ONI tested these filtering systems from computers based within China using a list
of banned keywords that Chinese hackers discovered and published to a Chinese bulletin
board system in August 2004. The list includes terms in categories such as national minor-
ities’ independence movements, the Tiananmen Square incident, Falun Gong, proper names
of Chinese Communist Party leaders, and sensitive nonproper nouns (such as generic words
relating to uprisings or oppression), and were said to be employed by authorities on popular
instant messaging services. Using this list of keywords as a basis for testing, the ONI found
that Blogbus and BlogCN filtered only 18 and 19 of the keywords, respectively, while Blog-
driver filtered 350 of the terms.
An analysis of the filtered content that the ONI tested shows the areas of content about
which the Chinese government is especially sensitive. The filtered keywords generally fall into
five categories:
1. National minorities’ independence movements: the well known Tibetan cause is repre-
sented as well as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. The inclusion of some Taiwanese politicians’
names also fall into this category as they are all people who are known to support Taiwan
independence.
2. The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989: it is referenced by the full name, ‘‘Tiananmen
massacre,’’ the Chinese custom of referencing important events by the number of the month
and the day (in this case, 6-4), and also by reference to people involved—a mother of one of
the victims who has been campaigning for human rights. The name of Zhao Ziyang, former
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general, is also included in this category.
3. Chinese communist leaders: a list of the top leaders, past and present, are included along
with a particularly creative rewriting of Jiang Zemin by replacing one of the characters of his
name by the character for thief.
4. Falun Gong: a list of different names for Falun Gong including various spellings with char-
acters that sound the same, often used to circumvent filtering.
5. Keywords relating to uprisings or suppression: a list of words referring to uprisings or
suppression.
Blogs are clearly seen within China as being threatening to the state because of the ways in
which they facilitate rapid and easy freedom of expression. As blogs have grown in popularity,
the Chinese authorities have focused their attention on blogs, bloggers, and blogging services
accordingly.
As with China, Iran has seen blogging become a popular activity for dissidents and human
rights activists both within and outside the state. By some counts, there are 65,000 individual
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blogs written in Persian, and numerous others written in English on Iranian issues by Iran
expatriots located around the world. A list of Iranian blogs is archived at Blogs X Iranians.33
One Iranian blogger, Hossein Derakshan (a.k.a. Hoder), has become a very prominent
blogger in the Internet activist community, and has been profiled in major media around the
world.
However, blogging and bloggers in Iran have become the target of censorship by a filtering
regime that ranks with China as one of the world’s most extensive. The 2005 and 2006 ONI’s
tests on Internet filtering in Iran included checks on blogs and popular blogging services. The
2005 tests were performed using sets of lists in two different categories: the ONI’s general
global list of blogging sites applied to all countries (of which one was blocked) and a high-
impact list of 533 Iranian-related blogs. Of the 533 blogging sites that were checked, 86
were found to be blocked. Moreover, there was a dramatic increase in the number of blogs
blocked during the time frame in which the ONI conducted its tests; 35 of the 86 sites were
accessible one year earlier. The ONI tested a large number of blogs on several of the large
blogging domains and found that, while Iran blocks a significant number of individual blogs,
the state has not taken the (technically) easier step of preventing access to entire blogging
domains. Most likely this is because the Iranian government wants to allow access to most
blogging services (the exceptions being Moveable Type and Live Journal, which are blocked
in their entirety) while focusing on individual blogs that threaten the regime.
The 2006 tests show a continuation of these trends. For example, all seven ISPs tested in
Iran block access to the highly popular blog www.boingboing.net. Iran (four of seven ISPs
tested) also blocks access to the popular blogger tool www.technorati.com and the photo-
sharing site Flickr, while all Iranian ISPs block access to the video posting and distribution
site YouTube.
Although China and Iran are the most aggressive in terms of targeting blogs and bloggers,
the ONI found evidence other countries are following suit. In Syria, for example, we tested 159
blog URLs in the ‘‘Free Expression and Media Freedom’’ category and found 117 blocked.
However, all the 117 blocked blogs were hosted on Google’s Blogspot and are blocked as a
result of the Blogspot service in its entirety being blocked. Ethiopia and Pakistan also block all
of Blogspot. In the case of the latter, the motivation to block Blogspot comes from a desire to
block access to blogs hosted on the service containing imagery offensive to Islam. However,
the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority has chosen to block access to these blogs by
blocking all of Blogspot, thus collaterally filtering even those Web sites critical of the blogs
containing the imagery. United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, India, and Tunisia all block at least
one Blogspot blog. Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia block access to BoingBoing, most likely
as a result of those countries’ use of SmartFilter, which categorizes BoingBoing as ‘‘nudity.’’
Like Iran, Saudi Arabia also blocks access to the video file–sharing blog service, YouTube.
Just as blogging is becoming a popular form of self-expression and communication gener-
ally, activists, dissidents, NGOs, and other global civil society actors are also increasingly
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blogging. Blogs are even more efficient than typical Web sites in providing a quick and easy
means for individuals and organizations to communicate and distribute information, especially
in regions of the world with low bandwidth. Blogging is becoming increasingly politicized, par-
ticularly among nondemocratic and repressive regimes, but also in ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘partly free’’
parts of the world. The number of bloggers targeted for silencing has grown in proportion
roughly to the spread and increasing popularity of blogging. In some parts of the world, blog-
ging can be an attractive alternative to state-controlled media, but one which presents signifi-
cant security risks for individuals undertaking the blogging. Blogging content is increasingly
subject to Internet censorship and surveillance. Among the countries that the ONI has stud-
ied, China and Iran have the most refined systems of blog filtering in place, although there is
blog filtering in other countries as well. As the tendency worldwide is toward an increase in the
scope and scale of Internet censorship and surveillance, we should anticipate the number of
countries targeting blogs for filtering to increase as well.
Evolving Techniques: Just-in-Time Blocking, DoS, and Computer Network Attack
Since 2003, research collected by the ONI indicates an increase in the number of countries
applying filtering to an expanding number of categories, many of which affect civic networks,
resistance networks, as well as dark nets. However, increasing awareness of filtering prac-
tices has also provoked a degree of blowback, evident in both the negative publicity in the
global media targeting the worse offenders, such as China, Iran, and Uzbekistan, and
calls for adjusting U.S. foreign policy to label countries following such practices as pariahs.
There is, of course, a question mark over the degree to which establishing the global norm
of a free and open Internet is possible, given that such a stance would contradict the con-
cerns shared by many security agencies, in democratic and nondemocratic states alike, as
to the degree to which the Internet can and does serve as a sanctuary for armed social
movements, and hence is in need of enhanced rather than decreased policing. Likewise,
criminal exploitation of cyberspace and particularly efforts aimed at stopping sexual exploita-
tion of children means that calls for the complete removal of filtering are unlikely to meet with
success.
It is equally true, however, that not all countries have the political will, economic clout, or
natural resource base of a China or Iran. Many Third World countries are dependent on dif-
ferent forms of foreign assistance, or are sensitive to sanctions that may disrupt trade or
the movement of migrant workers. Consequently, being labeled as a pariah, with any of the
attendant negative publicity and possibility of sanctions, is of consequence. Yet controlling
unwanted political agency, whether it comes in the form of prodemocracy groups, indepen-
dent media channels, or armed social movements is increasingly critical, particularly in author-
itarian states, or countries with less institutionalized and more fragile systems for managing
political change (such as elections). Among these states, the perceived costs of maintaining
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a national filtering policy may be seen as either too high, too difficult to maintain, or simply
undesirable for other reasons.
However, the costs of no control may be even higher. In this respect, the ‘‘color revolutions’’
that occurred in the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan between
2003 and 2005—which leveraged the Internet and other forms of communications as a
means to force political change by way of mass civil action—may be seen as milestones
toward the evolution of just-in-time blocking identified by the ONI. Just-in-time blocking differs
from the first-generation national filtering practices of countries like China and Iran in several
significant ways. First, and most importantly, just-in-time blocking is temporally fixed. Unlike
the evolving block lists used by national firewalls, just-in-time blocking occurs only at times
when the information being sought has a specific value or importance. Usually, this will mean
that blocking is imposed at times of political change, such as elections, or other potential so-
cial flashpoints (important anniversaries or times of social unrest). In the CIS, this kind of filter-
ing was documented by the ONI during the March 2005 Kyrgyz parliamentary elections,34 the
March 2006 Belarus presidential elections,35 and the October 2006 Tajik presidential elec-
tions.36 It has also been alleged in other regions, including Bahrain, Uganda, and Yemen dur-
ing the run-up to their 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections.37
Second, the exact techniques by which just-in-time blocking is occurring differs greatly from
traditional national firewalls. In some cases, such as in the Tajik and Ugandan elections, exist-
ing public order laws are used that require ISPs to filter out sites detrimental to national secu-
rity. In Tajikistan, ISPs received orders to block two opposition Web sites ‘‘in compliance with
the national concept of information security developed in year 2003’’ as they were deemed to
‘‘aim to undermine the state’s policies in the sphere of information.’’38 Similarly the Uganda
Communications Commission (UCC) ordered the two national Internet providers, MTN and
Uganda Telecom, to block radiokatwe.com, a Web site critical of the government citing ‘‘seri-
ous concerns.’’39 The Uganda case came to light as the technique used by the ISP resulted in
a further 657 completely unrelated Web sites that shared the same IP address being blocked.
Bahrain blocked several Web sites in the run-up to the country’s parliamentary elections in
2006, and Yemen banned access to several media and local politics sites ahead of the coun-
try’s 2006 presidential elections. Likewise, Bahrain also briefly blocked access to Google
Earth in 2006, citing national security concerns, as did Jordan in the same year with respect
to Skype.
In other cases, blocking has been accomplished by covert or special technical means. Dur-
ing the Belarus elections, a variety of techniques were observed, ranging from apparent errors
in the propagation of domain name information, causing Web sites to be inaccessible from
ISPs within Belarus, through to technical failures that disconnected all Internet access in Minsk
during the period of street demonstrations that followed the election. One of the most often
seen techniques is the use of Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS) against ISPs hosting targeted
Web sites or services. This form of blocking is particularly effective as it can occur anony-
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mously, with no demands being made, and presents investigators with the difficult task of pin-
pointing the source of the attack, which in at least one case was purchased from rogue hack-
ers on the open market (in the CIS). During the Kyrgyz 2005 elections, a sophisticated DoS
attack was carried out against a national ISP (El Cat) that hosted several independent (and
pro-opposition) media sites. ‘‘Extortion notes’’ requiring that the ISPs remove the opposition
sites accompanied the attacks. El Cat was particularly vulnerable as it was dependent on a
few relatively ‘‘narrow’’ connections to the Internet and, as a result, the DoS attacks on the op-
position sites threatened to disrupt access to all its other commercial Internet operations,
which included a large number of commercial clients. In Belarus, DoS attacks were used
against several opposition Web sites (hosted outside of Belarus). In this latter case, the
attacks were not accompanied by any claims of responsibility or demands. The attacks did
end shortly after the elections, as it was clear that the opposition was defeated and its street
protest would not prevail.
This later form of just-in-time blocking, which takes an offensive rather than defensive char-
acter (as in most traditional forms of filtering), is likely to gain in popularity. The expansion of
broadband access, particularly in less-developed countries with lower levels of knowledge of
‘‘bot nets’’ and other ‘‘crack attacks,’’ will almost certainly lead to an increase in these kind
of disruptions as ‘‘bot herders’’ exploit unprotected computers and broadband connections.
Other factors also make this form of offensive blocking particularly appealing. The first is that
such attacks are difficult to trace to an exact source (particularly as they can be bought) and
thus allow for ‘‘plausible deniability.’’ It is also difficult for individuals or nonstate groups to get
assistance in tracking down the source of such attacks, as they do not have access to the
necessary legal instruments to do so. For example, in the Kyrgyz election case, the extortion
notes sent by the attackers originated from a computer located in the United States. However,
to enlist U.S. authorities’ assistance, the means to do so—Multilateral Legal Assistance Trea-
ties (MLATs)—need to be initiated by states. In this case, the Kyrgyz ISP affected by the
attacks was told that in order to get help from the FBI (or other U.S. law enforcement
agencies) they would either have to launch a request through the Kyrgyz Ministry of Justice
(or Interior), or file a civil case directly in a U.S. state court in which the computer allegedly re-
sponsible for sending the letter was located. In both cases, bureaucratic realities and costs
prevented the Kyrgyz ISP from taking any further action. These barriers, combined with the rel-
ative ease in which such attacks can be ‘‘plausibly denied’’ by their perpetrators, make them a
potentially effective tool for preemptive attacks against information resources. Indeed, use of
these kinds of attacks against ‘‘terrorist’’ sites is currently under active consideration by a
number of states, including perhaps most importantly the United States.40
Indirect filtering by way of DoS or other computer network attacks (CNAs) also requires
much less in the way of infrastructure, and is thus less costly and less difficult to maintain
than national firewalls. As a result, it opens the door for substate actors to engage in their
own denial of access campaigns using CNAs. In the Russian Federation, and the CIS, for
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example, winning elections is as much about mobilizing your supporters as it is about pre-
venting the mobilization of opposition groups and parties. The relative ease and low cost of
conducting DoS or other CNAs makes it probable that such tactics will become part of the
normal way in which elections campaigns are run. It is also likely that activist groups from
across the political spectrum will employ these means as a way to raise awareness or cause
lasting damage to their opponents, indirectly causing damage to the openness of the Internet
by likely leading to further calls for regulation and policing. Indirectly, it may induce yet further
blowback against unfettered use of the Internet by civic networks.
Conclusions
As the evidence presented in this chapter makes clear, a simple correlation between the Inter-
net environment and the expansion of global civil society can no longer be taken for granted.
While it is certain that civic networks, resistance networks, and dark nets exploded in the
1990s and early 2000s, the material and political conditions of the communications environ-
ment of the time were favorably structured for such an outcome. Largely oblivious to the unin-
tended consequences of the Internet environment, policy-makers were actively encouraging
the growth and penetration of information and communications technologies worldwide
through FDI and development projects. Not until the appearance and impact of civic net-
works, resistance networks, and dark nets—human rights advocates, antiglobalization acti-
vists, militants, extremists, and jihadists—did state military, intelligence, and law enforcement
take active measures to secure the Internet through filtering and surveillance and begin to
rethink the encouragement of open and uncontrolled global communications networks. As
we show in this chapter, the scope, scale, and sophistication of Internet-content filtering and
surveillance and other methods of Internet control are growing rapidly and spreading globally.
Although these security practices are aimed primarily at ‘‘uncivil’’ society, dark nets, and those
actors considered to be a national security threat, the measures affect the operational environ-
ment for civic networks as well.
It is important to underline, however, that, notwithstanding these assertions of state power
and control, the Internet and civic networks likely will never fully be reigned in. A sprawling,
distributed, and highly potent sphere of global civic networks has been unleashed that moves
in and around sovereign states. These networks of autonomous agents are highly creative
and can be technologically sophisticated. Most noteworthy has been the growing solidification
and international presence of a formidable transnational social movement around Internet pro-
tection. This movement has put the filtering and surveillance activities of states and corpora-
tions under an intense ‘‘sous-veillance’’ grid, exposing unaccountable and nontransparent
practices while pushing for access to information and freedom of speech worldwide. Their
efforts include grassroots research and development initiatives to build software and advance
knowledge and capacity that helps secure human rights online. Although the pendulum pres-
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ently has swung in the direction of state control worldwide, hacktivists occasionally are able to
puncture through.
Alongside state efforts at control, as well as the emerging militarization of cyberspace, the
Internet has become an object of geopolitical contestation among states and nonstate actors
alike across each of its layers: infrastructure, code, law, and ideas. The outcome of this com-
peting securitization process is not clear—for state sovereignty, for human rights, or for open-
ness on the Internet. While states have more power and legal means to directly influence the
Internet, and together are creating mutually constitutive (if not explicitly defined) norms of con-
trol, civil society actors are able to create tools and publish information that expose and occa-
sionally even undermine these measures. For the foreseeable future, then, we believe the
Internet will have no ‘‘natural’’ tendency; it will be a media environment that morphs in contin-
uous tension, creating new forms of agency that in turn produce effects that shape the Inter-
net itself. Given the multilayered complexity of this environment, it seems apparent that no one
agent will be able to dominate cyberspace entirely, but many will be able to push technolo-
gies, regulations, and norms that affect it.
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Every country wishes to share in the prospective
benefits of the Internet. However, there are no
countries that are completely comfortable with
the newfound freedoms of expression and
access to information the Internet brings. As 
a result, there are few countries left in the 
world today that have not debated, planned, or
implemented Internet filtering. In the following
eight regional overviews, we provide broad sum-
maries that exhibit the ways in which the coun-
tries within each region are grappling with the
implications of Internet freedom and the chal-
lenges of regulating online content.
Three of the eight regional overviews—Asia,
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and
the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS)—synthesize the findings of the technical
tests and the background research carried out in
these regions. These regional overviews present
the results of the forty country studies in a greater
context.
The other five regional overviews—United
States/Canada, Europe, Latin America, sub-
Saharan Africa, and Australia/New Zealand—are
written to extend the coverage of the study
beyond the forty countries in which we were able
to test in the first year of this global filtering study.
These overviews are based solely on back-
ground research and secondary sources; the
OpenNet Initiative (ONI) did not carry out techni-
cal filtering tests in these regions with the excep-
tion of two countries—Ethiopia and Zimbabwe—
in sub-Saharan Africa and one country—
Venezuela—in Latin America. Although these
overviews fall short of a truly comprehensive
global view of Internet filtering, we believe that
they cover the major issues and trends as of
spring 2007.
In general, the regional overviews are struc-
tured to cover the targets of and approaches to
Internet content regulation, though the individual
composition of the eight overviews varies in
accordance with the quantity, focus, and strate-
gies of regulation and filtering employed by the
countries within a given region. As ONI continues
to investigate and document Internet filtering in
future years, we expect to expand our regional
coverage to include more countries.
The overviews for Asia, MENA, and CIS
exhibit considerable variation in filtering practices
between and within those regions. This variation
is seen not only in the depth, breadth, and foci of
filtering, but also in the legal, technical, and
administrative tools used to enact filtering. For
example, the overview of Asia presents a region
with a range of filtering targets and strategies as
wide and diverse as its political and cultural land-
scape. The CIS overview displays a more narrow
range of activity, reflecting perhaps the common
history of the region. The MENA report evinces a
region with extensive social filtering regimes and
a growing penchant for targeting political
speech.
By contrast, the general picture that
emerges from Europe, the United States,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is one of
more narrowly focused targeting of online con-
tent and a more diverse mix of strategies for
restricting access to that content. Filtering plays
an important part in these regions and countries,
though it tends to be voluntary and focused on a
much narrower set of issues—primarily child
pornography and, in a few cases, hate speech.
The primary content regulation strategies in these
countries tend to rely more heavily on taking
down domestically hosted Web sites and in
removing Web sites from search results than on
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the technical filtering of foreign-hosted Web sites.
This is not surprising given the large proportion of
total Internet content hosted on local servers in
these regions. The targets of content restrictions
vary by country. Within this set, Australia is the
most aggressive toward combating obscene
content, while the United States goes to the
greatest effort to remove Web sites that are sus-
pected of breaching copyright law. Germany and
France are the most vigorous in addressing
online hate speech.
Latin America generally shares the same
complement of targets and strategies as docu-
mented in Europe, the United States, Canada,
and Australia. However, the legal and administra-
tive means for restricting access to content are
not as advanced in Latin America as they are in
these other countries and, therefore, the policy
and practice of Internet blocking and content
restrictions have not been applied as widely. As
the legal structures and technical tools are further
developed in the next several years, we may see
a marked change in content regulation in Latin
America.
Finally, sub-Saharan Africa has implement-
ed the lowest level of regulatory restrictions on
content of any region to date. One country,
Ethiopia, has a systematic filtering regime, while
Uganda has one reported incidence of filtering.
In Africa the obstacles to viewing and posting
content online are based on infrastructure and
economics—few people have access to the
Internet. This region is another in which we
expect to see increased content regulation activ-
ity in the future, particularly as Internet access
expands.
In the regional overviews that follow, ONI
presents information on the current ways that
regions approach Internet filtering and content
restrictions. These summaries in turn provide a
context for the forty specific country summaries
addressed by ONI in this first report.
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Overview
It is not surprising that Asia, a region with extraor-
dinary cultural, social, and political diversity, is
home to a broad range of approaches, policies,
and practices toward Internet censorship.
ONI conducted in-country testing in
Afghanistan, China, India, Malaysia, Myanmar
(Burma), Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, South
Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. Afghanistan,
Malaysia, and Nepal do not use technical filtering
to implement their policies on information control,
but China, Myanmar, and Vietnam rely heavily on
pervasive filtering as a central platform for shap-
ing public knowledge, participation, and expres-
sion. The filtering practices of Thailand and
Pakistan are more targeted, as ONI testing indi-
cated that they blocked a substantial number of
sites across categories of content considered
sensitive or illicit. The remaining countries in Asia
tested by ONI filtered on a selective basis and on
targeted topics, including India (ethnic and reli-
gious conflict), South Korea (sites containing
North Korean propaganda or promoting the
reunification of North and South Korea), and
Singapore (pornography).
Of countries filtering political content, China,
Myanmar, and Vietnam blocked with the greatest
breadth and depth, spanning human rights
issues, reform and opposition activities, inde-
pendent media and news, and discrimination
against ethnic and religious minorities. Thailand
and Pakistan blocked political content to a much
more limited degree than China, Myanmar, or
Vietnam.
A narrower range of social content was
blocked in Asian countries. Many countries,
including Vietnam, cited obscene content as a
major justification for engaging in technical filter-
ing. Singapore, Thailand, China, Pakistan, and
Myanmar actually blocked pornographic content
to varying degrees. Pakistan filtered a number of
sites posting Danish cartoon images of the
Prophet Muhammad widely condemned as 
blasphemous, while India also blocked a limited
number of sites providing extreme viewpoints on
religion. South Korea and Thailand filtered a
small selection of gambling sites.
Internet Filtering in 
Asia
Conflict and security blocking was carried
out by Myanmar, China, South Korea, India,
Pakistan, and Thailand most frequently in regard
to groups or movements implicated in “seces-
sionist” or pro-independence activities, or in
regard to disputed territories and border con-
flicts.
Myanmar, China, Vietnam, Thailand, and
Singapore filtered Internet tools, including free
Web-based e-mail providers, blog hosting servic-
es, and more frequently proxies and other cir-
cumvention tools. South Korea blocked pirated
software on a nominal basis.
Internet in Asia
Some of the most and least connected countries
in the world are located in Asia: Japan, South
Korea, and Singapore all have Internet penetra-
tion rates of over 65 percent, while Afghanistan,
Myanmar, and Nepal remain three of thirty coun-
tries with less than 1 percent of its citizens online.1
Among the countries in the world with the
most restricted access, North Korea allows only a
small community of elites and foreigners online.
Most users must rely on Chinese service
providers for connectivity, while the limited num-
ber of North Korean–sponsored Web sites are
hosted abroad.
Even with an Internet penetration rate of only
10 percent, China was host to 137 million Internet
users at the end of 2006.2 The Chinese govern-
ment predicted that within two years China would
overtake the United States in becoming the coun-
try with the greatest number of Internet users
worldwide.3 Similarly, though India’s Internet
community is the fifth largest in the world, users
amounted to only about 4 percent of the coun-
try’s population in 2005.4
Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Nepal are
among the world’s least-developed countries.
Despite the constraints on resources and serious
developmental and political challenges, however,
citizens are showing steadily increasing demand
for Internet services such as Voice-over Internet
Protocol (VoIP), blogging, and chat. The Internet
market in Nepal is growing rapidly as a result of
a competitive Internet service provider (ISP) mar-
ket and low Internet access prices.5 In
Afghanistan, the Internet and information com-
munications technology (ICT) have been identi-
fied as important sources of growth and devel-
opment, with the potential to create opportunities
for disadvantaged groups such as women, whose
literacy rate stands at least 10 percent lower than
the overall adult literacy rate of 28 percent. 6
The range in access to broadband and
high-speed Internet in Asia on a national basis is
also staggering. South Korea has the highest rate
of Internet penetration in the world: more than 89
percent of South Korean households had Internet
access, and 75 percent of them used broadband
in 2005.7 As a result of heavy investment in its
broadband infrastructure following the Asian
financial crisis in the late 1990s, South Korea pro-
vides its citizens with a national network that car-
ries data at speeds up to 50 Mb/s.8 In 2005 the
number of Internet users in Singapore reached
2.42 million, or 67 percent of the population,9 one
of the highest Internet penetration rates in the
world. Singapore became the “first fully connect-
ed country in the world” by acting on a common-
ly held belief that the integration of technology is
essential to achieving economic growth.10 Home
access is commonplace, with residential dialup
and broadband subscriptions totaling more than
2.1 million.11 Although Thailand has a penetration
rate of 19 percent, homes and businesses in
Bangkok and other major cities account for most
of the connectivity;12 only around 15 percent of
schools in 2004 had access the Internet, and
broadband access for households is at less than
2 percent penetration.13 In Pakistan, broadband
and high-speed Internet is accessible only to
wealthier individuals or businesses: the majority
of home Internet users are connected by
modem, while cybercafés tend to split one
modem or DSL connection over many comput-
ers, reducing connection speed.
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Regional, language, and ethnic differences
also impact access to Internet services and ICT
infrastructure, and frequently reflect other dispar-
ities in national development priorities and
resource allocation. China’s longstanding policy
of extracting taxes and other resources from rural
areas to fund coastal development has resulted
not only in alarming rural-urban income dispari-
ties, but also has contributed to a growing digital
divide: while a quarter or more of residents in
major cities such as Tianjin are online, in poorer
and western provinces the rate is usually less
than 10 percent.14 Access in India is gradually
expanding from the eight most heavily populated
urban centers, where 41 percent of users are
concentrated, to small cities and towns.15 Since
71 percent of the population lives in rural areas,
and since the gap between rural and urban tele-
density is increasing, the majority of Indians are
shut out of the Internet.16 In Thailand and Vietnam
it is believed that Internet use will increase as
content (including search engines) becomes
available in local languages rather than English.
User-generated content and media, which
has ballooned in the scale and the scope of its
influence, continued to shape—and in many
cases redefine—the dissemination and genera-
tion of information in many Asian countries. In
media climates where news publications are fre-
quently owned by the state or controlled by busi-
ness interests with close ties to ruling parties,
bloggers and other independent content
providers are becoming an increasingly trusted
source of news, and in many cases have broken
stories that are picked up by mainstream media.
At the same time, the popularity of blogs and por-
tals discussing political issues and reform in
countries such as Malaysia and China indicate
that citizen-generated content is filling an impor-
tant information deficit in highly controlled media
environments.
For example, despite the government’s
requirement that “persistently” political blogs and
Web sites would be required to register and then
abstain from engaging in election campaigning
in the run-up to the 2006 general elections in
Singapore, “citizen media” uploaded footage of
opposition party rallies taken with handheld video
cameras and cell phones to media-sharing sites
such as YouTube and Google Video. This partici-
pation marks a departure from perceptions that
the vast majority of Singaporeans “do not con-
sider the Internet to [sic] useful for political
engagement and civic participation.”17 Although
very few Nepalis have access to the Internet, it
has nevertheless become an important source of
independent news in Nepal.18 When King
Gyanendra assumed authoritarian control in
2005, Nepali bloggers became an important
political voice and source of information to the
world about the situation unfolding inside the
country, as traditional media were either shut
down or heavily censored.19 In a study of MSN
users in Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, 41 percent of
bloggers were “active” (spending three hours or
more each week blogging), and  with the excep-
tions of India and South Korea, a majority of blog-
gers in these countries were women.20 Online cit-
izens’ media has played an important role in
South Korean politics and Internet culture in
recent years, led by ohmynews.com, a Seoul-
based online newspaper that publishes articles
mostly written by 50,000 citizen journalists and is
considered the most influential news source in
South Korea.21 OhmyNews has been widely
acknowledged as strongly influencing the 2002
election of Korean President Roh Moo-hyun.22
Age is an essential demographic factor to
consider when tracking trends in Internet use and
growth in Asia. In Vietnam—which has an Internet
penetration rate of 17 percent, where more than
half of the population is under thirty, and where a
significant portion of individual users use cyber-
cafés for online gaming and access to the
Internet—control over these venues is an impor-
tant priority for the state.23 In China, eighteen- to
twenty-four-year-olds comprise over 35 percent
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of all Internet users.24 Over 70 percent of the 20.8
million bloggers (of which around 3.15 million
were active) are under thirty.25 In Thailand those
under twenty-five years account for over half of
Thai users.26 A Windows Live Spaces report on a
thriving blogging community in India, estimated
at 14 percent of Internet users, found that a vast
majority of bloggers are men under the age of
thirty-five, which conforms to the demographic
snapshot of Indian Internet users as predomi-
nantly male, middle class, and young.27
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Each of the countries that practice pervasive 
filtering in the region have issued ambitious 
regulations that aim to bring Internet users under
government supervision and control, even if the
feasibility of such oversight remains in doubt.
Myanmar, China, and Vietnam engage in con-
stant, unremitting supervision of and interference
with other forms of media. Well-established
strategies include the shuttering of reformist
newspapers and Web sites, the institutionalized
supervision over content, and the intimidation
and harassment of dissidents, journalists, and
human rights activists.
In the regulation of cyberspace, the corre-
sponding phenomenon is the delegation of polic-
ing and monitoring responsibilities to ISPs, con-
tent providers, private corporations, and users
themselves. These frameworks are not structured
to accommodate only voluntary self-regulation
along industry lines, but rather they exact compli-
ance with state-imposed requirements through
the looming threat of shutdowns, loss of license,
fines, job dismissals, and even criminal liability.
Vietnam and China apply a more direct form of
censorship through the detention of cyberdissi-
dents, while in Pakistan the Supreme Court
authorized the police to register criminal cases
against publishers of content blaspheming the
Prophet Muhammad, even though no one was
apprehended. Although there are no known
cases of individuals detained for merely viewing
prohibited online content, there are scores of
journalists, writers, and activists who have been
imprisoned on the basis of publishing criticism of
government policies on the Internet, even in the
form of song lyrics or discussion of political
reform over VoIP.28 The hidden, cumulative cost
of these tiered and overlapping controls is self-
censorship and a chilling effect that pervades all
speech.
China can point to dozens of regulations
that systematically proscribe nine to eleven types
of illegal content, and the number of regulations
is growing. The government has imposed new
regulations to keep pace with, and even antici-
pate, the explosion of online video sharing, blog-
ging, and other Web 2.0 platforms, proposing
real-name registration requirements for bloggers
and national regulations for online video and
short film content.29 With the support of a legal
framework where even unemployment rates 
and certain family planning statistics are state
secrets, the central propaganda organ issues
instructions throughout the government hierarchy
to media organizations, hosts such as BBS and
blog platforms, and other content providers to
suppress discussion of an ever-expanding list of
proscribed topics.
Whether or not a legal basis for filtering is
implicit in content regulations, in many Asian
countries filtering has proceeded despite the lack
of clear authority to do so. This includes coun-
tries with established democratic systems and
protections for the press and other forms of
speech. For example, while India is in the
process of centralizing its filtering at the interna-
tional gateway level and therefore improving its
efficacy, many still question whether its primary
legal authorization for filtering, the 2000 IT Act, is
valid in light of constitutional requirements for lim-
its to freedom of expression.
In Thailand, where human rights protections
and press freedom have deteriorated in recent
years, the legal authority for filtering is not clear.
Indeed, the practice of filtering may in fact con-
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tradict protections in the 1997 Constitution that
guarantee Thai citizens the rights to express
opinions, to communicate by “lawful” means,
and to access information.30 The first military
coup in fifteen years, in September 2006, ampli-
fied the uncertainty over the legitimacy of gov-
ernment policy, particularly through the declara-
tion of martial law that precipitated claims of
increased filtering.31 The new military govern-
ment took controversial and unilateral measures
such as abrogating the Thai Constitution and
banning new political parties, but ONI testing
revealed that the post-coup content targeted for
filtering was generally continuous with the filtering
regime established by former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra’s government.
Defamation laws
A popular tool for silencing critics in countries
such as Singapore, Malaysia and China, defama-
tion laws and other forms of civil and criminal 
liability have begun to be applied to compel inde-
pendent news sources, bloggers, and others to
remove or retract online content.
In Singapore, defamation suits levy civil lia-
bility and heavy damages on independent and
critical voices, from opposition party politicians 
to regional publications with domestic circula-
tion.32 Thai journalists and other critics of former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s ruling party
had been similarly targeted, in line with a well-
established precedent for using defamation suits
to silence those fighting corruption.33 Individuals
perceived as criticizing the King, an act of lèse
majesté, can be found liable under both defama-
tion laws and the criminal code. In Malaysia, the
first defamation suits against bloggers were inau-
gurated in January 2007, where the New Straits
Times paper and several of its executives sued
Jeff Ooi (www.jeffooi.com) and Ahirudin Attan
(www.rockybru.blogspot.com) simultaneously for
both blog posts and reader comments critical of
their coverage.34
Implementation of filtering
However, even where legal authority for technical
filtering and other forms of Internet censorship
has been clearly established, filtering remains a
contested practice.
At times an important source of conflict
between users and government is the clumsy
execution of imprecise methods, leading to a
much broader scope of filtering than what was
authorized. This was the case in Pakistan in
February 2006, where a strong public outcry to
“blasphemous” Danish cartoons depicting the
Prophet Muhammad contributed to the blocking
of twelve sites posting the images. The initial
blockage quickly mushroomed into a mandate to
filter all blasphemous content and resulted in the
collateral blocking of the Blogspot domain for
most of 2006, a consequence of the use of IP
blocking. In India, the collateral blocking of Web
sites occurred in response to CERT-IN orders in
August 2003 and July 2006,35 where ISPs in both
incidents cut off access to parent Web sites
including Google’s blogspot.com, typepad.com,
and Yahoo!’s geocities.com. One exception to
the elastic filtering frequently encountered in
Asian countries is North Korea, where access to
online content is limited to the few dozen Web
sites in Kwangmyong, the nation’s domestic
intranet.
In the implementation of technical filtering,
the content blocked also frequently departs from
pre-established or publicly acknowledged tar-
gets. For example, despite its putative focus on
cleansing the Web of “harmful” social content
such as obscenity,36 the South Korean govern-
ment uses its authority to define “harmful” con-
tent to focus on pro-North Korean or pro-reunifi-
cation material. ONI testing found very little
blocking of sensitive social content. The varia-
tions in filtering, if not the type of content blocked,
between the two state-owned ISPs in Myanmar
were surprising given the government’s lock-
down on information and all forms of media.
India’s IT Act, cited as the authority for the cre-
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ation of the filtering certification body CERT-IN,
prohibits only the publication of obscene content;
however, CERT-IN has used its authority to issue
blocking instructions against religious and ethnic
inflammatory content.
Nonstate actors—especially ISPs—are dep-
utized not only to shoulder monitoring duties and
legal responsibility for unauthorized online
behavior, but in many Asian countries they are
relied upon to implement technical filtering.
Countries that filter effectively at the international
gateway were the exception in Asia. The two
main state-owned ISPs in China each control a
backbone network, and filtering was remarkably
consistent between them. Blocking between
South Korean ISPs was extremely consistent,
even though both Korea Telecom (KorNet) and
Hanaro Telecom (HanaNet) are publicly held cor-
porations. In most other countries, the implemen-
tation of filtering primarily at the “margins” of
state action has led to significant disparities
across ISPs (especially in a crowded market),
potential overblocking, and other inconsistencies
such that users in the same country experience
their “right” to access information differently and
are able ultimately to view and interact with dif-
ferent portions of the Internet.
Additionally, the scope of a state’s legal reg-
ulation of online activity often belies an imple-
mentation of state policy that is not entirely
monolithic. Myanmar, China, Vietnam, India, and
Pakistan all have regulations requiring cyber-
cafés to monitor the online activities of their users
and demand personal identity information.
Generally these policies are difficult to enforce.
For example, though the Myanmar government
requires that users be registered and that screen-
shots of their activity be taken every five minutes,
cafés do not always comply and CDs of screen-
shots are requested only sporadically.37
Impact of economic and social factors
Economic incentives and social factors have a
definite impact on filtering practices in Asia.
Global industry players such as Google and
Microsoft have engaged in censorship in order to
benefit from state investment in providing
improved speed and quality of access to
approved content while strengthening technical
filtering, particularly in China.
On June 29, 2006, India’s Department of
Telecommunications (DOT) reportedly instructed
around 150 ISPs to block the Web site of the
People’s War Group (PWG), a Maoist paramilitary
group that was hosted on Geocities. A month
later, the DOT informed ISPs that Yahoo! had
removed the PWG’s site, apparently the first time
a service provider had voluntarily removed a Web
site to avoid being blocked.38
The Chinese and Vietnamese governments
must contend with the challenge of maintaining
control over specified corridors of information as
the space for approved or harmless topics grows
increasingly vast. Myanmar has taken a blunter
approach than its authoritarian neighbors, and in
the case of China, its stalwart ally and aid
provider. Internet access in Myanmar is struc-
tured so that broadband costs are prohibitive for
most of its citizens, and dialup access comes
bundled with state-monitored, fee-based e-mail
service and a small collection of pre-approved
sites on the country’s intranet. In a reported
attempt to not only censor communications but
also preserve its monopoly over telephone and e-
mail services as MPT’s revenues dipped, the
government blocked free e-mail services at
points in 2006.39 ONI testing confirmed that
Yahoo! Mail, Gmail, Hushmail, and mail2web
were blocked, with the ISP Myanmar Posts and
Telecom taking the additional precaution of
blocking thirteen additional e-mail sites, including
Hotmail and Fastmail. Similar concerns about
loss of state revenue have factored into similar
tightening of VoIP services in Pakistan and China.
Economic motivations may also work to
achieve an opposite effect, where governments
explicitly refrain from Internet censorship in order
to encourage growth. A number of Asian coun-
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tries known for effective and sophisticated sys-
tems of information control, such as Singapore
and Malaysia, demonstrated surprisingly low lev-
els of filtering. For these governments, the
strength of their historical interventions in free-
dom of the press and free speech may partially
obviate the need for rigorous filtering.
In contrast to its approach toward other
forms of media, the official policy of Singapore’s
Media Development Authority (MDA) has been to
apply a “light-touch” regulatory framework to the
Internet, promoting responsible use while giving
industry players “maximum flexibility.” Thus
Singapore filters content on a symbolic scale, but
also relies on established controls over print and
broadcast media to set a precedent for citizens’
online behavior, leading one scholar to call media
regulation a “dual regulatory regime.”40 Greater
control of cyberspace may be obviated by exist-
ing restrictive laws, political ties to the judiciary,
and ownership and intimidation of the media that
are already used to suppress dissenting opinion
and opposition to the ruling People’s Action Party
(PAP).41 Taken together, these economic and
legal controls contribute to a climate of pervasive
self-censorship of political commentary.
In Malaysia the state pledges not to censor
Internet content in its “Bill of Guarantees” to com-
panies approved for its Multimedia Super
Corridor (MSC), a high-tech business center and
communications infrastructure designed to help
the country become an international information
technology leader.42 However, rather than filter
content, Malaysia’s Communications and
Multimedia Act (CMA) targets “indecent” and
“offensive” online content by subjecting publish-
ers and authors to civil and/or criminal liability.
Internet content publishers in Malaysia operate
under the constant risk that the CMA and numer-
ous other laws regulating speech and content on
traditional media will be interpreted or amended
to extend to Internet publications.43 Notably, the
bloggers Jeff Ooi and Ahirudin Attan were target-
ed under defamation laws and not the regulatory
framework for online speech, which delineates
fines and criminal penalties for persons using a
content applications service to provide content
that is “indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or
offensive in character.”44
In Afghanistan and Nepal serious political
and economic challenges have perhaps made
technical filtering impracticable, but this does not
mean their citizens have unfettered access to
information and communication via the Internet.
Political instability has affected not merely the
quality of access, but also the question of access
altogether. The Internet in Afghanistan was
banned altogether by the Taliban in July 2001—
primarily because it was thought to broadcast
obscene, immoral, and anti-Islam material, and
the few Internet users at the time could not be
easily monitored because they obtained their
phone lines from Pakistan.45 In 2005, citing dete-
riorating security conditions in Nepal due to
Maoist violence, the Nepali king imposed author-
itarian rule and a week-long media blackout and
cut off all Internet access in the country.
In countries whose governments consider
free access to information and unrestricted free-
dom of expression to be threats to social stabili-
ty and public order, filtering is overwhelmingly tar-
geted at local language content and country-spe-
cific issues.
China, Myanmar, and Vietnam filter a signif-
icant portion of content addressing their own
human rights record and practices. Both China
Netcom and China Telecom chose to block only
one of the major international news organizations
tested—the BBC—but they denied their users
access to a significant number of overseas
Chinese-language media representing different
positions on the political spectrum. News in lan-
guages spoken by ethnic minorities in contested
regions was also blocked in China. In Vietnam,
sites only in English or French were rarely
blocked, but sites in Vietnamese only tangentially
or indirectly critical of the government—such as
those with content focusing on local communities,
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world news, or voicing strong anti-Communist
sentiments—were inaccessible. In Pakistan,
though Balochi and Sindhi independence and
human rights sites have been filtered, other Web
sites pertaining to Pashtun secessionism were
fully accessible. In this case, filtering may be
seen as unnecessary, as the majority of Pashtuns
are illiterate in their local language.
Transparency
All countries in Asia engaged in technical filtering
exhibited a lack of transparency in the legal
authorization, technical processes, or implemen-
tation of filtering. Governments chose to remain
silent on their source of authority to filter content
from its citizens, or relied on indirect or implicit
authority found in existing laws and regulations.
Citizens in many countries were not put on notice
of filtering as it occurred, and instead the cause
of content inaccessibility was identified to be the
result of inadvertent or unintentional error.
Virtually all governments in Asia have yet to
develop procedures for official notification of
blocking to Web site owners, or appeal mecha-
nisms for individuals to challenge blocking deci-
sions in independent tribunals.
Governments often fail to disclose the extent
of filtering to the general public. One notable
exception is Singapore: before most Asian coun-
tries even had infrastructure in place to begin
engaging in technical censorship of the Internet,
Singapore announced in 1999 that a list of 100
pornographic Web sites would be blocked by the
three major ISPs. As a “gesture of concern” to
demonstrate the government’s commitment to
“Asian” values,46 this figure has been continually
cited in coverage of Internet censorship in
Singapore, though the extent of actual filtering
has remained symbolic.
In South Korea, state regulation (through the
Internet Content Filtering Ordinance in 2001)47
reportedly required ISPs to block as many as
120,000 Web sites on a state-compiled list, as
well as mandating that Internet access facilities
accessible to minors, such as public libraries and
schools, install filtering software.48 However, ONI
testing indicated that Internet filtering in South
Korea is not as extensive as reports have sug-
gested. In Thailand as well, the distinct lack of
transparency in the filtering process has persist-
ed through the change in Thai governments.
Adding to the uncertainty, a range of figures for
the number of sites blocked by the Thai govern-
ment continues to be circulated but not con-
firmed. A Thai police Web site citing the number
of blocked sites at over 34,000 sites since 2002
has been taken down.
However, both South Korean and Thai ISPs
do employ a blockpage, the most transparent
notification of filtering. For example, sites blocked
by KorNet through DNS tampering in South
Korea resolve to a blockpage hosted by the
police at 211.253.9.250. This blockpage not only
states that the page has been lawfully blocked
but also displays the user’s IP address, which
suggests the possibility of tracking the viewers
that have visited the blocked site. Only a few
countries provide clear notice that access is
being denied because of proscribed content. In
contrast, China’s filtering methods are set up so
that users in China who cannot access content
due to IP address blocking, DNS tampering, or
keyword search string filtering receive a network
timeout or error page. When a keyword block is
triggered, further requests made to the target site
(IP address) are blocked (including attempts to
access otherwise permissible sites) for a variable
period ranging from five to thirty minutes.
Civil society mobilization
In Asia, civil society groups (as characterized/
defined by Deibert and Rohozinski in Chapter 6)
have carved out a prominent role in monitoring
Internet censorship, advocating for greater
access to information and freedom of expression
and creating a space for issues shut out or mar-
ginalized in mainstream discourse. In response
to the collateral blocking of the entire Blogspot
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domain in India and Pakistan, bloggers and other
loosely based coalitions mobilized quickly to
generate media attention to the blocking and called
for government transparency in the process.
Vigilant monitoring and advocacy by civil
society activists in India, rather than government
disclosure, has contributed to a greater under-
standing of technical filtering processes there.
For example, the July 13, 2006, notice to block
seventeen Web sites in the wake of the Mumbai
train bombings issued by CERT-IN was not repro-
duced on any official government Web site but
scanned and posted on an individual’s blog. A
number of individuals have filed requests seeking
greater disclosure about the criteria and authori-
zation for filtering under the 2005 Right to
Information Act, but information has not been
forthcoming.
Similarly, in Pakistan, the government never
provided an official declaration confirming the
blanket block on Blogspot.com since March
2006 or the rationale for it. Rather, the investiga-
tion and awareness-building around the contro-
versial overblocking was initiated by two individu-
als through their “Don’t Block The Blog” cam-
paign. In the months after two Malaysians
became the first bloggers to be sued for defama-
tion in January 2007, bloggers in Malaysia and
around the region formed the protest campaign
“Bloggers United, No Fear,” organized a legal
defense fund trusteed by Datin Paduka Marina
Mahathir, the daughter of former Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad, and initiated a boycott of the
plaintiff New Straits Times.
Many countries in Asia have achieved high-
ly restricted media environments, and the Internet
has become a tool for savvy civil society activists
who must operate in them. Commonly the organ-
ization and resources required to shut down the
Internet as an alternative medium of communica-
tion are far more expensive than the require-
ments of transmitting information online. For
example, for many months in 2005 Radio Free
Asia had been reporting about villagers in
Shanwei in China’s Guangdong province. These
villagers had been protesting the construction of
a wind power plant that would threaten their liveli-
hoods and provide them with inadequate com-
pensation for their expropriated land. After news
about the police shooting and killing several
Shanwei villagers broke in December 2005, the
government attempted to suppress information
about the incident by shutting down cybercafés
in neighboring areas, cutting off Internet access
to residents, stopping queries for the town’s
name on search engines, and erasing blogs
mentioning the incident as soon as they were
posted.49 In spite of a lockdown in the area, a
rights defense group was able to conduct an
investigation into the incident and post it online.50
Conclusion
Notwithstanding a diverse range of approaches
to Internet censorship, most of the governments
in Asia where ONI conducted in-country testing
are expanding their mandate to filter sensitive
content, both technically and through “soft con-
trols” such as legal regulation and delegated lia-
bility. Technical filtering is far from refined in most
Asian countries, but is becoming an increasingly
important tool in an armament of possible con-
trols on free expression and the flow of informa-
tion. It is also most clearly demarcated along
national lines rather than using any regional or
categorical formula. Accordingly many Asian
governments focus overwhelmingly on content
relating to sensitive political information and in
local languages. Although filtering has been
adopted as state policy for many Asian countries,
the practices and implications of filtering contin-
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Australia maintains some of the most restrictive
Internet policies of any Western nation, while its
neighbor, New Zealand, is less rigorous in its
Internet regulation. Without any explicit protection
of free speech in its constitution,1 the Australian
government has used its “communications
power” delineated in the constitution to regulate
the availability of offensive content online,2
endowing a government entity with the power to
issue take-down notices for Internet content host-
ed within the country. A number of state and ter-
ritorial governments in Australia have also
passed legislation making the distribution of
offensive material a criminal offense, as the con-
stitution does not afford that power to the nation-
al government.3
The Australian government also promotes
and finances an “opt-in” filtering program, in
which Internet users voluntarily accept filtering
software that blocks offensive content hosted
outside of the country. At present there are no
plans for a countrywide Internet service provider
(ISP)-level filtering regime, though Australia’s
handling of hate speech, copyright, defamation,
and security signals the government’s desire to
increase the scope of its Internet regulation.
New Zealand by contrast is less strict in its
Internet regulation. The government maintains a
more limited definition of offensive content that
can be investigated by a designated government
entity, although—unlike in Australia—the defini-
tion includes hate speech (despite it being illegal
in both countries). Furthermore, the government
has not passed legislation to allow issuance of
takedown notices for such content and its
enforcement of Internet content regulation by
prosecution almost solely focuses on child
pornography. Although New Zealand Internet
copyright policies have not yet been formalized,
its defamation and security policies are fairly sim-
ilar to Australia’s.
Overall, however, Australia maintains a
stricter regime of Internet censorship and regula-
tion than New Zealand and much of the Western
world, though not at the level of the more repres-
sive governments that ONI has studied.
Internet Filtering in 
Australia and New Zealand
Offensive content
Australian and New Zealand approaches to
offensive content on the Internet are somewhat
similar in structure, in that they both rely on clas-
sifications systems and entities with the power to
investigate online content. But their approaches
are very different in terms of what is considered
offensive and what is done about the offending
content.
Australian laws relating to the censorship of
offensive content are based on the powers delin-
eated in and protections omitted from the
Australian constitution. Section 51(v) of the doc-
ument gives the Parliament power to “make laws
for the peace, order, and good government of the
Commonwealth with respect to: (v) postal, tele-
graphic, telephonic, and other like services.”4
With no explicit constitutional protection of free
speech, the Australian government has invoked
its “communications power” to institute a restric-
tive regime of Internet content regulation.
The Broadcasting Services Amendment
(Online Services) Bill 1999, an amendment to the
Broadcasting Services Act 1992, establishes the
authority of the Australian Communications and
Media Authority (ACMA)5 to regulate Internet
content. The ACMA is empowered to look into
complaints from Australians about offensive con-
tent on the Internet and issue takedown notices.
The ACMA is not mandated to scour the Internet
for potentially prohibited content, but it is allowed
to begin investigations without an outside com-
plaint.6
Web content that is hosted in Australia may
be removed by the ACMA if the Office of Film and
Literature Classification finds that it falls within
certain categories as defined by the
Commonwealth Classification (Publications,
Films and Computer Games) Act 1995, a coop-
erative classification system agreed to by the
national, state, and territorial governments.
The levels and definitions of prohibited con-
tent are as follows:
• R18—Contains content that is likely to be
disturbing to those under eighteen. This
content is not prohibited on domestic host-
ing sites if there is an age-verification sys-
tem certified by the ACMA in place.
• X18—Contains nonviolent sexually explicit
content between consenting adults. This
content may be subject to ACMA takedown
provisions if hosted on domestic servers.
• RC—Contains content that is Refused
Classification (child pornography, fetish,
detailed instruction on crime, and so on)7
and is prohibited on Australian-hosted sites.
The classification system chosen for Internet
content is not the publications classification sys-
tem but the more restrictive standard used for
films. As a result, some content allowable offline
is banned when brought online.8
Once the determination has been made that
content hosted within Australia is prohibited, the
ACMA issues a takedown notice to the Internet
Content Host (ICH). It is not illegal for the ICH to
host prohibited content, but legal action could be
taken against it by the government if it does not
comply with the take-down notice.
For offensive content hosted outside of
Australia, the ACMA itself determines whether
content is prohibited and notifies a list of certified
Web-filter manufacturers to include the prohibit-
ed sites in their filters.9 To obtain certification,
these certified “Family Friendly Filters” must
agree to keep lists of prohibited sites confiden-
tial.10 ISPs are then required to offer a Family
Friendly Filter to all of their customers, though
customers are not required to accept them.11 As
a result, content taken down in Australia could be
posted outside of the country and still be acces-
sible to the majority of Australian Internet users.
Electronic Frontiers Australia, a nonprofit group
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dedicated to protecting online freedoms, reports
that at least one site taken down has moved to
the United States, even keeping its URL and
“.au” domain. It is not known how many sites
have moved overseas in this fashion.12
States and territories have instituted a vari-
ety of laws that criminalize the downloading of
illegal content and the distribution of content that
is “objectionable” or “unsuitable for minors.”13
The state of Victoria, for example, in §57 of its
Classification (Publication, Films and Computer
Games) (Enforcement) Act 1995, makes it illegal
to “use an on-line information service to publish
or transmit, or make available for transmission,
objectionable material.”14 There is not complete
uniformity between the states, however. In
Western Australia, for example, it is not illegal to
distribute R18 and X18 to adults online (though
the ACMA can still issue takedown notices), but
the possession of any RC content (not just 
child pornography as is the case in other states)
is illegal.15
Beyond its regulation of online content, the
Commonwealth is implementing new Internet 
filtering initiatives. In June 2006 the Australian
government announced an AU$116.6 million 
initiative called “Protecting Australian Families
Online.” Of this, AU$93.3 million will be spent
over three years to provide all families with free
Web filters, though they will still be optional.
Further, the National Library of Australia is now
required to use Web filters on all of its computers.
All other libraries are to be provided with free 
Web filters and encouraged to use them on their
computers as well.16 Finally, perhaps in a nod to
elements of the government—especially mem-
bers of the Labor Party—pushing for a system
like Cleanfeed in the United Kingdom, the 
government will be testing an ISP-level blocking 
system in Tasmania. The Minister for Communi-
cations, Information Technology and the Arts,
Helen Coonan, however, remains opposed to
implementing this system on a countrywide
basis.17
In a related development, all mainland
states in Australia recently banned access to
YouTube over school networks because of a
video uploaded depicting a seventeen-year-old
Australian girl being abused, beaten up, and
humiliated by a group of young people. Eight
youths have been charged in connection with the
assault.18 The blocking has continued to worsen
rifts between state schools and some nonstate
schools, such as Melbourne Grammar School,
which have chosen to protect free speech and
allow unfiltered access to the Internet.19
New Zealand, on the other hand, does not
have any government legislation directly regulat-
ing Internet content.20 Officials have claimed,
however, that the Films, Videos, and Publications
Classification Act of 1993, which defines “objec-
tionable” material, covers Internet materials as
well.21 Under the Act, any material that
“describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise
deals with matters such as sex, horror, crime, cru-
elty, or violence in such a manner that the avail-
ability of the publication is likely to be injurious to
the public good” is considered objectionable and
is illegal to distribute or possess.22 Specifically
listed is any material that promotes or supports
“the exploitation of children, or young persons, or
both, for sexual purposes; or the use of violence
or coercion to compel any person to participate
in, or submit to, sexual conduct; or sexual con-
duct with or upon the body of a dead person; or
the use of urine or excrement in association with
degrading or dehumanising conduct or sexual
conduct; or bestiality; or acts of torture or the
infliction of extreme violence or extreme cruelty.”23
There is also a decision-making procedure
described in the Act for any content that might be
objectionable but does not fall within this specific
list, including discriminatory and hateful materi-
al.24 This law has formed the basis of the
Department of Internal Affairs’ (DIA) enforcement
of Internet censorship in the country.
Like Australia’s ACMA, the DIA “proactively”
investigates potentially banned material25 and
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submits any such material not already classified
to the Office of Film and Literature Classification
for a ruling.26 This office then classifies the mate-
rial as “unrestricted,” “objectionable,” or “objec-
tionable” except in certain circumstances of
restricted access or for “educational, profession-
al, scientific, literary, artistic, or technical purpos-
es.”27
Unlike in Australia, however, there is no
explicit legal mechanism for the take-down of
objectionable material. Instead, the nonprofit
InternetNZ is in the process of establishing an
industrywide code of conduct that would require
its signers to agree not to host illegal content.28
As a result, the government focuses its efforts on
prosecuting the distributors or possessors. The
Films, Videos, and Publications Classifications
Amendment Act 2005 sets the penalty for distrib-
uting objectionable material at a maximum of ten
years in prison (up from a maximum of one year)
and for knowingly possessing objectionable
materials at a maximum of five years in prison or
a NZ$50,000 fine.29 According to various
sources, the DIA has almost completely focused
its enforcement of Internet censorship on child
pornography.30
Hate speech
Both Australia and New Zealand have legislation
addressing hate speech generally, and both have
applied this legislation to the Internet through dif-
ferent means. New Zealand, however, has an
institutionalized investigation system, while
Australia does not.
Australia addresses hate speech through
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which makes
it “unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise
than in private, if: the act is reasonably likely, in all
the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or
intimidate another person or a group of people;
and the act is done because of the race, colour
or national or ethnic origin of the other person, or
of some or all of the people in the group.”31
Australian courts applied this law to the
Internet for the first time in October 2002 in the
Jones v. Toben case. Jeremy Jones and the
Executive Council of Australian Jewry brought a
lawsuit against Frederick Toben, the director of
the Adelaide Institute, because of material on
Toben’s Web site (www.adelaideinstitute.org) that
denied the Holocaust. The Federal Court, ruling
that publication on the Internet without password
protection is a “public act,” found that posting
this material online was in direct violation of §18C
of the Racial Discimination Act 1975 (quoted
above) and called for the material to be removed
from the Internet.32
Australia does not, however, give the ACMA
authority to investigate complaints or issue 
takedown notices for hateful or racist materials
online, even if they would be illegal under the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975.33 Schedule 5 of
the Broadcast Services Act 1992 gives the ACMA
authority only over materials deemed “offensive”
within the classification scheme described earlier.
As a result, there appears to be no venue other
than the courts in which to pursue complaints
about hateful or racist materials online. However,
Chilling Effects reports that Google received
notice on May 5, 2006, of a site in its search
results that “allegedly violates section 18C of the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975” and removed it
from the Google Australia site (www.google.
com.au).34 This may be indicative of a new
notice-based system taking form.
New Zealand, on the other hand, has both
explicit prohibition of discrimination based on
race, religion, age, disability, sexual orientation,
and so on in §21(1) of the Human Rights Act
1993,35 as well as explicit prohibition of the pub-
lication of material that “represents (whether
directly or by implication) that members of any
particular class of the public are inherently inferi-
or to other members of the public by reason of
any characteristic of members of that class,
being a characteristic that is a prohibited ground
of discrimination specified in §21(1) of the
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Human Rights Act 1993”36 in §3e of the Films,
Videos and Publication Classifications Act 1993.
The DIA uses these statutes to pursue investiga-
tions into potentially discriminatory material.
Copyright
Australia is applying copyright law to the Internet
in a vigorous attempt to expand its role in limiting
copyright infringement. New Zealand, on the
other hand, is more slow-moving and has yet to
enact legislation directly relevant to Internet
copyright.
Australia’s copyright laws underwent signifi-
cant overhaul following the acceptance of the
Australian-United States Free Trade Agreement in
2004. Pursuant to that agreement, Australia was
required to bring its copyright laws closer in line
with those of the United States.37 Some of the rel-
evant requirements included:
1. agreeing to World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Internet treaties,
2. implementing an “expeditious” takedown
system of copyright infringing materials,
3. strengthening control over copyright protec-
tion technology circumvention,
4. agreeing to copyright protection standards,
and
5. increasing the length of copyright to life +
seventy years from its previous level of life +
fifty years.38
Most of these provisions were implemented
in the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act 2004,39 though new regulations in response
to requirement (3) were recently implemented in
the Copyrights Amendment Act 2006.40
After implementing a system of copyright
more consistent with that of the United States,
the Australian government decided to pursue
another overhaul of its copyright laws in 2006 to,
as ABC Science Online reports, “keep up with the
rapidly changing digital landscape.”41 The pro-
posed amendments to the Copyright Act 1968
were worrisome to many. Google argued that
certain provisions would allow copyright owners
to pursue legal action against it and other search
engines for caching material without obtaining
express permission from each site. This would
“condemn the Australian public to the pre-
Internet era,” Google argued.42 Other critics con-
tended that the proposed amendments would
make possession of an iPod or other music-lis-
tening device designed to play MP3s illegal, and
uploading a video of yourself singing along to a
pop song a crime.43
Although these two final concerns have
been remedied in the resulting Copyrights
Amendment Act 2006 (it is still legal to own an
iPod and it is allowable to post a lip-synching
video),44 the caching issue still appears to be
unresolved. There is an exception in the act that
allows computer networks of educational institu-
tions to cache copyright-protected online materi-
al “to facilitate efficient later access to the works
and other subject-matter by users of the sys-
tem.”45 However, this does not appear to offer the
exception that Google sought.
Overall, though, the amendments allow for
increased exceptions to the copyright laws to
establish more realistic fair use of copyrighted
material, such as “time-shifting, format-shifting
and space-shifting” (e.g., recording a television
show to watch later, scanning a book to view it
electronically, and transferring material from CDs
to iPods, respectively), and greater protection of
parody and satire.46
The Australian judiciary has been active in
setting precedents in copyright enforcement
online. In a landmark decision in December
2006, the Federal Court upheld a lower court rul-
ing that found the Web site operator of
mp3s4free.net, Stephen Cooper, and the hosting
ISP, E-Talk, liable for copyright infringement.
Cooper’s site did not itself host any copyright-
protected material, but rather served as a search
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engine through which users could find and
download copyright-protected music for free. In
its ruling, the court found that merely linking to
copyright-protected material was grounds for
infringement. In addition, the court found that ISP
E-Talk was also liable for copyright infringement
because it posted advertisements on the site and
was unwilling to take the site down.47
Interestingly, Dale Clapperton of Electronic
Frontiers Australia has argued that this decision
could be used against search engines such as
Google. In an article in the Sydney Morning
Herald, he stated that “what Cooper was doing is
basically the exact same thing that Google does,
except Google acts as a search engine for every
type of file, while this site only acts as a search
engine for MP3 files.”48
In New Zealand, there is no legislation in
effect that explicitly relates copyright law to the
Internet. Current New Zealand copyright law is
contained within the Copyright Act 1994, which
makes exceptions for time-shifting of television
programs but none for format- or space-shifting
of content. In addition, copyright is set at life +
fifty years.49
The Copyright (New Technologies and
Performers’ Rights) Amendment Bill currently
being considered in New Zealand, however,
would dramatically change the digital copyright
landscape into one that more closely mirrors the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of the
United States. If passed, the bill would allow for
format-shifting and space-shifting of music,50
criminalize the distribution of the means to 
subvert technological protection measures 
protecting copyrighted content, and establish a
system in which ISPs are required to remove
copyright-infringing content and notify the poster
if “[the ISP] obtains knowledge or becomes
aware that the material is infringing.”51 This
removal system is somewhat different from the
U.S. system of notice-and-takedown in that it
requires knowledge of infringement and not 
simply notification.52
Defamation
Through a variety of court cases, both Australia
and New Zealand have applied their respective
defamation laws to the Internet, and both coun-
tries, with New Zealand courts following the
Australia courts’ example, have controversially
expanded their jurisdiction in defamation suits to
online materials hosted outside of their borders.
Defamation in Australia, except for a small
range of cases, is handled through state and ter-
ritorial law.53 And until December 2005, states
and territories maintained largely nonuniform
codes of defamation.54 After what amounted to a
threat that the Commonwealth would act if states
and territories did not, the states and territories
finally decided to enact uniform laws in
December 2005.55 Since defamation laws in
Australia are applied where material is seen,
read, or experienced, nonuniform laws meant
that writers and publishers had to be wary of dif-
ferent sets of laws all over the country under
which they might be sued under various defini-
tions of defamation.56 Now the laws are uniform,
so this liability risk has been mitigated. No legis-
lation specifically targets defamation on the
Internet and, therefore, its regulation is essential-
ly the same as that for all other publications.57
The judiciary has played an important role in
setting online defamation policy because of juris-
dictional issues. In a major decision in December
2002, the Australian High Court ruled that a party
within Australia can sue a foreign party in
Australian court for defamation resulting from an
online article hosted on a foreign server. The spe-
cific case involved a lawsuit pitting Joseph
Gutnick, an Australian businessman, against
Dow Jones over a defamatory article written
about him in Barron’s Online in October 2000.
Dow Jones argued that since its servers (and
therefore the article) are in the United States, the
defamation case should have been tried in the
United States. A decision allowing the case to be
tried in Australia, they argued, would restrict free
speech around the world because it would
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require authors and publishers to take into
account the laws of foreign countries under
which they could be sued when publishing mate-
rial online.58
The court countered, however, that the
“spectre of ‘global liability’ should not be exag-
gerated. Apart from anything else, the costs and
practicalities of bringing proceedings against a
foreign publisher will usually be a sufficient
impediment to discourage even the most intrep-
id of litigants. Further, in many cases of this kind,
where the publisher is said to have no presence
or assets in the jurisdiction, it may choose simply
to ignore the proceedings. It may save its contest
to the courts of its own jurisdiction until an
attempt is later made to enforce there the judg-
ment obtained in the foreign trial. It may do this
especially if that judgment was secured by the
application of laws, the enforcement of which
would be regarded as unconstitutional or other-
wise offensive to a different legal culture.”59 The
parties eventually settled for AU$180,000 in dam-
ages and AU$400,000 in legal fees.”60
New Zealand defamation law was first found
to apply to online material in a District Court deci-
sion, O’Brien v. Brown, in late 2001. In the case,
Patrick O’Brien, CEO of the New Zealand domain
manager Domainz, sued Alan Brown, the head of
a Manawatu ISP, for Brown’s posting of harsh crit-
icisms and calls for fraud investigation into
Domainz on a publicly available Internet Society
of New Zealand bulletin board.61 The judge in the
case found that the Internet afforded no addition-
al freedom of expression to the defendant than
any other medium and, further, that publication
on the Internet required a greater award of dam-
ages than through another medium because of
the ease with which Domainz’s potential cus-
tomers and clients could access the defamatory
material.62
In addition the New Zealand courts have fol-
lowed in Australia’s example in determining the
jurisdiction for defamation suits over online con-
tent hosted in a foreign country. Ironically
enough, the relevant suit involved an Australian
defendant. In 2004 the Wellington High Court
found that the University of Newlands (based in
New Zealand) could sue Nationwide News Ltd.
(based in Australia) in New Zealand court for
Nationwide’s inclusion of the plaintiff in a list of
“Wannabe Unis” and “degree mills” in its online
newspaper, The Australian. This essentially
eschewed the United States’ rule of “single pub-
lication” and more closely aligned New Zealand
defamation policy with Australia.63
Security
Both Australia and New Zealand have taken
steps toward greater Internet security in their
countries, passing laws to give government
agencies greater authority to investigate illegal
activities online.
Australia’s Internet surveillance regime is
primarily based on two laws. The first is the
Telecommunications (Interception and Access)
Act 1979. This act, amended in June 2006, pro-
hibits intercepting telecommunications or
accessing, without first notifying both the sender
and the receiver, stored telecommunications by
any person or entity, except in cases such as the
installation or maintenance of telecommunica-
tions equipment.64 It also establishes two warrant
systems, controlled by the Attorney General, by
which law enforcement may gain access to these
communications: “telecommunications service
warrants” (for real-time interception) and “stored
communications warrants” (for access to stored
communications without a requirement to notify
the communicants).65
The second relevant law is the Surveillance
Devices Act 2004, which significantly increases
the authority of law enforcement to install surveil-
lance devices such as key-stroke recorders
under newly created “surveillance device war-
rants.”66 Electronic Frontiers Australia has
expressed worry that these warrants will be used
by law enforcement to avoid applying for a
telecommunications service warrant, essentially
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allowing them to intercept communications
where a telecommunications service warrant
would not have been authorized.67
Further, in 2003 the Australian Internet
Industry Association (IIA) attempted to establish
a code of practice requiring ISP signatories to
retain user information for six or twelve months
and provide it to law enforcement upon official
request. Specifically, personal data—such as
name, address, and credit card details—were to
be retained by ISPs for six months after a cus-
tomer ends service with that ISP or twelve
months after the record is created, whichever is
longer. Operational data, such as proxy logs and
email information, were to be kept for six months
after creation of the data.68 Law enforcement
could request this information using the certifi-
cate system set up in the Telecommunications
Act 1997,69 which allows private information to be
disclosed if “an authorised officer of a criminal
law-enforcement agency has certified that the
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the
enforcement of the criminal law.”70 The code was
skewered by privacy advocates,71 and it is still
listed as “not yet ratified” and “in public consul-
tation” on the IIA’s Web site, even though it was
released four years ago.72
In New Zealand, the most relevant piece of
legislation to Internet security is Supplemental
Order Paper 85 to the Crimes Amendment Bill
No. 6, passed in 2003. The act essentially makes
it illegal to hack or intercept electronic communi-
cations, but exempts the Police, Security
Intelligence Service, and the Government
Communications Security Bureau acting under
interception warrants as described by the Crimes
Act 1961. As Keith Locke of the Green Party
points out, however, these warrants “can be quite
broad in their application and cover a class of
people.”73
Conclusion
Australian laws and policies toward the Internet
are restrictive relative to similar Western countries,
while New Zealand is less stringent. The
Australian government has instituted a strict take-
down regime for offensive content, and various
states and territories have made distribution of
said content a criminal offense. The government
is pursuing voluntary programs to increase home
filtration of the Internet, and Australia’s evolving
hate speech, copyright, defamation, and security
policies offer further justification for restricting
Internet content. So far, the government has
resisted calls to implement ISP-level blocking of
offensive content on a countrywide basis, though
there is significant political backing to implement
one.
New Zealand, on the other hand, has insti-
tuted a more limited classification system—
though it does include hate speech—with no
takedown notices and has not even formally
adopted copyright legislation that applies to the
Internet. Its broad defamation and security poli-
cies, however, are more reminiscent of Australia.
Overall, though, Australia’s Internet censor-
ship regime is strikingly severe relative to both its
neighbor and similar Western states. It is not,
however, at the level of the most repressive
regimes that ONI has examined.
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As a former superpower—with a tradition of
authoritarianism, poorly developed independent
media, and lack of private rights—the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) would seem
to be an ideal setting for substantial and perva-
sive Internet controls.1 The reality, however, is var-
iegated and complex. While the CIS region is
home to some of the world’s most repressive
measures and advanced techniques for subtly
“shaping” Internet access, it also showcases
examples of just how profoundly the Internet can
affect social and political life.
States within this region have a conflicted
relationship with the Internet. Most have adopted
national development strategies that emphasize
information technology (IT) as a means for eco-
nomic growth, with some even declaring their
intent to become regional “IT powerhouses.” IT
development is favored because it is seen to
leverage the comparative advantage of the ex-
Soviet educational system with its emphasis on
mathematics and engineering, and the strong
tradition of innovation in the computing and tech-
nology sector. Until its demise in 1991, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was one of
the few countries with a ”homegrown” capacity in
supercomputing, cryptography/crypto-analysis,
and worldwide signals intelligence gathering.
Currently many former Soviet citizens are among
the leaders of the global IT industry.
At the same time, CIS governments are wary
of the civil networking and resistance activities
that these technologies make possible. In recent
years, Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan have
experienced “color revolutions,” where net-
worked opposition movements (albeit move-
ments that are more reliant on cell phones than
on the Internet) have effectively challenged and
overturned the results of unpopular (or allegedly
fraudulent) elections. Neighboring governments
fear that these challenges were made possible
by opposition groups leveraging IT to organize
domestic protest (often with the help of foreign-
Internet Filtering in the
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funded NGOs) and are therefore wary of leaving
the sector unregulated and without control. Many
now see the Internet and other communications
channels in national strategic terms, and these
countries have increasingly turned to security-
based arguments—such as the need to secure
“national informational space”—to justify regula-
tion of the sector.
In 2006 ONI tested for the presence of 
filtering in eight of the eleven CIS countries:
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Background and baseline testing was also car-
ried out in a further two countries: the Russian
Federation and Turkmenistan, although in these
two cases limitations on the testing methodology
do not allow us to claim comprehensive results.
Of the eight countries in which ONI tested,
our results did not yield significant patterns of
substantial or pervasive filtering. Only Uzbekistan
pursued pervasive filtering of the kind found in
China, Iran, and some parts of the Middle East.2
In almost all countries some degree of filtering
was present, but this filtering occurred mostly on
corporate networks (such as educational and
research networks) where accepted usage poli-
cies (AUPs) dictated that inappropriate content
was not permitted or in “edge locations,” such as
Internet cafés, where the reasons for filtering
were more benign (conserving bandwidth) or left
to the discretion of the Internet café owners
themselves.
At the same time, in all eight countries
authorities had taken steps of one kind or anoth-
er to restrict or regulate their national informa-
tional space. These measures include:
• expanded use of defamation and slander
laws to selectively prosecute and deter
bloggers and independent media from post-
ing material critical of the government or
specific government officials (however
benignly, including, as was the case in
Belarus, through the use of humor);
• strict criteria pertaining to what is “accept-
able” within the national media space, lead-
ing to the deregistration of sites that did not
comply (Kazakhstan);
• moves to compel Internet sites to register as
mass media, with noncompliance then
being used as grounds for filtering “illegal”
content;
• national security concerns (Ukraine); and,
• formal or informal “requests” of ISPs.
The net effect of these sanctions (legal and
quasi-legal) is to create overall environments that
encourage varying degrees of self-censorship
among ISPs, who are fearful of jeopardizing their
licenses, and among individuals for whom pros-
ecution or imprisonment is too high a price to pay
for voicing criticism, which at times amounts to
little more than a form of digital graffiti.
The CIS region: Ethno-cultural diversity
and a shared historical space
To define the CIS as a region understates the
sheer diversity of the countries and peoples that
fall within the former Soviet Union’s historical
boundaries. Straddling a swath of Eurasia from
the Pacific to the doorsteps of Europe, the Arctic
Circle, and the deserts of Central Asia, this vast
landmass takes in twelve time zones, some 350
million people, and more than a hundred distinct
ethnic groups encompassing all the world’s
major religions and at least three major linguistic
communities (Slavic, Turkic, Farsi). At the ethno-
cultural level, diversity is a defining commonality
of this region.
At the same time, the CIS forms an historical
community that for seventy years constituted the
world’s second major economic, military, and
political superpower of the twentieth century,
rooted in the same traditions of modernism as
the West but oriented around a different set of
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ideological and organizational principles. These
principles emphasized a centralized and admin-
istered form of governance where the state rather
than the market decided issues of economic and
social production and where overarching leader-
ship was vested in the Communist Party, whose
rule was substantiated by ideological precepts
that did not allow for dissention or opposition.
Despite this complex multinationalism, the
former Soviet Union was dominated by Russia,
which endowed the region with a common lan-
guage (Russian) and popular culture, as well as
defined trade, political, and even social ties
(including the creation of substantial Russian
minorities in some states, which persist to the
present day). Even following the USSR’s dissolu-
tion and the newly independent states’ adoption
of national languages and scripts (in Azerbaijan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and others), CIS countries
retained strong ties with Russia. Transportation,
communications, and energy routes continue to
bind the region together. Russia is currently a
major energy supplier to many CIS states, giving
it considerable political muscle in the region
(which it has not been shy to flex, when needed).
The region’s shared political heritage, and
the fact that many present-day leaders in the CIS
governments and economies were also in posi-
tions of authority during the Soviet era, means
that a great deal of formal and informal coordina-
tion exists among and between member states,
despite political differences that are at times diffi-
cult. Furthermore, the loose, informal coordina-
tion among officials is helped along by the fact
that most countries share the same legal codes
and procedures, as well as similar organizational
characteristics of the security forces and the dis-
tribution of powers among the judiciary, execu-
tive, and legislative branches of government.
The Internet in the CIS: Access and 
political significance
Internet penetration rates in the CIS region are
relatively low and clustered among the urban
youth—both male and female, perhaps reflecting
the “equality” between sexes of the Soviet peri-
od.3 Income levels in the CIS are generally low,
while the costs of computers and connectivity are
relatively high. This means that Internet use is
lower than would be expected. Overall, Internet
penetration in Russia lags behind that of other
industrialized nations (15 percent as of 2005),4
and is relatively high only in large cities (particu-
larly Moscow and St. Petersburg). Among the CIS
countries, Belarus has the highest Internet pene-
tration rate of 30 percent; Ukraine and Moldova
lag behind with less than 10 percent penetration
rate, while the states of Central Asia have the low-
est Internet penetration rates. Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan lead this latter subgroup with around
8 percent, followed by Kyrgyzstan. The least con-
nected countries are Uzbekistan (3 percent for
2004) and Tajikistan, where only 1 percent of the
population has access to the Internet.
However, in all cases these figures may be
misleading. Most Internet users rely on shared
Internet access, through their places of work or
study, as well as via Internet cafés, whose use is
very high in some countries, (for example,
Internet cafés users account for over 50 percent
of all users in Kyrgyzstan).5 This shared use—
and in some cases the creative use of networks
such as Fidonet to route traffic to and from the
Internet—may result in considerable underesti-
mation of the actual number of users.6
The importance of the Internet to political life
varies from low in Tajikistan to high in Uzbekistan.
In Russia the relevance of the Internet as a
source of news is reported as low; however, this
estimation is changing as the Internet remains
one of the few outlets for direct criticism of the
government. Moreover, an important aspect of
the Internet’s political significance—as a person-
to-person backchannel for communications and
social networking essential to daily life in Russia
(where personal contacts and an “informal econ-
omy of favors” remains a key to “getting
ahead”)—remains understudied.7 In this sense, it
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is interesting to note that in Uzbekistan informa-
tion obtained from the Internet is accepted as
being more accurate than from other sources,
reflecting the culture’s strong social networking
aspect. 
Legal and normative environment
In general, the tendency in all CIS countries has
been toward greater government regulation of
the Internet to bring it in line with existing regula-
tions that control the mass media (in Russia,
Uzbekistan, and Belarus, for example). To date,
government actions to enforce more restrictive
Internet environments have rarely been chal-
lenged—perhaps a reflection overall of the weak-
ness of “opposition” parties in most countries, as
well as poorly defined or tested laws governing
the role of independent media. Nonetheless,
some exceptions exist. For example, in Tajikistan
and Azerbaijan concerted (if quiet) action by
“civic” actors led to the reversal of policies aimed
at removing politically sensitive content from
cyberspace. In Tajikistan political Web sites that
were banned during the December 2006 election
were restored. In Azerbaijan a banned Web site
that was critical of the government’s policy of
raising prices was restored and its author
released from police detention. Both cases are
significant because the initial order to “ban” the
Web sites was opaque from a legal perspective.
The constitutions of nearly all CIS countries
enshrine principles of freedom of expression and
prohibit censorship. Nevertheless, often these
provisions are interpreted “flexibly” when it
comes to implementation. In Kazakhstan author-
ities often resort to various quasi-legal or “admin-
istrative” mechanisms to suppress “inappropri-
ate” information or shut down oppositional
domain names. In Uzbekistan the law on mass
media holds journalists and editors responsible
for the “veracity” of published materials, which
has caused independent media and bloggers to
practice self-censorship. The “objectivity” test is
applied also in Belarus, where independent jour-
nalists, editors, and opposition leaders are fre-
quently subject to prosecutions and arrests.
In legislation and regulation, Russia remains
a leader in the region, and increasingly has been
proactive in seeking influence and extending
assistance to other CIS states. Since late 2000
Russia’s “Doctrine of Information Security” has
been adapted (in various forms and guises) as
the basic precept defining the national strategic
value of the Internet and the “national informa-
tional space” in most CIS countries. 8 Likewise,
Russia’s legal approach to Internet surveillance
for law enforcement (that is, the System for
Operational-Investigative Activities or SORM-II,
which allows security services unfettered physi-
cal access to ISP networks) has influenced the
way in which other CIS countries have
approached the problem (see the next section).
Some, including Kazakhstan, have adopted the
Russian system, while others have mirrored its
approach. In Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and
Ukraine, specialized units under the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (Department “K”) have been
established to combat “computer crime” with
specialized technical units also established in
other security services.
Surveillance
Obtaining a telecommunications license in
Russia and other CIS states requires close coop-
eration with state security agencies. Since the
mid-1990s a key requirement has been that
providers allow law enforcement and other 
security agencies full monitoring access to the
communications systems. In Russia the enabling
acts and system used to monitor telecommuni-
cations, including the Internet, comes under the
rubric of SORM-II, which came into effect in
2000.9
At the regulatory and technical level, SORM-
II requires ISPs to provide the Federal Security
Service (FSB) with statistics about all Internet traf-
fic that goes through the ISP servers (including
the time of an online session, the IP address of
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the user, and the data that were transmitted).10
ISPs themselves are responsible for the cost and
maintenance of the hardware and connections.
ISP objections to SORM-II, which raised con-
cerns about individual privacy, resulted in the
providers being stripped of their licenses.11
In many respects, SORM is not unlike a com-
bination of the Unites States’ Communi-
cations Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA)12 and the recent “warrantless” provi-
sions for wiretapping, including the USA PATRIOT
Act13 passed after the attacks of 9/11. Russian
legislation formally protects individual privacy,
prohibiting wiretapping of any kind without a court
order.14 As a consequence, SORM requires gov-
ernment personnel to obtain a court order to inter-
cept telephone conversations, electronic commu-
nications, or postal correspondence.15 In reality,
however, the FSB will not bother to seek a warrant.
Recently a senior FSB official sought to apply sim-
ilar registration requirements for all mobile phones
with Internet capabilities. However, despite this
formidable surveillance potential, there is doubt
about the actual capacity of the FSB to analyze
the data collected.16
At present, several CIS countries have 
followed Russia’s lead in implementing Internet
surveillance.
• Kazakhstan followed the Russian example
requiring ISPs to install special software in
order to register and maintain electronic
records of customers’ Internet activities.
• Azerbaijan made an unsuccessful attempt
to employ technologies similar to the
SORM-II. At present surveillance does
occur, but mainly by way of visits to ISPs and
Internet cafés by officials from the State
Security Service.
• In Uzbekistan the principal intelligence
agency, the National Security Service (SNB),
monitors the Uzbek segment of the Internet
and works with the main regulatory body to
impose censorship. As all ISPs must rent
channels from the state monopoly
providers. Credible anecdotal evidence
strongly suggests that Internet traffic is
recorded and monitored via a centralized
system purchased from an Israeli vendor.
• In Ukraine, the security services have devel-
oped a capacity to monitor Internet traffic
and legislation has been proposed to limit
access to “questionable” content for rea-
sons of national security. The security serv-
ices are also empowered to initiate criminal
investigations and use wiretapping devices.
• In Belarus, special services conduct active
and warrantless surveillance of Internet
activities under the pretext of national secu-
rity using a system similar to SORM-II.
Transparency
Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
once said when asked about the Soviet Union, 
“It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an
enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is…
national interest.” Transparency with regard to 
filtering practices varies across the region, but in
all cases it is defined by the interest of the state
(or the group that holds the reins of power).
Protection of state interests (usually cast in terms
of national security or the protection of public or
cultural values) generally trump the written rules
for regulation of Internet content, although often
the laws themselves are ambiguous and open to
interpretation. In addition, the restrictive practices
of states are often fairly subtle. As an example,
Uzbekistan—which was until recently the most
egregious Internet censor in the region—denied
that it was engaged in censorship practices. The
plausibility of this claim was increased because
filtering was neither uniform nor universal across
all ISPs, which left open the possible, although
highly improbable, chance that observed filtering
practices were self-imposed by ISPs rather than
proscribed by higher ups. Such subtle approach-
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es allow the state “plausible deniability” of 
any wrongdoing and require a great deal of con-
textual research to uncover the sources of the
practice.
Overall a general lack of transparency
affects most political/legal issues in the CIS, not
only the issue of Internet filtering. Often official
laws are breached in subtle but effective ways.
For example, in Azerbaijan the author of a Web
site critical of the government was detained with-
out formal arrest; this was never followed up by
any formal legal sanctions. In other cases, such
as the pervasive filtering policies of Internet cafés
throughout the region, the decision to limit con-
tent is formally controlled by the café owners, so
it is difficult to argue whether their filtering results
from a fear of sanction for allowing politically sen-
sitive material to be accessed, or from personal
choice. Certainly for most Internet café owners,
the objective is to make a living, not to run for
office. If certain content stands in the way of busi-
ness, then it is not a difficult choice to decide
what measures to take. In Tajikistan, for example,
research suggests that filtering is really based on
economic choices rather than any overt fear of
political sanction from the security forces.
Emergent forms of information control
Overt Internet filtering, such as that undertaken
by China or Iran, is unlikely to occur in the CIS.
First, only in a very few cases (Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan) is the government willing to create
an informational blockade of the country that
could, in turn, jeopardize economic prospects
and stifle the “scientific potential” of these tech-
nologies. Second, as noted above, governments
generally have more subtle legal and quasi-legal
methods for putting pressure on content and
access providers to remove or otherwise elimi-
nate “undesirable” content, so there is little need
to resort to overt technical means such as filter-
ing. Third, many CIS states are dependent on
development aid and trade and have oriented
themselves toward integration with Europe and
the broader global economic system. Engaging
in widespread filtering of the kind conducted by
China or Iran would present the risk of being
labeled as an “international human rights pariah,”
an eventuality that most CIS countries would
rather avoid. Fourth, and perhaps most impor-
tant, those CIS states that are concerned by the
Internet’s empowering potential—that is, their
potential to make possible further “color revolu-
tions”—have found more subtle technical means
for ensuring that these capacities are curtailed, if
and when necessary.
Event-based interventions
The CIS is the first region in which ONI research
documented the presence of “event-based” fil-
tering. This form of filtering differs in technical
execution from more conventional filtering forms
(such as those that rely on bloc lists) and is more
difficult to track and definitively ascertain. For
example, during Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 parliamentary
elections, two ISPs were disrupted by distributed
denial of service attacks (DOS), and then a
“hacker for hire” posted threats to the affected
ISPs’ visitor logs, stating that unless these sites
stayed offline the attacks would continue.17 The
DOS attacks effectively disrupted the ISPs’ serv-
ices because the hacker exploited the ISPs’ nar-
row bandwidths and dependence on a single
satellite-based connection. To this day is it
unclear who hired the hackers responsible for the
attack, although an investigation by ONI found
that they were based in Ukraine (and were also
responsible for an attack on a U.S. site using the
same “bot” network). The opposition accused
the government of ordering the attacks as a
means of undermining the opposition. The gov-
ernment responded by ordering the affected ISPs
to keep their resources online, but this was
impossible because the DOS attack had degrad-
ed their ability to provide any services. In the end,
the attack was stopped as a result of U.S. legal
action against the originating “bot net,” which
had also been attacking a U.S. site. When the
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“bot net” was taken down, the attacks against the
Kyrgyz sites also stopped.
During the March 2006 presidential elec-
tions in Belarus, several opposition Web sites
became suddenly inaccessible, ostensibly by
innocuous network faults and DNS failures.
Likewise, at the peak of protests against the elec-
tion results, a major Minsk-based ISP ceased to
provide dialup services owing to “technical prob-
lems.” These occurrences meant that important
independent media and opposition political Web
sites were not accessible at periods when the
information they were conveying could have had
political significance or acted as a catalyst for fur-
ther political action. Although nothing transpired
that could be identified as extralegal filtering, de
facto access was not available when and where
needed, with some evidence suggesting that
tampering may have been afoot.18
This form of “event-based” information con-
trol, which temporally “shapes” Internet access,
can be said to represent the emerging “2.0 ver-
sion of Internet controls.” Not unlike the shorter
supply line chains that boasted manufacturing
efficiencies under just-in-time production, event-
based filtering can also be considered to be “just
in time” as it offers greater efficiencies in denying
access to information when and where it is needed.
At the same time this form of targeted and time-
limited filtering is much harder to prove, which
also removes the potential liabilities of being
“caught” undertaking more deliberative filtering. 
Upstream filtering
For its size, the CIS region has a relatively under-
developed telecommunications system, much of
which remains centered on Russia. At the same
time, the region itself is contiguous with (or bor-
ders) Europe, Asia, and—via the circumpolar
route—North America. This centrality means that
most countries in the region obtain connectivity
from several different sources beyond Russia.
This situation has created some interesting pat-
terns in filtering behavior, such as similar content
becoming inaccessible across several different
countries, but with different filtering patterns
amongst content providers within any single
country. ONI research into this phenomenon is
still preliminary, and thus we are not yet in a posi-
tion to provide conclusive evidence or observa-
tions on its implications.
However, preliminary indications suggest
that providers reselling connectivity to CIS coun-
tries may be providing pre-filtered access, pass-
ing on filtered content either as part of their serv-
ice offering or as a consequence of the policies
they use to manage traffic on their own networks.
This form of blocking, which we have dubbed
“upstream” filtering (indicating that the filtering is
happening in a jurisdiction other than that of the
state in question), was first observed during ONI
testing in Uzbekistan in 2004. At that time the traf-
fic of one Uzbek ISP was clearly filtered using a
pattern similar to that employed by Chinese ISPs.
Further investigation revealed that the Uzbek ISP
was buying connectivity from China Telecom,
which in this case may have sold access to its
network as it would to a regular Chinese client.
Our 2006 testing suggested similar patterns of
prepackaged filtering affecting Internet services
within several other CIS states where ISPs had
purchased their connectivity from a Russian
provider.
Conclusion
The CIS region is experiencing a general trend
toward greater regulation and control of the
national information space, which includes the
Internet. Although most CIS countries do not
practice the substantive or pervasive filtering—
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan excepted—Internet
content control through regulation or intimidation
is growing throughout the region. In most cases,
the legislative and judicial framework for filtering
(or other restrictions) is ambiguous and open to
interpretation. Moreover the laws are often
unevenly applied, with “flexible” implementation
often paired with other more subtle (but effective)
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measures designed to promote self-restraint (or
self–censorship) of both ISP providers as well as
content producers. Information control—in par-
ticular the protection of national informational
space—is clearly an issue of concern throughout
the CIS, and has encouraged more stringent
attention to telecommunications surveillance (as
has been happening in other parts of the world,
most notably the United States). In addition,
measures to protect regimes in power and stifle
opposition are often couched in the language of
“national security” and have resulted in the devel-
opment of new measures and techniques aimed
at temporally “shaping” access to information at
strategic moments, such as “event-based filter-
ing.” Another innovation that merits further inves-
tigation is “upstream filtering.” Although these
new measures are not present in all CIS coun-
tries, they are indicative of a new seriousness
with which strategies for information control are
being developed.
In 2007 a number of critical elections 
will take place in Russia and several other CIS
countries. In Russia, exiled billionaire Boris
Berezovsky has expressed his intent to overturn
the existing regime. The Internet and other forms
of communications technologies are expected to
play an important role in the electoral process,
and as such they will no doubt be the object of
many actors’ attention.
Last, the re-emergence of stronger states in
the region following more than a decade of tran-
sition and general unhappiness concerning U.S.
policies in the region (which have, over the past
ten years, promoted media freedom and an
active if foreign-funded civil society), is also
sparking a degree of “blow-back” and renewed
competition between East and West. For exam-
ple, ONI research found that many “.mil” sites are
not reachable in the CIS, suggesting that these
may be subject to “supply-side” filtering by U.S.
authorities.19 Between greater assertiveness on
the part of CIS states and the stimulus of
renewed interstate competition, the CIS is a
region to watch as a global actor shaping norms
that will govern the Internet into the future.
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Introduction
In less than a decade, the Internet in Europe has
evolved from a virtually unfettered environment to
one in which filtering in most countries, particu-
larly within the European Union (EU), is the norm
rather than the exception. Compared with many
of the countries in other regions that block
Internet content, the rise of filtering in Europe is
notable because of its departure from a strong
tradition of democratic processes and a commit-
ment to free expression. Filtering takes place in a
variety of forms, including the state-ordered take-
down of illegal content on domestically hosted
Web sites, the blocking of illegal content hosted
abroad, and the filtering of results by search
engines pertaining to illegal content. As in most
countries around the world that engage in filter-
ing, the distinction between voluntary and state-
mandated filtering is somewhat blurred in
Europe. In many instances filtering by Internet
service providers (ISPs), search engines, and
content providers in Europe is termed “voluntary”
but is carried out with the implicit understanding
that cooperation with state authorities will prevent
further legislation on the matter.
The scope of illegal content that is filtered in
Europe largely is limited to child pornography,
racism, and material that promotes hatred and
terrorism, although more recently there have
been proposals and revisions of laws in some
countries that deal with filtering in other areas
such as copyright and gambling. Filtering also
takes place on account of defamation laws; this
practice has been criticized, particularly 
in the UK, for curtailing lawful online behavior 
and promoting an overly aggressive notice-and-
takedown policy, where ISPs comply by removing
content immediately for fear of legal action. ISPs
in Europe do not have any general obligation to
monitor Internet use and are protected from lia-
bility for illegal content by regulations at the
European Union (EU) level, but must filter such
content once it is brought to their notice.
Therefore the degree of filtering in member states
depends on the efforts of governments, police,
advocacy groups, and the general public in iden-
tifying and reporting illegal content.
Internet Filtering in 
Europe
Efforts over the past decade have been
underway to create a set of common policies and
practices at the EU-level on Internet regulation.
This is viewed as necessary to promote regional
competitiveness and commerce, to counter
Internet crime and terrorism, and to serve as a
platform to share best practices amongst
nations. Notable advancements in regulation at
the EU level—although not directly in the area of
filtering—include the definition of ISP liability
toward illegal content and obligations toward
data retention.
Regional regulation
A recurring theme throughout this overview will
be the overlapping nature of individual country-
level law and regionwide regulation. Countering
criminal activity on the Internet and promoting the
overall competitiveness of the Internet industry
have been the primary reasons cited to develop
a regional regulatory framework.1 A regional
approach in Europe has its beginnings with a
request by the European Council to the
European Commission in April 1996 to produce
“a summary of problems posed by the rapid
development of the Internet” and to assess the
need for regulation. The Commission produced a
report titled “Illegal and Harmful Content on the
Internet” and a Green Paper on “The Protection
of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual
Services” in response. Based on these docu-
ments, “a common framework for self-regulation
(of the Internet) at the European level” was draft-
ed, which culminated in an Action Plan on
Promoting Safe Use of the Internet. The plan,
adopted on January 25, 1999 and operational up
to 2002, outlines the basic principles underlying
Internet content regulation at the European level.2
Broadly, undesirable content on the Internet is
classified either as “illegal” or “harmful.”
The scope of “illegal” content tends to vary
between countries, although there are certain
issues where there is a greater amount of con-
sensus, such as child pornography, trafficking in
human beings, racist material, material promot-
ing terrorism, and all forms of Internet fraud (such
as credit card fraud).3,4 “Harmful” material, as
defined in the plan, is that which might offend the
values and sentiments of others and could per-
tain to politics, religion, or racial matters, and
could also vary significantly between cultures.
The plan emphasizes the need for action in
five broad areas in order to curb illegal and harm-
ful content on the Internet:5
1. promoting voluntary industry self-regulation
and content monitoring schemes, including
the use of hotlines for the public to report
illegal or harmful content;
2. providing filtering tools and rating systems
that enable parents or teachers to regulate
the access of Internet content by children in
their care, while allowing adults access to
legal content;
3. raising awareness about services offered by
industry among users to allow them to lever-
age the Internet more fully;
4. exploring the legal implications of promoting
the safer use of the Internet; and
5. encouraging international cooperation in the
area of regulation.
Europe also maintains a regional policy that
is generous in limiting ISP liability under the
Electronic Commerce Directive, 2000/31/EC.
Article 12, the “mere conduit” exception provi-
sion, absolves ISPs from liability for information
transmitted over their networks as long as they
did not initiate the message, select or modify the
information, or select the intended recipients. The
exemption also extends to the “automatic, inter-
mediate and transient” storage of information,
provided it is for a “reasonable period.” The latter
is left to be specified by member states. Article
13 deals with caching—granting exemption from
liability for the “automatic, intermediate and tem-
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porary storage of information” that is carried for
the exclusive purpose of making onward trans-
mission more efficient. Article 14 addresses the
liability associated with hosting content, stating
that ISPs “will not be liable for hosting informa-
tion, provided they do not have actual knowledge
that the activity is illegal and, upon obtaining
such knowledge, act quickly to remove it.”6
Finally, Article 15 precludes ISPs from any gener-
al obligation to monitor content or data transmit-
ted or stored through their services. Further, ISPs
are not required to actively seek facts that might
indicate illegal activity.7 These provisions grant-
ing ISPs substantial immunity from liability over
illegal content are consistent with the law and
practice of many other countries around the
world that seek to expand Internet use and pro-
mote freedom of expression.
Social filtering
Action to regulate obscene content started with
individual countries and the implementation of
voluntary ISP-level filtering programs. The land-
mark model of large-scale voluntary ISP filtering
in Europe originated in the UK.8 BT, Britain’s
largest ISP, serving about a third of the country’s
home Internet users, launched Project Cleanfeed
in June 20049 in consultation with the British
Home Office. Under the auspices of this project,
BT filters Internet content based on a blacklist of
Web sites hosted anywhere in the world that con-
tain images of child abuse as defined by the
amended Protection of Children Act, 1978.10 The
list is compiled by the Internet Watch Foundation
(IWF), a not-for-profit organization, in consultation
with government, industry, the police, and the
public. IWF provides the list to its members,
which today include ISPs, mobile network opera-
tors, content providers, and search engines such
as Google and Yahoo!11 Those attempting to
access the illegal content hosted abroad receive
an error message as if the particular page were
unavailable as a result of other connectivity prob-
lems.12 Illegal content that is hosted within the
UK, including child abuse images and content
that is criminally obscene or incites racial hatred,
is required to be taken down by ISPs and content
providers under a notice-and-takedown regime.13
Although this form of filtering is termed “volun-
tary,” by the end of 2007 all broadband consumer
ISPs in Britain are expected to have implemented
a similar system, failing which, regulatory
enforcement might be considered.14,15 Other
countries, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
and Italy, have implemented similar programs,
while Finland is currently considering doing so.16
Filtering also takes place through “voluntary
self-regulation” by search engines. As of early
2005 all major search engines in Germany —
Google, Lycos Europe, MSN Deutschland, AOL
Deutschland, Yahoo, T-Online, and t-info — have
formed an organization that coordinates filtering
of search results that are harmful to minors,
based on a list provided by a government agency
in charge of media classification. The move is
seen as a response to pressure for voluntary self-
regulation by industry at the EU level, and
arguably to the fear among industry that a failure
to comply will result in increased legislation. The
system has been criticized, however, for a lack of
transparency,17 since the search engines cannot
disclose the list of Web sites to the public, as per
a codex signed by them.18 In addition, disclosure
would defeat the purpose of filtering search
results, as the sites are removed only from the
search results, not from the Internet.
Internet content is also monitored through
online surveillance by authorities in the UK. The
Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre
(launched in April 2006) made thirteen arrests in
July 2006 after beginning investigations into pay-
per-view Internet services.19 The police in Britain
have also been vested with the power to pass on
to banks the personal details of those who
access illegal content online using credit cards,
based on an amendment to the Data Protection
Act (1998).20 Banks will then cancel the cards as
a breach of their terms of service.
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The public in nineteen European countries
assists in identifying and reporting illegal content
—particularly in the area of child pornography —
through a network of hotlines that have been
implemented on the basis of a recommendation
at the EU level.21 In Austria authorities were able
to uncover a “child-pornography ring” involving
seventy-seven countries in February 2007, based
on a report by a man working for a Vienna-based
Internet file-hosting service.22 Recent reports
show that the Save the Children Denmark
Hotline, financed jointly by Denmark and the
European Commission’s Safer Internet Plus
Programme, had nearly 9,000 reports of child
abuse images in 2006 alone.23 The police in
Spain were able to arrest ninety people in 2004 in
the country’s largest operation against the distri-
bution of child pornography, facilitated by the
hotlines. The INHOPE Association acts as the
coordinator of the network of hotlines, including
in countries outside Europe such as Australia,
Brazil, Canada, South Korea, Taiwan, and the
United States.24
Although early filtering efforts had fairly limit-
ed agendas, proposals and laws are emerging in
many nations toward filtering in other social
realms, such as gambling and betting. A propos-
al was drafted in 2002 to revise Swiss federal
laws on lotteries and betting, such that those pro-
viding access to games that are considered ille-
gal face fines up to 1 million Swiss francs or up to
a year of imprisonment. This effort was suspend-
ed in 2004, and no further action has been taken
since. As of February 2006 ISPs in Italy are
required to block access to Web sites that offer
online gambling. The list of Web sites to be
blocked is compiled by the Autonomous
Administration of State Monopolies (AAMS, a
part of the Ministry of Economy and Finances),
which issued the decree.25 The most broad-
based proposal yet for filtering comes from
Norway, where the government is considering
blocking access to foreign gambling sites, Web
sites that “desecrate the Flag or Coat of Arms of
a foreign nation,” sites that promote hatred
toward public authorities, contain hate speech or
promote racism, offensive pornography sites,
and peer-to-peer sites that offer illegal down-
loads of music, movies, or television shows.26
Nationalistic filtering
There are no examples in Europe of filtering car-
ried out to silence political opposition such as
those that the ONI has documented in other
regions. There are, however, examples of filtering
that seeks to maintain the legitimacy of govern-
ment institutions and preserve national identity. In
December 2002 a local Swiss magistrate,
Françoise Dessaux, ordered several Swiss ISPs
to block access to three Web sites hosted in the
United States that were strongly critical of Swiss
courts,27 and to modify their DNS servers to
block the domain appel-au-people.org.28 The
Swiss Internet User Group and the Swiss
Network Operators Group protested that the
blocks could easily be bypassed and that the
move was contrary to the Swiss constitution,
which guarantees “the right to receive informa-
tion freely, to gather it from generally accessible
sources and to disseminate it” to every person.
However, there was strong enforcement, as the
directors of noncompliant ISPs were asked to
appear personally in court, failing which they
faced charges of disobedience.
On March 7, 2007, the video-sharing Web
site YouTube was blocked in Turkey as per a court
order, following the posting of certain videos on
the site that were found to be derogatory toward
Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
the Turkish people in general, and the Turkish
flag. The blocking invoked Article 301 of the
Turkish Penal Code, known as the main obstacle
to freedom of speech, which defines insults
toward Ataturk as well as “Turkishness” as a
crime. Turkey’s leading ISP, Turk Telecom, com-
plied with the order but petitioned to the court to
allow access to the site to be restored. The court
agreed on the condition that the particular videos
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were removed. The two-day blocking was heavi-
ly criticized both within Turkey and abroad and
likened to “closing a library because of a single
book that was found to be improper.”29
Hate speech
European states are also increasingly taking
action against online hate speech, applying their
offline policies to the Internet. Some efforts raise
important issues such as the jurisdiction over
material on the Internet. For example, a French
court in 2000 ruled that U.S.-based Yahoo! Inc. is
liable under French law for allowing the people of
France access to auction sites that include Nazi
memorabilia and demanded that Yahoo! must
ensure that this content is impossible to access
from France or face fines.30 The case was
brought by two French not-for-profit organiza-
tions31 dedicated to fighting anti-Semitism.32
Yahoo! brought suit in a U.S. District Court in San
Francisco, claiming that the French court’s ruling
was unenforceable in the United States. The U.S.
court ruled in Yahoo!’s favor in November 2001,
but in 2004 a panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned the ruling by the lower
court on the grounds that it “did not have suffi-
cient jurisdiction over the French parties.”33 After
reconsidering the decision, the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed Yahoo!’s case in
January 2006 despite claiming jurisdiction over
the matter because Yahoo! had already removed
the materials and, therefore, the requirement to
block would not have done any actual First
Amendment harm.34
Similarly, the German Federal Court of
Justice ruled in December 2000 that material glo-
rifying the Nazis and denying the Holocaust must
be censored as per German law, regardless of
where it is hosted, based on a case involving an
Australian-based Holocaust revisionist who was
using the Internet to spread his message denying
the atrocities of World War II.35 In another case,
seventy-eight ISPs in Nordrhein-Westfalen were
ordered to block access to two foreign Web sites
in 2002 that contained neo-Nazi content.36 The
same regional government of Düsseldorf also
took an anti-censorship activist to court for post-
ing hyperlinks on his Web site to radical rightwing
content that had been censored.37
Other European countries also have laws
against Holocaust denial and ban material that
promotes racial hatred. These have been “har-
monized” in a protocol to the Council of Europe’s
cybercrime treaty, which requires that “any writ-
ten material, any image, or any other representa-
tion of ideas or theories, which advocates, pro-
motes or incites hatred, discrimination or vio-
lence, against any individual or group of individu-
als, based on race, color, descent or national or
ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as pretext
for any of these factors” and “material which
denies, minimizes, approves of or justifies crimes
of genocide or crimes against humanity” must be
made illegal by the signatories.38 As with all ille-
gal content, once brought to their attention, ISPs
must either take down or block the relevant Web
sites depending on whether the sites are hosted
within the country or abroad.
Defamation
Member states of the EU have expressed the
need for a simplified framework to be applied
with respect to rules concerning defamation by
media or publications via the Internet and other
electronic networks. The general principle in
cases of defamation concerning the media—that
the law of the country where the defamed person
lives is applicable—implies that media organiza-
tions must know the privacy and defamation laws
of each European country, which is criticized as
impractical. In Italy, for example, in 2000, a man
in “a trans-border custodial battle” claimed that
his ex-wife, now resident in Israel, was responsi-
ble for posting statements and images on the
Internet that were defamatory of him and deroga-
tory of his ability to care for their two daughters.
The Italian Supreme Court, or Suprema Corte di
Cassazione, overturned a prior verdict from a
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lower court, affirming that Italy’s laws of libel
apply to content on foreign Web sites accessible
by Internet users in the country.39 The Court held
that while the offending statements were posted
outside of Italy, the effects were felt within the
country and were therefore subject to the nation-
al laws.
The issue of the need for a unified frame-
work was brought to the fore once more in
February 2007 as a part of the European
Parliament’s second reading of the Rome II
Regulation, which seeks to establish rules on the
applicable law to noncontractual obligations rele-
vant to publications via the Internet and other
electronic networks. The Parliament’s proposed
amendment is that the law applicable should be
that of the country to which “the publication or
broadcast is most directed,” which is to be deter-
mined “by the language of the publication or
broadcast, or by sales or audience size in a given
country as a proportion of total sales or audience
size, or by a combination of these factors.”
Further, the amendment suggests that if these
are not easy to determine, “the relevant law will
be the one of the country where editorial control
is exercised.” With regard to the right to reply, it is
suggested that the applicable law should be that
of the country in which the publisher or broad-
caster has its “habitual residence.” The text,
which has been adopted by the Parliament, is not
expected to find easy favor with the European
Council and must undergo a standard conciliato-
ry procedure where member states and
Members of European Pariliament, in equal rep-
resentation, debate the proposal, and it will be
approved as a regulation if an acceptable com-
promise is reached.40
In their current form, defamation laws at the
country level, particularly in the UK, have been
criticized for leading to a “Web takedown” culture
where ISPs immediately remove content that is
allegedly defamatory when brought to their
notice, for fear of facing law suits. The concern in
the UK, as in other nations, is that this can have
a “chilling effect” on lawful online content and
behavior.41
A landmark precedent in the UK led the way
for the establishment of a notice-and-takedown
system. In Laurence Godfrey v. Demon Internet
Limited, a defamatory statement was made on a
posting to a newsgroup called “soc.culture.thai,”
available on a server at the provider Demon
Internet Limited. The message was found to be
forged and only appeared to come from Godfrey.
Despite a request by Godfrey to take down the
content, as it was defamatory of him, the ISP did
not comply. As a result, he claimed damages for
libel under §1 of the Defamation Act, 1996, and
settled with Demon out of court.42
Libel law in the UK has been known to be
particularly sympathetic to libel plaintiffs—and is
often contrasted with the law in the United States
in this context—such that many individuals from
outside countries have sued publications in the
UK, despite a relatively small circulation there, for
a better chance of winning. However, the Jameel
v. Wall Street Journal Europe case significantly
increased press protections against libel claims
in October 2006.43 There has also been debate
over whether the protection of the reputation of
individuals is in conflict with the Human Rights
Act of 1998, insofar as it might infringe upon the
right to free speech.44
Copyright
A few countries in Europe have begun to employ
Internet filtering to combat copyright infringe-
ment, evolving toward the notice-and-takedown
approach used in the United States. In Denmark,
as per a ruling of the Copenhagen City Court on
October 2006, TDC, the country’s largest ISP,
blocked access to a Web site that distributes ille-
gally copied music.45 In February 2007, as men-
tioned earlier, Norway proposed filtering on a
much larger scale that would include blocking of
peer-to-peer sites offering illegal downloads of
music, movies, and television shows.46
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On March 16, 2007, the police arrested the
owner of www.arenabg.com, which is one of
Bulgaria’s largest BitTorrent trackers and one
among the country’s ten most popular Web
sites,47 providing links to copyrighted music,
movies, and software.48 Although the owner was
released within twenty-four hours, the Web site
was filtered by police order for the period March
16–19, on the grounds that it was “necessary to
prevent foreign interference with the torrent track-
ers.”49 The order to filter the site was lifted by the
General Office for Fighting Organized Crime, but
has resulted in considerable citizen protest for
what is considered unjust treatment toward the
owners and operators of torrent sites.50 Following
the arrest, other tracker Web sites have reported-
ly closed, some under threat of confiscation of
property by the police, or have moved their
servers abroad to avoid prosecution under the
Bulgarian Copyright Law. The extent of actual fil-
tering of these sites in the country is not known
because there are differing reports regarding
accessibility by various ISP subscribers. Given
that BitTorrent trackers point to content but do not
host it, the legal recourse to deal with the copy-
right violation associated with these Web sites is
especially unclear.51
Law suits concerning alleged copyright
infringement by search engines have been raised
in a few countries, with recent rulings in favor of a
notice-and-takedown policy that could arguably
serve as a precedent for other countries in the
region. In February 2007 the Brussels Tribunal
found Google Inc. to be in violation of national
copyright laws in a case raised by Copiepresse
of Belgium, a trade group representing seven-
teen of Belgium’s French- and German-language
newspapers, and the company was fined 2.4 mil-
lion pounds for the breach.52 As per a translation
of the ruling, “the reproduction and publication of
headlines as well as short extracts, and the use
of Google’s cache, the publicly available data
storage of articles and documents, violate the
law on authors’ rights.”53 The former refers to the
Google News service,54 while the latter to Google
Web Search. The outcome is that Google cannot
include references to articles, pictures, or draw-
ings of Copiepress members through its Google
News service without prior agreements, and
must remove Belgian newspaper content from its
search results. Failure to comply will result in
fines of 25,000 euros a day.
Google intends to appeal against the judg-
ment, stating that Web search results and the
news service in fact drive more traffic toward the
newspaper Web sites, and that Google News
does not earn any advertising revenue from this.
Copiepress, however, holds that by allowing
users to bypass the front pages of newspapers
and link directly to articles, newspapers lose
advertising revenue. In addition, by making old
newspaper material available through its cache,
newspapers effectively lose the ability to charge
customers for access to their archives, while
Google Web Search does in fact earn advertising
revenue for this service. The court ruling also
states that all copyright holders can notify
Google in case of infringement, and the search
engine will have to remove content within a twen-
ty-four-hour period or pay a 1,000 euro daily
fine.55 This could lead to an attitude of risk aver-
sion and immediate compliance on the part of
ISPs, content providers, and search engines—
similar to instances of alleged defamation—in the
face of potential law suits.
Google had run into similar difficulty in
France with respect to its news service when
Paris-based Agence France Presse (AFP) had
sued the company for USD 17.5 million in 2005.
The suit was dropped in April 2007, following a
licensing agreement where Google would be
allowed to use stories and photographs from
AFP for its news aggregator and for other Google
services, including products that Google is
expected to launch in the future. The financial
terms of this arrangement have not been publicly
disclosed.56 Out-of-court settlements in Europe
for copyright infringement should not be surpris-
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ing, because the legal defenses available in the
region for alleged infringers are relatively weak.57
At the regional level, Intellectual Property
Rights pertaining to Internet content are
addressed by two directives: the Copyright and
Related Rights in the Information Society adopted
on April 9, 2001, and the Electronic Commerce
Directive 2000/31/EC, which came into force on
June 8, 2000. Article 5(1) of the Copyright
Directive exempts ISPs from liability for copyright
infringement where “reproduction is transient or
incidental” or where copies are an integral part of
a technological process “whose sole purpose is
to enable onward transmission in a network
between third parties by an intermediary or a law-
ful use of a work or other subject-matter to be
made.” The Copyright Directive also exempts
ISPs from liability where the copies have “no
independent economic significance”; this is left
to be adjudged independently by courts in the
respective member states. As per the first condi-
tion, ISPs and telecommunications operators do
not need to request permission to transmit tran-
sient copies across their networks. However, the
second condition implies that ISPs still face a sit-
uation of differing degrees of liability across the
member states of the EU, and the directive has
been criticized in this regard.58 The Electronic
Commerce Directive deals with the liability of
ISPs toward content more generally, but with
important implications for copyright. In particular,
the directive provides a “mere conduit” excep-
tion, limits liability for content associated with the
caching and hosting functions, and exempts
ISPs from any general obligation to monitor.
Security
Security concerns in Europe have resulted in leg-
islation concerning the surveillance and monitor-
ing of Internet use. Although distinct from filter-
ing, these have many parallels in their potential
impact upon online freedom of speech. A recent
and controversial area of legislation at the EU
level in this regard pertains to the surveillance of
traffic data and its retention. As per the European
Data Retention Directive, which was passed in
March 2006 and must be put into effect for
Internet traffic by March 2009,59 ISPs in the vari-
ous nations are required to retain specific data
pertaining to communications—in particular, with
regard to Internet access, e-mail and telepho-
ny—for a period of at least six months but not
exceeding two years. The data to be retained do
not concern the content of communications. The
aim is to bring about a “common code” of data
retention in order to facilitate the tracing of illegal
content and the source of attacks against infor-
mation systems, and to identify those who use
the electronic communications networks for ter-
rorist activities and organized crime.60 As the
directive is implemented across the member
states, privacy groups are concerned about the
ability of ISPs, search engines,61 and Web com-
panies to retain data and monitor people’s online
habits. Moreover, the retention period of up to
twenty-four months has been argued to be an
unjustifiable length of time.62
An example of security legislation at the
country level is a proposed law drafted in March
2007 in Sweden, which would give the national
defense intelligence agency power to monitor all
cross-border phone calls and e-mail traffic with-
out court order. This will be carried out by the
National Defence Radio Establishment in the
form of searches for sensitive key words through
the use of computer software. With some sug-
gested amendments, the Swedish Legislative
Council has approved the proposal to go for-
ward. Concerns for privacy have been raised,
including for communications within the country,
which are often routed via servers hosted
abroad.63 Critics include the country’s national
security police agency, SAPO, which considers




Filtering of online content takes a variety of forms
among the states of Europe. Examples include
orders issued by states to ISPs to take down Web
sites that contain illegal content if they are hosted
within the country, blocking orders by enforce-
ment authorities for illegal content hosted
abroad, and search engines that filter results per-
taining to illegal content as a form of self-regula-
tion. Although forms of filtering by search
engines and ISPs are often referred to as “volun-
tary self-regulation” in some countries, there
appears to be an implicit understanding that
cooperation with government orders will forestall
further legislation.
Filtering in European countries has also
given rise to several legal disputes over the ques-
tion of jurisdiction involving content that is hosted
abroad. While the degree of filtering that takes
place tends to vary among states, there is a con-
cern in many countries over an apparent increase
in the overall extent of filtering, as manifested in
recent proposals and revisions in laws. Filtering
in European states has, however, largely been
confined to content that is illegal, and the extent
has been tempered by public dialogue, adher-
ence to law, and commitment to free speech,
although the latter is more constrained than it is
in the United States.
At the EU level there have been efforts over
the past decade to create a common platform of
“harmonized” Internet regulation. With regard to
the filtering of online content, the emphasis has
been on greater cooperation among industry, the
public, and enforcement authorities within states,
and increased voluntary industry self-
regulation. Although EU level discussions were
initially focused on various forms of illegal con-
tent online (in particular child pornography and
racist and xenophobic content), there is
increased attention being paid toward the use of
the Internet for terrorism and organized crime in
recent years. The latter has spurred legislation in
the area of data retention, and much debate on
the need for greater security measures versus
the associated implications for privacy. There
have also been recent advancements in terms of
regulation at the EU level in the areas of defama-
tion law, copyright, and defining ISP liability for
online content. Creating a common platform for
legislation at the regional level is a slow and com-
plex process given the significant differences in
the cultures and existing legislations in the coun-




communic.html#f10 (accessed May 11, 2007).
2. This has been followed by the Safer Internet Action
Plan (2002–2005) and the Safer Internet Plus
Programme (2005–2008).
3. See http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/internet/
communic.html#f10 (accessed May 11, 2007).
4. Even in the case of child pornography, variations
between countries exist pertaining to the definition of
child pornography, the range of criminal activities
that are subject to legislation (the possession, pro-
duction, and dissemination of material, and so on),
the means of investigation, and the penalties. For an
overview of the national-level legislation and initia-
tives to counter child pornography in various coun-
tries, see http://www.inhope.org/en/about/about.html
(accessed May 11, 2007).
5. See http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/fr/internet/
actplan.html (accessed May 11, 2007).
6. http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/pdfs/isp_liability.pdf
(accessed May 11, 2007).
7. However, member states might impose additional
obligations for ISPs to immediately convey informa-
tion to relevant authorities “of alleged illegal activities
undertaken, or information provided by recipients of
their service.” ISPs might also have to provide, on
request, information that enables the “identification
of recipients of their service with whom they have
storage agreements.” See http://www.jisclegal.
ac.uk/pdfs/isp_liability.pdf (accessed May 11, 2007).
8. Project Cleanfeed is cited as the “first mass censor-
ship of the web attempted in a Western democracy,”
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,6903,
1232422,00.html.
9. For further information on Project Cleanfeed, see
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/cleanfeed.pdf
(accessed May 11, 2007).
194 Regional Overviews
10. As of early 2006, 35,000 illegal images were being
blocked daily and four million access attempts were
recorded in a period of four months among BT sub-
scribers.
11. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/12/29/iwf_feature/
(accessed May 11, 2007).
12. Although BT records the number of access
attempts, it does not retain information pertaining to
the identity of persons who attempt to access these
Web sites. See http://technology.guardian.co.uk/
news/story/0,,1704342,00.html (accessed May 11,
2007).
13. Internet Watch Foundation, “Frequently Asked
Questions by the Media,” (page modified January
15th, 2006), http://www.iwf.org.uk/media/
page.70.215.htm (accessed May 11, 2007).
14. http://publicaffairs.linx.net/news/?p=518 (accessed
May 11, 2007).
15. Project Cleanfeed was introduced in the aftermath of
Operation Ore, an operation in the UK that formed a
part of a large-scale international police operation to
track down pedophiles on the Internet, under which
6,500 police investigations, 1,200 arrests, and 655
convictions were made in the country. The accused
were identified based on credit-card information
used to access a pedophile Web site hosted in the
United States, passed on to the UK by the FBI. (The
U.S. counterpart of the project, which preceded
Operation Ore, is known as Operation Avalanche).
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/








10#a52 (accessed May 11, 2007).
18. http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/56817
(accessed May 11, 2007).
19. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5213058.stm




21. For the list of countries running hotlines and the












italybetting (accessed May 11, 2007).
26. Article available in Norwegian, http://www
.dagbladet.no/dinside/2007/02/12/491719.html, cited
in: http://www.opennetinitiative.net/blog/?p=144
(accessed May 11, 2007).






youtube-turkey (accessed May 11, 2007).
30. http://www.cdt.org/publications/policyposts/2005/5
(accessed May 11, 2007).
31. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitisme
(LICRA) and L’Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France.
32. http://www.tomwbell.com/NetLaw/Ch03/
YahoovLICRA.html (accessed May 11, 2007).
33. http://www.cdt.org/publications/policyposts/2005/5
(accessed May 11, 2007).
34. BBC News, “The Law, borders, and the Internet,”
January 24, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/4641244.stm (accessed May 11, 2007).
35. Center for Democracy and Technology, “Foreign
courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over Web content
seen in other cases,” July 11, 2001,
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_7.06.shtml. For
more information on this case, please refer to the
Toben case in the Australia and New Zealand
Regional Overview.




(accessed May 11, 2007).
38. I. Brown, “Internet censorship: Be careful what you
ask for.” Proc. International Conference on
Communication, Mass Media and Culture, Istanbul,
October 2006.
39. http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/
defamation2.html (accessed May 11, 2007).
40. http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.3/romeII
(accessed May 11, 2007).
41. Libel law in Britain—known internationally to be par-
ticularly strict—was loosened in October 2006. See
Sarah Lyall, “High court in Britain loosens strict libel




42. Yaman Akdeniz, “Case Analysis of Laurence 
Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited,” 1999,
http://www.cyber-rights.org/reports/demon.htm;
Consumer Project on Technology, CPT’s Page on





(accessed May 11, 2007).
45. http://www.flickr.com/photos/jesper/336756697/
(accessed May 11, 2007).
46. Article at http://www.dagbladet.no/dinside/2007/
02/12/491719.html (in Norwegian), cited February
13, 2007, in http://www.opennetinitiative.
net/blog/?p=144.
47. BitTorrent is “a peer-to-peer (P2P) communications
protocol for file sharing,” and is a “method of distrib-
uting large amounts of data widely without the origi-
nal distributor incurring the entire costs of hardware,
hosting and bandwidth resources.” In this system,
“when data is distributed using the BitTorrent proto-
col, recipients each supply data to newer recipients,
reducing the cost and burden on any given individ-
ual source, providing redundancy against system
problems, and reducing dependence upon the origi-
nal distributor.” A BitTorrent client is any client that
implements the BitTorrent protocol, and “each client
is capable of preparing, requesting, and transmitting
any type of computer file over a network, using the
protocol. A peer is any computer running an
instance of a client. To share a file or group of files, a
peer first creates a ‘torrent’. This is a small file which
contains metadata about the files to be shared, and
about the ‘tracker’, the computer that coordinates
the file distribution. Peers that want to download the
file first obtain a torrent file for it, and connect to the
specified tracker which tells them from which other
peers to download the pieces of the file.” See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent (accessed May
11, 2007).
48. In May 2006 the Web site administrator and systems
operator of www.arenabg.com had been arrested









53. http://www.out-law.com/page-7758 (accessed May
11, 2007).
54. Introduced in Belgium in 2006, Google News shows
headlines, photos, and the first few lines of news
stories with links to the full versions on the Belgian
newspaper Web sites.
55. http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.3/
google-belgium (accessed May 11, 2007).
56. http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-6174008.html
(accessed May 11, 2007).
57. http://wistechnology.com/article.php?id=3548
(accessed May 11, 2007).
58. http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/ispliability/ispliability.htm
(accessed May 11, 2007).
59. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=
5275032 (accessed May 11, 2007).
60. http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?
cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-63514 (accessed May 11,
2007).
61. At present, IP addresses, search queries, and cookie
details are retained by Google in Europe for eight-
een to twenty-four months. After this period, server
logs are anonymized and it is no longer possible to
identify users.
62. See http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.6/
google-data-retention (accessed May 11, 2007).
63. http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.5/
sweden-wiretapping (accessed May 11, 2007).
196 Regional Overviews
Introduction
With the exception of Cuba, systematic technical
filtering of the Internet has yet to take hold in Latin
America. The regulation of Internet content
addresses largely the same concerns and strate-
gies seen in North America and Europe, focusing
on combating the spread of child pornography
and restricting children’s access to age-inappro-
priate material. As Internet usage in Latin
America increases, so have defamation, hate
speech, copyright, and privacy issues.
The judiciary in Latin America has played an
important role in shaping and tempering filtering
activity, a development common to North
America and Europe. At the same time, there has
been a wide range of legal and practical
responses to regulating Internet activity. Latin
American countries have relied primarily upon
existing law to craft remedies to these chal-
lenges, though a growing number of Internet-
specific laws have been debated and implement-
ed in recent years. These issues have been
addressed primarily through the application of
cease and desist orders in conjunction with
requests to have materials removed from search
engine results.
Though most Latin American countries have
ratified the American Convention on Human
Rights,1 a regional treaty that guarantees the
freedom of expression, speech continues to be
threatened by government authorities, drug car-
tels, and others. In particular, journalists have
long been targets of a range of attempts to
obstruct or limit speech, from government threats
to withhold publication licenses to outright intimi-
dation and physical violence. In 2006 and 2007
journalists in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela were
threatened, physically attacked, murdered, or
simply disappeared.2 For journalists working in
Latin America, death threats were commonplace.
In 2006 Mexico surpassed Colombia as Latin
America’s deadliest country for journalists (sec-
ond only to Iraq globally), while Cuba has the
world’s second-biggest prison for journalists.3
The level of openness of the media environ-
ment in Latin America is reputed to be subject to
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considerable self-censorship, particularly in
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.4
Because of threats from local drug cartels or
other gangs and individuals, many journalists
practice self-censorship,5 including many in
Colombia who avoid reporting on corruption,
drug trafficking, or violence by armed groups.
Drug gangs waging a campaign of intimidation in
Mexico not only tack notes to corpses and pub-
lish newspaper ads, but have also posted a
video on YouTube where an alleged Zeta member
(a group of cartel operatives) is tortured and
decapitated.6 The few Cubans who gain access
to the Internet are limited by extensive monitoring
and excessive penalties for political dissent,
leading to a climate of self-censorship.
Internet in Latin America
Most countries in Latin America recognize the
value of the Internet as an integral part of modern
life. For example, numerous groups in Chile have
recommended legislation to make access to the
Internet a right, alongside access to clean water
and shelter.7 However, the high value placed on
Internet access has not in fact resulted in uni-
formly unfettered access. Although the Cuban
government declared Internet access a “funda-
mental right” of the Cuban people,8 all Internet
access there requires government authorization
and oversight by the Cuban Ministry of Computer
Technology and Communications.9
While estimates vary, the regional penetra-
tion rate appears to be approximately 12 per-
cent.10 More than half of the Internet users in
Latin America are in Brazil and Mexico, though
Jamaica, Chile, and Argentina have the highest
penetration rates (at 44 percent, 34 percent, and
26 percent, respectively).11 Penetration rates in
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are clustered close
to 17 percent. In Bolivia, only one person in twen-
ty is connected, and in Cuba less than one per-
son in fifty.12 In 2004 Cuba had the lowest pene-
tration rate in the region, trailing even Nicaragua
(2.3 percent) and Paraguay (2.5 percent).13
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile are also the
leaders in high-speed Internet access, account-
ing for 90 percent of all broadband subscribers in
2006 and forming the top four markets for ADSL
in the region.14 Despite the region’s low Internet
penetration, fixed line and mobile phone sub-
scription continues to grow at an annual rate of
50 percent.15
In countries such as Argentina, Chile, and
Colombia the process of deregulation has led to
a surge in more affordable and increasingly pop-
ular services such as voice over Internet protocol
(VoIP). Nominally the Cuban Internet service
provider (ISP) market was fully competitive by
2000,16 in contrast to the monopolies in the vari-
ous telephone, data, and television markets.17
However, all ISPs remain under government con-
trol and oversight; of the ISPs, only CENIAI pro-
vides personal internet access to Cuban citi-
zens.18
Physical, legal, and economic limits on
access to the Internet can constitute the most
significant form of governmental control. The
Cuban government strongly restricts not only pri-
vate ownership of computer hardware,19 but also
many public access points to Cuban intranets.20
In addition to the state prohibition of private com-
puter sales, the Cuban police have also confis-
cated existing private computers and modems.21
The lack of private resources forces most
Cubans to use public access points, which may
allow access only to national e-mail and Cuban
intranets.22 In Venezuela, Internet use is concen-
trated among young, male, educated city resi-
dents, with more than 60 percent of users com-
ing from Caracas and all but the lowest income
sector represented.23 Despite programs promot-
ing Internet use by poor and rural Venezuelans,
access for 60 percent of the population remains
essentially nonexistent, and basic public educa-
tion does not incorporate Internet technologies.24
At the same time, many governments in
Latin America have committed to investing in
expanded public access points and creating
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community telecenters, such as cybercafés,
where most users in the region access the
Internet.25 In countries such as Honduras, cyber-
cafés and other public access centers have
become the local “telephone booth,” providing
cheaper and more readily available Internet
telephony.26 Though VoIP is available throughout
the region, the regulatory landscape is still evolv-
ing, with sometimes contradictory reports on the
legality of the service. VoIP is illegal in Cuba, but
it is offered with stringent restrictions in countries
such as Guyana, Paraguay, and Costa Rica.
Licensing requirements also legally restrict which
operators can offer VoIP in Bolivia,27 Mexico,
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the
Dominican Republic, though these restrictions
are not enforced in many countries.28 In Chile
and Brazil, the VoIP markets operate as if unreg-
ulated, but they are also evolving.29 In October
2006, even after deregulation, Telefónica Chile
was fined nearly USD1 million for antitrust viola-
tions in blocking VoIP calls.30
The introduction of Internet services in Latin
America has offered citizens opportunities to
affect their social and political landscape. For
example, bloggers in Mexico inaugurated their
coverage of elections in the 2006 presidential
campaigns. Social networking sites are also
immensely popular. Orkut in Brazil was host to
eleven million of Orkut’s more than fifteen million
users.31
Social content
The protection of children is a widely used ration-
ale for filtering the Internet in Latin America.
Despite the generally sparse extent of Internet
regulation, countries throughout the region have
focused on making the access and provision of
pornographic material illegal online.
The bulk of the regulatory responsibility for
filtering has been delegated to ISPs and public
Internet access points such as cybercafés. For
example, in 2006 the Venezuelan National
Assembly passed a law to safeguard children
from illicit content on the Internet, requiring ISPs
both to limit content on their servers and to pro-
vide free filtering software to users in order to pro-
mote self-regulation.32 Examples of similar mech-
anisms include the 2002 Argentine Internet
Providers Law, which requires all ISPs to provide
filtering software to users upon request,33 and a
Colombian law demanding that ISPs monitor
their content and report any illegal activity to the
government.34 Colombia’s “Internet Sano”
(healthy Internet) campaign calls for public edu-
cation on “decent” ways of using the Internet as
well as penalties for improper usage.35 In Peru it
is mandatory for all businesses to have 
filters installed in all computers designated for
use by children.36 In Buenos Aires businesses
offering Internet services that fail to install
pornography filters on computers for use by chil-
dren are subject to fines or temporary closures.37
Definitions of pornographic content are not
always clear; Argentine ISPs expressed concern
that the instruction to filter “specific sites” was not
adequately precise.38
Regulation of child pornography is steadily
being expanded to include the Internet. In 2003
Brazil made child pornography illegal in any
medium, explicitly including the Internet.39 Similar
laws have been approved and implemented in
Buenos Aires40 and Colombia.41 In Argentina’s
proposed draft law on cybercrimes, child
pornography is criminalized in “any medium of
communication.”42
In addition to efforts at protecting children
from explicit online content, other social content
deemed offensive has occasionally come under
fire. Since the 1997 presidential declaration
regarding “Free Speech on the Internet” that
guaranteed Internet content the same constitu-
tional protections for freedom of expression,
Argentina has become a haven for neo-Nazi and
race-hate groups around the region.43 In 2000 an
Argentine appellate court affirmed a lower court’s
dismissal of a claim that a Yahoo! site selling Nazi
memorabilia violated Argentina’s anti-discrimina-
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tion law (no. 23.592),44 holding that the equiva-
lent restrictions of non-Internet speech would be
unacceptable.
A recent case involving a social networking
site illustrates some of the tensions between law
enforcement needs and individuals’ right to pri-
vacy. In 2005 the Brazilian government took issue
with Google’s social networking site, Orkut, when
it became evident that it was being used for the
sale of illegal drugs45 and child pornography, and
had also become a domain for racist speech.46
The National Reporting Center of Cyber Crimes,
which operates in partnership with the Ministério
Público Federal, brought civil and criminal court
lawsuits against Google’s Brazilian unit alleging
failure to stop the spread of child pornography
and hate speech.47 In 2006 Google agreed to
comply with the Brazilian government’s request
that they track all users and hand over the identi-
ties of users involved in these and other illegal
activities.48
Defamation
The bulk of filtering in the Latin American region
arises from court order. Conceptually, defamation
covers a broad swath of unlawful acts in the
region, primarily distinguished by the status of
the person(s) harmed. In addition to defamation
of individuals and antidiscrimination laws ban-
ning hate speech (group defamation), the major-
ity of countries in Latin America have laws
against desacato (disrespect, insult against, or
comtempt for public figures).49
Hate speech is regulated by some Latin
American countries. In Brazil, the Criminal Code
includes the crime of prejudice on the basis of
race, color, religion, ethnic background, or
national origin.50 The Brazilian Constitution,
which establishes racism as a crime not entitled
to bail or statutes of limitation, has been used as
the legal basis for search engine takedowns.51 In
Argentina’s antidiscrimination law, a crime is con-
sidered more serious if racism is involved.52
In Argentina the defendant in the case
Jujuy.com v. Omar Lozano was found liable for
publishing slanderous content on his Web site
after imputing adulterous conduct to a couple
and failing to remove the content promptly. An
injunction was imposed and damages were set
at USD40,000.53 In a “defamation of the public
image” case, the Brazilian court ordered the
country’s seven largest ISPs to block the Web
site of a travel company based in the United
States called “Tours Gone Wild,” which reported-
ly sells and promotes sexual tourism packages to
Rio. A Brazilian citizen had sued the Web site
claiming photos were used on the Web site with-
out permission.54 These judicial strategies may
be incorporated into future legislative moves by
the Brazilian government or other Latin American
countries.
Although many countries have declared
desacato laws unconstitutional,55 others—such
as Panama56 and Venezuela57—are increasing
restrictions on press freedom through such
defamation laws. A 1999 desacato case in Costa
Rica, where the journalist Mauricio Herrera Ulloa
published accounts of the illegal acts of a public
official, led to a judicial order to remove the name
of the plaintiff from a newspaper Web site and to
criminal convictions against Herrera Ulloa.58
However, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights ruled that the conviction of Herrera Ulloa
was a violation of his right to freedom of expres-
sion under the American Convention on Human
Rights.59
In 2006 a Brazil court extended the 1967
Press Law60 to apply to Internet publications and
fined a magazine, Veja Online, for defaming an
ex-official in an article published online.61 The
2006 elections in Brazil provide a prominent
example of desacato being brought into cyber-
space, as well as the self-regulating stance taken
by Brazilian ISPs. Senate candidate (and former
President) Jose Sarney sued and won his case in
the electoral court (which exists in part to “ensure
that all candidates are fairly represented in the
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media,” though this court does “not generally
cover defamation”)62 against a blogger who
posted a cartoon of Sarney. Even after Alcilene
Cavalcante deleted the cartoon as requested by
the court, the ISP that hosted her blog
(http://www.uol.com.br) proceeded to remove
the blog without a court directive to do so. Sarney
also filed to sue Cavalcante’s sister Alcineia, who
divulged details of the case on her blog. Again,
without any court order, the ISP also removed
Alcineia Cavalcante’s blog.63
Privacy and confidentiality
The judiciary also continues to play an active role
in parsing the scope of privacy rights and confi-
dentiality of data by experimenting with filtering
orders. For example, in 2005 a court in Brazil
ordered the daily newspaper Folha Online to
remove from its Web site 165 URLs that detailed
how Brasil Telecom allegedly used a Canadian
consulting company to spy on its competitor
Telecom Italia. On trial for the abuses alleged in
these articles, Brasil Telecom requested that the
judge issue a writ against Folha Online. The arti-
cles were published in print a year before the
takedown writ was issued, but the Web site was
held to have violated the confidentiality of a judi-
cial investigation.64 However, after protests, the
judge reduced the number of pages to be
blocked the next day.65
The Brazilian judiciary has also engaged
with Google over the privacy concerns regarding
sexual content that appeared on its video-sharing
site YouTube in 2005. After a Brazilian model and
her boyfriend sued YouTube for hosting a sexual-
ly explicit video they claimed violated their right to
privacy, Google agreed to take down the video,
but it continued to be put back online by users. In
January 2007 a São Paulo judge ordered
telecommunications companies to block
YouTube until the video was removed from the
Web site. Several ISPs, including Brasil Telecom,
announced their intention to comply with the
court ruling.66 Days later, the judge revoked his
order and lifted the ban on the entire site.67
Security and political speech
With the exception of Cuba, there has been no
reported technical filtering of content relating to
security or political speech. Since it established
its first full-time Internet connection in 1996,68 the
Cuban government has combined access
restrictions with severe penalties for illegal
uses—including violations such as counter-revo-
lutionary writing69—to deter free expression
online.70 Regulation outlaws Internet use “in vio-
lation of Cuban society’s moral principles or the
country’s laws,” as well as e-mail messages that
“jeopardize national security.”71 Moreover, the
government restricts Internet use by having all
legal Cuban Internet traffic pass through state-
run ISPs, which use software to detect politically
dissident information, and requires ID and regis-
tration for Internet use.72 E-mail messages are
monitored prior to being sent or delivered.73
Copyright
Many countries in Latin America, including
Argentina and Brazil, have attempted to shore up
intellectual property rights (IPR) protections by
drafting and updating laws and ratifying interna-
tional agreements such as the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.
Other countries, such as Chile and Mexico, have
been criticized for having antiquated or weak
laws that fail to meet international threshold
requirements set by the UN and WIPO.74 Uneven
regulation of IPR is often coupled with a level of
enforcement characterized as insufficient or ane-
mic.75 For example, one of the objectives of the
U.S. government in signing a free trade agree-
ment with Chile was to improve protection
against piracy for U.S. copyright and trademark
holders.76 As a proposed replacement for the
North American Free Trade Agreement, the Free
Trade Agreements of the Americas (FTAA) would
include every country in Central America, South
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America, and the Caribbean, except Cuba.
Although the United States has pushed for
greater intellectual property protections, negotia-
tions have been stalled since 2005.77
At the same time, the drive for enhanced IPR
regimes, often led by the United States, has been
controversial for a range of reasons, from lack of
public support to the nature of the civil law sys-
tem in many countries.78 For example, these
international “individualistic” and “exclusionary”
frameworks have been criticized as alien to many
of the unique cultures of the region, indigenous
rights, and traditions of collective rights.
Panama’s IP laws recognize indigenous folklore
and knowledge, and in 2000 it became the first
country in the world to conceive of a sui generis
IP system for the protection of indigenous crafts
and knowledge.79
Other factors
In Latin America economic factors can have a
significant impact on citizens’ Internet access. In
Cuba a combination of Cuban government poli-
cy, the U.S. trade embargo, and personal eco-
nomic limitations prevents the vast majority of
Cuban citizens from accessing the Internet.
Access is likely restricted even further by the U.S.
government’s sponsorship of reverse filtering,
which encourages Web sites to prevent access
from Cuba and other countries.
In Venezuela, President Hugo Chávez’s
announcement on January 8, 2007, of re-nation-
alization plans for the telecom CANTV80 has
heightened fears of expanded regulation and
content restrictions as the government assumes
greater control of Internet media. A recent article
notes that CANTV has held 83 percent of the
Internet market since the market’s privatization,81
so any changes in filtering through a nationalized
CANTV will have a strong impact on Internet
users.
Conclusion
Governments and especially courts in Latin
America are engaged in an adaptive process of
regulating online activity and content. Only Cuba
employs systematic technical filtering, with many
countries delegating the responsibility for filtering
content unsuitable for minors to ISPs. In addition,
a wide range of actors—including government
officials, telecom companies, individuals, and
judges—have attempted to induce or enforce fil-
tering on a case-by-case basis, often with nego-
tiated and shifting results. The ad hoc approach-
es that have been applied thus far suggest that
efforts to control Internet content in Latin America
are still unsettled and contested; this promises to
be an area of considerable change in the coming
years.
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Overview
ONI conducted in-country testing for Internet fil-
tering in sixteen countries in the North Africa and
Middle East region. We found that eight of these
countries broadly filter online content: Iran,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Another
four—Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco—
carry out selective filtering of a smaller number of
Web sites. ONI found no evidence of consistent
technical filtering used to deny access to online
content in Algiers, Egypt, Iraq, or Israel.
Most of the sites targeted for blocking are
selected because of cultural and religious con-
cerns about morality. Political filtering, however, is
the common denominator in the region. Bahrain,
Jordan, Libya, and Syria focus their filtering
efforts primarily on political content. Iran, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen, on the other hand, not only
extensively filter political content but also perva-
sively block content that is perceived to be reli-
giously, culturally, or socially inappropriate.
Regional and internal political conflicts are
also behind content blocking. For example, Syria
and the United Arab Emirates block all Web sites
within the Israeli domain. Morocco blocks Web
sites arguing for the independence of Western
Sahara.
Internet censorship in the Middle East and
North Africa is multilayered, relying on a number
of complementary strategies in addition to tech-
nical filtering; arrest, intimidation, and a variety of
legal measures are used to regulate the posting
and viewing of Internet content.
Introduction
Most of the states in the Middle East and North
Africa introduced the Internet in their countries to
promote economic development and competi-
tiveness; however, they soon realized that the
Internet made it more difficult for them to control
the flow of information both within the country
and across international borders.
States’ power to regulate social, economic,
and political activities started to erode as citizens
and other nonstate actors, empowered by the
Internet Filtering in the
Middle East and North Africa
Internet, started to create and disseminate infor-
mation. The Internet, along with satellite television
networks, has effectively broken the monopoly of
many Middle Eastern and North African govern-
ments. The availability and accessibility of infor-
mation, as well as the ability to create and dis-
seminate information anonymously, has led to a
sense of freedom among many Arab Internet
users.
Internet in the Middle East and North
Africa
Though some countries in the region enjoy wide-
spread and easy access to the Internet, the
region is also home to some of the least-con-
nected countries in the world. While in 2006
some 61 percent of Israelis and 35 percent of
Emiratis had regular access to the Internet,
Internet penetration still lags behind in most of
the region. In fact, according to the International
Telecommunication Union, less than 4 percent of
people in the Arab world use the Internet regular-
ly.1 In many countries, poor infrastructure along
with economic barriers remain the biggest obsta-
cle to expanding access to the Internet. In
Yemen, for example, less than 1 percent of the
population uses the Internet (there are 0.87 users
per 100 inhabitants), and there are only 300,000
personal computers in the country (1.5 per 100
inhabitants).2 In Syria fewer than six out of one
hundred people regularly use the Internet. In Iraq
the Internet penetration rate is 0.1 percent.
Interestingly, broadband Internet access is
growing faster in the Middle East and Africa than
in any other region in the world. The number of
broadband subscribers grew by 38 percent in
2006, while the number of those subscribers
using DSL access technology grew by 82 per-
cent, to 4.3 million.3
The highest rates of broadband penetration
in the region are found in Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Lebanon. Half of all households in
Qatar, almost one-third in the United Arab
Emirates, and one-quarter in Lebanon have a
broadband connection. Three countries—
Tunisia, Qatar, and Egypt—experienced a
remarkable broadband growth rate, doubling in a
year. At the same time, DSL subscriptions in the
United Arab Emirates increased by almost two-
thirds.4
State response: Censorship
As the Internet has proven to be a new space for
the extension of power and for different nonstate
players to compete for influence, states have per-
ceived this as a potential threat. The response
has been filtration and surveillance. For the many
restrictive governments of the Middle East and
North Africa, embracing the Internet meant pro-
viding citizens with access to troubling content
and ideas, along with new methods to circum-
vent traditional controls on life and discourse. In
reaction, many governments in the region have
chosen to restrict online freedom, giving the
Middle East and North Africa one of the most
repressive Web environments in the world. The
Middle East and North Africa is home to five of
the thirteen countries listed as enemies of the
Internet by Reporters Sans Frontieres.5
ONI testing has confirmed that governments
and Internet service providers (ISPs) have
blocked content they have designated as moral-
ly offensive, in violation of public ethics and order,
or critical of governments, leaders, or ruling fam-
ilies.
To one degree or another, the Gulf countries,
as well as Iran, Sudan, Tunsia, and Yemen, block
content related to pornography, homosexuality,
dating, and provocative attire. Some of these
countries also censor topics considered sensitive
or forbidden under Islam, such as gambling,
alcohol, and drugs, along with Web sites that fea-
ture nudity, even if in a non-erotic context. A few
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, ban access to Web sites that are
critical of Islam and those that promote conver-
sion to Christianity.
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Many states in the region were found to
block political content, or to have blocked such
content in the past. For example, Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia consistently block Web
sites of opposition groups. Egypt has intermit-
tently blocked the Web site of the Muslim
Brotherhood, an Islamist group critical of the gov-
ernment, as well as the site hosting the online
version of the Labor Party’s newspaper, which
had previously been banned in its hard copy.
Yemen temporarily blocked political Web sites in
the run-up to the 2006 presidential elections,
while Bahrain did the same ahead of parliamen-
tary elections. One political Web site was found
to be blocked in Jordan.
Several countries, including Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, and Tunisia, also restrict access to mate-
rial from human rights organizations, particularly
sites that have published reports that are espe-
cially critical about those countries.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Communications services have been liberalized
in several countries in the Middle East and North
Africa in the past few years, and there are
attempts to liberalize more markets in other
countries. Some countries have passed legisla-
tion that regulates the telecommunications sector
and allows the participation of the private sector
in the communication industry. The past few
years have also witnessed the establishment of
telecommunications regulatory authorities.
Most of the countries in the region do not
have Internet-specific legislation, though some
countries have started to adopt these laws.
In February 2006 the United Arab Emirates
issued a federal law designed to combat cyber-
crime. This law criminalizes certain online activi-
ties such as “setting up a website or publishing
information for groups calling for facilitating and
promoting ideas in breach of the general order
and public decency,” and “setting up a website
or publishing information for a terrorist group
under fake names with intent to facilitate contacts
with their leadership, or to promote their ideolo-
gies and finance their activities, or to publish
information on how to make explosives or any
other substances to be used in terrorist attacks.”6
In October 2006 Saudi Arabia also issued a
law that criminalizes, among other things,
“[e]avesdropping on, tapping or obstructing
information sent through the Internet or a com-
puter without legal justification,” “[d]efaming oth-
ers or harming them through the different means
of information technology,” and “[e]stablishing a
Web site for terrorist organizations and/or pub-
lishing it in order to aid the leaders of these
organizations or any of their members, or pro-
moting their ideas, or financing them, or publish-
ing how to make explosives or other weapons
used in terrorist acts.”7
Journalists and citizen journalists have been
detained under emergency laws, vague media
laws, or penal codes. Others have faced extralegal
harassment and intimidation from security agen-
cies. Governments have further blocked access
to new services, citing security concerns. In 2006
the voice-over Internet protocol (VoIP) service
Skype and Google Earth were briefly banned in
Jordan and Bahrain, respectively. In both cases,
the government cited security concerns.
The use of Internet is also regulated by ISPs’
terms of use that in some cases mandate that
users not carry out activities that contradict the
social, cultural, political, religious, or economic
values of the state. In some cases, users are
asked to sign written agreements to this effect.
Transparency
Some countries in the region openly acknowl-
edge their practice of Internet filtering. Saudi
Arabia and Sudan publish details about what
they filter, how, and why. They also make avail-
able information about their Internet filtering poli-
cies, procedures, and other related materials,
such as the impact of their filtering systems on
connectivity. An Iranian official recently boasted
that Iran has censored ten million Web sites, and
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that they add 1,000 Web sites to the blacklist
every month.8 However, even where a state
admits some filtering, it may not admit targeting
political opposition, dissidents, or critical human
rights reports.
Some ISPs acknowledge filtering by serving
blockpages when users try to access banned
content. A blockpage usually alerts users that
they tried to access illegal Web sites; some invite
users to suggest the removal of the block on the
Web sites if they think they were erroneously
blocked. Some ISPs also ask users to volunteer
suggestions for the blacklists.
Countries such as Syria and Tunisia attempt
to hide their filtering regimes by returning block-
pages disguised to look like error messages.
Users in Libya receive time-out messages when
they try to access banned content.
Overblocking
Internet filtering will inherently lead to either
overblocking or underblocking of targeted con-
tent. Many countries in the region are reasonably
successful at blocking what they openly declare
to be the target of their filtering system, without
excessively high rates of overblocking. Others,
however—such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates—not only extensively block
targeted content but they also unnecessarily
overblock unrelated content. For instance, Iran
and the United Arab Emirates block www
.flickr.com entirely because they have deemed
some of the photographs posted on the site
objectionable. Also most of ISPs in countries
such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen prevent Internet users
from legitimately using privacy and anonymizing
tools and online translation services because
they can be used to bypass the filtering systems.
Filtering tools
The majority of the ISPs in the region rely on com-
mercial filtering software, primarily applications
produced by U.S.-based companies Secure
Computing and Websense. This software allows
ISPs, often acting on the behest of governments,
to filter by category based on lists of pages
updated by the company. The categories that
ISPs choose to filter can differ widely between
countries. In some cases ISPs block individual
Web sites’ URLs or entire top-level domains, as
in the case of Syria and the United Arab
Emirates, both of which block access to the
Israeli top-level domain. In addition, some ISPs
block search strings that contain objectionable
keywords. For example, the Yemeni ISP Ynet
blocks the use of the word sex in search strings,
and the Emirati ISP Etisalat bans the use of sev-
eral keywords that could return erotic images.
In addition, some ISPs block access to
cached copies of certain Web sites as an extra
measure to prevent access to their content. Most
notably, the U.S.-based, Arab-language online
newspaper www.arabtimes.com is blocked in
several Arab countries, as is access to the
cached copy of the page in Google.
Iran, in addition to blocking Web sites,
restricts users’ ability to access online content by
limiting their Internet speed. In October 2006 the
Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology ordered ISPs to limit the connection
speed they offer to 128 Kb/s in order to hinder
users’ ability to download foreign cultural prod-
ucts (such as music and films) and to organize
political opposition.9
Physical restrictions and filtering
An additional mode of control is to regulate the
places where users access the Internet. In many
countries in the Middle East and North Africa,
users primarily go online at Internet cafés. Some
governments require these cafés to maintain lists
of their patrons and keep an eye on their activi-
ties. Yemen and Oman require that computer
screens be visible to café managers at all times;
indeed, Oman requires that prospective café
owners submit a floor plan in their application
package. The authorities give specific instruc-
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tions on how Internet cafés should be designed;
these instructions include the height, depth, and
width of partitions between computers.
Temporary and event-based blocking
Some countries block Web sites at sensitive polit-
ical moments. As stated previously, in 2006
Bahrain blocked several Web sites in the run-up
to the country’s parliamentary elections and
Yemen banned access to several media and
local politics Web sites ahead of the country’s
presidential elections.
Another example of temporary blocking
mentioned earlier is the banning of access to the
VoIP service Skype in Jordan and Google Earth in
Bahrain in 2006.
Control without filters
Several countries in the region do not have tech-
nical filtering in place, or they selectively filter
sensitive content. This, however, does not neces-
sarily mean that there is no media censorship in
these countries. Citizens in these countries are
able to enjoy unfettered access to the Internet
because filtering is either very selective or nonex-
istent. But sweeping media laws lead to perva-
sive self-censorship and, in some cases, deten-
tion. The intimidating laws discourage users from
engaging in political and social conversations
online.
Jordan, for example, blocks very few Web
sites, but media laws curb the freedom of the
press and encourage some measure of self-cen-
sorship in cyberspace.10 Citizens have reported-
ly been questioned and arrested for Web content
they have authored.11 Similarly, the Egyptian gov-
ernment no longer blocks Web sites, but it has
detained people for their online activities. On
February 22, 2007, a court in Alexandria sen-
tenced a blogger to four years in prison for
“incitement to hate Muslims” and “insulting the
president.”12
The Iraqi government does not block Web
sites, but the war there makes it difficult for peo-
ple to access the Internet and makes it danger-
ous to express political opinions online.
Internet censorship: The users’ response
Users may exploit alternative technologies to cir-
cumvent filtering systems when censorship
imposed by ISPs restricts access to content. In
Saudi Arabia, for example, 93 percent of Internet
users regularly try to access blocked Web sites,
according to an official at King Abdul Aziz City for
Science and Technology (KACST) once responsi-
ble for overseeing the country’s filtering system.13
Many Web sites that discuss sensitive
issues and feel that they are likely to be blocked
use services such as Yahoo! Groups as part of
their contingency plans. Once the Web sites are
blocked by ISPs, users continue to exchange
content via e-mail. Because it is very difficult for
ISPs to filter e-mail discussions, group conversa-
tion continues to be virtually uncensored.
Other Web sites and discussion forums post
tutorials for their visitors that describe how to use
circumvention tools to bypass local filtering sys-
tems even before they are actually blocked. One
Arabic political Web site’s home page once read,
“Click here to enter our Web site and click here to
learn how to access us once we are blocked.”
Another trick used by Internet users is the
dissemination of controversial content in a large
number of Web sites that are unknown to the
ISPs. When the novel Girls of Riyadh was banned
in Saudi Arabia, for example, the full text was
posted in tens of Saudi Arabian forums and
blogs that have low visibility. Although this is a
violation of copyright, it is also an example of how
banned content is being distributed and is evi-
dence that blocking the flow of information is not
as easy as was once thought.
Some technologically sophisticated user
groups went as far as developing their own cir-
cumvention tools. In fact, a special Web browser
once emerged on the Internet that enabled users
to access blocked Jihadi-oriented Web sites.
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Conclusion
Though the Internet is growing rapidly in many
countries and high-speed access is spreading,
most countries in the Middle East and North
Africa maintain control over what citizens can see
and say online. Authorities use technology and
legal and physical restrictions to limit what users
can access online. While filtering is primarily
based on religious and cultural concerns, most
countries in the region also filter some political
content.
Even in countries that filter little or no online
content, legal restrictions and extralegal harass-
ment from security agencies can still be used to
cow or silence online critics.
In addition, although some countries openly
acknowledge practicing Internet filtering of reli-
giously and culturally objectionable content,
there is less openness when it comes to blocking
of political oppositional content. Other countries
deliberately try to obscure the fact that they are
filtering content by producing false error mes-
sages or time-out messages.
Furthermore, as governments try to prevent
people from circumventing filtering, they inflict
collateral damage on the Internet, preventing
users from using useful and politically neutral
services such as privacy tools and online transla-
tion services.
In sum, filtering in the MENA region demon-
strates an ongoing struggle between the filtering
states’ desire to integrate into the global econo-
my and their efforts to restrict and prevent access
to what they deem to be dissident activities or
objectionable materials.
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Internet penetration in sub-Saharan Africa lags
behind much of the rest of the world for a variety
of economic, political, and infrastructural rea-
sons. Despite these hurdles, most countries in
the region view their future success as inextrica-
bly linked to harnessing the Internet’s promise for
economic development. Internet regulation in
Africa, as a result, is primarily focused on infra-
structure and access-related issues rather than
on content regulation, though countries are mak-
ing plans to broaden the scope of regulation as
the Internet spreads.
Given the current restrictions on the free-
doms of expression and the press in sub-
Saharan Africa, one would expect similar restric-
tions on Internet freedom. In one way, this expec-
tation is met: a number of countries in Africa have
sought to limit the use of Voice-over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) to protect incumbent telecommu-
nications companies. However, ONI unearthed
evidence of systematic blocking of Internet con-
tent in only one country, Ethiopia.1 Uganda is
also reported, by other sources, to have engaged
in one temporary incidence of filtration during the
past year. Time will tell whether sub-Saharan
countries choose to apply their restrictive laws
and practices—targeted originally at traditional
media—to the Internet realm as the Internet
spreads.
Infrastructure and development
In sub-Saharan Africa Internet penetration rates
are exceptionally low. West Africa generally has
Internet penetration rates of around 1 percent or
lower, with a pocket of countries (Benin, Nigeria,
and Togo) maintaining higher Internet usage
rates falling between 4 and 6 percent. Eastern
and southern African penetration rates are slight-
ly higher on the whole, between 1 and 4 percent.
South Africa and Zimbabwe stand out with 11
and 8 percent, respectively.2
Various factors contribute to these low
Internet penetration rates. Many areas in the
region lack the basic infrastructure necessary to
support the Internet. Only half of the homes in
Botswana3 and as few as 10 percent in Tanzania4
have access to electricity.
Internet Filtering in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
The poorly developed state of Internet infra-
structure is also a formidable problem. In West
Africa, a high-capacity cable known as SAT-3
(South African Telecom-3) connects Europe to
West Africa to South Africa to India. However,
incumbent telecommunication companies, which
are usually state owned, often have sole control
over the branching unit from this cable to their
country. As a result, they often charge exorbitant
rates for connection via this cable, between
US7,000 and USD15,000 per Mb/s per month
depending on the country.5 There is no equiva-
lent high-bandwidth cable connecting East
African countries to the Internet, though there are
a number of plans to build one.6 As a result,
many sub-Saharan African Internet service
providers (ISPs) are highly reliant on expensive
satellite Internet services (not lower than
USD1,800 to USD2,000 per Mb/s per month)7,
driving up the price and driving down the avail-
ability of Internet services for the people in the
region.
Even if sub-Saharan countries were better
connected to the rest of the world with more equi-
table pricing arrangements, it would be difficult
and expensive in most cases for them to develop
sufficient internal infrastructure to support wide-
spread Internet development. Since populations
are highly rural and spread out (in Rwanda, 94
percent of the population lives in rural areas;8 in
Uganda, 85 percent),9 it is often a better invest-
ment for companies to build a cable into another
country with more populous cities than to build
further into the originating country.10 Moreover,
the endemic poverty and economic degradation
of the region makes any significant rural Internet
development prohibitively expensive for many
countries.11 In Zimbabwe, for example, with infla-
tion rates reaching nearly 1,600 percent, the gov-
ernment-owned TelOne has had difficulties pay-
ing its satellite provider bills to just maintain its
current level of Internet access.12 As a result,
Internet usage remains low and concentrated in
urban areas; in Kenya, 80 percent of Internet
users live in Nairobi.13
The recent privatization and liberalization of
the telecommunications markets was promoted
as a means to alleviate the infrastructure prob-
lems of Africa. Many countries have made this
important step, including Botswana in 1996,14
Malawi in 1998,15 South Africa in 2002 (though
there was no real competition until 2006)16,
Senegal in 2003,17 and Kenya in 2004.18 Despite
this liberalization, telecommunications compa-
nies that once held monopolies are still domi-
nant,19 limiting the boost in Internet development
expected from deregulation and competition in
the Internet services markets.20
In Uganda the spread of the Internet has
been hampered by tariffs so high as to be pro-
hibitive to the vast majority of the population. For
monthly unlimited Internet access, the standard
tariff is priced at USD50, along with local phone
charges for dial-in users that, for an hour of
usage a day, could run from USD31 to USD93 a
month (depending on whether the connection
was used at peak or off-peak times).21 Even
Internet usage in cybercafés costs around
USD6/hour.22 Compared to Uganda’s annual
GDP per capita of USD525 in 2005,23 the cost of
Internet use is strikingly disproportionate to the
disposal income of most of the population.24
The lack of local content may also serve as
a disincentive to Internet use. Although English is
the official language of Uganda, for instance,
very few of the country’s inhabitants speak it as a
first or even as a second language, although that
number is growing.25 Botswana’s own telecom-
munications regulatory body, the Botswana
Telecommunications Authority, has pointed out
that “another factor hampering Internet uptake is
the lack of indigenous local content.”26
Nevertheless, many countries actively pro-
mote the Internet through ICT policies as an ele-
ment in their overall development plans. Rwanda,
for example, has an ambitious, long-term “ICT-
led socio-economic development plan” to trans-
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form “Rwanda into a middle-income country by
2020.”27 The plan covers everything from gener-
al infrastructure (such as improving electrical
power quality), to Internet regulatory issues, and
plans for social development (such as the
Citizen’s Guide to Health Information Services).
Though other countries’ plans may not be
as ambitious or far-sighted, most countries also
have policies to spread Internet use. For exam-
ple, Nigeria’s National Information Technology
Development Agency has implemented pro-
grams such as the Mobile Internet Unit, the Rural
Internet Resource Center,28 and the Computers
for All Nigerians Initiative.29 In addition, at least
thirteen sub-Saharan countries have made huge
leaps in providing Internet services by launching
Internet exchange points so that Internet traffic
can travel easily within their borders.30 Overall,
governments are attempting to shake off these
limitations to Internet development and create
vibrant ICT systems throughout their countries. In
many cases, they have been fairly successful, as
Internet usage rates in the region grew by rough-
ly 530 percent between 2000 and 2004.31
Legal framework: Freedom of expression
and freedom of the press
Before examining the state of Internet content
regulation in the region, it is important to under-
stand how countries handle traditional media.
Though countries do have protections for free
expression and press in sub-Saharan Africa,
these protections are often limited and, in a few
cases, seem honored most in the breach thereof.
Freedom of expression and press freedoms
are subject to constitutional protection in most
African countries. “Everyone has the right to free
expression, which includes freedom of the press
and other media,” in South Africa.32 “Every per-
son shall have the right to freedom of expression”
and “the press shall have the right to report and
publish freely, within Malawi and abroad, and to
be accorded the fullest possible facilities for
access to public information” in Malawi.33 Explicit
constitutional exceptions to free speech are com-
mon as well, such as an exclusion for hate
speech (South Africa),34 for defamation
(Ghana),35 for anything that may impact the
enjoyment of rights by others (Zimbabwe),36 and
broader topics such as public safety and welfare
(Rwanda,37 Kenya,38 and Ghana39).
Legislation designed to limit free speech
and the press is found in a number of countries.
Some laws protect the government from defama-
tion and insult (Botswana)40 and restrict the dis-
semination of obscenity (Liberia),41 while other
laws restrict journalism based on security con-
cerns (Malawi).42 Fortunately, a number of coun-
tries are making efforts to reform their laws to
make them less restrictive. Rwanda, for example,
has drafted a new, less restrictive press bill to
replace its oppressive 2002 Press Law.43 Other
countries in the region, however, are actively pur-
suing even greater restrictions of free speech.
Nigeria, for example, is considering an anti-gay
bill entitled the “Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition)
Act,” which would restrict free speech, associa-
tion, and assembly relating to homosexuality.44
Sub-Saharan governments have also taken
significant action against the media under the
auspices of antidefamation or national security
law. In Nigeria, the leader in media abuses in
West Africa,45 two newspapers were raided in
2004 by the State Security Service for alleged
libel of government officials;46 and in 2006 jour-
nalists were charged with an annulled sedition
law for questioning the president’s new plane
purchase.47 In Côte d’Ivoire, the government has
been accused of using the media under its con-
trol to promote its own agenda48 while suppress-
ing oppositional newspapers and arresting jour-
nalists, even though the December 2004 press
law was supposed to have abolished jail time for
journalists.49 Reporters in Rwanda were threat-
ened by the government after criticizing the
administration.50
In Uganda there have been reports of jour-
nalists being harassed by the military and, in one
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case, a foreign journalist being excluded from the
country altogether.51 In Kenya there have been
numerous reports of journalists harassed by
state actors and, in some cases, even jailed.52
Although Tanzania enjoys widespread press free-
dom as a general rule, the semiautonomous
region of Zanzibar has been marked by threats to
the independent press, which has been accused
of being “a threat to national unity.”53 The
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front arrested seventy-six journalists, politicians,
and civil society activists for “‘treason,’ ‘conspir-
acy’ to overthrow the government and ‘geno-
cide’” in the ongoing crackdown on opposition to
the government following the disastrous May
2005 legislative elections.54 Self-censorship runs
rampant in the Malawi Broadcasting Company
because, as a current employee put it, “a mere
negative joke about the ruling party can cost
someone a job here.”55
Nor has radio been immune to government
intervention. In Zimbabwe the government
jammed opposition radio stations in 2006,56 and
in Zambia the government forcibly shut down
and revoked the license of a radio station that
broadcasted opposition views.57
Though some countries, such as Botswana
and South Africa, protect free speech and are
recognized for their level of freedom, the conti-
nent as a whole is characterized by its severe,
entrenched restrictions of expression and the
press.58
Internet content regulation
The regulation of Internet content in sub-Saharan
Africa is still in its formative stages. Given the
generally low penetration rates across the region,
the inchoate nature of Africa’s Internet regulatory
regimes is not surprising. With a few exceptions,
including South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa has
just begun to consider options and put together
plans for regulating Internet content. In this sec-
tion, we investigate the current trends and likely
futures of Internet content regulation in the region
relating to obscene content, defamation, political
opposition, security, copyright, and Voice-over IP
(VoIP).
Obscene content
Many sub-Saharan African countries have laws
that restrict the traditional distribution of obscene
materials and empower organizations to enforce
those laws. In South Africa all material classified
by the Film and Publications Board as XX, includ-
ing child pornography and violent sexual acts,
and X18, including any depictions of explicit sex-
ual conduct, is illegal to distribute.59 X18 material
can be legally distributed, however, if it occurs in
a face-to-face manner honoring age restrictions
and within a building.60 The Malawi Censorship
Board, established in 1968 under the harsh
Banda regime, remains active in restricting
pornographic material. For example, in 2002 the
board ordered the takedown of a billboard adver-
tisement showing a woman’s navel.61 Zimbabwe
similarly restricts pornographic content, with laws
making the possession and dissemination of any
“indecent or obscene” content (that is, anything
“subversive of morality”) illegal.62
Many countries, however, have not directly
applied these laws to the Internet. In many cases,
it is still unclear whether they actually could be
applied. For example, a nonprofit media organi-
zation focusing on gay and lesbian affairs in
Africa, known as Mask, argues that Zimbabwe’s
Censorship and Entertainments Control Act,
which regulates obscene content, has not kept
pace with technology and, therefore, may not
apply to Internet pornography.63 Similarly,
Botswana’s Telecommunications Act 1996
makes illegal the transmission “by means of a
public telecommunication system, a message or
other matter which is offensive or of an indecent,
obscene or menacing character,”64 but the coun-
try’s ICT policy document questions whether this
covers actions such as “exporting” child pornog-
raphy over the Internet.65
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Countries have come to the realization that
they will need to develop policies to address the
social and political ramifications associated with
the availability of obscene content online as the
Internet spreads through the region. For exam-
ple, the Malawi ICT for Development (ICT4D) pol-
icy calls on the government to “put in place
mechanisms that will safeguard girls, boys and
women from fraud, misuse of information and
immoral behavior brought about by the use of
ICTs” and puts the Malawi Censorship Board in
charge of “addressing ethical issues of the digi-
tal culture in order to ensure the protection of the
rights of the vulnerable consumers.”66 Tanzania’s
ICT policy document comes to a similar conclu-
sion, stating that “the Government will seek to
discourage inappropriate use of ICT that is detri-
mental to our cultural values, ethics, mores, and
morality such as viewing pornography.”67
Countries with greater Internet penetration
rates than Malawi and Tanzania, at 0.4 percent
and 0.9 percent respectively,68 are further along
in their handling of the issue. Nigeria, for exam-
ple, with a 4 percent penetration rate,69 is cur-
rently considering the Computer Security and
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Bill
2005, which would explicitly make distribution of
child pornography online a crime.70 In Clause 12
of Ghana’s (which has a 2 percent penetration
rate)71 Computer and Computer Related Crimes
Act, 2005, there are strict prohibitions for online
child pornography.72 South Africa, with the high-
est penetration rate in sub-Saharan Africa, at
about 11 percent,73 took the most drastic step of
all when, in September 2006, the government
notified all pornography sites hosted in South
Africa that they must cease posting XX and X18
classified materials by December 31, 2006, or
face criminal action under the Film and
Publications Act 1996.74 So far, the vast majority
of pornography sites have complied and
removed their infringing content, but some
remain. The government is currently compiling a
list of sites that have refused to remove their con-
tent for shut-down and prosecution.75
In sum, it appears likely that obscene con-
tent on the Internet will be increasingly regulated
as Internet development progresses in the
region. Obscenity laws that might be applied to
Internet content already exist in most sub-
Saharan countries. As the South African prece-
dent has shown, decisive action is a possibility.
Defamation
As discussed in the legal framework section,
most countries in this region have existing
defamation or insult laws restricting what can be
broadcast or published. For example,
Botswana’s Penal Code bans insults directed at
its president and flag.76 As many of these laws in
the region are criminal, free expression watchdog
groups such as the International Freedom of
Expression Exchange (IFEX) have called for their
repeal.77
Few countries in sub-Saharan Africa, how-
ever, have put their defamation laws to use in the
Internet sphere. South Africa is an exception, as
it often is, with a small amount of case law rele-
vant to civil defamation over the Internet. In the
case of Tsichlas v. Touch Line Media, the manag-
er (Natasha Tsichlas) of a South African soccer
team filed suit against Touch Line Media for
anonymous defamatory posts directed at her on
Touch Line’s Web site, Kick Off. Among the
“prayers” of the suit was a requirement for Touch
Line to actively monitor posts on Kick Off for
defamatory material.78 The judge found, howev-
er, that freedom of speech on the Internet would
be significantly curtailed if the hosts of discussion
boards were required to self-regulate material
posted on their sites.79 What makes this ruling
interesting is that 1) it upheld the principle of lim-
ited liability for content hosts under a system of
takedown notices similar to the U.S. Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) for defamatory,
copyright infringing, and illegal material, as insti-
tuted by the Electronic Communications and
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Transactions Act 2002,80 and 2) it established an
Australia-like jurisdictional rule for Internet
defamation cases in which publication occurs
where the material is experienced.81 Even though
the material was hosted by an ISP in Cape Town,
the case was held in the Johannesburg High
Court.82
One incidence of Internet filtering found in
the region was based on defamation in the lead-
up to the Ugandan presidential and parliamen-
tary elections on February 23, 2006. On February
16, the government ordered all of the country’s
ISPs to block the Web site of Radio Katwe, where
a user had posted criticism of President
Museveni. In addition, on February 18, the gov-
ernment ordered a temporary block on The
Monitor, an independent daily, though the exact
reasoning for the block is unknown. The ISPs
complied in both cases, making the sites inac-
cessible.83
In Senegal the French national Christian
Costeaux in 2004 was sentenced in absentia to a
year in prison and fined 600 million CFA francs
(USD1.2 million)84 for posting an allegedly
defamatory article on his tourism Web site
www.senegalaisement.com from the Senegalese
newspaper Walfadjiri that accused aides of the
mayor of Ziguinchor of embezzling more than
100 million CFA francs (USD200,000). The site,
however, was never blocked.85
Finally, in Zimbabwe the government has
been cracking down on criminal defamation and
insult transmitted by e-mail. In 2005 authorities
arrested forty people in a raid on a local Internet
café because an e-mail insulting President
Robert Mugabe was allegedly sent from the 
location.86
Overall only a small number of countries in
the region have begun to apply defamation and
insult laws to the Internet. However, as the
Internet spreads across the region, there is no
reason to doubt that an increasing number of
countries will also come to apply their laws to the
Internet, as has occurred in the rest of the world.
Political opposition
Though one could imagine other countries in the
region doing the same, Ethiopia is so far the only
country in sub-Saharan Africa to actively engage
in political Internet filtering. ONI research has
found that Ethiopia focuses its filtering primarily
on political bloggers with oppositional views by
blocking two major blog services, blogspot.com
and nazret.com. This blanket ban of these blog-
ging domains results in extraordinary overblock-
ing, filtering thousands of Weblogs that have no
relevance to politics or Ethiopia. In addition, the
government blocks Web sites of opposition par-
ties, sites representing ethnic minorities, sites for
independent news organizations, and sites pro-
moting human rights in Ethiopia.87
Ethiopia’s Internet penetration rate of 0.2
percent88 is the lowest rate of any country that
ONI has identified as implementing an active
Internet filtration regime. Other countries such as
Zimbabwe, which have higher rates of Internet
usage and similarly repressive regimes, filter nei-
ther political nor any other content. One possible
explanation is location. Ethiopia’s proximity to the
heavily filtering Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region may influence its decision making
on the subject. Whatever the reason, it is striking
that a country with such a small population of
Internet users would choose to implement an
Internet content filtration regime.
As the Internet spreads, there is likely to be
a convergence between the regulation of tradi-
tional media and the Internet, with countries in
the region enacting restrictions on political con-
tent online, as they already do offline. This may
well take the form of Internet filtration, as it has in
many of the other countries which ONI has stud-
ied.
Security
Despite limited Internet access in the region, a
number of countries have implemented Internet
security policies to increase communication
interception abilities and curb illegal online 
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activities. In South Africa, parliament passed the
Regulation of Interception of Communications
and Provisions of Communication-Related
Information Act 2002, which requires ISPs to
retain data from customers for an as-yet undeter-
mined period of time and makes any Internet sys-
tem that is unable to be monitored illegal.89 In
addition, the Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act 2002 created a legion of cyber
inspectors whose job it is to, as Privacy
International describes, “inspect and confiscate
computers, determine whether individuals have
met the relevant registration provisions as well as
search the Internet for evidence of ‘criminal
actions.’”90
Zimbabwe’s government, on the other hand,
has been fighting for years with its High Court for
wider powers to monitor and intercept e-mails.
As of publication, the court has successfully lim-
ited the legal ability of the government to perform
these tasks.91 The raid, mentioned earlier, on a
cybercafé in 2005, however, shows that the gov-
ernment appears to be achieving its ends
despite these limitations. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment has recently stepped up its surveillance
of Internet activity by placing plain clothes agents
in cybercafés.92
Nigeria has a relatively well developed
Internet security regulatory system in place
involving agencies such as the Nigerian
Cybercrime Working Group.93 As mentioned ear-
lier, Nigeria is currently considering the Computer
Security and Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection Bill 2005, which contains provisions to
combat cyberterrorism and to allow the govern-
ment to request that ISPs hold information about
users without due process.94 Additionally, the
Nigerian Communications Act 2003 contains
vaguely worded “information-gathering powers”
in the name of security.95
Under the Telecommunications Act 2005 in
Ghana, ISPs can be instructed under court order
to intercept communications transmitted online
and gather all information they can about users.96
In special cases, the president can grant author-
ization, avoiding the need to obtain a court
order.97 Clauses 20–24 of the Computer and
Computer Related Crimes Act 2005 also delin-
eate specific data retention and Internet commu-
nication interception rules for criminal investiga-
tions.98
In addition to those countries that have
already adopted Internet security measures, a
handful of countries are formulating strategies to
address this issue. Malawi’s ICT4D policy, for
example, calls for the government to “formulate
and enforce laws and regulations that combat
cyber crimes; institute mechanisms and laws to
curb vandalism and theft of ICT infrastructure;
and enact a law to validate digital signatures on
documents in relation to the technology on the
market today.”99 Botswana, as another example,
has acknowledged in its ICT Policy that it lacks
“comprehensive legislation in Botswana to deal
with data crimes, such as interceptions, modifi-
cation, data theft, or trafficking in digital signa-
tures or domain names” and has called for 
further investigation into these topics.100
As Internet usage develops in Africa, regula-
tions to ensure increased Internet security will be
enacted to address cybercrime and the rights
and responsibilities of government investigators,
including such topics as investigation powers,
surveillance, and data retention laws. Even with
limited Internet penetration, a number of coun-
tries have already taken or are currently taking
significant steps to secure the Internet. The intru-
siveness of these measures will likely vary by the
repressiveness of the government in question. If
South Africa’s relatively draconian policies are
any indication, however, these security measures
are likely to be highly invasive.
Copyright
Copyright protection is generally well established
in law in sub-Saharan Africa, covering materials
such as written works, music, and videos.
Exceptions for “fair use” are also commonplace.
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Kenya’s Copyright Act 2001, for example, pro-
tects “literary works, musical works, artistic
works, audio-visual works, sound recordings and
broadcasts,”101 and establishes exceptions to
the rights of copyright holders.102 Even with this
legal structure, however, DVD and software pira-
cy is rampant in the region. Sixty percent of all
DVDs sold in South Africa and 81 percent of all
software in use in Africa is pirated.103 Few coun-
tries have established policies to apply their
copyright laws to the Internet.
International pressure is a growing factor in
the application and enforcement of copyright
laws, particularly in cyberspace; the World
Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO)
“Internet treaties” are intended to compel coun-
tries to apply copyright protections to the
Internet. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) obli-
gates countries to protect traditional works, and
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(WPPT) obligates countries to protect producers
and performers of sound recorders. WIPO
explains that “the treaties thus clarify, first, that
the traditional right of reproduction continues to
apply in the digital environment, including to the
storage of material in digital form in an electronic
medium. Second, they clarify that the owners of
rights can control whether and how their cre-
ations are made available online to individual
consumers at a time and a place chosen by the
consumer, e.g., at home via the Internet.”104 Only
thirteen—including South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria,
and Botswana—of the forty-eight sub-Saharan
countries included in this overview (but not
including Sudan) are parties to these treaties. As
a result, there is only moderate international obli-
gation imposed on the region to protect copy-
right over the Internet.
There has been even less action on the
related issue of ISP liability, both in general and
for copyright infringement specifically. Only South
Africa has done anything on the matter. As men-
tioned earlier, the Electronic Communications
and Transactions Act 2002 establishes blanket
liability limitation for South African ISPs through a
notice and takedown system similar to that in the
DMCA.105 Botswana, however, has also recog-
nized the need to address this issue in its ICT
Policy, in which the writers directly point out the
lack of any “appropriate legislative limitation on
the liability of Internet Service Providers” and call
for the government to “examine the liability of
third parties, including Internet Service
Providers.” 106
On the whole, online copyright protection in
sub-Saharan Africa is still in an embryonic state.
As with defamation, however, there does not
seem to be any reason that copyright laws will
not be applied to the Internet on a widespread
basis as the Internet expands. It is unclear, how-
ever, what balance will be struck over ISP liability.
The one example in the region, South Africa,
points to the development of systems with blan-
ket liability, but other models may yet emerge.
VoIP
The introduction of voice over Internet protocol
(VoIP) represents a major challenge to sub-
Saharan governments with the stiff competition it
presents to the incumbent telecommunications
companies by offering significantly cheaper call-
ing rates.107 This challenge has elicited a number
of responses. Most countries, such as Botswana,
Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia,108 and Malawi, do not
allow ISPs to provide VoIP.109 Only seven sub-
Saharan countries—Kenya, Mauritius, Somalia,
South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda110—actually
allow it. In yet other countries, the policy is less
clear. Though Zimbabwe technically allows VoIP,
the regulatory agency Potraz has not yet promul-
gated regulations on the issuance of the particu-
lar license that would allow a company to provide
VoIP services.111 In Ghana, while no laws specif-
ically make VoIP illegal, the government chose to
protect a duopoly (of Ghana Telecom and
Westel) over the international voice gateways by
having the National Communications Authority
shut down ISPs that offered VOIP services.112
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Although this duopoly was supposed to end in
2002, in 2003 there were still reports of the
national phone company “turning off the lines of
those suspected of” using VoIP.113
Conclusion
It is striking that a region with such high levels of
speech and media restrictions would have only
two countries that have engaged in Internet con-
tent filtration. The explanation lies partially in the
low Internet penetration rates in sub-Saharan
Africa; filtration strategies are likely judged to be
too expensive, given the limited impact of Internet
on access to information. Even if content restric-
tions were seen to be desirable, there are not
enough people online to warrant the expense.
Moreover, the governments most likely to institute
filtering lack the technical, administrative, and
financial resources necessary for implementation
(Zimbabwe, for example, fits this mold). However,
as the Internet spreads, the balance of costs to
benefits may shift, yielding a situation in which a
growing number of countries in the region active-
ly filter the Internet. This is by no means
inevitable, however. As we see in the experiences
of countries around the world, there are no easy
answers to the dilemmas that arise with the
spread of the Internet—along with its potential as
an engine for human and economic develop-
ment, the Internet is profoundly disruptive, both
socially and politically. Filtering is a likely
response, but one fraught with many challenges.
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Though neither the United States nor Canada
practices widespread technical Internet filtering
at the state level, the Internet is far from “unregu-
lated” in either state.1 Internet content restrictions
take the form of extensive legal regulation, as well
as technical regulation of content in specific con-
texts, such as libraries and schools in the United
States. The pressure to regulate specific content
online has been expressed in concerns related to
four problems: child-protection and morality,
national security, intellectual property, and com-
puter security. In the name of “protecting the chil-
dren,” the United States has moved to step up
enforcement of child pornography legislation and
to pass new legislation that would restrict chil-
dren’s access to material deemed “harmful.”
Legislators invoke national security in calls to
make Internet connections more traceable and
easier to tap. Copyright holders have had the
most success in this regard by pressing their
claims that Internet intermediaries should bear
more responsibility—and more liability—than
they have in the past. Those concerned about
computer security issues, such as badware and
spam, have also prompted certain regulations of
the flow of Internet content. In addition, in
Canada, although not in the United States, pub-
lishing of hate speech is restricted.
Debate on each of these restrictions is heat-
ed. Public dialogue, legislative debate, and judi-
cial review have resulted in different filtering
strategies in the United States and Canada than
those described elsewhere in this volume. In the
United States, many government-mandated
attempts to regulate content have been barred
on First Amendment grounds. In the wake of
these restrictions, though, fertile ground has
been left for private-sector initiatives. The govern-
ment has been able to exert pressure indirectly
where it cannot directly censor. In Canada, the
focus has been on government-facilitated indus-
try self-regulation. With the exception of child
pornography, Canadian and U.S. content restric-
tions tend to rely more on the removal of content
than blocking; most often these controls rely
upon the involvement of private parties, backed
by state encouragement or the threat of legal
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action.2 In contrast to those regimes where the
state mandates Internet service provider (ISP)
action through legal or technical control, most
content-regulatory urges in both the United
States and Canada are directed through private
action.
With only 5.1 percent of the world’s popula-
tion, the United States and Canada are home to
21.1 percent of the world’s Internet users.
Together their Internet penetration rate is 69.4
percent.3 Canada and the United States, howev-
er, have not kept pace with many other countries
in expanding broadband access, slipping in the
global ranking of Internet broadband penetration
rates to 11th and 16th, respectively, in 2006.4
These high rates of Internet usage bring with
them the ability of citizens to express dissenting
points of view, as well as to engage in a large
number of other activities (such as accessing
pornography) that test a society’s dedication to
free expression and privacy. Like the states that
actively filter the Internet through technical
means, Canada and the United States are not
immune from the ongoing challenges that these
tests pose.
Regulating and filtering obscene and
explicit content
It is a truism (i.e., repeated without necessarily
being true) that pornographers are the first to
embrace every new technology. The first sus-
tained battle over content filtering in the United
States broke out over sexually explicit material,
particularly because of the perception that it is
easily accessible and the fear that it can do harm
to minors who access it online.
Canada has tended to act conservatively in
response to online obscenity, while legislators in
the United States have pursued broader defini-
tions of offenses and mandates on Internet filter-
ing. In its response to online sexually explicit
material, Canada has made only de minimis
amendments to pre-existing law.5 Legislators
have simply revised existing obscenity provisions
to encompass online offenses. For example, the
passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of
20016 established online acts of distributing and
accessing child pornography and luring a child
as crimes.7 The Criminal Code mandates a sys-
tem for judicial review of material (including
online material) alleged to be child pornography.
It does not, however, require ISPs to judge the
legality of content posted on their servers or to
take corrective action prior to a judicial determi-
nation.8 If a judge determines that the material in
question is illegal, ISPs may be required to take it
down and to give information to the court to help
in the identification and location of the person
who posted it.9
Many Canadian ISPs, however, have begun
to filter content hosted outside of Canada despite
regulatory uncertainty in the area. For three days
in July 2005, the Canadian ISP Telus blocked
access to a Web site run by members of 
the Telecommunication Workers Union during a
labor dispute containing what Telus argued was
proprietary information and photographs that
threatened the security and privacy of its employ-
ees.10 This unilateral action by Telus broke the
“cardinal rule” of Canadian ISPs—that they pass
on any and all information without regard for con-
tent in exchange for immunity from liability over
content. This action also conflicted with Section
36 of the Canadian Telecommunications Act,
which states that, without the approval of the
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunica-
tions Commission (CRTC), a “Canadian carrier
shall not control the content or influence the
meaning or purpose of telecommunications car-
ried by it for the public.”11 Telus, however, argued
that content filtering is permitted in the contract it
holds with its subscribers, although, to the detri-
ment of their argument, the blocking affected the
customers of other ISPs that connect via Telus.
The matter was resolved when, though the site
was hosted in the United States,12 Telus was able
to obtain court orders from Alberta and British
Columbia requiring the Web site operator, who
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lives and works in Canada, to remove the offend-
ing materials.13
In August 2006 the Canadian human rights
lawyer Richard Warman filed an application with
the CRTC to authorize Canadian ISPs to block
access to two hate speech sites hosted outside
of Canada.14 The CRTC denied the application,
but the decision recognized that, although the
CRTC cannot require Canadian ISP’s to block
content it, can authorize them to do. However, the
CRTC noted that the “scope of this power has yet
to be explored.”15
In November 2006 Canada’s largest ISPs
launched Project Cleanfeed Canada in partner-
ship with www.cybertip.ca, the nation’s child sex-
ual exploitation tipline. The project, modeled after
a similar initiative in the United Kingdom, is
intended to protect ISP customers “from inadver-
tently visiting foreign web sites that contain
images of children being sexually abused and
that are beyond the jurisdiction of Canadian legal
authorities.”16 Acting on complaints from
Canadians about images found online,
www.cybertip.ca analysts assess the reported
information and forward potentially illegal materi-
al to the appropriate foreign jurisdiction. If a URL
is approved for blocking by two analysts, it may
be added to the Cleanfeed Canada distribution
list. Each of the participating ISPs voluntarily
blocks this list without knowledge of the sites it
contains, precluding ISP involvement in the eval-
uation of URLs. Blocked sites fail to load, but
attempts to access them are not monitored and
users are not tracked.17
Since Cleanfeed Canada is a voluntary pro-
gram, the blocking mechanism is up to the dis-
cretion of the ISPs. Sasktel, Bell Canada, and
Telus all claim to block only specific URLs, not IP
addresses, in an attempt to avoid overblocking.18
Besides the significant public outcry that would
most likely result, overblocking may itself be ille-
gal under the Telecommunications Act men-
tioned above.
Because accessing child pornography—as
well as making it accessible—is unlawful in
Canada, the filtering of such content does not
infringe on rights of access or speech afforded
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Moreover, because ISP participation
in Project Cleanfeed is voluntary, the blocking of
sites through the project cannot be said to be
state sponsored. However, the project remains
controversial for other reasons. First, Cleanfeed
Canada has not yet sought or received authori-
zation from the CRTC. Second, the blacklist
maintained by www.cybertip.ca remains secret,
though necessarily, as publishing a “directory” of
child pornography would itself be illegal. This
lack of transparency inevitably generates distrust
of the list and the process by which it is com-
piled. Third, the procedure for appealing the
blocking of a site may have implications for
anonymity.19 A content owner or ISP customer
may complain to the ISP or directly to www.cyber
tip.ca, which will reassess the site and, if neces-
sary, obtain an independent and binding judg-
ment from the National Child Exploitation
Coordination Centre. It is unclear whether 
this process might expose the complainant’s
identity and create the potential for abuse of that
individual’s rights by the ISP or perhaps even by
authorities.
Canada’s response to online obscenity and
its collaborative filtering initiative look restrained
by contrast to the more vigorous regulatory
efforts of the United States.
The United States Congress passed the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) as part of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Signed into
law by President Clinton in February 1996, the
CDA criminalized the transmission of “indecent”
material to persons under eighteen and the dis-
play to minors of “patently offensive” content and
communications.20 The CDA took aim at both the
speakers and service providers of indecent
material, although it offered them each safe 
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harbor if they imposed technical barriers to
minors’ access.
Even before it took effect, the CDA was chal-
lenged in federal court by a group of civil liberties
and public interest organizations and publishers
who argued their speech would be chilled by fear
of the CDA’s enforcement. The three-judge dis-
trict court panel concluded that the terms “inde-
cent” and “patently offensive” were so vague that
enforcement of either prohibition would violate
the First Amendment.21 “As the most participato-
ry form of mass speech yet developed,” Judge
Dalzell wrote in a concurring opinion, “the
Internet deserves the highest protection from
governmental intrusion.”22 The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed this holding in 1997, invalidating
the CDA’s “indecency” and “patently offensive”
content prohibitions.23 In the landmark case
Reno v. ACLU, the Court held that CDA was not
the “least restrictive alternative” by which to pro-
tect children from harm. Rather, parent-imposed
filtering could effectively block children’s access
to indecent material without preventing adults
from speaking and receiving this lawful speech.24
U.S. lawmakers responded to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU by enacting the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA)—a second
attempt at speaker-based content regulation. In
COPA, the Congress directed its regulation at
commercial distributors of materials “harmful to
minors.”25 The slightly narrower focus of COPA,
nicknamed “son of CDA,” did not solve the
Constitutional problems that doomed the CDA.
The district court enjoined COPA on First
Amendment grounds.26 As this volume went to
press, the district court had just struck down
COPA, finding it void for vagueness and not nar-
rowly tailored to the government’s interest in pro-
tecting minors. Once again, the court held that
criminal liability for speakers and service
providers was not the “least restrictive means” to
accomplish the government’s purpose because
the private use of filtering technologies could
more effectively keep harmful materials from chil-
dren.
Plaintiffs successfully argued that CDA and
COPA would chill the provision and transmission
of lawful Internet content in the United States.
Faced with the impossible task of accurately
identifying “indecent” material and preemptively
blocking its diffusion, ISPs would have been
prompted to filter arbitrarily and extensively in
order to avoid threatened criminal liability, while
writers and publishers felt compelled to self-cen-
sor.
Stymied at restricting the publication of
explicit material, Congressional leaders changed
their focus to the recipient end of the equation.
The Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) of
2000 forced public schools and libraries to use
Internet filtering technology as a condition of
receiving federal E-Rate funding. A school or
library seeking to receive or retain federal funds
for Internet access must certify to the FCC that it
has installed or will install technology that filters
or blocks material deemed to be obscene, child
pornography, or material “harmful to minors.”27
The Supreme Court rejected First Amendment
challenges to CIPA, holding that speakers had no
right of access to libraries and that patrons could
request unblocking.28 In response, some libraries
and schools have rejected E-Rate funding, but
most have felt financially compelled to install the
filters.
The aftermath of CDA, COPA, and CIPA has
left the business of Internet filtering largely to pri-
vate manufacturers competing for market share.
Schools, businesses, parents, and other parties
wishing to (or compelled to) block access to cer-
tain content have a broad range of competing
software packages available to them. Some pro-
grams permit access only to whitelists of pre-
approved sites, but most services generate
blacklists of blocked sites through automated
screenings of the Web and, in some cases, real-
time monitoring. Whatever their configuration,
these products and the content they permit and
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restrict reflect different normative choices about
the subjects targeted for filtering. Indeed, it is
developers first, and users second, who deter-
mine what gets filtered when such software is
implemented.
Although CIPA mandates the presence of fil-
tering technology in schools and libraries receiv-
ing subsidized Internet access, it effectively dele-
gates blocking discretion to the developers and
operators of that technology. The criteria
“obscene,” “child pornography,” and “harmful to
minors” are defined by CIPA and other existing
legislation, but strict adherence to these (vague)
legal definitions is beyond the capacity of filters
and inherently subject to the normative and tech-
nological choices made during the software
design process. Moreover, while CIPA permits
the disabling of filters for adults and, in some
instances, minors “for bona fide research or
other lawful purposes,”29 it entrusts school and
library administrators with deactivating the filters,
giving them considerable power over access to
online content. Once FCC certification require-
ments have been met, it is these individuals who
shoulder the burden of ensuring access to con-
stitutionally protected material.30
In the single known U.S. attempt to install 
filtering deeper into the network, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 2004 author-
ized the state attorney general (AG)’s office to
force ISPs to block Pennsylvania residents’
access to sites the AG’s office identified as child
pornography. A district court struck this regula-
tion down on First Amendment grounds of over-
breadth because the filters’ imprecision blocked
substantial lawful speech unrelated to child
pornography.31 Since both possession and distri-
bution of child pornography are criminal in the
United States, service providers do respond to
requests to remove it from their networks and
report it to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children when they encounter it.
Defamation
As in other national contexts, the potential for
legal liability for other civil violations, including
defamation and copyright, constrains the pub-
lishers of Internet content and certain service
providers in the United States and Canada.
These pressures can have a “chilling effect” on
lawful online content and conduct and can
threaten the anonymity of users. The content and
court adjudication of such laws is “state action,”
even when the lawsuits and threats are brought
by private individuals or entities.
At common law, one crucial factor in deter-
mining liability for defamation is the provider’s
relation to the content—whether the provider
functioned as a carrier, distributor, or publisher of
the defamatory content. In the United States the
common law has been overridden by a federal
statute, a holdover portion of the CDA, 47 U.S.C.
230. A key part of the CDA survived judicial
scrutiny. Section 230 immunizes ISPs for their
users’ defamation: “No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information pro-
vided by another information content provider.”32
Moreover, the First Amendment shields speakers
from liability for much speech about public fig-
ures. In Canada ISPs must still find their fit within
the traditional categories, where they can escape
liability if they are carriers or distributors, trans-
mitting data without discrimination, preference,
or regard for content, or may face liability as pub-
lishers if they exercise editorial control over mate-
rial. Thus, while Canadian and U.S. service
providers share the right to remove content vol-
untarily, those in Canada do not have the broad
discretion or protection enjoyed by those in the
United States, and may be compelled to take
down allegedly defamatory content (e.g., post-
ings to message boards) under threat of suit.
Copyright
U.S. copyright law has also evolved more quick-
ly—perhaps even hastily—than Canadian law in
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addressing the issue of service provider liability
and in encouraging removal of infringing materi-
al. The “Online Copyright Limitations of Liability
Act,” a part of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) of 1998,33 gives service providers a
“safe harbor” from liability for their users’ copy-
right infringements provided they implement
copyright policies and a notice-and-takedown
regime. Where a service provider unknowingly
transmits, caches, retains, or furnishes a link to
infringing material by means of an automatic
technical process, it is protected from monetary
liability so long as it promptly removes or blocks
access to the material upon notice of a claimed
infringement.34 (The ISPs’ CDA 230 immunity dis-
cussed above applies primarily in the context of
defamation matters and explicitly excludes intel-
lectual property offenses.)
The notice-and-takedown provision has
been seen as giving copyright owners—poten-
tially anyone who has fixed an “original work of
authorship”—unwarranted leverage over service
providers and their subscribers. When a provider
is notified of an alleged infringement, risk aver-
sion encourages it to remove or disable access
to the specified material, probably without first
informing the subscriber. The subscriber may file
a counter-notice and have the content restored if
the copyright owner does not file a claim in
court,35 but such challenges are rare.
Subscribers, like the providers hosting their Web
sites, are more likely to concede to takedown
pressures, even when an infringement may not
actually be occurring. If a subscriber is sued, his
or her identity may be subpoenaed, as in cases
of defamation, and with similarly little judicial
scrutiny.36 Major search engines such as Google
comply with hundreds of removal requests a
month, when it is not even clear that provision of
a hyperlink would incur copyright liability.37
As Canada began to consider amending its
copyright laws, it appeared to be following in the
footsteps of the United States. In 2004, the
House of Commons Standing Committee on
Canadian Heritage re-tabled its Interim Report on
Copyright Reform, which proposed a notice-and-
takedown policy similar to that of the DMCA,
under which Canadian service providers would
be compelled to remove content immediately
upon receiving notice of an alleged infringement
from a professed copyright holder. The Report
came under fire from the Canadian Internet Policy
and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC), Digital
Copyright Canada, and the Public Interest
Advocacy Centre (PIAC); numerous petitions and
critiques have followed, calling for balance
between the rights of content creators and fair
public use. The government seems to be
responding to these inputs as it continues to con-
sider changes to copyright legislation.38
In the midst of this period of copyright
uncertainty, Canadian ISPs have implemented a
notice-and-notice policy for handling copyright
infringement. Originally proposed in the now-
defunct Bill C-60, which was dropped from the
legislative agenda in 2005 with the collapse of
the Liberal government,39 the policy allows copy-
right owners to send notices to ISPs regarding
possible copyright infringement by subscribers.
The ISPs then forward the notices to their sub-
scribers requesting them to desist in their illegal
activities.40 Even though the notices do not mean
that immediate legal action will follow if infringing
activities do not cease, they have been success-
ful in getting significant portions of infringing sub-
scribers to remove their materials.41
At present, however, protections against
defamation and copyright infringement afforded
under U.S. and Canadian law remain in tension
with the rights of service providers and Internet
users, often giving rise to the censoring and self-
censoring of material. Canadian service
providers erring on the side of caution may
remove content from subscribers’ sites, as U.S.
providers do when informed of alleged copyright
violations. User material is therefore subject to
censorship based on unsubstantiated claims.
Moreover, because subpoenas offer plaintiffs an
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avenue for ascertaining subscribers’ identities
without scrutiny, the potential for misuse of these
subpoenas can instill a fear of improper discov-
ery in subscribers that leads to self-censorship.
These chilling effects have been well document-
ed,42 and while they are indirect rather than direct
state-mandated filtering, they do constitute real
censorship of online speech.43
National security, computer security
Security concerns drive many of the state-man-
dated limitations on the speech and privacy inter-
ests of citizens. These security concerns in the
United States and Canada take two forms:
national security and computer security.
Concerns related to national security have
led more to online surveillance by the state than
to content filtering. The Bush Administration’s
warrantless wiretaps are reported to have includ-
ed taps on major Internet interconnect points and
data-mining of Internet communications.44
Tapping these interconnect points would give the
government the ability to intercept all overseas
and many domestic communications. At press
time, the U.S. government has moved to dismiss
lawsuits filed against it and against AT&T by
asserting the state secrets privilege; district
courts in California and Michigan have refused to
dismiss the lawsuits. If the allegations prove to be
true, they show that the United States maintains
the world’s most sophisticated Internet surveil-
lance regime. The Bush Administration is push-
ing to expand the Communications Assistance to
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) to force providers
to give law enforcement wiretap access to elec-
tronic communications networks. Attorney
General Gonzales has called for data retention
laws to force ISPs to keep and potentially pro-
duce data that could link Internet subscribers to
their otherwise-anonymous communications.45
Canadian electronic surveillance, primarily
undertaken by the National Defense’s secretive
Communications Security Establishment (CSE),
operates in close cooperation with U.S. and other
allied intelligence networks. Although bound by
Canadian laws and prohibited from eavesdrop-
ping on solely domestic Canadian communica-
tions without explicit ministerial approval, the
CSE’s activities are highly secret and oversight is
minimal.
Computer security has led to certain content
restrictions in the United States and Canada.
Concerns about unwanted messages reaching
computers, in various flavors of spam, have
prompted content-based restrictions such as the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 in the United States. In
Canada a National Task Force on Spam was con-
vened in 2005 to study the spam problem. While
some laws, such as the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, were
found to at least tangentially apply to spam, the
Task Force found a need for legislation directly
limiting spam, which has yet to be passed.46 The
U.S. Congress has considered a range of options
for limiting the free flow of bits across the Internet
to address the problem of bad applications
infecting computers, though most of the efforts to
filter information based upon content deemed to
be a computing security risk are carried out by
private firms or individuals on a voluntary basis.47
Calls are also being made to consider ISP liabili-
ty in order to contain the worst of “zombie” com-
puters sending spam and distributing badware,
in the interest of preserving network safety for
other connected PCs. In sum, there is still an
active, ongoing discussion about how and why
regulation of the flow of obviously malicious code
over the Internet might take place.48
Conclusion
Although the United States and Canadian
Internet are often thought to be relatively free
from technical Internet filtering, Internet activity is
far from “unregulated.” With respect to online
surveillance, the United States may be among
the most aggressive states in the world in terms
of monitoring online conversations. Lawmakers
in both countries have imposed Internet-specific
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regulation that can limit their citizens’ access and
view of the Internet. In addition, they have
empowered private individuals and companies to
press Internet intermediaries for content removal
or to carry out the filtering in the middle of the net-
work. Although the laws are subject to legislative
and judicial debate, these private actions may be
less transparent. Governments in both countries,
however, have experienced significant resistance
to their content restriction policies and, as a
result, the extreme measures found in some of
the more repressive countries of the world have
not gained ground in North America.
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The country summaries that follow offer a 
synopsis of the findings and conclusions of
OpenNet Initiative (ONI) research into each of the
countries. The summaries also provide a basic
framework for considering the factors influencing
countries’ decision to filter or abstain from filter-
ing the Internet, as well as the impact, relevance,
and efficacy of technical filtering in a broader
context of Internet censorship.
These summaries cover the countries where
ONI conducted both testing and analysis in 2006.
As noted in chapter 1, countries selected for in-
depth analysis are those in which it was believed
that there was the most to learn about the extent
and processes of Internet filtering. Many coun-
tries known to filter the Internet, including many in
Europe and North America, were not subject 
to testing because their practices are well docu-
mented elsewhere. ONI plans to conduct 
in-depth analysis on an expanded number of
countries in future years.
Each country summary includes the sum-
mary results of the empirical testing for filtering.
The technical filtering data alone, however, do not
amount to a complete picture of Internet censor-
ship and content regulation. A wide range of poli-
cies relating to media, speech, and expression
also act to restrict expression on the Internet and
online community formation, as discussed in
chapter 2. Legal and regulatory frameworks,
including Internet law, the state of Internet access
and infrastructure, the level of economic devel-
opment, and the quality of governance institu-
tions are central to determining which countries
resort to filtering and how they choose to imple-
ment Internet content controls. Therefore a brief
overview of each of these factors is included in
the each of the country summaries. Together,
these sections are intended to offer a concise,
accurate, and unbiased overview of Internet filter-
ing and content regulation.
As described in chapter 1, each country is
given a score on a five-point scale presented in
the Results-at-a-Glance box. The scores reflect
the observed level of filtering in each of four
themes:
• Political: This category is focused primarily
on Web sites that express views in opposi-
tion to those of the current government.
Content more broadly related to human
rights, freedom of expression, minority
rights, and religious movements is also 
considered here.
• Social: This group covers material related to
sexuality, gambling, and illegal drugs and
alcohol, as well as other topics that may be
socially sensitive or perceived as offensive.
• Conflict/security: Content related to armed
conflicts, border disputes, separatist move-
ments, and militant groups is included in
this category. 
• Internet tools: Web sites that provide 
e-mail, Internet hosting, search, translation,
Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) tele-
phone service, and circumvention methods
are grouped in this category.
The relative magnitude of filtering for each of the
four themes is defined as follows:
• Pervasive filtering: Filtering that is charac-
terized by both its depth—a blocking regime
that blocks a large portion of the targeted
content in a given category—and its breadth
—a blocking regime that includes filtering in
several categories in a given theme.
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• Substantial filtering: Filtering that has
either depth or breadth: either a number of
categories are subject to a medium level of
filtering or a low level of filtering is carried out
across many categories.
• Selective filtering: Narrowly targeted filter-
ing that blocks a small number of specific
sites across a few categories or filtering that
targets a single category or issue.
• Suspected filtering: Connectivity abnor-
malities are present that suggest the pres-
ence of filtering, although diagnostic work
was unable to confirm conclusively that
inaccessible Web sites are the result of
deliberate tampering.
• No evidence of filtering: ONI testing did
not uncover any evidence of Web sites
being blocked.
The Results-at-a-Glance box also includes a
measure (low, medium, or high) of the observed
transparency and consistency of blocking 
patterns. The transparency score given to each
country is a qualitative measure based on the
level to which the country openly engages in 
filtering. In cases where filtering takes place 
without open acknowledgment, or where the
practice of filtering is actively disguised to appear
as network errors, the transparency score is low.
In assigning the transparency score, we have
also considered the presence of provisions to
appeal or report instances of inappropriate
blocking. Consistency measures the variation in
filtering within a country across different ISPs—in
some cases the availability of specific Web
pages differs significantly depending on the ISP
one uses to connect to the Internet.
An aggregate view of the level of develop-
ment for each country is represented by the
results of the first four indexes presented in the
Key Indicators box: gross domestic product per
capita, life expectancy, literacy rates, and the
human development index. The first three meas-
ures are drawn from the World Bank develop-
ment indicators dataset. The GDP measure 
is expressed in terms of purchasing power parity
in constant 2000 international dollars, which 
captures the ability to purchase a standard bas-
ket of consumer goods. Life expectancy can be
seen as a proxy for general health, and literacy
an imperfect but reasonable indication of the
quality of education. The human development
index is constructed by the United Nations
Development Programme to reflect overall
human well-being.
Governance is widely recognized to be a
key determinant of economic success and
human welfare. We therefore also include two
measures of governance: rule of law and voice
and accountability. These indexes are defined
and compiled by researchers at the World Bank
using an aggregation of the best available data.
The authors of the indexes define them in the 
following way: 
• Rule of Law includes several indicators which
measure the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of soci-
ety. These include perceptions of the inci-
dence of crime, the effectiveness and pre-
dictability of the judiciary, and the enforce-
ability of contracts.
• Voice and Accountability includes in it a num-
ber of indicators measuring various aspects
of the political process, civil liberties, politi-
cal and human rights, measuring the extent
to which citizens of a country are able to
participate in the selection of governments.
There are a number of similar indicators
available that are presented as comparative
measures of civil liberties, free expression, and
political freedom. We use only those indicators
because they have been developed using what
we believe to be the most rigorous methodology
and without undue bias. Further information is
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available at the World Bank Governance and
Anti-Corruption Web site: www.worldbank.org/
wbi/governance. 
We also include two measures of Internet
accessibility provided by the International
Telecommunication Union: the digital opportunity
index (DOI) and Internet users as a percentage of
the population. The DOI is based on eleven core
ICT indicators that are agreed upon by the
International Telecommunication Union’s Partner-
ship on Measuring ICT for Development. These
are grouped in three clusters by type: opportuni-
ty, infrastructure, and utilization. The DOI there-
fore captures the overall potential for and context
of Internet availability rather than usage alone.
The measure of Internet access, the Internet 
penetration rate, is simply the percentage of the
populace identified as active Internet users.
Internet regulation and filtering practices are
often dynamic processes, subject to frequent
change, though we expect that the political cli-
mate and the aggregate view of the issues
reflected in these summaries will change more
slowly than the specific instances of filtering. 
As the context for content regulation and the
practice of Internet filtering evolve, updates will
be made to the country summaries and new
countries may be added. These updates will be
available at http://www.opennet.net.
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Although the government of Afghanistan, with
the help of international donors and private
sector partners, continues to build an informa-
tion communications technology (ICT) infra-
structure up from its nominal status of only five
years ago, very few Afghans are online. 
The government does not engage in technical
filtering, but it has attempted to regulate media
coverage and control published content.
Background
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has commit-
ted to meeting ambitious goals of achieving gen-
uine security, promoting sustainable economic
and social development, strengthening human
rights, and promoting the rule of law.1 However,
institutions are being rebuilt in a severely chal-
lenged security environment and the gains made
since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 continue to be
at risk. Other forms of media are gaining some
ground (for example, more than thirty independ-
ent community radio stations have been estab-
lished), but journalists continue to be subject to
threats, violence, and intimidation.
Internet in Afghanistan
The Internet is one of many sectors in
Afghanistan in a process of reconstruction from
the dilapidated status it has had since 2001.2 It
was banned by the Taliban in July 2001 because
it was thought to broadcast obscene, immoral,
and anti-Islamic material, and because the few
Internet users at the time could not be easily
monitored, as they obtained their telephone lines
from Pakistan.3
The current government recognizes the
Internet as an important source of growth and
development for the country, believing that ICT
can create opportunities for disadvantaged
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groups and improve the access of the rural poor
to markets.4
However, the struggle to make the Internet
widely available is an arduous one. With a total of
1,200 Internet subscribers and an average of one
Internet user per thousand people for a total of
30,000 estimated users,5 Afghanistan remains
almost completely outside the cybersphere. One
major obstacle is the adult literacy rate, which
stands around 28 percent (as of 2004).6 The liter-
acy rate for women is between 9 and 18 percent,
the lowest in the world;7 ongoing violence and
intimidation threaten primary school education
for girls, and indeed for all children.8
A second barrier to Internet use is its cost,
which is prohibitive for most Afghans.9 In part to
address these concerns, the Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology
(MCIT, formerly the Ministry of Communications)
contracted two Chinese firms, ZPE and Huawei,
to build a digital wireless network in twelve
provinces.10 Internet service providers (ISPs)
often choose wireless networks as well, since the
number of fixed lines is limited. Still, although the
Internet is essentially a luxury of the wealthy,
Afghans are interested in the Internet and all it
offers.11
In 2003 Afghanistan was given legal control
of the “.af” domain, and the Afghanistan Network
Information Center (AFGNIC) was established to
administer domain names. Through a presiden-
tial decree, the MCIT was charged with spinning
off all telecommunications operations and servic-
es to a newly created independent company
called Afghan Telecom.12 Up from five functional
ISPs in 2003, in 2006 Afghanistan supported
twenty-two Internet hosts and seven main ISPs13
and a growing number of Internet cafés and
telekiosks (public access points located in post
offices and at the Kabul airport).14 It plans to con-
nect the country (and neighboring nations) along
major highways with Afghan Telecom’s National
Optical Fibre Backbone project.15
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Freedom of expression is inviolable under the
Afghanistan Constitution, and every Afghan has
the right to print or publish topics without prior
submission to state authorities in accordance
with the law.16 However, the normative limits of
the law are clear: under the Constitution no law
can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of
the sacred religion of Islam.17 Mass media law




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........1,119 3.43
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................42 1.13
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................28 0.00
Human development index (out of 177)..................................nd —
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................205 1.64
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................184 2.44
Digital opportunity index (out of 180) .....................................nd —
Internet users (% of population) ............................................0.1 3.07
Source (by indicator): IMF 2006; WHO 2006; World Bank 2006a, 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2005
nd = no data available
vigorous adherence to this principle. The Media
Law decreed by President Hamid Karzai in
December 2005, just before the national legisla-
ture was formed, included a ban on four broad
content categories: the publication of news con-
trary to Islam and other religions; slanderous or
insulting materials concerning individuals; mat-
ters contrary to the Afghan Constitution or crimi-
nal law; and the exposure of the identities of vic-
tims of violence.18 A draft amendment of the law
circulating in 2006 added four additional pro-
scribed categories: content jeopardizing stability,
national security, and territorial integrity of
Afghanistan; false information that might disrupt
public opinion; promotion of any religion other
than Islam; and “material which might damage
physical well-being, psychological and moral
security of people, especially children and the
youth.”19
The independence of the media was also
brought into question by the March 2004 Media
Law enacted by the transitional government,
which handed the Minister of Culture and
Information important veto powers (e.g., foreign
agencies and international organizations may
print news bulletins only after obtaining permis-
sion from the Minister)20 and leadership of a
Media Evaluation Commission that reviews
appeals of rejections of publishing licenses by
the Ministry of Information and Culture.21 The
proposed amendment to the Media Law in late
2006 would dissolve the Media Evaluation
Commission and two other regulatory bodies, the
National Commission of Radio and Television
Broadcast, and an investigation commission that
reviewed complaints against journalists and
decided which cases should be forwarded to
courts for prosecution.22
With the approval of the Telecommuni-
cations Services Regulation Act in 2005 (Telecom
Law), an independent regulatory agency called
the Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority
(TRA) was created out of the merger of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Board and the
State Radio Inspection Department (SRID) under
the Ministry of Communications.23 The TRA
assumed responsibility for telecommunications
licensing as well as promoting sustainable com-
petition for all telecommunications services.
Licensing requirements are straightforward:
companies must abide by the law to be licensed
by the TRA, and only those with licenses can sell
telecommunications services.24 Of the two types
of ISP licenses, transit and national licenses, only
transit licenses allow ISPs to establish interna-
tional connectivity.25 Part of the TRA mandate is
to protect users from the abuse of monopoly
market share: companies determined to have
“significant market power” must apply to have an
amended license26 and are subject to additional
penalties for anti-competitive behavior.27 A
license may be revoked if the licensee has bro-
ken the law or has failed to fix repeated breaches
in the agreement, has misleading or false infor-
mation in their application, or does not pay the
fee even after a warning.28
Under the Telecom Law, ISPs are duty-
bound to protect user information and confiden-
tiality.29 However, the TRA is also authorized to
demand the operator or service provider monitor
communications between users as well as
Internet traffic in order to trace “harassing, offen-
sive, or illegal” telecommunications, although
what constitutes these prohibited communica-
tions is not specified.30 Where an issue of nation-
al security or a criminal case is involved, opera-
tors and service providers must hand over the
required information and give the authorities
immediate access to their network.31
In cases where there is no such immediate
need, the TRA still has the right to “relevant infor-
mation” as long as the TRA has given two weeks’
notice.32 In its Acceptable Use Policy, the 
AFGNIC prohibits the use of the “.af” domain to
make any communications to commit a criminal
offense; racially vilify others; violate intellectual
property rights; and distribute, publish, or link 
to pornographic materials that a “reasonable 
242 Country Summaries
person as a member of the community of
Afghanistan would consider to be obscene or
indecent.”33 The ban on spam or junk mail also
includes unsolicited political or religious tracts
along with commercial advertising and other
information.34
On June 12, 2006, the National Directorate
of Security (NDS), Afghanistan’s national intelli-
gence agency, issued a list of broadcasting and
publishing activities that “must be banned” in
light of heightened security problems that could
deteriorate public morale.35 The list of proscribed
press activities was quite extensive and attrib-
uted negative intention,36 causality,37 and morali-
ty38 to reporting on specific issues (primarily ter-
rorism and the Taliban insurgency). President
Hamid Karzai denied these were instructions,
saying they were merely guidelines and a request
for media cooperation.39 Restricted activities
included the publication or broadcasting of exag-
gerated reports against national unity or peace;
decrees, statements and interviews of armed
organizations and terrorist groups; and even the
proscription against news on terrorism serving as
the lead story.40
ONI testing results
ONI testing found no evidence of filtering in
Afghanistan, although testing was not as exten-
sive there as it was in some other countries.
Conclusion
In a country where 40 percent of the rural popu-
lation suffers from low-income food deficit and
life expectancy is less than forty-five years,41 the
Internet and ICT infrastructure represent only one
component of social and economic development
needed for the government to meet the goals set
forth in the Afghanistan Compact. Only about 0.1
percent of Afghans are online. Testing revealed
no evidence of government-led Internet filtering.
However, through legal regulation and other acts
conducted under the color of authority,
Afghanistan may be constraining media cover-
age in ways that violate the international human
rights norms for freedom of expression protected
in its own constitution.
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Although Internet access in Algeria is not
restricted by filtering, the state controls the
Internet infrastructure and regulates content by
other means.1 Internet users and Internet serv-
ice providers (ISPs) can face criminal penalties
for posting or allowing the posting of material
deemed contrary to public order or morality, for
example, and journalists report being subject-
ed to government surveillance.2
Background
Despite democratic advances made since
Algeria held its first contested elections in 2004,3
the government continues to invite criticism from
human rights organizations for repressing dis-
sent. In February 2006, Algeria’s cabinet passed
the so-called emergency law, which restricts free-
dom of assembly and threatens imprisonment for
those who speak out on atrocities that occurred
during the country’s civil war.4 Algerian officials
frequently harass journalists and human rights
advocates under the guise of security through
defamation laws or dubious criminal prosecu-
tions.5 Religious freedom has declined in recent
years as President Bouteflika has pushed
through legislation greatly restricting non-Muslim
worship.6 The government has telecommunica-
tions regulations in place that require Internet
providers to undertake surveillance of Internet
content, but watchdog organizations report that
there have been no cases of censorship under
the regulations thus far.7
Internet in Algeria
Algeria first gained Internet connectivity in 1994
under the auspices of the Center for Research on
Scientific and Technical Information (CERIST),8
which by law remained the country’s sole ISP
until 1998.9 On August 5, 1998, decree no. 98-
257 opened Internet service provision to other
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providers, but private entry into the market pro-
ceeded slowly.10 Two years later, law no. 2000-03
created the Ministry of Post and Telecommuni-
cations (MoPT), which included the Internet reg-
ulatory agency Algérie Télécom.11 Algérie
Télécom launched the ISP Djaweb in 200112 to
extend service beyond universities and research
centers.13 Today, Algérie Télécom lists twenty-six
ISP partners operating in the country, including
CERIST.14 CERIST continues to develop the aca-
demic, noncommercial Internet15 under the influ-
ence of the state16 and has created nodes in
Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Ourgla.17
The MoPT—the government agency respon-
sible for the Internet in Algeria—has expressed its
desire to promote the Internet as a source of
investment and job creation.18 Though Internet
penetration has increased dramatically over the
past few years, jumping from approximately
1,500 in 199919 to nearly 850,000 in 2006,20 this
still represents only 2.6 percent of the population.
The government has supported programs that
allow users to access the Internet on a “pay-as-
you-go” basis, without requiring a monthly sub-
scription.21 Although most ISPs offer broadband,
ADSL, or satellite plans, the prices of these 
services remain prohibitively high for many
Algerians.22 Consequently, most Algerian Internet
users rely on dialup connections and cybercafés
for access.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The establishment of the MoPT in 2000 signaled
the government’s desire to catch up to some 
of its neighbors and develop the economic
potential of the Internet.23 At the same time, the
government has moved to modernize informa-
tion-control infrastructure and legislation, includ-
ing extending criminal penalties for publishing
material “contrary to public order” to Internet
publications.24 All connections between the
Algerian network and the Internet at large pass
through government-controlled content caching
servers, an arrangement that reduces bandwidth
costs but could also facilitate filtering.25
In January 2004 Algeria Telecom announced
a deal with Daewoo to introduce high-speed con-
nections. MoPT acts as an independent regulator
and is not legally obligated to consult with or
inform any other organizations before making
decisions.26 Algeria’s network topology is highly
centralized,27 and all Internet connections pass
through state-controlled content caching servers
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privately owned, but must obtain a license from
the MoPT.29 Approximately fifty companies have
obtained licenses.30
Article 144(b) of the criminal code criminal-
izes “insulting or defaming” the president, parlia-
ment, armed forces, or any other public body, in
writing, drawings or speech, through radio, tele-
vision, electronic, or computer means.31 Article
14 of a 1998 telecommunications decree makes
ISPs responsible for the sites they host, and
requires them to take “all necessary steps to
ensure constant surveillance” of content to pre-
vent access to “material contrary to public order
and morality.”32 Journalists report that it can take
up to two days to receive their e-mails, and con-
sequently suspect the government is spying on
them.33 The regulatory framework is under review
and MoPT had targeted 2005 as the year for lib-
eralization of various sectors of the telecommuni-
cations market.34
ONI testing results
Among the most sensitive topics in Algeria are
criticism of President Bouteflika and the military,35
same-sex relationships,36 and non-Islamic reli-
gious worship.37 Algerians who engage in any of
these activities face serious sanctions, including
stiff fines and imprisonment. Nonetheless, ONI
testing found no evidence that the government
filters Internet sites or activity associated with
these, or any other, sensitive topics. The govern-
ment’s primary forms of control thus appear to be
the access controls and content monitoring reg-
ulations noted above.
Conclusion
Although Algeria does not at present filter Internet
content, legislation that criminalizes peaceful crit-
icism of the government and requires ISPs to
police online content, together with a highly cen-
tralized network, could facilitate the filtering of
online content in the future. 
NOTES
1. Ministre des postes et télécommunications,
“Configuration des services de la plate-forme
Internet des P&T,” http://www.postelecom.dz/
service.htm (accessed January 24, 2007).
2. Reporters Sans Frontières, “Internet under surveil-
lance 2004: Obstacles to the free flow of information
online,” June 22, 2004, http://www.rsf.org/
article.php3?id_article=10730, (accessed January
24, 2007).
3. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 2005: Algeria,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61685.htm.
4. Human Rights Watch, Algeria’s Amnesty Decree,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/04/12/
algeri13169.htm.
5. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 2005: Algeria,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61685.htm;
Human Rights Watch, “Algeria: Press freedom at risk
despite release of editor,” http://hrw.org/english/
docs/2006/06/13/algeri13543.htm; Human Rights
Watch, “Algeria: Human rights lawyers tried on 
dubious charges,” http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/
02/20/algeri15360.htm.
6. U.S. Department of State, International Religious
Freedom Report 2006: Algeria,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71418.htm.
7. Reporters Sans Frontières “Internet under surveil-
lance 2004: Obstacles to the free flow of information
online,” June 22, 2004,
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10730.
8. Economic Commission for Africa. Algeria: Internet
Connectivity, http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/
country_profiles/Algeria/algerinter.htm.





12. Djaweb, “Presentation,” http://www.djaweb.dz/
presentation.htm.
13. Economist Intelligence Unit. “Algeria: Telecoms 
and technology background,” 
http://www.ebusinessforum.com/index.asp?
layout=newdebi&country_id=DZ.
14. Algérie Télécom, “Les partenaires,”
http://www.algerietelecom.dz/?p=partenaire.
15. Academic Research Network, “Portail ARN,”
http://www.arn.dz/index.php?file=infrastructure.
16. GÉANT2, “Academic Research Network & what it
gives,” http://www.geant2.net/upload/ppt/
4_Khelladi_Abdelkader.ppt.




18. Ministre des postes et télécommunications,
“Editorial,” http://www.postelecom.dz/secteur1.htm.
19. Economic Commission for Africa, Algeria: Internet
Connectivity, http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/
country_profiles/Algeria/algerinter.htm.
20. Internet World Stats, “Africa Internet usage and 
population statistics,”
http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#dz.
21. Le 1516, “Comment se connecter,”
http://www.le1516.com/index.html.
22. Djaweb offers 2-megabyte connections for approxi-
mately USD1,500 per month. See Djaweb, “Tarifs,”
http://www.djaweb.dz/tarifs.htm.
23. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Algeria: Telecoms and
technology background,” http://www.ebusinessforum.
com/index.asp?layout=newdebi&country_id=DZ.
24. Reporters Sans Frontières, “Internet under surveil-
lance 2004: Obstacles to the free flow of information
online,” June 22, 2004, http://www.rsf.org/article.
php3?id_article=10730.
25. Ministre des postes et télécommunications,
“Configuration des services de la plate-forme
Internet des P&T,” http://www.postelecom.dz/
service.htm.
26. VSAT Case Studies: Nigeria and Algeria, Research
Report prepared by Steve Esselaar and Aki Stavrou
on behalf of the LINK Centre for the IDRC, CATIA
and GVF, December 2, 2003.
27. Ministre des postes et télécommunications, 
“Plate forme d’accès à l’Internet,” 
http://www.postelecom.dz/plate.htm.
28. Ministre des postes et télécommunications,
“Configuration des services de la plate-forme
Internet des P&T,” http://www.postelecom.dz/
service.htm.
29. Ministre des postes et télécommunications,
“Dispositions generales,”
http://www.postelecom.dz/titre1.htm.
30. Ministre des postes et télécommunications, “Les
providers Algeriens,”
http://www.postelecom.dz/provider.htm.
31. Reporters Sans Frontières, “Internet under surveil-
lance 2004: Obstacles to the free flow of information




34. VSAT Case Studies: Nigeria and Algeria, Research
report prepared by Steve Esselaar and Aki Stavrou
on behalf of the LINK Centre for the IDRC, CATIA
and GVF, December 2, 2003.
35. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2006,
The right to freedom of expression: Report of the
Special Rapporteur, Ambehi Ligado,
E/CN.4/2006/55/Add.1, March 27.
36. The International Lesbian and Gay Association,
World Legal Survey: Algeria, last updated July 31,
2000, http://www.ilga.info/Information/
Legal_survey/africa/algeria.htm.
37. Liberté, ”Les nouvelles sanctions concernant 
l’exercice illegal du culte: Les évangélistes sous
haute surveillance,” March 14, 2006,
http://www.africatime.com/algerie/nouvelle.asp?no_n
ouvelle=244719&no_categorie=2; Moharram 1427,
Official Journal of the Algerian Republic, “Fixing the
conditions and rules for the exercise of religious wor-
ship other than Muslim,” Ruling no. 06-03 of 29,
#12, February 28, 2006, http://www.hrwf.net/religious
freedom/news/2006PDF/Algeria%202006.doc.
248 Country Summaries
The Internet in Azerbaijan remains free from
restrictions despite the government’s (at times)
heavy-handed approach to dealing with politi-
cal opposition. Azerbaijan has a growing
Internet population, helped along by a national
strategy to develop the country into an infor-
mation communications technology (ICT) hub
for the Caucasus region. Investment in the ICT
sector has been prioritized, with ICT being
seen as an essential pillar for diversifying the
country’s oil-dependent economy—an impor-
tant policy given that Azerbaijan’s rich oil and
gas reserves are expected to run out in the next
twenty to forty years. Azerbaijan’s transition
under the charismatic former president, Heidar
Aliev, from war and instability in the 1990s left
the political opposition weak and fragmented
and has led to authoritarian tendencies. The
Internet is beginning to surface as an important
medium and space for political communica-
tion, and there are some indications that
restrictions on content may emerge in the
future.
Background
After a decade of civil unrest and a disastrous
war over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh,
Azerbaijan recovered and stabilized under the
strong hand of former President Heidar Aliev
(elected in 1993). Since that time, political devel-
opment in the country has remained dominated
by the presidential apparatus. In 2003 Heidar
Aliev was succeeded by his son Ilham Aliev in
elections whose fairness was questioned by
some observers.1 The first President Aliev strongly
promoted information technology (IT) as a pillar
for national development, enacting a national 
ICT strategy in 2003 that set ambitious targets 
for the development of Internet in government,
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education, and the industrial sector.2 On a popu-
lar level, the Internet plays an increasingly impor-
tant role in daily life, including politics. Opposition
groups as well as individuals voicing discontent
are now using the Internet as a communication
platform, which has prompted a mild crackdown
by authorities. Thus far these control measures
have been reversed through legal challenges,
although the government’s concern for maintain-
ing social and political stability suggests that
more restrictive measures may be on the way.
Azerbaijani hackers are also involved in a long-
standing “cyber war” with Armenian hackers over
the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. No
official sanctions have been placed on Azeri
hackers, and the attacks do not appear to be a
government-organized campaign but rather the
work of individuals acting on their own. Web site
defacements and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
have led to disruptions in the Azeri Internet, which
may prompt the government to act should these
attacks begin to affect critical services.
Internet in Azerbaijan
During the Soviet era, Azerbaijan was a major
center for IT development, particularly in the area
of process control systems. This legacy left the
country with a reasonably large and well-devel-
oped technical infrastructure, including several
research institutes and a political leadership that
was savvy about the importance of the ICT sec-
tor. Internet development is following the pattern
typical of many developing countries, with
access centered on the major cities, particularly
the capital city Baku. Overall—supported by the
government ICT strategy as well as the large
Azeri diaspora for whom the Internet is increas-
ingly an important channel for maintaining con-
tact with their homeland—Internet penetration is
rising. Between 2004 and 2005 the number of
Internet subscribers doubled; it now encompass-
es around 700,000 users. Official statistics state
that penetration is 8 percent, but this figure may
be misleading as many Azerbaijanis access the
Internet from shared connections, such as their
place of work or study, or from cybercafés (with
the latter providing access for 21.3 percent of
users). PC ownership is low (1.5 per 100), homes
account for only 27.5 percent of all Internet users,
and broadband penetration stands at 6.5 per-
cent. For connectivity, most individual sub-
scribers rely on mobile telephone (53.7 percent)
and dialup (38.4 percent) as their primary means.




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........5,016 4.44
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................72 5.80
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educational barriers remain the major reason for
these low figures, with 34 percent blaming the
high cost of computer equipment and 24.3 per-
cent indicating a lack of necessary skills.3
Economic reasons are particularly important,
because the cost of Internet service remains
comparatively high for the average citizen: a DSL
connection of 64/64Kbps costs around
USD40–50 per month and unlimited access
costs USD30–35, while the average salary is
slightly over USD100 per month.
The Azeri Internet population is young,
urban, and mostly male. Over 55 percent of the
users are youth in the age range of sixteen to
twenty-four, and approximately 70 percent of the
users are male. During the 1990s the official lan-
guage of Azerbaijan switched from Russian to
Azeri, and the script from Cyrillic to Latin. As a
result the number of Web sites using the
Azerbaijani language increased. Azeri is used
today on all official government sites and by the
major media and general Internet population.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Azerbaijan has made telecommunications and
the Internet national development priorities. As a
result, the state plays a leading role in the ICT
sector, with the Ministry of Telecommunications
Information Technology acting as both regulator
and operator. Most services must be licensed,4
including Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP).5
Internet provision is highly centralized on
two state-owned Internet service providers
(ISPs)—BakInterNet and AzTelecomNet—which
provide national coverage and re-sell connectivi-
ty to the remaining twenty registered ISPs.
AzerSat, a joint venture between the Ministry of
Communications and Information Technologies
and Delta Telecom Ltd, supplies international
connectivity to over 85–90 percent of all users.
Almost all ISPs use AzerSat’s Internet internation-
al gateway and only a few possess independent
international channels. The exceptions include
AzEuroTel, Adanet, AzerOnline, and the nonprofit
AZNET/AZRENA project that provides connectiv-
ity to the educational and research community
and benefits from a satellite channel provided
through NATO’s “Silk Road” project.6
Recently the government has taken steps to
liberalize the ISP market. Mandatory state licens-
ing for ISPs is being eliminated, and state influ-
ence over domain registration is limited.7
From a regulatory perspective, the Internet
is treated as mass media8 and included in the list
of telecommunications services regulated by the
2005 Law on Telecommunications. Azeri law
does not require mandatory filtering or monitor-
ing of Internet content. However, as Web sites
that are critical of unpopular government policies
(such as increases in the cost of energy) have
emerged, the government has considered intro-
ducing a law that will impose restrictions on Web
sites with an obscene or antinational character,
thereby strengthening existing defamation laws.
Content filtering is practiced by AZNET, the edu-
cation and research ISP, but is regulated by an
Accepted Usage Policy and is restricted to filter-
ing out pornographic content. Anecdotal
accounts claim that filtering of specific Web sites
occurs, which is seemingly the result of informal
requests to ISP managers by state officials from
the Ministry of National Security, Ministry of
Communications and Information Technologies,
or the Presidency. These instances have been
infrequent, and the resulting public outcry has led
to a swift unblocking of the affected sites.
Azerbaijani law does not provide a formal
legal foundation requiring Internet surveillance.
Nevertheless, surveillance does occur, mainly by
sporadic visits of the State Security Services to
ISPs. In 2000–01 there was an unsuccessful
attempt to adopt the Russian SORM-II model for
Internet surveillance, but the project was inter-
rupted because of financial difficulties and oppo-
sition from the ISPs and the Internet community.
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ONI testing results
ONI tested for content filtering on five ISPs—
Adanet, AzerOnline, AzEuroTel, AZnet, and
BakInternNet—as well as several end-use loca-
tions (such as cybercafés). The results indicate
that only AZnet engages in filtering, and that fil-
tering is both limited and backed by an explicit fil-
tering policy. AZnet blocks obscene and erotic
content and gay and lesbian sites, as well as cer-
tain hacker and dating sites. Some sites with
commercial content, such as gambling and drug
use, are also inaccessible to users. One religious
site was also blocked. Filtering on AZnet is
explicit, with the user receiving a blockpage indi-
cating that access is blocked as it violates the
network’s Accepted Usage Policy. AZnet uses
Symantec Gateway Security on a backbone net-
work for virus protection and blocking selected
sites. No other instances of persistent filtering
were detected on the other ISPs tested, and ONI
did not detect the presence of commercial filter-
ing software at any other ISP.
However, ONI did detect the selective block-
ing of Web sites in early 2007 during protests
against the government’s unpopular decision to
raise consumer prices of basic utilities. The
affected sites were temporarily inaccessible from
ten Azeri ISPs, and the editor of one of the sites
was detained by the police for a few hours, but
later released without charge.9
At the cybercafé level, many owners impose
restrictions that prevent users from downloading
large attachments and visiting certain porno-
graphic sites. But these policies are not universal,
and they are implemented at the discretion of the
cybercafé owner.
At the enterprise level, most employers limit
access to the Internet through the use of intelli-
gent firewalls that restrict downloads of files with
certain extensions (.mp3, .avi, .mpg, .mov, and so
on), as well as access to storage file servers and
to the servers of instant communication (ICQ,
MSN, Skype, and so on).
The ongoing cyber war between Azeri and
Armenian hackers has also caused disruptions to
some Web sites and ISPs. In early 2007, five
Armenian sites were inaccessible. Users viewed
a defaced Web page commenting on the political
affiliation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.10 At
the same time the Web site of the Azerbaijani
National TV Channel was taken down.11 Since
most of the allegedly inaccessible sites con-
tained oppositional political content, there are
allegations that the Azerbaijani government was
involved in the attacks. However, ONI testing
could not confirm these suspicions. ONI did not
test for political issues related to the proclaimed
independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
Conclusion
Azerbaijan’s Internet remains for the most part
“free and open” as a result of the government’s
strong interest in developing the country into an
“ICT hub” for the region. With the exception of
AZnet (which has a declared filtering policy) and
the discretion of certain cybercafé owners, ONI
did not detect the presence of any systematic
policy of Internet filtering. Instances of just-in-time
filtering appear to result from “informal” requests
by state officials to ISP operators, and these were
limited in duration and scope. Moreover, public
pressure led to a swift reversal of these policies.
That said, the filtering requests appear to have
occurred extrajudicially. Given the prospect of
increased use of the Internet by Azerbaijani
opposition groups and the government’s sensi-
tivity to opposition, we may expect to see some
attempts to regulate Internet content and further
instances of just-in-time filtering affecting opposi-
tion Web sites.
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Bahrain is one of the most connected countries
in terms of the Internet in the Middle East and
maintains a liberal Internet filtering regime rela-
tive to the region. The government prevents its
citizens from accessing a small number of
Internet sites, which are mostly related to
pornography or gays and lesbians. The state
also blocks access to a number of Bahraini
political Web sites that criticize the government
or the ruling family.
Background
The royally decreed political reforms of
2001–2002, which reinstituted the legislature and
declared protection of personal freedoms, have
improved the state of human rights in Bahrain. A
small, rich, majority Shiite (estimated to be 70
percent of the population)1 but Sunni-led state in
a dangerous neighborhood, Bahrain attempts to
delicately balance its policies to preserve the
government’s power. It has partnered with the
United States in the war on terror and receives
assistance accordingly (USD17.3 million request-
ed for military and counterterrorism assistance in
FY2007).2 In addition, the United States keeps
“important air assets” and its headquarters for
the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, further
exhibiting Bahrain’s importance to U.S. interests
in the region.3 Despite its reforms and U.S. part-
nership, Bahrain continues to act and pass laws
contrary to its supposed democratization.
Decree no. 56 of 2002 grants blanket immunity to
government officials suspected of human rights
abuses committed before 2001.4 Law no. 32 of
2006 requires meeting organizers to send three
days’ notice of meetings to Public Safety to
receive authorization; this law was invoked as
justification for the use of rubber bullets and tear-
gas by police to break up a meeting of the
Movement of Liberties and Democracy on
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September 22, 2006.5 Press law no. 47 of 2002
allows for prosecution of journalists who are
found to report against the king or Islam, advo-
cate change in the government, or generally
threaten national security.6 Not surprisingly, this
law has created a culture of self-censorship in the
media.7 And finally, the Supreme Court in
October 2006 banned any mention in the media
of a scandal known as “Bandargate,” which
involved the royal family and other politicians.
Two journalists were threatened anonymously
over the phone for writing on the subject.8 It
appears, as Reporters Without Borders argues,
that the democratization trend has “quickly faded
before the demands of the country’s Shiite major-
ity for a voice.”9
Internet in Bahrain
Bahrain has one of the highest Internet penetra-
tion rates in the region. As of 2005, the United
Arab Emirates led the Arab world in Internet pen-
etration, followed by Bahrain and Qatar.10
According to the ITU, there are an estimated
152,700 Internet users out of a population of
738,874,11 and approximately 121,000 Bahrainis
own computers.12 Bahrain is also unique in that
Internet telephony is legal, unlike in some other
Gulf Arab states.13 Batelco, a state-owned com-
pany, functioned as a monopoly (and in practical
terms it still does) over Internet access in Bahrain
until the Telecommunications Law of 2002, which
attempted to inject competition in the Internet
service provider (ISP) market.14 As a result, a
number of additional ISPs have sprung up in
Bahrain,15 though none has yet seriously chal-
lenged Batelco.16 Resistance to Batelco’s contin-
ued dominance has been increasing, however,
as a number of disgruntled consumers have
begun to voice their displeasure on the site
www.boycottbatelco.com in response to the
company’s recent decision to place a monthly
usage limit on their ADSL packages and charge
more for higher limits.17
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Bahrain started democratization efforts in 2002
by adopting a new constitution, which reinstated
a legislative body with one elected chamber. The
constitution mentions the right to free speech
and free press,18 but press law no. 47 of 2002
superseded these protections and was used to
prosecute, detain, and expel journalists. Three




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ......19,079 6.88
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Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................156 3.30
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under this law for two weeks in March 2005 after
they were charged with defaming the king.19
Bahrain’s Internet is regulated by legal infra-
structure governing both access and available
content. The Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority (TRA), created by the 2002 Telecom-
munications Law, is tasked with liberalizing
Bahrain’s telecommunications market. More
specifically, the TRA seeks “to protect the inter-
ests of subscribers and users of telecommunica-
tions services and maintain effective and fair
competition between established and new
entrants to the telecommunications market of the
Kingdom of Bahrain.”20 Two of the major initia-
tives set forth in the National Telecommunications
Plan of 2003, produced by the Minister of
Transportation in accordance with the Telecom-
munications Law of 2002, are the continued intro-
duction of competition into the market through a
liberal licensing regime and the eventual divest-
ment of the state’s shareholdings in Batelco.21
The updated list of licensed entities is available at
www.tra.org.bh/en/LicensingCurrent.asp.
However, the Telecommunications Law of
2002 also contains penalties for illicit use of the
network, including the transmission of messages
that are offensive to public policy or morals.22
A stipulation in the law allows “security organs to
have access to the network for fulfilling the
requirements of national security.”23 Further, in
2005, the Ministry of Information decreed that all
Web sites within Bahrain and all sites external to
Bahrain containing content involving Bahraini
affairs must register with the government.24 This
rule met with widespread resistance and has not
been put into practice.25
ONI testing results
ONI ran in-country tests in 2006 on Bahrain’s ISP,
Batelco, using dialup as well as broadband
access points. Batelco was found to institute lim-
ited Internet filtering compared with the other Gulf
States. The testing found a broad range of topics
to be subject to filtering, including pornography;
gay and lesbian discussion; proxy and
anonymizing servers; Web sites that attempt to
convert Muslims to Christianity; Web sites that
are critical of the Bahraini government, parlia-
ment, and the ruling family, such as
www.bahraintimes.org and www.vob.org; and the
Web site www.rezgar.com, which has secular left-
ist Arabic content. However, the vast majority of
sites with content similar to these blocked sites
were not blocked, indicating that the filtration
regime is not comprehensive.
Unlike most of the Gulf States’ ISPs, Batelco
is not transparent about its blocking policy; users
do not always get a blockpage when they try to
access banned Web sites. For some blocked
Web sites, users receive error messages such as
“The page cannot be displayed.”
According to Reporters Without Borders,
Bahrain blocked access in October 2006 to 
several Web sites that were critical of the govern-
ment. Among these Web sites is the Bahrain
Center for Human Rights (www.bahrainrights.org)
and the popular blog www.mahmood.tv, which
openly criticizes the government and parliament
members.26 Both sites were found to be accessi-
ble during ONI’s testing in November.
In August 2006, Bahrain banned access to
Google Earth for three days. Soon after the
blocking of Google Earth, cyberactivists circulat-
ed via e-mail a PDF file that annotated Google
Earth screenshots of Bahrain to highlight what
they claimed as the inequity of land distribution in
Bahrain.27
Conclusion
Despite the broad range of topics that are fil-
tered, Bahrain allows for relatively unfettered
access to the Internet, especially compared with
its neighbors. ONI found only very limited filtering
of pornography; gay and lesbian material; content
related to the conversion of Arab Muslims 
to Christianity; criticism of the Bahraini govern-
ment, parliament, and royal family; and secular
leftist Arabic content. This extremely light blocking
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indicates that this filtration effort is likely symbol-
ic rather than an attempt to completely impair the
ability of Bahrainis to access certain types of
Internet content. For each blocked site, there are
numerous similar sites that are not blocked by
the government.
In 2006, however, Bahrain temporarily
blocked a Bahraini human rights Web site, a pop-
ular blog run by a Bahraini citizen, and Google
Earth. Even though the ban on these Web sites
and services did not last long, this might indicate
an intensification of the state’s comparatively lib-
eral, yet not transparent, filtering policy. In addi-
tion, given the state’s close relationship with
Batelco and its comprehensive regulatory struc-
ture, the government could quickly introduce new
filtration if it wished.
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Internet content in Belarus remains largely
accessible to users despite the declared policy
of selective filtering. Access remains largely
centralized, as the government aims to retain
firm control over the Internet. Self-censorship
by online media is encouraged by the political
climate, as opposition leaders and independ-
ent journalists are frequently detained and
prosecuted.
Background
Under President Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule,
Belarus has been criticized for its repressive and
increasingly authoritarian tendencies. The econo-
my and political system remain highly central-
ized, with executive authority vested in the office
of the president. Charges of election fraud have
been widespread. Human rights organizations
are heavily critical of the regime, including the
steady increase in the control over information
that has occurred over the past few years.
Nevertheless, Lukashenka remains genuinely
popular with many citizens, particularly the mid-
dle-aged and rural populations who have benefit-
ed most from his protectionist economic policies
and the overall stability that Belarus has enjoyed
(which contrasts with that of Ukraine and other
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
countries).
Steady economic growth in Belarus has
stimulated the development of telecommunica-
tions in recent years. However, because of exces-
sive regulation and state control of major partici-
pants in the telecommunications industry, the
development of telecommunications remains low
compared with the rest of the region. The state
retains a dominant position over the telecommu-
nications sector, with all Internet connections
passing through the state-owned operator
Beltelecom. The top-level domain is managed
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and administered by the Belarus equivalent of
the U.S. National Security Agency. Taking into
account both the increase in Internet users and
the potential of the Internet to spread political
ideas, the government is adopting restrictive poli-
cies, monitoring content, and placing temporary
limitations on access to politically sensitive Web
sites. During the February 2006 presidential elec-
tions, ONI documented the use of just-in-time
methods against opposition Web sites, which
included domain name system tampering, net-
work disconnection, and allegations of DoS
attacks.1
Internet in Belarus
The cost of access in Belarus has recently
decreased dramatically. This has seen a stark
rise in usage and a growing Internet service
provider (ISP) market. As of 2005, Belarus had an
Internet penetration rate of approximately 30 per-
cent. Nevertheless, prices remain higher than
those of neighboring countries, and home
access is not affordable for most of the popula-
tion. In 2005 the cost of Internet access through
the state-owned provider Beltelecom was
USD0.68 per hour, while an ADSL connection
cost USD340 per month—placing the latter
beyond the reach of most citizens, given that the
average salary was around USD230 in 2005.2
The most active Internet users in Belarus are
in the twelve- to thirty-four-year-old age range,
although some 30 percent of Belarusians in this
age group have never used the Internet.3 The
level of computer penetration in the country
remains low. In 2005, 58 percent of schools in
Belarus had computers and only 25 percent of
the schools had Internet access. The popularity
of cybercafés has fallen in recent years, as most
users prefer to access the Internet from home or
work. Russian is the most widely used language
by Belarussians on the Internet, followed by
Belarusian and then English.
As Internet usage has risen, related services
have developed into fast-growing and profitable
businesses in Belarus. In 2005 there were thirty-
two ISPs active in the country.4 The state-con-
trolled ISP Beltelecom holds the biggest market
share, with 187 public Internet access points in
the country. All ISPs are required to connect
through Belpak, Beltelecom’s Internet subsidiary.
Beltelcom has a legal monopoly on the external
channels of communications. As a conse-




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........7,051 4.57
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................68 5.32
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)....................................100 6.97
Human development index (out of 177) .................................67 5.93
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................177 2.93
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................197 1.64
Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................76 5.44
Internet users (% of population) ..........................................34.8 6.33
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Beltelecom’s infrastructure, often at very high
prices.5
In recent years, broadband Internet services
have begun to develop rapidly. Beltelecom has
announced plans to establish 250,000 ADSL
connections by the year 2010. Beltelecom holds
a monopoly over the fixed-line infrastructure and
services. Despite the formal liberalization of the
Belarusian mobile market, the government owns
a significant stake in all four operators.6
Beltelecom is the only operator licensed to pro-
vide Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services
in Belarus. The high prices maintained by the
monopolist operator encourage the emergence
of illegal VoIP providers, which are criminally
prosecuted. Under decree of the Ministry of
Communication and Information, IP telephony
can be used only for noncommercial purposes. 7
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Ministry of Communications and
Informatization is the main regulatory authority of
the telecommunications sector. The ministry is
frequently accused of placing unjustified limita-
tions on commercial operators to reinforce
Beltelecom’s monopoly. Actual information com-
munications technology (ICT)-related policy
appears to be mostly created on an ad-hoc basis
by President Lukashenka and his administration.
The President frequently holds special meetings
to issue directives regarding ICT regulation and
the implementation of particular policies. The
Security Council, chaired by the President,
decides on a wide range of questions related to
the security of the regime, including information
security. Additionally, a number of state entities
have significant power to influence and control
the Internet. The State Center for Information
Security, under the supervision of the President
and initially a subdivision unit of the special secu-
rity services (KGB), is a specialized body respon-
sible for protecting state secrets. The Center also
manages the administration of the country’s top-
level domain (“.by”).
Although Belarus lacks a well-developed
Internet regulatory framework, the authorities
appear to be pursuing a legislative basis for
achieving control over the Internet. Conscious of
the popularity of Internet publishing among
opposition groups and private media, authorities
compel self-censorship through frequent threats
and prosecutions. In addition, in order to avoid
public debate of pending measures, authorities
often delay publishing laws before their final
promulgation. In 2005 the Security Council of
Belarus drafted a document entitled “The
Conception on Information Security,” which was
then revised at the President’s directive to take
into consideration the new challenges to national
security posed by ICT. This text is not available to
the public.
Officially, Internet filtration and monitoring
telecommunications networks is illegal in
Belarus. However, authorities conduct surveil-
lance of Internet activities under the pretext of
protecting national security. In 2001 a
Presidential Decree extended the concept of
“national security” to include the Internet as a
potential threat.
The special bodies of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the KGB have the right to seize data
distributed through any channel of communica-
tion8 in order to fight criminal activity and guaran-
tee state security. This law establishes the right of
the KGB to obtain any data considered to be “rel-
evant” from state entities and from private or
public organizations, and also gives the KGB
unlimited access to the information systems
(including log files and so on) of communication
providers.
Belarus does not have systems monitoring
Internet traffic analogous to the Russian SORM-II.
However, it is likely that the Belarusian and
Russian special services cooperate in this
sphere. Over 70 percent of Belarusian Internet
traffic goes through Russia and part of it is
processed through the Russian system SORM-II.
Some providers confirm that the authorities have
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unofficially requested that all user logins be kept
for up to one month and be turned over to the
security services on demand.
Extensive governmental regulation, a strict
licensing regime, and the state-owned
Beltelecom monopoly are major impediments to
the development of Internet services in Belarus.
Beltelecom is under the direct supervision of the
Ministry of Communications and Informatization.
This may change in 2007 because of the World
Trade Organization (WTO)’s accession require-
ments, which demand that Beltelecom be priva-
tized and end its monopoly on external commu-
nication channels. The ministry has agreed to pri-
vatize Beltelecom, but it is likely that the govern-
ment will become the controlling shareholder.
The ministry has also declared that Beltelecom’s
control over external communication channels
will remain after privatization, with licenses given
only to those operators that have built their own
external communication infrastructure.
E-commerce is regulated by the state. All
Internet retailers are legally obliged to register
domain names with the State Center of
Information Security, as well as to obtain a
license for retail trade by e-commerce activities.
International electronic payment systems are
seriously limited in Belarus. All international mon-
etary transfers must occur through banks that
notify the tax authorities of all fund transfers from
abroad.
ONI testing results
ONI tested five leading ISPs: Aichyna, Belinfonet,
Beltelecom, BN, and Solo. The testing could not
ascertain blocking, although filtering of content is
suspected, given the government’s declared pol-
icy of blocking selected Web sites. The filtering of
gay and lesbian Web sites has been an official
policy since the beginning of 2005, on the basis
that they contain pornographic material.
Interestingly, these Web sites were inaccessible
on all ISPs except for the state-owned
Beltelecom.
ONI suspects that Internet filtering in Belarus
has a deliberate but episodic character.
Beltelecom’s control over external connection
channels allows for the creation of an effective
system for regulating Internet traffic. During 
presidential elections, access to opposition and
independent media sites appear to have been
temporarily blocked. In 2006 ONI documented
just-in-time tampering (indirect filtering) of oppo-
sition sites. Some specialists have suggested
that, during presidential elections, Beltelecom
established so-called shaping practices—that is,
deliberately slowing down access to specific IP
addresses. Beltelecom allegedly received spe-
cial “requests” by authorities to block certain
Web sites for a limited period.
Self-censorship by Internet users has
become a pervasive phenomenon. In 2005 the
popular Belarusian portal www.tut.by refused to
put up banners advertising opposition Web sites.
It is unknown whether this activity was a result of
pressure by the authorities or merely an attempt
to protect its own business.
ONI researchers confirmed that most cyber-
cafés restrict access to sites containing pornog-
raphy, terrorist material, and proxy-related mate-
rial. Cybercafés install software that either blocks
URLs within the list of forbidden sites or alerts the
administrator if such a URL is visited. The restrict-
ed URL list includes Web sites forbidden for dis-
tribution by the Republic Committee on
Prevention of Pornography, Violence, and Cruelty
Propaganda. Administrators often require pass-
port identification of customers. Some cyber-
cafés also limit the volume of Internet traffic and
decrease the download speed when exceeded.
On the request of state security services, admin-
istrators keep the logs of users’ network activity.
Conclusion
As Internet use in Belarus has risen significantly
in recent years, the government seems intent to
extend its firm control over all forms of informa-
tion flows within the country. All ISPs in Belarus
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must connect to the Internet through channels of
the state-owned ISP Beltelecom, thus facilitating
government’s control over all traffic. The presi-
dent has established a strong and elaborate
information security policy, and has declared his
intention of exercising strict control over the
Internet under the pretext of national security.
Based on periodic testing, ONI suspects spo-
radic but sophisticated blocking of Internet con-
tent related to political events in the country.
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China continues to expand the largest and
most sophisticated filtering system in the
world, despite the government’s occasional
denial that it restricts any Internet content.1 As
the Internet records extraordinary growth in
services as well as users, the Chinese govern-
ment has undertaken to limit access to any
content that might potentially undermine the
state’s control or social stability, a goal also
underlying President Hu Jintao’s call, in
January 2007, for officials to promote “healthy”
online culture.2
Background
The government’s strenuous commitment to
achieving strict supervision of the Chinese
Internet showed no signs of abating in 2006, a
year beginning with the introduction of Internet
police cartoon mascots (Shenzhen’s Jingjing and
Chacha) and closing with regulations, cautiously
welcomed, that allow foreign reporters to travel
throughout the country and conduct interviews
without prior official consent through the 2008
Olympic Games. At least eight cyber-dissidents
were sentenced to prison terms in 2006.3
Expectations that political participation and
greater government transparency and accounta-
bility would be inevitable windfalls of nearly thirty
years of economic reform have been largely
deflated. The government under the leadership
of Hu Jintao has responded in part to sharp
increases in “mass incidents” of public disorder,
rampant social and economic inequalities, break-
downs in social services and public infrastruc-
ture, and growing social unrest with increased
restrictions and harsh treatment of lawyers, jour-
nalists, and civil society activists. At the same
time, its Herculean effort to tame the Internet
activities and expression of over 100 million 
citizens to levels considered appropriate is
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achieving greater success and efficacy, largely
as a result of self-censorship and monitoring
controls placed at every point of access. As one
commentator noted, “while China is the world’s
biggest jailer of journalists, China is also writing
the manual on how to control your press and 
citizen media—and hence your national 
discourse—while jailing a minimum number of
people.”4
Internet in China
From 2005 to the end of 2006, the number of
Internet users grew from 94 million to 137 mil-
lion.5 The countrywide Internet penetration rate is
now 10.5 percent, but this rate varies regionally—
while a quarter or more of residents in major
cities such as Tianjin are online, in poorer and
western provinces the rate is usually less than 10
percent.6 Gender and age are also important
demographic factors, with male users significant-
ly outnumbering women (58.3 percent to 41.7
percent) and eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds
comprising over 35 percent of all Internet users.7
While 76 percent of users in China connect from
home, 30 percent of users also use Internet cafés
as a main access location.8 Not only do Chinese
users cite the Internet as the most important
source for information, more important than tele-
vision and newspapers, but they also have
access to a wide variety of well-developed
Internet services such as search engines, Bulletin
Board Services (BBS), online video, blogging,
and booming business-to-customer e-com-
merce.9 China has the largest number of Voice-
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) users in the world.10
In March 2006, Tom Online (which formed a joint
venture with Skype), announced that the govern-
ment would issue no licenses for paid computer-
to-telephone service (known as SkypeOut) for
two years,11 reportedly because of concerns
about the financial losses to the core businesses
of the major telecom carriers.12 Only China
Netcom and China Telecom were permitted to
offer pilot commercial VoIP services in selected
cities.13
Physical access to the Internet is controlled
by the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), the
main regulatory organ of the telecommunications
sector, and is provided by seven state-licensed
Internet access providers (IAPs) (with three IAPs
under construction), each of which has at least
one connection to a foreign Internet backbone.14
IAPs peer at three Internet exchange points




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........5,878 4.35
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................71 5.80
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................91 6.09
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Key indicator data refers to China only.
Internet service providers (ISPs) access to back-
bone connections. In November 2006 the
Ministry of Public Security announced the com-
pletion of the essential tasks of constructing the
first stage of its “Golden Shield” project, which is
a digital national surveillance network with almost
complete coverage across public security units
nationwide.15
By sheer scope and range of topics—from
online novels to video satires—discussion and
expression over the Internet is flourishing. A
major development has been the explosion of the
Chinese blogosphere, which reached 20.8 mil-
lion blogs at the end of 2006.16 The growth of the
Internet, in tandem with other technologies such
as short messaging services, has also engen-
dered a phenomenon of increasingly relevant
“public opinion” in China, where incidents not
necessarily prioritized by traditional media
receive national attention and frequently lead to
calls for government action and response. At
times, online activity has tested this relationship
between citizens and government on a range of
sensitive issues.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Although China’s constitution formally guaran-
tees freedom of expression and publication,17 as
well as the protection of human rights, legal and
administrative regulations ensure that the
Chinese Communist Party will be supported in its
attempt at strict supervision of all forms of media.
Government ministries and Party organs also use
both formal and informal controls, including poli-
cies and instructions, editor responsibility for
content, economic incentives, defamation liabili-
ty, intimidation, and other forms of pressure to
discipline media.18
Many of these formal and informal controls
have been extended to Chinese cyberspace,
though the greater range of nonstate actors
makes legal regulation over the Internet a more
complex effort. China’s legal control over Internet
access and usage is multilayered and achieved
by distributing criminal and financial liability,
licensing and registration requirements, and self-
monitoring instructions to nonstate actors at
every stage of access, from the ISP to the con-
tent provider and the end user. The Internet has
been targeted for monitoring since before it was
even commercially available,19 and the govern-
ment seems intent on keeping regulatory pace
with its growth and development. For example,
over half of the 137 million Internet users in China
were found to have visited video sharing sites,20
and in August 2006 the State Administration for
Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) announced it
would be issuing regulations subjecting all online
video content to its inspection.21
ISPs are required to record important data
(such as identification, length of visit, and activi-
ties) about all of their users for at least sixty days
and to ensure that no illegal content is being
hosted on their servers.22 Internet content
providers, such as BBS and other user-generated
content sites, are directly responsible for what is
published on their service.23 Internet access
through cybercafés is also heavily regulated: all
cafés are required to install filtering software, ban
minors from entering, monitor the activities of the
users, and record every user’s identity and com-
plete session logs for up to sixty days.24 Getting
a permit for a café is a complex process, and at
any time one of at least three state departments
have jurisdiction to deem a cybercafé to be inad-
equately self-policing and shut it down.25 All serv-
ices providing Internet users with information via
the Internet that fail sufficiently to monitor their
sites and report violations to the proper authori-
ties also face serious consequences, including
shutdown, criminal liability, and license revoca-
tion.26
New subscribers to ISPs themselves have
been expected to register with their local police
bureaus since 1996.27 In October 2006, the
Internet Society of China recommended the
drafting of regulations that would require all indi-
viduals to register actual personal identifying
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data with Web site operators in order to open a
blog or make comments on bulletin boards, a
change from current requirements where individ-
uals must register real names with Web sites but
not blog-hosting services.28 State media report-
ed that 83.5 percent of respondents in a survey
conducted by China Youth Daily opposed the
proposed real-name registration system.29
Underlying all regulation of the Internet is a
pantheon of proscribed content. Citizens are pro-
hibited from disseminating between nine and
eleven categories of content that appear consis-
tently in most regulations;30 all can be consid-
ered subversive and trigger fines, content
removal, and criminal liability.31 Illegal content,
although broadly and vaguely defined, provides
a blueprint of topics the government considers
sensitive, from endangering national security to
contradicting officially accepted political theory;
more recently illegal content includes conducting
activities in the name of an illegal civil organiza-
tion inciting illegal assemblies or gatherings that
disturb social order. One prominent application
of these rules was the July 2006 shutdown of the
online forum Century China (Shiji Zhongguo), a
site with over 30,000 registered members and
hundreds of thousands of readers co-sponsored
by the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s
Institute of Chinese Studies.32
Technical filtering associated with the “Great
Firewall of China” is only one tool of information
control among more blunt and frequently applied
methods such as job dismissals; Web site and
blog closures and deletions; and the detention of
journalists, writers, and activists. In 2006, fifty-two
individuals were known to be imprisoned for
online activities, among them several writers and
journalists who were convicted in part because of
the disclosure of their personal e-mail accounts
by Yahoo’s Chinese partner.33 Web sites can be
closed not only for a broad array of taboo topics,
but also from asking the wrong questions in opin-
ion polls.34 In June 2006, the Information Office
under the State Council and the MII embarked on
a period of “strict supervision” of search engines,
chat rooms, and blog service providers to curb
the circulation of “harmful” information online.35
According to the South China Morning Post, offi-
cial statistics show that in 2006 authorities had
shut down hundreds of liberal Web sites and
forums and ordered eight search engines to filter
“subversive and sensitive” content based on
about 1,000 keywords.36
Because many of the laws defining illegal
content are vaguely worded and have been
inconsistently enforced, they provide the govern-
ment with almost endless authority to control and
censor content while discouraging citizens from
testing the boundaries of these areas. Further, for
a wide range of reasons—from economic incen-
tives and demographic factors of the online com-
munity to the dragnet of legal liability—the impact
of self-censorship is likely enormous and increas-
ingly public, if difficult to measure. On April 9,
2006, fourteen major Web portals including
www.sina.com, www.sohu.com, www.baidu.com,
www.tom.com, and Yahoo’s Chinese Web site
issued a joint declaration calling for the Internet
industry to censor “unhealthy” and “indecent”
information that is “severely harmful to society,”
voluntarily accept supervision, and strengthen
“ethical” self-regulation.37 Their proposal sparked
a flurry of similar pledges across China, from
legal Web sites to blog hosting services, and with
targeted content extended to include Party
secrets and information affecting national 
security.38
ONI testing results
China employs targeted yet extensive filtering of
information that could have a potential impact on
social stability and the Party’s control over socie-
ty, and is therefore predominantly focused on
Chinese-language content relating to domestic
issues. For the government, information consti-
tuting a threat to public order extends well
beyond well-publicized sensitive topics, such as
the June 1989 crackdown and the Falun Gong
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spiritual movement (both of which are methodi-
cally blocked), and includes independent media
and dissenting voices, human rights, political
reform, and circumvention tools.
Testing was conducted on two backbone
providers, the state-owned telecoms China
Netcom (CNC) and China Telecom (CT), which
between them provide coverage nationwide.
Because both control access to an international
gateway, URL filtering and domain name system
(DNS) tampering implemented by CNC and CT
affect all users of the network regardless of ISP.
China also uses IP blocking at these internation-
al gateway to block access to at least 300 IP
addresses, which are remarkably similar across
both backbone ISPs. Though China does not
employ keyword blocking on the body content of
any given page, it filters by keywords that appear
in the host header (domain name) or URL path.
Although there is almost complete correla-
tion in blocking between CNC and CT, there are
some gaps within certain families of Web sites.
The English and Chinese versions of Wikipedia
continue to be closely monitored by media and
rights groups, and at time of testing the site
www.wikipedia.org was accessible on both ISPs,
while Chinese-language Wikipedia (zh.wikipedia.
org) was inaccessible only on China Telecom.
Certain bloggers, including Zeng Jinyan, the wife
of activist Hu Jia (zengjinyan.spaces.live.com)
were also blocked solely on CT.
As an example of targeted filtering, of the
major international news organizations, only the
BBC (news.bbc.co.uk) is blocked by both ISPs.
The main Web site of the U.S. government–
sponsored Voice of America news service, along
with the Epoch Times (the newspaper published
by the Falun Gong), are the other media outlets
on the global list filtered by CNC and CT. The 
situation changed entirely, however, with
Chinese-language media outside mainland
China. From Hong Kong’s Apple Daily, Ming Pao
and Sing Tao Daily newspapers to the U.S.-based
World Journal and Chinesenewsnet, a significant
number of independent media representing 
different points on the political spectrum were 
filtered. The Taiwan newspaper China Times
(www.chinatimes.com.tw), although blocked at
time of testing, was reportedly accessible in early
2007.39 Further, news in languages spoken by
ethnic minorities in contested regions was also
blocked, but with less uniformity. While Radio
Free Asia (RFA)’s Uyghur service (www.rfa.org/
uyghur) was blocked by both ISPs, RFA’s main
site and its Tibetan service were inaccessible
only on China Telecom.
China filters a significant portion of content
specific to its own human rights record and prac-
tices. As such, only a few global human rights
sites, including Amnesty International, Article 19,
and Human Rights First were blocked or sus-
pected to be blocked. Thus, although China is a
member of the International Labor Organization,
which along with other U.N. bodies are accessi-
ble to mainland users, the Web site of the China
Labour Bulletin (www.clb.org.hk/public/main) and
other Chinese labor rights watchdogs are
blocked. Similarly, the Web site of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(www.cecc.gov) is filtered, but the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom
(www.uscirf.gov), which has a broader mandate
but has published critical reports on China,
remains accessible. While blocked content most-
ly originates from overseas organizations and
individuals (including those from Hong Kong),
some organizations within China are also filtered
(such as the rights defender network
www.gmwq.org/web/index.asp).
Certain targets for blocking cut across 
political and social lines of conflict. The consis-
tent filtering of Web sites supporting greater
autonomy and rights protection for the 
Uyghur (www.uyghurcongress.org), Tibetan
(www.savetibet.org), and Mongolian (www.
innermongolia.org) ethnic minorities is not sur-
prising, as these issues have already been
excluded from official discourse inside China.
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The government has long characterized the
Muslim Uyghur community as presenting a sep-
aratist threat, and has blocked not only the site of
the Uyghur American Association (whose presi-
dent, Rebiya Kadeer, is an exiled former political
prisoner and human rights activist) but has also
blocked a substantial number of sites on Islam in
Arabic, including those presenting extremist
viewpoints (www.alumah.com).
China filters a significant number of sites
presenting alternative or additional perspectives
on its policies toward Taiwan and North Korea.
For example, the main portal of the Taiwanese
government (www.gov.tw) as well as its Mainland
Affairs Council were among the many official
sites blocked, along with the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan (www.dpp.
org.tw).
Other topics bridging the political-social
divide, such as corruption, were not treated uni-
formly. Among the limited anticorruption Web
sites filtered was the New Threads site
(www.xys.org), run by the scientist Fang Shimin
and focusing on academic fraud. The only
HIV/AIDS-related site to be filtered was the
English-language China AIDS Survey
(www.casy.org), a site not updated since 2005.
All other content relating to public health,
women’s rights, reproductive health, the environ-
ment, and development that ONI tested was
accessible.
Of blocked Web sites, the major exceptions
to the focus on politically sensitive topics specif-
ic to China are circumvention tools and pornog-
raphy. A portion, though not a majority, of proxy
tools and anonymizers in both the Chinese 
(www.gardennetworks.com) and English lan-
guage (www.peacefire.org) was blocked. The cir-
cumvention tool Psiphon (psiphon.civisec.org) is
also blocked. Both ISPs also blocked a substan-
tial amount of pornographic content.
While the IP address of the blog search
engine Technorati was blocked by both ISPs, at
time of testing no blog hosting service was
blocked by either ISP. However, though Google’s
Blogspot domain (www.blogger.com) was acces-
sible, all individual Blogspot blogs tested were
accessible on China Netcom and blocked or
inaccessible on China Telecom. Ongoing ONI
testing has confirmed that Blogspot has been
blocked for several years in China, with periods
of intermittent accessibility.
Hong Kong
ONI also conducted testing on two ISPs in Hong
Kong, City Telecom (HK) Limited and PCCW, and
found no evidence of filtering. However, the main-
land government blocks a significant amount of
content originating from its own special adminis-
trative region. In addition to many independent
newspapers, sites operating out of Hong Kong
that focus on political reform and governance—
even those not focusing on mainland affairs but
instead on exclusively local issues (such as the
Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor)—are
blocked across most of the categories where fil-
tering occurs. Thus, Hong Kong–based alterna-
tive media, grassroots NGOs and coalitions
(www.alliance.org.hk), religious organizations,
and legitimate political parties (www.dphk.org)
are all affected.
Conclusion
As China’s Internet community continues to grow
exponentially, the government continues to refine
its technical filtering system while deputizing 
a range of actors, including users, ISPs and 
content providers, to limit the ability of its citizens
to access and post content the state considers
sensitive. A complex, overlapping system of legal
regulation, institutionalized practices, and infor-
mal methods has been extended from print and
broadcast media to the Internet. A consistent fea-
ture of regulation of the Chinese Internet has
been the lack of transparency, which has long
been a hallmark of the government’s manage-
ment and suppression of information.
268 Country Summaries
NOTES
1. Gillian Wong, “China defends Web controls following




2. Xinhua News Agency, “President Hu Jintao asks offi-
cials to better cope with Internet,” January 24, 2007,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-01/24/
content_5648674.htm.
3. Reporters Without Borders, “Cyber-Dissident gets
three-year sentence on day French President
arrives,” October 25, 2006, at http://www.rsf.org/
article.php3?id_article=19435.
4. RConversation, “Online journalists in jail... and
Chinese innovation...” December 8, 2006,
http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/
2006/12/online_journali.html.
5. China Internet Network Information Center,
Nineteenth Statistical Report on the Development of
the Internet in China (di shijiu zhongguo hulian wan-
gluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao), issued




9. Analysis International, “China B2C E-Commerce
Market Size Reached RMB 854 million in Q1 2006,”






10. SinoCast China IT Watch, “Skype has over 25mn
users in China,” November 28, 2006.
11. Alison Maitlin, “Skype says texts are censored by
partner in China,” The Financial Times, April 18,
2006.
12. Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., China:
Infrastructure: IP Networks, July 30, 2006.
13. SinoCast China IT Watch, “China to issue its first
VoIP license,” March 13, 2006.
14. China Internet Network Information Center,
Nineteenth Statistical Report on the Development of
the Internet in China, (di shijiu zhongguo hulian wan-
gluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao), issued
January 23, 2007 (in Chinese). 
15. Ministry of Public Security, “National Development
and Reform Commission issues national approval
for the ‘Golden Shield’ construction project at man-
agement conference,” (guojia fazgaiwei zhuchi
zhaokai dahui tongguo “jinzhi gongcheng” jianshe
xiangmu guojia yanshou), November 17, 2006,
http://www.mps.gov.cn/cenweb/brjlCenweb/jsp/
common/article.jsp?infoid=ABC00000000000035645.
See Greg Walton, China’s Golden Shield:
Corporations and the Development of Surveillance
Technology in the People’s Republic of China, a
Rights and Democracy Report, October 2001,
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/
globalization/goldenShieldEng.html.
16. People’s Daily Online, “China has 20.8 million 




18. See Benjamin Liebman, “Watchdog or demagogue?
The media in the Chinese legal system,” The
Columbia Law Review, January 2005, p. 41.
19. See the Regulations of the People’s Republic of
China for the Safety Protection of Computer
Information Systems (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jisuanji xitong anquan baohu tiaoli), issued by the
State Council on February 18, 1994. 
20. Xinhua News Agency, “Webcasting casts spell on
Chinese Internet users,” February 3, 2007,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/03/
content_800573.htm.
21. Xinhua News Agency, “China to issue new regula-
tions to censor online video programs,” August 16,
2006.
22. Ibid.
23. Article 13, Rules on the Management of Internet
Electronic Bulletin Services (Hulianwang dianzi gong-
gao fuwu guanli guiding), issued by the Ministry of
Information Industry on October 7, 2000. 
24. Articles 19, 21, and 23, Regulations on the
Administration of Business Sites Providing Internet
Services (Hulianwang shangwang fuwu guanye
changsuo guanli tiaolie), issued by the State Council
on September 29, 2002, effective November 15,
2002.
25. Ibid.
26. Article 20, Measures for Managing Internet
Information Services (Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli
banfa), issued by the State Council on September
25, 2000, effective October 1, 2000. 
27. Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, Freedom of
Expression and the Internet in China, http://www.hrw.
org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm; Alfred
Hermida, “Behind China’s Internet red firewall,” BBC
News Online, September 3, 2002, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/low/technology/2234154.stm.
Country Summaries 269
28. Xinhua News Agency, “China strives to regulate
cyberspace,” December 12, 2006.
29. Xinhua News Agency, “Real-name online registration
system meets opposition in China,” January 8, 2007.
30. The nine types of content that have been illegal to
produce or disseminate since the earliest Internet
regulations are: 1) violating the basic principles as
they are confirmed in the Constitution; 2) endanger-
ing state security, divulging state secrets, subverting
the national regime, or jeopardizing the integrity of
national unity; 3) harming national honor or interests;
4) inciting hatred against peoples, racism against
peoples, or disrupting the solidarity of peoples; 5)
disrupting national policies on religion, propagating
evil cults and feudal superstitions; 6) spreading
rumors, disturbing social order, or disrupting social
stability; 7) spreading obscenity, pornography, gam-
bling, violence, terror, or abetting the commission of
a crime; 8) insulting or defaming third parties,
infringing on legal rights and interests of third par-
ties; and 9) other content prohibited by law and
administrative regulations. Two categories of prohib-
ited content were added in Article 19 of the
Provisions on the Administration of Internet News
Information Services (Internet News Information
Services Regulations) (hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu
guanli guiding), promulgated by the State Council
Information Office and the Ministry of Information
Industry on September 25, 2005. These two addi-
tional categories are 1) inciting illegal assemblies,
associations, marches, demonstrations, or gather-
ings that disturb social order; and 2) conducting
activities in the name of an illegal civil organization.
Translation is available at http://www.cecc.gov/
pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
31. See, for example, Rules of the NPC Standing
Committee on Safeguarding Internet Security
(Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu weihu hulian-
wang anquan de guiding), issued by the NPC
Standing Committee on December 28, 2000.
32. Raymond Li and Kristine Kwok, “Popular forum 
rushes to go offline after closure order: Mainland
authorities shut-down Century China, a multi-forum
site with over 30,000 registered users,” South China
Morning Post, July 25, 2006, reprinted at
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=
49836; South China Morning Post, “Chinese
Communist Party launches website to promote
social stability,” October 20, 2006. The official order
cited Article 19 of the 2005 Internet News Information
Services Regulations.
33. Reporters Without Borders, Press Release, “Bad
start to year for online free expression,” January 12,
2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=
20383; Reporters Without Borders, Press Release,
“Verdict in cyberdissident Li Zhi case confirms 
implication of Yahoo!” February 27, 2006,
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=16579;
Reporters Without Borders, Press Release, “Cyber-
dissident convicted on Yahoo! information is freed
after four years,” November 9, 2006,
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=8453. See
also Human Rights in China Case Highlight, Shi Tao
and Yahoo, at http://hrichina.org/public/
highlight/index.html. 
34. For example, the Web site China Consultation Net
was reportedly shut down on August 3, 2006, after
80 percent of respondents answered “yes” to a poll
asking whether competitive elections should be held
to choose the general secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party. Kristine Kwok, “Mainland censors
shut down pair of websites,” South China Morning
Post, August 5, 2006. Also, a Netease editor was
reportedly fired for an online survey where 64 per-
cent of respondents replied they would not like to be
born Chinese in the next life. Howard French,
“Beijing’s growing urge to dominate the media,” The
International Herald Tribune, September 22, 2006. In
another case, authorities withdrew the operating
license of the Web site polls (Zhongguo guoqing
zixun) on August 3, 2006. The Web site
(http://www.s007s.com/) had recently asked visitors
to “cast votes” on the question: “Do you think the
General Secretary of the Communist Party of China
should be chosen from among several candidates in
differential voting?” Nearly 75 percent of those polled
had answered “yes.” (See IFEX, “Websites shut
down amid Internet crackdown,” http://ifex.org/
alerts/content/view/full/76210/).
35. Xinhua News Agency, “China to tighten supervision
over blogs, online search engines,” June 29, 2006.
See also Howard French, “Chinese discuss plan to
tighten restrictions on cyberspace,” The New York
Times, July 4, 2006. 
36. Raymond Li and Kristine Kwok, “Popular forum 
rushes to go offline after closure order: Mainland
authorities shut-down Century China, a multiforum
site with over 30,000 registered users,” South China
Morning Post, July 25, 2006, reprinted at
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=
49836.
37. People’s Daily, “Fourteen Beijing websites issue joint
proposal for civilized management of the Internet,”
(Beijing 14 jia wangzhan lianhe xiang hulianwangjie




38. See Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
“Internet Operators in China Agree to Support Hu
Jintao, Marxism, and the Party,” China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, May 2006,
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?s
howsingle=48987.
39. Reuters, “China unblocks Taiwan newspaper Web
sites,” February 5, 2007, http://news.zdnet.com/
2100-9588_22-6156197.html.
Country Summaries 271
Internet use is severely restricted in Cuba. A
combination of Cuban government policy, the
U.S. trade embargo, and personal economic
limitations prevents the vast majority of Cuban
citizens from ever accessing the Internet. The
few who gain access are limited by extensive
monitoring and excessive penalties for political
dissent expressed on the Internet, leading to a
climate of self-censorship. Access probably is
restricted even further by the U.S. govern-
ment’s sponsorship of reverse filtering, which
encourages Web sites to prevent access from
Cuba and other countries.
Internet in Cuba
In October 1996 Cuba first connected full time to
the Internet, and in 1998 Cuba had only a single
64-Kbps satellite connection run by Sprint in
Florida and allowed by an exception for commu-
nications to the U.S. trade embargo.1 More
recent legislation forbids U.S. investment in
Cuban telecommunications and hampers acqui-
sition of Cuban IP addresses; these policies, as
well as Cuba’s own economic policies, have hin-
dered connectivity.2 Currently Cuba still uses its
satellite connection with a 65 Mb/s upload band-
width and a 124 Mb/s download bandwidth for
the entire country.3
In 1998, out of a population of eleven mil-
lion, approximately 200 government-approved
scientists, medical researchers, and government
officials had Internet access from their desktops
and 5,000 had e-mail addresses, used on Cuban
intranets that remained entirely within the coun-
try.4 By 2000 there were 6,000 computers linked
to the Internet and approximately 80,000 Cubans
possessed e-mail accounts, but only half of
those accounts had full Internet access—
accounts were selectively granted by the 
government, and development focused on gov-
ernment and tourism efforts. The country had
only a single Internet café and banned personal
computing purchases.5 Currently Cuba has
approximately 480,000 email accounts6 and
190,000 regular Internet users (less than 2 per-
cent of the population).7 The cost of public
Internet access (approximately USD4.50 per
hour, or half the average monthly wage) and the
very slow connections prohibit most Cubans
from using the international Internet connections;
most Cubans choose the national intranet
instead (approximately USD1.50 per hour).8 In
2005 Cuban computer ownership was 3.3 per
100 inhabitants.9 An unknown number of Cubans
illegally access the Internet through black market
purchases of access or illegally shared author-
ized connections.10
Although the Cuban people primarily use
connections to send e-mail, the Cuban govern-
ment hopes to use the Internet to spread its polit-
ical messages, promote tourism, and improve
the efficiency of medical services.11
Cuba
ONI did not carry out empirical testing for Internet filtering in Cuba for this report.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Cuban executive branch controls govern-
mental power, the law criminalizes dissent and
permits imprisonment and surveillance without
cause, and the court system lacks independ-
ence, preventing fair trials with adequate
defense.12
Upon the arrival of a Cuban Internet con-
nection, the government declared Internet
access a “fundamental right” of the Cuban peo-
ple.13 However, Cuban Internet use also has
been restricted since its beginning, with the 1996
Decree-Law 209 requiring accreditation for
Internet use and outlawing Internet use “in viola-
tion of Cuban society’s moral principles or the
country’s laws” as well as e-mail messages that
“jeopardize national security.”14 All Internet
access requires government authorization, and
the Cuban Ministry of Computer Technology and
Communications has overseen Internet and
computer use since January 2000.15
In 1998 the Centro Nacional de Intercambio
Automatizado de Información (CENIAI) was the
only Cuban Internet service provider (ISP).16 By
2000 the International Telecommunication Union
reported full competition in the Cuban ISP mar-
ket.17 This level of competition is a contrast to the
monopolies in the various telephone, data, and
television markets;18 however, all ISPs were
under government control and oversight, and of
the ISPs, only CENIAI provided personal Internet
access to Cuban citizens.19 All services, includ-
ing ISPs, are subject to licensing.20
In terms of hardware restrictions, purchases
of computers were limited to foreign nationals
and government officials in 1998.21 Since 2002,
purchases by private individuals of computers,
printers, and other hardware have been banned
by a ministry of domestic commerce decree, and
modem sales were banned earlier.22
Reporters Without Borders considers Cuba
“one of the world’s 10 most repressive countries
[in regard to] online free expression” because of
the highly limited access and the severe punish-
ment of illegal Internet use, including “counter-
revolutionary” usage.23 The restrictions stem
from the strong desire of the Cuban government
to prevent attacks upon its political ideology from
broad access to contrary views.24
The restriction of access to the Internet as a
whole is the most significant governmental con-
trol. In addition to government prohibition of pri-
vate computer sales, the Cuban police have
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Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................77 6.76
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)....................................100 6.97
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ers and modems, claiming that the machines
were illegal or were used against the govern-
ment.25 The lack of private materials forces most
Cubans to use public access points. These sites
generally require ID and registration, and many
only access national e-mail and Cuban intranets;
the government limits use of most hotel and
cybercafé Internet connections to foreign
tourists.26 Additionally, the Cuban government
openly prohibits the use of IP telephony.27
The government further restricts Internet use
by having all legal Cuban Internet traffic pass
through state-run ISPs, which use software to
detect politically dissident information.28 This 
filtering includes the monitoring of e-mail messages
prior to their being sent or received.29 Tests and
investigation by Reporters Without Borders found
that very few Web sites are actually blocked from
access, but e-mail and word processing pro-
grams automatically close for “state security rea-
sons” upon detecting mention of dissidents or
other politically sensitive issues.30
For those who gain Internet access and use
it illegally, the penalties are severe. In 2002 thirty-one
people were sanctioned for improper Internet use
or use of e-mail addresses that did not belong to
them.31 Penalties for Internet violations include
twenty years in prison for “counter-revolutionary”
article writing and five years for connecting ille-
gally.32 Twenty-four independent journalists cur-
rently are serving prison sentences in Cuba of up
to twenty-seven years for Internet activity.33
The harsh penalties and pervasive monitor-
ing, particularly when combined with requirement
of name and ID for access, makes free Internet
usage difficult and dangerous. E-mail users
restrict the contents of their messages because
of fear of state monitoring.34 Cuban Internet poli-
cies lead to self-censorship.
Reported reverse filtering by the United
States
Historically the U.S. government has placed 
considerable emphasis on influencing Cuban
communications, creating specific policies for
these technologies and spending considerable
time and resources on anti-Castro radio and tel-
evision programming, such as TV Martí.35 The
United States exerts some open control over the
Cuban Internet, preventing U.S. investors from
spending on the Cuban telecommunications
market, requiring special U.S. Department of
Treasury licensing for Cuban satellite connec-
tions, and prohibiting the direct sale of U.S. hard-
ware and software.36
However, the United States is also suspect-
ed of engaging in less-public controls by reverse
filtering and the promotion of reverse filtering. In
a memo of April 15, 1994, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) included Cuba on a list of
countries to block from using NSF servers, a pol-
icy reversed several months later under pressure
from anti-Castro politicians who wanted to use
information technology to sway the population
against the Cuban government.37 Although this
particular block is no longer in effect, it does set
a precedent for U.S. governmental interest in
using route-filtering to prevent Cuban access.
More recently, in 2004, a report was made of a
private Web site being requested by the U.S.
government to refrain from conducting business
with Cuba, among other countries.38
Conclusion
Cuba does not have the resources to provide
Internet access for all of its citizens, particularly
considering the higher prices caused by the U.S.
trade embargo. However, the resources the gov-
ernment does devote to Internet development do
not promote broad and open access. Government
monitors, harsh penalties, and self-censorship
discourage the transfer of politically sensitive
information, and access is limited to government-
approved individuals. The approved Cuban
users may also be limited by reverse filtering. The
Cuban Internet environment obstructs freedom of
information and freedom of expression.
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Currently there is no evidence of Internet filter-
ing in Egypt, although a small group of politi-
cally sensitive Web sites have been blocked in
the past. Online writers and bloggers have
been harassed and detained for their activities
online and offline. Current laws allow jail terms
for journalists, editors, and online writers.
Background
Freedom of the press and freedom of expression
have traditionally faced severe limits in Egypt,
particularly in the spheres of religion and politics.
July 2006 amendments to Egypt’s Press Law left
intact provisions that criminalize criticizing the
president or the leaders of foreign countries and
“spreading false news.” Although local bloggers
and human rights organizations now routinely
use the Internet to cross the “red lines” that for-
merly circumscribed public speech, the Egyptian
government monitors online communications
and, in some cases, has harassed and detained
people for their online activities. Though no laws
specifically empower the Egyptian government 
to filter Web sites, provisions of the Penal Code
and the Emergency Law (effective since 1981)1
provide the government with broad authority to
restrict and monitor communications. Although
many journalists do criticize the government with-
out repercussion, the government detained and
beat several journalists in 2006. 
Internet in Egypt
Since introducing Internet service in 1993, 
the Egyptian government has embarked on an
ambitious program to expand Web access. The
country has about five million Internet users,
making up approximately 6.75 percent of the
total population.2 The government’s “Free
Internet Program,” which allows any Egyptian
with a computer, a modem, and a phone line to
RESULTS AT A GLANCE
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access the Internet for the price of a local phone
call, has led to a sharp rise in Internet use and
has served as a model for other developing
countries.3 As only 3.78 percent of people own
personal computers,4 most users gain access
through one of Egypt’s four hundred5 Internet
cafés, a Mobile Internet Unit,6 or nearly 1,300
public information technology clubs.7 These
clubs allow users to access the Internet for a
small fee; they are affiliated with the Ministry of
Communication and are located in public build-
ings such as schools.8 In 2004 the “PC for Every
Home” initiative helped 120,000 people obtain a
personal computer through a combination of
low-cost hardware and government financing.9
The government is experimenting with WiMax
technology that could provide vast areas of the
countryside with high-speed, wireless access.10
Despite all of these efforts, Internet access
remains most prevalent in the cities.11
Egypt boasts the largest fixed-line commu-
nications network in the Arab world. Where many
nations in the region are serviced by state-owned
companies or monopolies, Egypt has licensed
four Internet carriers and eight data service
providers, along with hundreds of Internet service
providers (ISPs).12 Service is currently provided
by 211 ISPs, the largest of which are
LINKdotNET, a private company founded in 1992,
and TEData, the Internet arm of the giant Telecom
Egypt, slated for privatization in 2007 whose
shares are 80 percent owned by the Egyptian
government and 20 percent free float. In 2004,
the government, along with nine companies,
introduced ADSL service to Egypt. As of 2006,
the service had approximately 130,000 sub-
scribers at an average monthly cost of 95
Egyptian pounds (USD17).13 In 2007, the
National Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority (NTRA) is expected to issue two new
licenses for international telecommunications
services, and the country has recently liberalized
the Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) market.14
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Despite Egypt’s progressive attitude toward
industry regulation, the Egyptian government
continues to rely on legal and extralegal meas-
ures to restrict the flow of information. Egypt’s
Emergency Law allows authorities to detain 
individuals without charge or trial for prolonged
periods of time and to censor, confiscate, and
close down any publication that the Ministry of
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Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................71 4.14
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................111 4.89
Rule of law (out of 208).........................................................95 5.05
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Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................90 5.11
Internet users (% of population) ............................................6.8 3.69
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successive three-year periods since President
Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Although in
his re-election campaign Hosni Mubarak said he
would replace the Emergency Law with an anti-
terrorism law, in May of 2006 parliament extend-
ed the Emergency Law for another two years
while the government drafts the new law.16
Much-anticipated amendments to Egypt’s
Press Law, which Mubarak signed in July 2006,
struck many of the old law’s most controversial
provisions. However, it left intact prison sen-
tences for journalists who criticize the president
or foreign leaders, or who “spread false news,”17
as mentioned previously. The laws cover print
and “other” publications, which courts have inter-
preted as including online writings.18
Although there is no law that explicitly
empowers the government to block Web sites, a
2006 court decision maintained that the Ministry
of Communications & Information Technology is
permitted to “block, suspend or shut down any
website liable to pose a threat to national securi-
ty.”19 This ruling gives the Department for
Confronting Computer and Internet Crime, a spe-
cial unit within the Ministry of Interior, additional
tools to pursue Web sites deemed “threatening,”
and some worry that such pursuit is escalating.20
In January 2007, the Ministry of Interior
announced plans to propose an international ini-
tiative to combat terrorism online. No Web sites
are currently blocked outright, but security offi-
cials monitor data traffic, including e-mail, blogs,
bulletin boards, and other Web sites. Internet
café owners have reported that security officials
have instructed them to keep lists of their cus-
tomers and the customers’ identification num-
bers.21 Furthermore, Internet café owners must
seek a license from the Ministry of
Telecommunications;22 those without licenses
can be shut down.23 Owners are sometimes
given lists of people who are to be banned from
using their cafés, and they are always supposed
to check IDs; some places have signs that
“announce ‘No entry to political or sexual sites by
order of the State Security.’”24
The government has arrested writers for
their online activities. In 2003, for example, State
Security officers detained activist Ashraf Ibrahim
on charges of “spreading false news” for e-mail-
ing accounts and photographs of police violence
at anti-war demonstrations to international
human rights organizations. On February 22,
2007, a criminal court in Alexandria sentenced
22-year-old blogger Abd al-Karim Nabil Sulaiman
to four years in prison on charges of “vilifying
Islam” and “insulting the president.”25 The
Egyptian government has also used the Internet
to entrap men engaged in consensual homosex-
ual conduct. Though it is not officially against the
law to engage in homosexual acts, dozens of
men have been charged with “debauchery” or
“distributing obscene material” after chatting with
police who were posing as gay men online.26
ONI testing results
ONI conducted in-country tests in fall 2006 and
found no evidence of Internet filtering in Egypt. In
2005, most ISPs blocked www.ikhwanonline.com,
the official site of the Muslim Brotherhood,
Egypt’s largest opposition movement. At one
time, the popular ISP LINKdotNET blocked
www.alshaab.com, the Web site of the Labor
Party’s biweekly newsletter, but no longer does.27
Though there have been reports that Web
sites for the Muslim Brotherhood are regularly
blocked, neither the official Web site for the
Muslim Brotherhood, www.ikhwanonline.com,
nor the unofficial www.ikhwanweb.com, were
blocked when the testing was conducted.
A number of ISPs also offer optional filters
that block pornography; TEData offers a “Family
Internet” plan that filters pornography and dating
sites. Some of these packages restrict blogs and
other Web sites as well.28
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Conclusion
Internet users in Egypt have unfettered access to
the Internet but the government monitors online
activities and has prosecuted online writers.
Bloggers have reported instances of harassment
and intimidation on the part of security forces. 
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Opponents of the current political regime have
increasingly used online media to criticize the
government, and Ethiopia has responded by
implementing a filtering regime that blocks
access to popular blogs and the Web sites of
many news organizations, dissident political
parties, and human rights groups. However, the
filtering is not comprehensive, and much of the
media content that the government is attempt-
ing to censor can be found on sites that are not
banned.
Background
Ethiopia’s record on human rights and political
openness took a turn for the worse after the leg-
islative elections of May 2005. Though originally
hailed by the U.S. State Department as “a mile-
stone in creating a new, more competitive multi-
party political system in one of Africa’s largest
and most important countries,”1 the elections
were quickly followed by protests and riots by
opposition parties alleging voter intimidation and
rigging by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF).2 Ethiopian police in
turn arrested more than 10,000 people in Addis
Ababa during the protests. According to Human
Rights Watch, most were released within a
month, but hundreds remained locked up. The
government recently released 400 prisoners 
in March of last year, but it is unknown how many
are still imprisoned.3 The EPRDF continued its
crackdown on opposition by arresting seventy-
six “politicians, journalists, and civil society
activists”4 and charging them with “‘treason’,
‘conspiracy’ to overthrow the government and
‘genocide.’”5 In foreign affairs, Ethiopia is
involved in a border dispute with Eritrea, the sub-
ject of a war between the two states from 1998 to
2000.6 Ethiopia, on behalf of the U.N.-recognized
transitional government of Somalia, has also
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entered into conflict with the Union of Islamic
Courts (UIC). The UIC is an Islamist group vying
for control of Somalia.7 Because of the rise of
Islamist extremism in Somalia, the United States
views Ethiopia as an important ally in the global
war on terror. As a result, Ethiopia still receives
the largest amount of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan
Africa despite U.S. disapproval of the repression
following the elections of May 2005.8 Self-censor-
ship in the media is driven by the fear of govern-
ment reprisal. Foreign journalists have difficulties
acquiring authorization to work in Ethiopia, and
an Associated Press reporter was sent out of the
country in early 2007 after “tarnish[ing] the image
of the country.”9 The government has reportedly
entered into censorship of blogs and opposition
Web sites, though it officially denies doing so.10
Internet in Ethiopia
Ethiopia lags behind much of Africa in Internet
availability and is currently attempting a broad
expansion of access throughout the country,
though efforts have been hampered by the large-
ly rural makeup of the Ethiopian population and
the government’s refusal to permit any privatiza-
tion of the telecommunications market. Only
113,000 people had Internet access in 2005, for
a penetration rate of 0.2 percent, one of the low-
est in Africa.11 The state-owned Ethiopian
Telecommunications Corporation is the sole
Internet service provider (ISP) in the country.
Internet cafés are a major source of access in
urban areas, and an active community of blog-
gers and online journalists now plays an impor-
tant role in offering alternative news sources and
venues for political dialogue. However, three-
quarters of the country’s Internet cafés are in the
capital city, and even there access is often slow
and unreliable.12
In 2005, Ethiopia announced plans to spend
hundreds of millions of dollars over the next three
years to connect all of the country’s schools, hos-
pitals, and government offices—and most of its
rural population—to broadband Internet via satel-
lite or fiber-optic cable.13 Currently satellite
Internet is available to some large corporations,
but individuals are not permitted to have private
satellite connections. The Ethiopian Telecommu-
nications Commission (ETC) also bans the use of
Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) in Internet




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ...........896 3.39
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................42 1.13
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................42 1.31
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................170 1.15
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................150 3.46
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................168 2.80
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................173 1.91
Internet users (% of population) ............................................0.2 3.08
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006b; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Ethiopian government maintains strict con-
trols over access to the Internet and online
media, despite constitutional guarantees of free-
dom of the press and free access to information.
The state-owned ETC and the Ethiopian
Telecommunication Agency (ETA) have exclusive
control of Internet access throughout the country.
The ETA is not an independent regulatory body
and its staff and telecommunications policies are
controlled by the national government.15 It grants
the ETC a monopoly license as Ethiopia’s sole
ISP and seller of domain names under the coun-
try code top-level domain, “.et”. Internet cafés
and other resellers of Internet services must be
licensed by the ETA and purchase their access
through the ETC.16 Individual purchasers must
also apply for Internet connections through the
ETC. Though Ethiopia has considered some lim-
ited privatization of the telecommunications mar-
ket, these plans are on hold indefinitely despite
acknowledgments that the ETC has not been an
effective service provider.17
In the face of political turmoil over the last
two years, the ruling party in Ethiopia has
become an increasingly active censor. In mid-
2006 the government cut off access within 
the country to online publications run by political
dissidents and to all blogs hosted by
www.blogspot.com (the ETC claimed that the
blockage was a technical glitch but offered no
further explanation).18 The government has also
banned reporters for the state-run news agency
from using the Internet at all and now frequently
jails journalists, including online journalists, for
charges including treason; most private news
outlets have now been shut down.19 The
Committee to Protect Journalists named Ethiopia
one of the top four jailers of reporters in the world
in 2006.20
In late December 2006, the ETA began
requiring Internet cafés to log the names and
addresses of individual customers, apparently as
part of an effort to track users who engaged in
illegal activities online. The lists are to be turned
over to the police, and Internet café owners who
fail to register users face prison.21 Bloggers
believe that their communications are being
monitored.22 The state maintains the right to cut
off Internet access to resellers or customers 
who do not comply with security guidelines. In
practice, it has shut down Internet cafés in the
past for offering VoIP services and other policy
violations.23
ONI testing results
ONI conducted testing on Ethiopia’s sole ISP, the
ETC. The ETC blocking effort appears to focus on
independent media, blogs, and political reform
and human rights sites, though the filtering is not
very thorough and many prominent sites that are
critical of the Ethiopian government remain avail-
able within the country.
The prime target of Ethiopia’s filtering is
political bloggers, many of whom oppose the
current regime. Ethiopia blocks all the blogs host-
ed at www.blogspot.com and at www.nazret.com,
a site that aggregates Ethiopian news and has
space for blogs and forums. Though many of the
filtered nazret blogs are critical of the govern-
ment, the scope of the filtering is wide: one
blocked blogger wrote solely about the 2006
World Cup. The blogspot-hosted sites that are
blocked include Ethiopian and international com-
mentators on politics and culture, including pop-
ular blogs EthioPundit and Enset.
The Web sites of opposition political parties
appeared to be a priority for blocking (www.kini
jit.org, www.hebret.com, and others), as did pages
for groups that represent ethnic minorities within
Ethiopia (www.anaukjustice.org, www.oromia.org).
Although women’s rights groups in general were
not filtered, the ETC did block one Web site
aimed at connecting women involved in politics
in Asia (www.onlinewomeninpolitics.org).
Many independent news sites covering
Ethiopian politics or compiling international and
local coverage were blocked, including Cyber-
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Ethiopia, the Tensai-Ethiopia radio site, Ethio-
Media, EthioX, and EthioIndex. But some media
sites carrying news and editorials that are unfa-
vorable to the Ethiopian government remained
available, including Addis Voice and Ethiopian
Review, which had been blocked as part of the
ETC’s initial filtering of blogs and media sites in
2006.24 International news sites such as CNN
and Voice of America radio were not blocked.
Some human rights sites focusing specifi-
cally on Ethiopia were filtered. The Ethiopian
Democratic Action League, which advocates for
political prisoners, was blocked, as was a page
calling for the freedom of jailed opposition leader
Yacob Haile-Mariam (www.freeyacob.com) and a
site about the imprisonment of human rights
activist Mesfin Woldemariam (www.mesfinwolde
mariam.org). However, information about these
and other imprisoned dissidents is available via a
number of human rights pages that are not
blocked, including Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, and various Ethiopian-
focused rights groups. Reporters Without
Borders, which has chronicled Ethiopian Internet
filtering on its Web site (www.rsf.org), is not
banned.
ONI testing found that search engines,
including Google, Yahoo, MSN, and others, were
available in Ethiopia, and no e-mail sites have
been blocked. Though VoIP has been banned
within the country, sites offering that service, such
as Skype, were not filtered. The ETC did not
block censorship circumvention tools such as
www.anonymizer.com, and Internet users within
Ethiopia appear to have found alternative means
of accessing banned sites.25
Conclusion
Ethiopia’s current approach to filtering can be
somewhat spotty, with the exception of the blan-
ket block on two major blog hosts. Much of the
banned political and human rights–related con-
tent is available at sites that are not blocked. The
authors of the blocked blogs have in many cases
continued to write to an international audience,
apparently without sanction. But Ethiopia is
increasingly jailing journalists and the govern-
ment has shown an increasing propensity toward
repressive behavior online; it seems likely that the
trend will be more extensive censorship as
Internet access expands across the country.
When the ETC becomes more sophisticated as
an ISP, its filtering regime may become broader
and more comprehensive, particularly if the
Ethiopian political situation remains unstable.
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As a stable democracy with strong protections
for press freedom, India’s experiments with
Internet filtering have been brought into the fold
of public discourse. The selective censorship
of Web sites and blogs since 2003, made even
more disjointed by the non-uniform responses
of Internet service providers (ISPs), has
inspired a clamor of opposition. Clearly gov-
ernment regulation and implementation of fil-
tering are still evolving.
Background
India is the world’s second most populous
nation, with a population of over one billion. India
generally respects the right to free speech and
the right to publish sensitive materials. A wide
array of political, social, and economic beliefs is
represented by the Indian media, generally with-
out repercussion.1 However, targeted censorship
around issues of political and social conflict is a
reality, particularly in areas of unrest. With the
political turmoil present in the continuing dispute
with Pakistan over Kashmir as well as fighting
between religious groups, and issues between
castes, the state takes an interest in censoring
offensive material that could induce violence.
Rarely are journalists detained on censorship
issues, and they are often quickly released if
held. Most violent attacks on journalists are car-
ried out by religious or ethnic groups, with occa-
sional harassment by state authorities.2
Internet in India
With an estimated forty-eight million users, the
Internet community in India is the fifth largest in
the world, although Internet users formed only
about 4.3 percent of the country’s population in
2005.3 Access is gradually expanding from the
most heavily populated urban centers, currently
41 percent of users, to small cities and towns.4
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Because 71 percent of the population lives in
rural areas, and because the gap between rural
and urban teledensity is increasing, the majority
of Indians are shut out of the Internet.5 In
decreasing order of popularity, points of access
are cybercafés, home, work or business, and
schools, with cybercafés remaining the most
popular option.6 An estimated 38 percent of all
Internet users in India are “heavy users” and
spend an average of 8.2 hours per week on the
Internet.7 A Windows Live Spaces report on a
thriving blogging community in India, estimated
at 14 percent of Internet users, found that a vast
majority of bloggers are men under the age of
thirty-five; this conforms to the demographic
snapshot of Internet users as predominantly
male, middle class, and young.8
There are 153 ISPs in operation today,
although the majority market share (62 percent)
remains with the public-sector corporations
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) (43 per-
cent) and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited
(MTNL) (19 percent).9 In the mid-1980s two state-
owned corporations were formed to provide lim-
ited telecom services—Videsh Sanchar Nigam
Limited (VSNL) for international long distance,
and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited
(MTNL) for Mumbai and Delhi. In 1995 VSNL was
the first to provide Internet services in India, and
it was privatized in 2002. The first Action Plan of
the National Task Force on Information
Technology and Software Development, created
in May 1998, sought to create Internet access
nodes in all district headquarters by January
2000. The government began allowing ISPs to
legally handle Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
in April 2002. As of March 2006, 134 ISPs 
were authorized to offer Internet-based telephony
services, but only 32 were actually providing the
service.10
In January 2007 the Department of
Telecommunications (DOT) announced that it
would be installing filtering mechanisms at
India’s international gateways. The head of the
Internet Service Providers Association of India
(ISPAI) stated that these new “landing stations”
would be able to both engage in centralized fil-
tering of Web sites and blocking of VoIP telepho-
ny services such as Yahoo, MSN, and Skype
(and many more) that have not technically been




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........3,118 3.82
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................63 4.51
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................61 3.17
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................126 3.86
Rule of law (out of 208).........................................................92 5.17
Voice and accountability (out of 208).....................................93 5.71
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................119 4.12
Internet users (% of population) ............................................5.4 3.57
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
Legal and regulatory frameworks
India guarantees freedom of speech and expres-
sion in its constitution, but reserves the authority
to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests
of the sovereignty and integrity of India, state
security, foreign relations, public order, decency,
or morality; or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation, or incitement to an offense.12 Each
form of media—print, film, and television—is
governed by its own regulatory apparatus. For
example, the Press Council of India (PCI), a
quasi-judicial body with two-thirds membership
of representatives from print media, has a man-
date to protect the independence of the press.
The PCI adjudicates complaints against the
media, issues normative guidelines, and per-
forms a public education function.13 In contrast,
films cannot be exhibited without certification of a
board appointed by the central government.14
Private FM radio station ownership was legalized
in 2000, but ownership licenses were granted
only for stations airing entertainment or educa-
tional content; commercial and community FM
radio stations are not allowed to broadcast news
and current affairs.15 The state still controls all AM
radio stations.
Until the late 1990s, the Indian government
had control over all aspects of the telecommuni-
cations sector—policy, regulation, and opera-
tions.16 The New Internet Policy introduced in
November 1998 allowed private companies to
apply for licenses to become ISPs and either
lease transmission network capacity or build their
own, thereby ending the monopoly over domes-
tic long distance networks of the Department of
Telecoms. Most, however, opted to use the lines
already established by the government.17
In June 2000 the Indian Parliament created
the IT Act to provide a legal framework to regulate
Internet use and commerce, including digital sig-
natures, security, and hacking. The act criminal-
izes the publishing of obscene information elec-
tronically, and grants police powers to search any
premises without a warrant and arrest individuals
in violation of the act. 18
The Indian Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT-IN) was set up by the Department of
Information Technology under the IT Act to imple-
ment India’s filtering regime.19 By stretching the
prohibition against publishing obscene content
to include the filtering of Web sites, CERT-IN was
empowered in 2003 to review complaints and act
as the sole authority for issuing blocking instruc-
tions to the Department of Telecommunications
(DOT).20 Only specified individuals or institutions
can make official complaints and recommenda-
tion for investigation to CERT-IN, a list that is lim-
ited to high-ranking government officials, the
police, government agencies, and “any others as
may be specified by the Government.”21 Many
have argued that giving CERT-IN this power
through executive order violates constitutional
jurisprudence holding that specific legislation
must be passed before the government can
encroach on individual rights. The blocking
mechanism created under the Act provides for
no review or appeal procedures, except in court,
and is permanent in nature. When CERT-IN has
issued orders to block specific Web sites, no
communication has been made to the public
beforehand.22
Another basis for filtering was demonstrated
with the blocking of the site www.hinduunity.org
on April 28, 2004, reportedly ordered by the
Mumbai police on the grounds that it contained
inflammatory anti-Islamic material.23 Police com-
missioners, who can exercise the powers of
executive magistrates in times of emergency, can
block Web sites containing material constituting
a nuisance or threat to public safety under
Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.24
While major and small ISPs immediately com-
plied with the blocking request, one of the
nation’s largests ISPs, Sify, refrained from block-
ing the Web site, arguing that only CERT-IN had
the authority to issue blocking orders.25
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Filtering can also be mandated through
licensing requirements. For example, ISPs seek-
ing licenses to provide Internet services with the
DOT “shall block Internet sites and/or individual
subscribers, as identified and directed by the
Telecom Authority from time to time” in the inter-
ests of “national security.”26 License agreements
also require ISPs to prevent the transmission of
obscene or otherwise “objectionable material.”27
The proposed amendment to the IT Act
brought before Parliament on December 15,
2006, aims to address growing concerns about
information security and data theft that threaten
the vitality of India as an outsourcing hub.28
Under specific conditions, the bill absolves inter-
mediaries (including cybercafés) of responsibility
for making available information or links created
by third parties.29 The government has also cre-
ated “guidelines” for ISPs to follow, such as the
monitoring of subscriber traffic by keyword and
the disclosure of dynamic IP addresses of clients
by ISPs.30
According to the Right to Information Act
passed in 2005, designated government officers
are required to respond to requests for informa-
tion within thirty days.31 Although it is not clear
whether information about the blocking of Web
sites falls within the exceptions listed in the Act,32
which include information relating to national
security and state sovereignty, individuals have
filed RTI requests seeking greater transparency
in the filtering process.33
ONI testing results
Results from ONI testing reveal that Indian ISPs
selectively filter sites identified by government
authorities as relating to national unity and state
security. ONI conducted testing on Bharti, Direct,
Reliance, YOU Telecom (formerly known as
Iqara), Pacenet, and VSNL. Variations in blocking
among ISPs of the same limited range of sites
suggest that CERT-IN and the DOT continue to
rely on ISPs to implement filtering instructions.
Although obscene information is the only type of
content to be made illegal under the IT Act, ONI
found no evidence that pornography is filtered in
India. Rather, nearly all the sites filtered had
already been reported publicly as blocked at
some time.
The only site made inaccessible by all ISPs
tested was the Hindu Unity Web site (www.hindu
unity.org). (A number of different URLs direct to
this site; these URLs were blocked with varying
consistency between ISPs.) Further evidence that
filtering has yet to be implemented through a uni-
form process can be found in the inconsistencies
in filtering of the Web sites named in the CERT-IN
blocking order following the bombings of subur-
ban trains in Mumbai on July 11, 2006. On July
13, 2006, CERT-IN ordered access to seventeen
Web sites blocked, reportedly because the
attackers were believed to have communicated
via the blogosphere. The Web sites that were
ordered to be blocked included “American right-
wing” sites (www.mypetjawa.mu.nu; www
.mackers-world.com), Hindu extremist or
“Hindutva” sites, and a defunct Web site sup-
porting the formation of a “Dalit” homeland with-
in India (www.dalitstan.org).34
Among the ISPs, Bharti, YOU Telecom,
Reliance, and VSNL blocked the majority of sites
included on the July 13 CERT-IN order. In this
context, the personal Web site of a member of
the Hindutva party VHP (and a university student
in Indiana), www.rahulyadav.com, was filtered
almost certainly because it was included in the
July CERT-IN order, but the actual Web site of the
VHP party (www.vhp.org) was available on all
ISPs tested.
In 2006, filtering requests were also generated
by individuals protesting content they considered
offensive or obscene. In response to a Public
Interest Litigation (PIL) petition calling for the ban
of the social networking site Orkut for hosting a
“We Hate India” community, the Bombay High
Court had directed the Maharashtra government
to issue notice to Google for “alleged spread of
hatred about India” on Orkut.35 A month later, in
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response to protests over an “anti-Shivaji” com-
munity on Orkut, Pune police banned Orkut, tem-
porarily shut down cybercafés where users were
found to be using the site, and began an investi-
gation under the IT Act and penal code provi-
sions for obscene publications and religious
insult.36 In December 2006, a government official
made a similar blocking request after reportedly
“obscene” material about “Hindu girls” was post-
ed on Orkut.37 However, none of these efforts
resulted in a comprehensive ban on Orkut, for
though it was intermittently available in Pune it
was nevertheless accessible on all ISPs tested.
ONI testing determined that filtering
occurred at the ISP level, with considerable vari-
ation between ISPs. Direct, Pacenet, and VSNL
blocked more of the tested URLs than did other
ISPs. Filtering focused primarily on Web sites
seen as a threat to national security, as well as
sites offering untraceable communication such
as the VoIP site www.hotfoon.com and the SMS
gateway www.clickatell.com. Other sites, such as
www.kahane.org, appear to have been blocked
only because they shared an ISP address with a
targeted site.
In contrast to the collateral blocking of 
Web sites in August 200338 and July 2006, where
ISPs in both incidents responded to CERT-IN
orders by cutting off access to parent Web sites
including Google’s www.blogspot.com, www.type
pad.com, and Yahoo!’s www.geocities.com,
banned Web site owners continue to migrate
their content successfully to other domains. For
example, while ISPs are clearly blocking on the
subdomain level (for example, the site
www.princesskimberley.blogspot.com is filtered
on four ISPs tested), the reportedly banned
Maoist Web site www.peoplesmarch.com was
accessible in other forms (www.peoplesmarch.
wordpress.com, www.naxalrevolution.blogspot.
com) on all ISPs at time of testing.
Conclusion
Amidst widespread speculation in the media and
blogosphere about the state of filtering in India,
the sites actually blocked indicate that while the
filtering system in place yields inconsistent
results, it nevertheless continues to be aligned
with and driven by government efforts. For exam-
ple, efforts to block certain communities on
Orkut, and in some instances the entire site alto-
gether, have been initiated largely by individuals,
but the government response has not resulted in
the systematic blocking of Orkut by the ISPs that
ONI tested. Government attempts at filtering
have not been entirely effective, as blocked con-
tent has quickly migrated to other Web sites and
users have found ways to circumvent filtering.
The government has also been criticized for a
poor understanding of the technical feasibility of
censorship and for haphazardly choosing which
Web sites to block. The amended IT Act, absolv-
ing intermediaries from being responsible for
third-party created content, could signal stronger
government monitoring in the future.
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Since 2000—in the midst of a media crack-
down that has seen the judiciary close more
than 100 publications, inspiring widespread
self-censorship—the Islamic Republic of Iran
has installed one of the most extensive techni-
cal filtering systems in the world. Iranian
authorities have detained dozens of people for
publishing material online.1 In addition, Iran
has moved to contain the Internet within height-
ened and more explicit regulation, accommo-
dating aggressive online censorship policies
through a complex system of political networks
and their affiliated government institutions.
Background
Regulation of freedom of expression in Iran is
extensive and the parameters of prohibited con-
duct are vague and ambiguous, or simply unde-
fined. It is prohibited to publish sensitive informa-
tion and matters relating to atheism without prior
approval, and media cannot promote social dis-
cord or divisions, dissent against state interests,
insult Islam or public officials, or quote from
deviant parties or parties opposed to Islam.2
Compared with the constitutionally mandated
state control of radio and television,3 and the
repression against independent papers and
reformist voices in print media, the space initially
afforded to free expression online was a unique
phenomenon for Iran. However, after several
years of relative openness in Iranian cyberspace,
bloggers, journalists, and others began to be tar-
geted, detained, and even tortured for their online
activities. And zealous new legislation places
sweeping controls over what people may post to
the Internet.
Internet in Iran
The Internet in Iran has experienced the most
explosive growth of the countries in the Middle
RESULTS AT A GLANCE
No evidence Suspected Selective Substantial Pervasive









East, with an increase of 2,900 percent between
2000 and 2005.4 Today an estimated 7.2 million
people are online in Iran, and there are approxi-
mately 400,000 blogs in Farsi.5 Yet even as the
government continues to promote the Internet as
an engine of economic growth, one Iranian offi-
cial recently boasted that Iran has censored ten
million Web sites, and that the judiciary requests
an additional 1,000 sites to be blocked every
month.6
On October 11, 2006, an order reportedly
issued to Internet service providers (ISPs) by the
Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology (MCIT) made providing Internet serv-
ices—for use in private or public places—at a
speed higher than 128 kilobytes per second ille-
gal, reportedly with the aim of hindering users’
ability to download foreign cultural products
(such as music and films) and organize political
opposition.7 Such an about-face contradicts
Iran’s fourth Five-Year Development Plan, which
calls for 1.5 million high-speed Internet ports
throughout the country.8
At that time, some 250,000 users were using
broadband services, with demand growing
sharply.9 Though the order applies to both public
and home use, high-speed Internet services are
most commonly available for commercial and
office use. Over the previous two years eleven
companies had been licensed to provide such
high-speed services free from government com-
petition and had invested significant capital in
importing the required machinery and setting up
the required infrastructure.10 The ban on high-
speed Internet services has pushed these private
sector companies to the verge of bankruptcy.
Furthermore, projects such as the USD6 million
Internet television project of the ITC (Information
Technology Company), as well as virtual surgery
lab projects and e-universities and many more
scientific and commercial projects being imple-
mented in the country may be doomed to fail.11
Members of parliament are campaigning
against the broadband ban and have started a
Web site, www.more-speed-more-progress.ir, which
is hosted on Iranian government servers.12
Although the head of the Public Relations
Department of the Regulation Organization said
that the ban would be lifted in four months’ time,
after the government had had a chance to put in
place measures to more effectively monitor
Internet use, the Minister of the MCIT stated 
that “positive” results could make the measure




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........7,137 4.59
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................71 5.80
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................77 4.73
Human development index (out of 177) .................................96 5.39
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................148 3.47
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................188 2.15
Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................95 4.89
Internet users (% of population) ..........................................10.1 4.00
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
plaint with the Regulation Organization and those
who can demonstrate that they will use broad-
band access for “legitimate” purposes may be
allowed to circumvent the ban.13
Legal and regulatory frameworks
As with all print media under the Press Law,
Internet content providers are subject to two
complementary sets of requirements: they must
produce content within state-defined objectives
and they must refrain from producing state-
defined types of illegal material.14 Thus, through
the judiciary, parliament, and the executive bod-
ies who all exercise the authority to make law,
content providers are encouraged to promote
genuine Islamic culture while being warned
against fomenting social discord or encouraging
dissent against state interests.
The legal status of blogs and Web sites in
Iran has been contested, but starting in 2006 the
government took additional steps to bring them
firmly in hand. First, framing regulations to sys-
tematize control and management of Internet
activity were issued by the government and
signed by the vice president on November 26,
2006. Second, the Bill of Cyber Crimes’
Sanctions (Cyber Crimes Bill) prepared by the
Judiciary’s Committee for Combating Cyber
Crimes on October 12, 2006, was slated to be
signed in to law by parliament;15 this bill applies
to all forms of electronic writings and graphics
and generally any activity within the realm of
cyberspace.
The November 2006 regulations were a
response to a directive of the Supreme Cultural
Revolution Council (SCRC) to manage Internet
activity “while considering individual rights and
safeguarding Islamic, national and cultural val-
ues.”16 The Ministries of Islamic Culture and
Guidance (MICG), Justice, and Information are
the main governmental bodies responsible for
leading this effort, and the MICG was given the
duty to create an infrastructure to systematize
management and stamp out illicit and immoral
content.17 All activities of Web sites and blogs
that do not obtain a license from the MICG are
considered illegal. On January 1, 2007, the MICG
issued a notice requiring all owners of blogs and
Web sites to register by March 1, provide detailed
personal information, and abstain from posting
certain types of content.18 An official from the
Telecommunications Ministry claimed that
enforcement would be impracticable.19
The Cyber Crimes Bill makes ISPs criminally
liable for the content they carry, effectively shifting
the burden of censoring Web sites and potential-
ly e-mail correspondence on to their shoulders.
Under the Cyber Crimes Law, ISPs that do not
abide by government regulations (including filter-
ing regulations) may be temporarily or perma-
nently suspended, depending on the graveness
of the offense, and their owners could face prison
terms.20 Article 18 of the bill requires ISPs to
ensure that “forbidden” content is not displayed
on their servers, that they immediately inform law
enforcement agencies of violations, that they
retain the content as evidence, and that they
restrict access to the prohibited content. The bill
also includes provisions for the protection and
disclosure of confidential data and information as
well as the publishing of obscene content.
Until the introduction of the Cyber Crimes
Bill, the most relevant statute governing the activ-
ities of blogs and Web sites was the 2000 Press
Law. Although experts argued to the contrary,
through the Press Law electronic publications
were subsumed into the definition of press publi-
cations.21 As such, Iranians were theoretically
required to first obtain a license to publish a Web
site or a blog and were subject to the Press Law.
Among the Press Law’s broad prohibitions on
speech are articles that prohibit “promoting sub-
jects that might damage the foundation of the
Islamic Republic … offending the Leader of the
Revolution … or quoting articles from the deviant
press, parties or groups that oppose Islam
(inside and outside the country) in such a manner
as to propagate such ideas.”22 Other provisions
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prohibit insulting Islam or senior religious author-
ities.23 The Press Supervisory Board under the
Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance had
absolute power to revoke licenses, ban publica-
tions, and refer complaints to a special Press
Court.24
As “publications” under the Press Law,
blogs and Web sites that did not obtain licenses
became subject to stricter “General Laws.” As a
part of the “General Laws,” the Penal Code
places further restrictions on speech. The Penal
Code incorporates content-based crimes such
as propaganda against the state (while leaving
“propaganda” undefined).25 Similarly, Article 513
allows for the death penalty or imprisonment of
up to five years for speech deemed to be an
“insult to religion,” but leaves “insult” unde-
fined.26 Article 698 provides maximum sentences
of two years imprisonment or seventy-four lashes
for those convicted of intentionally creating “anx-
iety and unease in the public’s mind,” spreading
“false rumors,” or writing about “acts which are
not true.”27 Article 609 criminalizes criticism of
state officials in connection with carrying out their
work, and calls for a fine, seventy-four lashes, or
between three and six months in prison as pun-
ishment for such “insults.”
ISPs and subscribers are also subject to
prohibitions on twenty types of activities, where
insulting Islam and religious leaders and institu-
tions, as well as fomenting national discord and
promoting drug use or obscenity and immoral
behaviors, are prominent.28
The Committee in Charge of Determining
Unauthorized Sites is legally empowered to iden-
tify sites that carry prohibited content.29
Established in December 2002 (some reports
state June 2003), this Committee notifies the
MICT of criteria for identifying unauthorized Web
sites and what sites shall be blocked. The SCRC
oversees committee members from the Ministry
of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Intelligence
and Security Ministry, and the Sound and Vision
Organization (Islamic Republic of Iran Broad-
casting).30
In February 2007 the online conservative
journal Baztab (www.baztab.com) became the
first site reported to have been blocked by the
November 2006 regulations. According to a gov-
ernment official, Baztab not only failed to apply
for a license, but it also violated the regulations
by disclosing state secrets and other confidential
military information, insulting government offi-
cials, and publishing false news.31 However, the
Supreme Court of Iran ruled against the filtering
of Baztab and it was made accessible inside Iran
again.32 This incident sparked a debate within
Iranian legal and media circles over the authority
of the Committee in Charge of Determining
Unauthorized Sites, and whether as an executive
body (government) it was improperly involved in
making legislative or judicial decisions according
to the constitution.33
However, not all filtering occurs through this
body. The Internet Bureau of the Judiciary also
orders ISPs to block sites through court orders,
which are considered a form of lawful punish-
ment imposed on legal entities.34 Tehran
Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, who has
led harsh crackdowns on media and has also
been implicated in cases of the torture of
detainees, including twenty-one bloggers arrest-
ed in 2004, has also ordered that certain sites be
censored.35 In May 2006 the MICT announced
the formation of a central filtering office, report-
edly to filter illegal content, identify Internet users,
and keep a record of the sites they visit.36 The
MICT subsequently denied having such tracking
capabilities, saying its primary objective was to
block pornography.37
In 2001 the SCRC declared that the govern-
ment was taking control of all access service
providers (ASPs).38 ISPs were required to obtain
bandwidth from these ASPs and also to employ
filtering systems to block access to immoral,
political, and other “undesirable” content while
storing user data and reporting to the ICT
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Ministry.39 ISPs in which the government owns a
share, such as the popular Pars Online, report-
edly filter some sites at their own discretion over
and above what is required by the regulations.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted testing on seven ISPs: APN,
Dana Fajr, Datak, Jahan Nama Co., Pars Online,
Shatel, and Tarashe. ONI testing confirmed that
Iran employs the greatest degree of filtering of all
the countries tested, in both scope and depth of
content. Iran uses a filtering proxy that displays a
blockpage when accessing blocked content.
Heavily filtered types of content include pornog-
raphy, provocative attire, and circumvention
tools, which is characteristic of states that use
commercial software such as SmartFilter. ONI
testing also found significant blocking of content
related to homosexuality, particularly if it had any
connection to Iran; Farsi-language news sites;
and opposition political sites.
A majority of circumvention tools were
blocked by all ISPs, including www.peoples
proxy.com and www.guardster.com. Compared
with anonymizers and proxies, filtering of 
other Internet tools was more selective but 
nevertheless occurred in all categories tested.
Certain multimedia sharing sites, such as
www.metacafe.com and www.photobucket.com,
were completely blocked, while others were less
consistently filtered: the popular photo-sharing
Web site Flickr was blocked on four ISPs at time
of testing, while the video-sharing site YouTube
was blocked on only two. Also filtered in limited
numbers were social networking sites, but at the
time of testing popular social networking sites
such as Myspace and Orkut were universally
available. Some Farsi-language forums for dis-
cussing movies (www.aghaghi.com) and music
(www.roozi.com) were also filtered.
Only a limited number of search engines
were filtered, and then, only on some ISPs.
Among them were www.163.com and the
Chinese site www.sina.com. However, on certain
ISPs—including Shatel, Datak, and Pars Online,
keywords in URL paths were blocked, most often
affecting queries in search engines (e.g.,
http://128.100.171.12/key.php?word=torture).
Of blog-hosting sites tested, only one,
www.livejournal.com, was blocked by all ISPs. A
limited number of other sites, including
www.xanga.com and the blog search engine
www.technorati.com, were blocked by multiple
ISPs. Instead, filtering targeted individual blogs.
A substantial number, though not a majority, of
individual blogs hosted by Blogspot and others
were filtered; these blogs spanned subjects such
as religion, women’s rights, political reform, and
reproductive health. All seven ISPs chose to filter
the same individual blogs, which all happened to
be hosted on Blogspot. Very few of the individual
blogs hosted on Persian-language services,
such as Blogfa and www.persianblog.com, were
filtered by any ISP.
Iran is among the most successful blockers
of pornographic Web sites in countries where
ONI conducted testing. Esmail Radkani, of Iran’s
quasi-official Information Technology Company,
claimed in a recent interview that 90 percent 
of the ten million filtered sites were deemed to
contain “immoral” content.40 This assertion was
supported by ONI’s tests. With very few excep-
tions, all of the pornography and provocative
attire sites tested were blocked by all ISPs.
Further, no pornography site tested was blocked
by fewer than five ISPs. The government does not
filter content regarding drugs, alcohol, gambling,
or dating as universally, though a substantial
number of sites in these categories are blocked
as well.
Outside of “immoral” content, independent
and dissenting voices are filtered across a range
of issues pertaining to Iran, including political
reform, criticism of the government, reporting on
human rights issues, and minority and women’s
rights. Filtering in these areas, across non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), blogs, and
thematic Web sites, is inconsistent and limited
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when content is provided solely in English, 
and much more substantial and complete across
ISPs for sites relating to Iran or in Farsi. For 
example, while no independent media sites or
newspapers available only in English were 
filtered across all ISPs tested, a large majority 
of similar sites relating to Iran or composed 
in Farsi were consistently blocked, such 
as www.iranvajahan.net and the publisher
www.kayhanpublishing.uk.com.
All seven ISPs tested blocked access to
almost the same list of human rights, political
reform, and opposition sites. All ISPs kept access
to international watchdogs such as Amnesty
International and FIDH open, but unilaterally
blocked Iran-focused groups such as the Society
for the Defense of Human Rights in Iran
(www.polpiran.com) and the online magazine
Siah Sepid (www.siahsepid.com).
For remaining content categories, the con-
siderable variation among the sites blocked by
the ISPs suggests that they are exercising some
control over the implementation of filtering. There
is no discernible pattern in the content of sites
blocked only by one ISP. For example, Pars
Online, the largest private provider of Internet
services in Iran, is the only ISP to block such dis-
parate sites as www.boingboing.net, the
International Herald Tribune, and the teen sexual
health site www.teenhealthfx.com. Tarashe is the
only ISP that blocked the e-mail service Hushmail
and the Times of India newspaper.
Overall, the greatest overlap in filtering
occurred with Jahan Nama, Pars Online, Datak,
and Shatel. Together, these ISPs filtered a 
range of Web sites in common, including a 
substantial number of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) rights organizations
(including www.gmhc.org and www.iglhrc.org),
NGOs focusing on free expression and access to
information, dating services, and alcohol and
drug sites.
Conclusion
Iran continues to maintain the most extensive fil-
tering regime of any country ONI has studied. As
filtering and censorship policies evolve, govern-
ment officials and citizens have pushed back
against many of the more extreme measures,
including the ban on high-speed Internet in 2006.
New developments may provide opportunities to
contest these policies further. The draft Cyber
Crimes Bill prohibits any blocking or investigation
of data without a warrant issued by a court after
evidence of suspicious activity. When this provi-
sion becomes law, it could potentially be used to
impede the arbitrary closures and blocking of
Web sites.
NOTES
1. Human Rights Watch Report, False Freedom: Online




3. Article 44(2), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, amended July 28, 1989, http://www.oefre.
unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html.
4. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,
http://www.unodc.org/iran/en/crime_prevention.html
(accessed April 30, 2007); Telecommunications
Company of Iran, Annual Report 2005, http://iran
telecom.ir/eng.asp?sm=3&page=17&code=5.
5. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Iran press
Iranian activists oppose regulation of websites,
weblogs,” January 2, 2007 (citing text of report by
E’temad-e Melli).
6. Interview with Esma’il Radkani, Iranian
Communication and Information Technology News
Agency, September 11, 2006, http://citna.ir/435.html.
7. The Guardian, “Iran bans fast internet to cut west’s
influence: Service providers told to restrict online
speeds Opponents say move will hamper country’s
progress,” October 18, 2006.
8. See the Information Technology Company Web site,
http://www.dci.ir/english/moarefi.htm.
9. BBC Persian, “Speed reduced for high speed






12. The Guardian, “Iran bans fast internet to cut west’s
influence,” October 18, 2006.
13. Information Technology News Agency, “Speed limita-
tion becomes permanent,” October 20, 2006,
http://www.itna.ir/archives/news/005618.php (in
Persian). 
14. Article 19, Regulation of the Media in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, March 2006.
15. Bill on Punishment for Cyber Crimes (Cyber Crimes
Bill), October 12, 2006, http://www.hoqouq.com/
law/article522.html.
16. BBC Monitoring Middle East, translation of report of
Kayhan newspaper, “There were sound grounds for
banning Baztab website: MP,” February 25, 2007.
17. Ibid.
18. BBC Monitoring International Reports, citing text of
report by E’temad-e Melli, “Iran press Iranian
activists oppose regulation of websites, weblogs,”
January 2, 2007. See also Omid Memarian,
“Bloggers rebel at new censorship,” Inter Press
Service News Agency, January 10, 2007, reporting
that prohibited content includes criticism of religious
figures, sexual matters, content considered offensive
to the Ayatollah Khomeini, or content slanderous of
Islamic law.
19. BBC Monitoring International Reports, citing text of
report by E’temad-e Melli, “Iran press Iranian
activists oppose regulation of websites, weblogs,”
January 2, 2007.
20. Article 21, Bill on Punishment for Cyber Crimes
(Cyber Crimes Bill), October 12, 2006,
http://www.hoqouq.com/law/article522.html.
21. Note 2 of Article 1 of Iran’s Press Law (as amended
in 2000) defines electronic publications as “publica-
tions regularly published under a permanent name,
specific date and serial number … on different sub-
jects such as news, commentary, as well as social,
political, economic, agricultural, cultural, religious,
scientific, technical, military, sports, artistic matters,
etc via electronic vehicles.” Publications must also
have obtained “publication licenses from the Press
Supervisory Board in the Ministry of Cultural and
Islamic Guidance,” otherwise they “fall out of the
scope of the Press law and become subject to
General Laws.”
22. Press Law, Article 6.
23. Press Law, Articles 26–27. 
24. Article 19, Memorandum on Regulation of the Media
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 2006.
25. Islamic Penal Code of Iran, May 22, 1996, Article 500
states that “anyone who undertakes any form of
propaganda against the state ... will be sentenced to
between three months and one year in prison”; unof-
ficial translation at http://mehr.org/index_islam.htm.
26. Islamic Penal Code of Iran, May 22, 1996, Articles
513–15; unofficial translation at
http://mehr.org/index_islam.htm.
27. Islamic Penal Code of Iran, May 22, 1996, Articles
697, 698, 700; unofficial translation at
http://mehr.org/index_islam.htm. Chapter 27 of the
Penal Code on libels and revilements, and more
specifically Article 698, only stipulate punishment for
statements made in the press and does not cover
writings in electronic format in computer and other
communication systems. As seen earlier, “press” is
defined in Article 1 of the Press Law, but the general
articulation of Article 698 subsumes both publica-
tions with and without licenses.
28. Human Rights Watch Report, False Freedom: Online
Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa: Iran,
November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/
mena1105/5.htm.
29. Decree on the Constitution of the Committee in
Charge of Determining Unauthorized Websites,
Official Gazette No. 16877.
30. Bill Samii, “Iran: Government strengthens its control




31. BBC Monitoring Middle East, translation of report of
Kayhan newspaper, “There were sound grounds for




33. Iranian Student News Agency (ISNA), Interview with
Head of Iran Law Society, February 16, 2007,
http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=
News-877388.
34. Information Technology News Agency “Report of an
ISP closure by judicial system agents,”
http://www.itna.ir/archives/article/000665.php
(accessed April 30, 2007).
35. Human Rights Watch Press Release, Iran: Prosecute
Torturers, Not Bloggers, December 12, 2006,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/12/iran14824.htm
. See also Human Rights Watch Report, Like the
Dead in Their Coffins: Torture, Detention, and the
Crushing of Dissent in Iran, June 7, 2004,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/torture/iran/.
36. Bill Samii, “Iran: Government strengthens its control






38. Iran CSOs Training & Research Center, A Report on




39. Ibid. See also Human Rights Watch Report, False
Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and




Iraq does not have a declared Internet filtering
policy, nor is there evidence of Internet filtering
practiced by the state Internet service provider
(ISP). However, ongoing conflict and deterio-
rating conditions prevent many Iraqis from
accessing the Internet.
Background
Although the Iraqi constitution, ratified in October
2005, guarantees the freedoms of “expression,
press, printing, advertisement, media, publica-
tion, assembly, and peaceful demonstration,”1 on
February 13, 2007, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki gave far-reaching martial law powers to
military commanders. These include the power to
conduct searches and seizures without warrants,
to arrest, detain, and interrogate people, and to
monitor, search, and confiscate “all mail parcels,
letters, cables, and wire and wireless communi-
cations devices,” and to restrict all public gather-
ings, including “centers, clubs, organizations,
unions, companies, institutions, and offices.”2
The Iraq war has had immense impact on the
country. A joint Johns Hopkins-MIT study in
October 2006 estimates that Iraq has suffered
650,000 “excess deaths” (600,000 of them vio-
lent deaths) since the onset of the Iraq war in
2003 and that Iraqi death rates are continually ris-
ing.3 Reporters Without Borders reports that 150
journalists and media assistants have died since
the start of the war.4 As of October 2007, the U.S.
military has suffered 3,800 deaths in the initial
invasion and subsequent efforts to stabilize the
country.5
Internet in Iraq
Saddam Hussein placed severe restrictions on
Iraqis’ ability to receive and impart information.
The press and broadcast media were tightly con-
trolled, as was access to the Internet. In 2002,
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there were only 45,000 Internet users, many of
them state officials, in Iraq.6 But after the U.S.
invasion Internet cafés spread throughout the
country. There are no recent studies that enu-
merate Internet users in Iraq, but the ITU estimat-
ed the number to have reached 50,000 users by
the end of 2004.7
The U.S. Defense Department spent more
than USD165 million to set up cybercafés in Iraq.
In 2004, Iraq contained 36 cafés, and by July
2006 it had more than 170.8 According to a report
from the London-based pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq
al-Awsat, approximately 45 percent of those who
frequent Internet cafés are women, and both
male and female users use matchmaking Web
sites to find future spouses from outside Iraq so
that they can get out of the country.9
Iraq’s primary ISP, uruklink, provides dialup,
DSL, and wireless connection services,10 and it
also provides wireless high-capacity data and
voice communications to government sites
through the Baghdad Wireless Broadband
Network in Baghdad.11
There is a very active Iraqi blogging com-
munity that blogs mostly about the experience of
living in a war zone and the effects of the conflict
on citizens’ lives. Several Iraqi bloggers have
caught the attention of international media. The
blog Baghdad Burning, for example, was adapt-
ed for stage12 and a book.13 The blog was started
in 2003 by a twenty-four-year-old Iraqi girl using
the pseudonym Riverbend. 
In November 2005, Iraq secured the .iq
ccTLD, and entrusted its administration to Iraq’s
National Communications and Media Commis-
sion (NCMC). 14
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The new Iraqi government has placed few restric-
tions or regulations on the Internet in Iraq. Article
36 of the Iraqi constitution guarantees freedom of
expression. The sweeping powers Prime Minister
al-Maliki granted to the military in the name of
security did not place unusual restrictions on the
right to free expression, but they did circumscribe
the corollary rights to privacy and assembly.15
Provisions of the penal code restricting freedom
of the press remain on the books; these provi-
sions have been used to sentence journalists to
long prison sentences in recent years.16
Iraqi security forces detained at least thirty
reporters over the course of 2006, with four still
held without charge at year’s end.17 The
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U.S. forces have detained dozens of journalists
since the war began in 2003. Though they quick-
ly released most, at least eight were detained for
weeks or months. On September 7, 2006, the
Iraqi government closed the Baghdad bureau of
the pan-Arab satellite news station Al-Arabiyya
for one month on the grounds that its reporting
amounted to “incitement.” Iraqi networks were
ordered not to show scenes of violence. The gov-
ernment continued to prevent the pan-Arab satel-
lite station Al-Jazeera from reopening its
Baghdad bureau. In 2004, Reporters Without
Borders stated that “[t]he United States has total
control of the country’s telecommunications 
system.”18
ONI testing results
ONI conducted in-country tests in 2006 on Iraq’s
ISP uruklink. The tests revealed no evidence of fil-
tering for any of the categories tested.
On the other hand, the BBC reported that
the “Pentagon is keeping a close eye on what its
troops post online, with special attention being
paid to videos that show the aftermath of com-
bat.” The BBC added that, “[o]ne soldier who
served in Iraq in 2005 told the BBC there was ‘a
tight watch’ being kept on video and pictures
posted to MySpace, with civilian contractors
monitoring the Internet on behalf of the
Pentagon.” The BBC has not been able to con-
firm that contractors are scouring the Internet for
inappropriate material from the military, but
reported that “US Central Command—which is
responsible for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan—
does have a team reading blogs and responding
to what they consider inaccuracies about the so-
called war on terror.”19
Other reports stated that some liberal Web
sites were blocked on military computers in Iraq
as part of filtering nonconservative content.
Examples include The Memory Hole20 and
Wonkette.21 However, officials from the U.S.
Defense Department denied that they block polit-
ical Web sites from soldiers serving in Iraq.22
In January 2007, at the request of the British
government, Google agreed to remove updated
images that included British bases in Iraq from
Google Earth after British divisional headquarters
came under almost daily mortar barrages.23
Conclusion
Iraqi citizens have unfettered access to the
Internet, but this fact is overshadowed by the
ongoing security condition. The deadly conflict
makes journalists and media professionals work-
ing in Iraq particularly vulnerable.
“Though Iraq’s state of disorder has opened
up a space of freedom, it has also produced seri-
ous fears. Living conditions continue to deterio-
rate. Owners of Internet centers close their stores
at night out of fear—fear of both the occupying
forces and those of the resistance.”24
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Israel is among the world’s leading countries in
broadband Internet penetration. Although the
censorship of information considered vital to
national security is a reality, Israel has yet to
legally authorize or implement filtering of the
Internet by law or voluntary pact.
Background
Since its founding as a state in 1948, Israel has
contended with the proper limits of security
measures as a democracy under military threat.
The Israeli Defense Forces’ Military Censor
decides what information should not be pub-
lished, and both domestic journalists and foreign
media organizations must comply as a condition
of operating in Israel. This longstanding practice
has been at the center of an ongoing debate
about the curtailment of freedom of expression in
order to protect national security and order.1
Internet in Israel
As a country self-described as always having to
“depend on its intellectual resources for survival
and development,” Israel is home to one of the
most vibrant technology centers in the world.2 In
2003, the country drew USD1.1 billion in venture
capital funding, placing it behind only Boston
and Silicon Valley in attracting funding for start-
ups.3 Five major Internet service providers (ISPs)
and approximately 70 smaller ISPs serve 3.6 mil-
lion Internet users, about 60.6 percent of the total
population in 2006.4
Israel ranks highest in the world in hours per
user spent on the Internet, at 57.5 hours a
month.5 The vast majority of Israelis access the
Internet from home, though many also do so at
school, work, and other places.6 Although blogs
remain a relatively marginal activity in Israeli
cyberspace, the Internet is now the main source
of news for 26 percent of online users, second to
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television but surpassing print newspapers.7 The
Internet is also increasingly seen as a communi-
cation tool,8 even a “new battleground,” for vital
Israeli interests and the national image.9
Initially, Internet penetration in Israel
increased relatively slowly, because of the high
cost of service—especially for broadband
access.10 Since 2001, however, the government
has taken steps to allow more service providers
to compete in Israel, reducing costs and dramat-
ically increasing Internet use in general and
broadband access in particular.11 Bezeq, a for-
merly state-owned telecommunications giant that
privatized in 2005, began offering ADSL service
in 2001.12 In large part because of the introduc-
tion of broadband cable modem access offered
by cable companies in 2002, the percentage of
households using broadband Internet increased
from 4 percent in 2002 to 62 percent in 2006, with
broadband service costing approximately USD9
a month.13
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Ministry of Communications (MOC) regu-
lates the Internet as part of the telecommunica-
tions sector.14 Prior to the 1980s, the Israeli 
government controlled both telecommunications
regulation and operations. In 1984 those func-
tions were split, and all telecommunications facil-
ities were transferred to Bezeq, a state-owned
company.15 Bezeq’s monopoly on fixed-line
transmissions within Israel led to a relatively high
cost of Internet service in Israel.16 After Bezeq’s
legal monopoly on fixed-line services expired in
1999, the MOC began liberally issuing licenses to
competitors. This and other regulatory changes
led to a burst of competition within the Internet
sector, lowering prices and contributing to a large
increase in Internet penetration after 2001.17
Israel’s history as a state under constant mil-
itary threat has strongly influenced its approach
toward the control of information. Censorship of
the media was “frozen” in law in 1945, when the
military censor was authorized to ban the publi-
cation, printing, importing, and exporting of any
material likely to cause damage to the security of
Israel or public order.18 Since then, censorship of
sensitive, security- or military-related information
has operated through voluntary agreements
between military authorities and an editors’ com-
mittee (the Israeli Committee of Daily Newspaper
Editors). These agreements provide a platform
for practical negotiation with a built-in arbitration
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1949 with some significant amendments.19
Despite the lack of full consent from all media, all
such organizations operating in Israel, including
foreign agencies, must agree to abide by the
censor’s rulings.20
The Directorate of Military Intelligence of the
Israeli Defense Forces maintains the Military
Censor unit that holds the authority to prevent
reporting of information that may aid attacks on
Israeli citizens. News outlets are prohibited, for
instance, from revealing the exact location of
enemy missile strikes, or stating that a high-rank-
ing official is entering a threatened area.21 After
periods of more slack enforcement, the Censor
has recently scaled up its efforts. During the 2006
war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, for instance,
the government banned specific reports on troop
movements, the location of Hezbollah rocket
strikes, and other information that could be used
to coordinate attacks or aim weapons.22
This regulatory structure has long been a
source of controversy. In another example, the
Military Censor blocked news about a National
Security Council report on the vulnerability of an
Israeli fuel depot. The censor was afraid the
report might give terrorists ideas, but critics
argue that such reports are necessary to spark
public debate about security precautions.23 A
series of Supreme Court decisions limited the
ban on publishing to content where there is a
“tangible” and “near-certain” danger to the well-
being of the public.24 Over the decades, the
Knesset has debated the role of the censors and
the limits of free expression, especially in light of
a changing media environment fueled by the
growth of the Internet, but no legislation has been
enacted to replace the current system.
Israel has yet to establish any explicit legal
authority for filtering of the Internet. In 1998 the
Knesset’s Committee for Scientific and
Technological Research and Development met to
discuss the subject of Internet filtering.25 Some
groups in Israel, particularly the Orthodox 
community, were concerned over widespread
pornography on the Internet, though the legisla-
ture seemed more worried about the availability
of privileged information such as Israeli missile
deployments.
ONI testing results
ONI testing in 2006 found no evidence of Internet
filtering in Israel. In addition to the global list, ONI
tested sites with content critical of the Israeli gov-
ernment or reflecting sensitive national security
issues and state policies, from Palestinian
groups such as Hamas, human rights organiza-
tions, and militant organizations (Hezbollah).
Conclusion
After years of somewhat stagnant growth, the
Israeli Internet community is expanding rapidly.
The country is likely to remain a center for the
development of new Internet technologies, with
widespread Internet access and deep broad-
band penetration. Israel does not filter the
Internet, and in this respect maintains the freest
Internet community in the Middle East. However,
as proposed legislation to restrict access to
pornography and violent content online contin-
ues to be debated, and as the space for online
media increases, the Internet will likely challenge
the bounds of the specific historical tradition and
established practices of Israeli censorship.
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Access to Internet content in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan remains largely unfettered,
with filtering selectively applied to only a small
number of sites. However, media laws and reg-
ulations encourage some measure of self-cen-
sorship in cyberspace,1 and citizens have
reportedly been questioned and arrested for
Web content they have authored.2
Background
Watchdog organizations continue to criticize the
Jordanian government’s record on human rights.
In 2006, Human Rights Watch noted that
“Jordanian authorities continued … to engage in
practices that censor free speech,” including
charging journalists under controversial articles
of the Penal Code.3 Reports of prolonged deten-
tions4 of criminals and government harassment
of opposition party members5 have also sur-
faced. In June 2006 the government charged four
parliamentarians from the Islamic Action Front
(IAF) with fueling national discord and inciting
sectarianism after the politicians visited the fami-
ly of deceased al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi.6 The constitutional monarchy has also
demonstrated its willingness to silence and pun-
ish those critical of its allies.7
Internet in Jordan
Although the government provides schools with
computers and encourages the growth of the
Internet in Jordan,8 connectivity prices remain
prohibitively high for many Jordanians.9 There
are only five personal computers per hundred
inhabitants, yet the country has achieved an
Internet penetration rate of 12 percent—a rela-
tively high figure for the region.10 Most of this
connectivity comes through the hundreds of
Internet cafés11 and community centers12 in the
country. A survey of 200 Jordanians, presented in
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2004, showed that the Internet serves as an
important networking and communication tool,
with all respondents using the Web to e-mail or
chat.13
In an effort to further increase the Internet
penetration rate, the government launched
“Knowledge Stations” across the country in
2001. Jordanians in rural areas can access the
Internet and attend courses in computers at
these Stations.14 An ongoing plan called the
Jordan Broadband Learning and Education
Network Project aims to create an extensive edu-
cational network by linking 8 public universities,
3,200 public schools, 23 community colleges,
and 75 Knowledge Stations nationwide.15
Jordan has an advanced, though expen-
sive, telecommunications infrastructure as com-
pared with other countries in the region.16 The
telecom sector serves as a key industry for the
Jordanian economy, accounting for 10 percent of
the GDP.17 Since the sector was liberalized in
2004,18 private companies—in particular
Wanadoo and Batelco, which together claim 83
percent of the Internet service provider (ISP) mar-
ket—have overtaken the government’s share of
the market.19 The government-owned National
Information Technology Center (NITC) remains
the exclusive registrar for the country code top-
level domain (ccTLD) “.jo”.20
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Established in 1995, the Telecommunications
Regulatory Commission (TRC) regulates telecom
and information technology services in Jordan.21
Under the Telecommunications Law of 1995, the
TRC is in charge of ISP licensing and telecom-
munications equipment.22 Prospective ISPs must
file a license application and document their
financial resources, base prices, services and
technologies, and geographical coverage
areas.23 ISPs must supply a mechanism for han-
dling customer complaints and may increase
user fees only after notification has run for at least
one full month in two local newspapers.24
To obtain a license to open an Internet café,
a party must submit an application with “an orga-
nizational site plan for the location to be used.”25
The Internet Café Regulations state that records
of Internet use, including personal information,
should be kept and that “a special technique
should be provided to block and filter the sites”26
that contain pornography or offensive religious
material, that promote recreational drug use or
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turing of materials for military uses in an illegiti-
mate manner.”27 Café patrons under thirteen
years of age must be accompanied by a par-
ent,28 and managers cannot be younger than
twenty-five.29 Although the Regulations state that
personal data should remain confidential,30 a
café must disclose such information when the
government requests it.31
The Telecommunications Law instructs ISPs
to withhold access from users who have “violat-
ed public morals”32 or who use the Internet in a
way that “endangers the national good,”33 but
leaves these stipulations undefined. The Law
also stipulates that “Any person who originates or
forwards, by any telecommunications means …
messages contrary to public morals, or forwards
false information with the intent to spread panic,
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than one month or more than one year, or a fine
… or by both penalties.”34
Article 5 of Jordan’s Press and Publications
Law (1998) prohibits journalists from publishing
material that goes against “national obligation …
and Arab-Islamic values.”35 Article 7(e) is equally
broad, forbidding the publication of anything that
is “bound to stir violence or inflame discord of
any form among the citizens.”36
In January 2007, Jordan’s Lower House
National Guidance Committee began consulta-
tions with media experts and officials about a
2006 Press and Publications Draft Law.37
Publishers and proponents of press freedom
hope lawmakers will scrap provisions that set jail
terms for journalists and amend articles they say
restrict free expression. 
ONI testing results
Testing conducted on three Jordanian ISPs—
Batelco, Wanadoo, and Linkdotnet—showed no
definitive blocking, though some filtering of polit-
ical content is suspected given inconsistencies in
the accessibility of certain sites.
Arab Times (www.arabtimes.com), a politi-
cally oriented news site that is sometimes critical
of Arab leaders, was found to be inaccessible on
Batelco and Wanadoo but was accessible via
Linkdotnet. Though this finding does not consti-
tute proof of filtering, it is worth noting, as the
Web site was reportedly blocked in 2004.38
Conclusion
Jordanians appear to enjoy essentially unfiltered
access to Internet content. However, the Press
and Publications Law’s broad provisions may
lead some writers to engage in self-censorship.
Although Jordan’s government continues to
develop initiatives to expand access to the
Internet, laws restricting freedom of speech pre-
serve an intimidating atmosphere that discour-
ages free discourse on political and social
issues.
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Like many of the governments in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
Kazakhstan has a conflicted position with
regard to the Internet. The Kazakh government
aims to make Kazakhstan the main IT portal in
Central Asia. In this regard, the government
has harnessed efforts to liberalize the IT sector,
promote Internet use, and encourage 
e-government in order to spur social develop-
ment. However, the government has also
implemented a complex system that allows for
state surveillance of Internet traffic that can be
used to filter or suppress Internet content.
Current rules require all Internet traffic to pass
through state-owned channels, politically sen-
sitive Internet content is selectively filtered, and
opposition media and bloggers are said to
practice self-censorship for fear of government
reprisal.
Background
Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia,
covering a territory equivalent to the whole of
Western Europe. An oil-rich country, Kazakhstan
has recovered from the economic crises of the
1990s, and President Nursultan Nazarbayev is
determined to turn Kazakhstan into an IT power-
house in the region. An ambitious e-government
project has been launched and the development
of IT infrastructure is encouraged.
Politically Kazakhstan has become increas-
ingly authoritarian. President Nazarbayev been
the head of state since national independence in
1991, and he is widely alleged to have manipu-
lated results of elections and suppressed oppo-
sition in order to remain in power.1 Although
press freedom is enshrined in the constitution,2
the government controls most mass media out-
lets and exerts influence over most printing and
distribution establishments. Anecdotal evidence
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points to online media and bloggers practicing
self-censorship for fear of prosecution by the
state under highly restrictive defamation laws.
Internet in Kazakhstan
The Kazakh Internet community is growing rapidly.
Internet usage increased from 0.7 percent of the
population in 2000 to 2.7 percent of the popula-
tion in 2004.3 Computer penetration is around fif-
teen to seventeen computers per 100 residents.
Because of its size and internal regional dis-
parities (especially between rural and urban
dwellers), Internet access remains beyond the
reach of most Kazakhs, except for those living in
major cities. Internet access is most popular
among young urban dwellers, with a surprisingly
high percentage of female users (44.1 percent).
Russian is the most popular language used
on the Internet (94.1 percent), followed by Kazakh
(4.5 percent) and English (1.4 percent), which may
account for the high percentage of Kazakh Web
sites hosted in Russia (including those on the
“.kz” domain). Six percent of “.kz” Web sites are
hosted in Kazakhstan, with the remainder hosted
in Russia and elsewhere. Kazakhs use a wide
range of search engines, including Russian, U.S.,
and Kazakh (www.rambler.ru, www.yandex.ru,
www.yahoo.com, www.google.kz, www.site.kz).
Recent liberalization of the telecommunica-
tions market increased competition among the
five licensed operators. These are Kazakhtele-
com (the former state monopoly), Transtelecom,
Kaztranscom, Arna [DUCAT], and Astel.
Kazakstan also has five first-tier Internet service
providers (ISPs) that possess independent chan-
nels to the Internet. These are Kaztelecom,
Nursat, Astel, Telcom, and NIT. Some 100 sec-
ond-tier providers lease access from the five first-
tier ISPs.4
Kazakhtelecom is the operator of the nation-
al data transfer network, which connects the
major cities of Kazakhstan with a total bandwidth
of 665Mbit/s,5 and carrying capacity of separate
local segments of up to 10 GB/s.6 Other leading
first-tier ISPs (Nursat and Astel) also operate 
significant terrestrial and satellite based infra-
structure.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Kazakh government exhibits an ambiguous
and at times contradictory approach to the
Internet. On one hand the “Development Strategy




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........7,617 4.68
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................65 4.83
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Human development index (out of 177) .................................79 5.70
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ernment’s strong commitment to create an inde-
pendent and effective system of telecommunica-
tions services, which will be competitive with
analogous infrastructures in more-developed
countries. On the other hand the government fol-
lows a strong and multilevel information security
policy, ensuring surveillance of telecommunica-
tions and Internet traffic in the country.
The Agency for Informatizaton and
Communication (AIC), a central executive body in
the IT field, is authorized to implement state poli-
cy in telecommunications and information tech-
nology development industries, carry out control
in these sectors, and issue licenses to every type
of telecommunications service.7 The Security
Council (SC), a body chaired by the president, is
responsible for drafting decisions and providing
assistance to the head of state on issues of
defense and national security.8 The SC also pre-
pares a list of Web sites every six months that it
wants to have blocked or forbidden from distri-
bution. A 2005 SC decision legally forbade key
national security bodies (namely the Ministries of
Emergency Situations, of Internal Affairs, of
Defense, and the National Security Committee)
from connecting to the Internet. However, despite
this prohibition, ONI researchers witnessed state
officials accessing forbidden Web sites through
an anonymizer.
The security system in Kazakhstan is com-
plex and multilayered. The Inter-Departmental
Commission is charged with coordinating and
developing the national information infrastruc-
ture. The National Security Committee (NSC)
monitors presidential, government, and military
communications. The Office of the Prime Minister
is an authorized state body responsible for the
protection of state secrets and the maintenance
of information security. “State secret” is broadly
defined, encompassing various government poli-
cies as well as the president’s private life, health,
and financial affairs. The NSC has issued a gen-
eral license to the private Agency on Information
Security to establish and organize facilities for
cryptographic protection of information, as well
as to formulate proposals on information security
for state organizations, corporate clients, banks,
and other large commercial companies.
The information communications technolo-
gy sector in Kazakhstan is highly regulated, as
evidenced by some 300 legislative acts that
expressly or implicitly control the information and
telecommunications environment. All ISPs
require a license from the AIC.9 All telecommuni-
cations operators are legally obliged, as part of
the licensing requirement, to connect their chan-
nels to a public network controlled by
Kazakhtelecom. The so-called Billing Center of
Telecommunication Traffic, established by the
government in 1999, helps trace the activity of
private companies and strengthen the monopo-
list position of Kazakhtelecom in the IT sphere. In
practice, some telecommunications operators
circumvent such regulations by using IP telepho-
ny to pass their interregional and international
traffic.
The government has established systems to
monitor and filter Internet traffic. Since the traffic
of all first-tier ISPs goes through Kazakhtele-
com’s channels, filtering can be achieved using
centralized resources. The ISPs may unknowing-
ly receive filtered content because the main oper-
ator could install filters on any information that it
deems inappropriate. ONI suspects that state
officials informally ask Kazakhtelecom to filter
certain content. Russian companies and
Kazakhtelecom have openly signed an agree-
ment to provide filtering, censorship, and surveil-
lance on the basis of Security Council resolu-
tions.
State regulations oblige Internet providers to
register and maintain electronic records of cus-
tomer Internet activity. ISPs are required to install
special software and hardware equipment in
order to create and store records for a specified
amount of time, including log-in times, types of
the connection, transmitted and received traffic
between parties of the connection, identification
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number of the session, duration of time spent
online, IP address of the user, and speed of data
receipt and transmission. The ISPs are also
required to prohibit their customers from dissem-
inating (via Internet) pornographic, extremist, or
terrorist materials or any other information not in
accordance with the country’s laws.10
The Kazakhstan Association of IT-
Companies is the officially recognized adminis-
trator of the “.kz” domain. It is registered as a
nongovernment organization but, in fact, it has 80
percent government ownership. The rules of reg-
istration and management of the “.kz” domain
are issued by the AIC. The constitution guaran-
tees freedom of speech and prohibits censor-
ship, but the government often resorts to various
mechanisms to suppress “inappropriate” infor-
mation or to shut down oppositional domain
names. These rules mean that an applicant may
be denied registration if the resource server
resides outside of Kazakhstan. Use of the
Internet by political parties in Kazakhstan is limit-
ed, and few opposition or illegal parties have
made the move to go online.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted testing on three main ISPs:
Kazakhtelecom, Megaline, and Nursat. The evi-
dence gathered from the testing is not sufficient
to conclusively confirm the existence of a sys-
tematic filtering regime. However, a number of
sites with sensitive political content, including
locally sensitive topics and regional issues of
concern to the Kazakh government, were inac-
cessible. Several of these inaccessible sites are
hosted in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. ONI found
some political sites were inaccessible for users of
two ISPs (Kazakhtelecom and Megaline), while
they remained accessible to Nursat users.
Generally most of the inaccessible sites con-
tained content related to political dissidents, alle-
gations of government corruption, human rights
issues, and strongly expressed criticism of the
president. 
Kazakh authorities also de-register Web
sites that do not comply with its restrictive rules
for registering domains within the “.kz” domain,
and filters sites within this domain.11 In 2005
Kazakh authorities de-registered a Web site cre-
ated by the producers of Borat, (claiming that the
site violated the rules by hosting the site outside
of Kazakhstan and providing false contact infor-
mation).12
ONI suspects that filtering practices in
Kazakhstan have changed and are now per-
formed at the network backbone. All traffic
should pass through the Kazakhtelecom network
and thus be subject to filters put in place by the
state-controlled ISP. However, not all incoming
and outgoing traffic passes through the network,
which results in inconsistent patterns of blocking.
Most of the users are also on “edge” net-
works, such as cybercafés and corporate net-
works. Kazakhstan companies apply filtering
mechanisms on a user level to prevent employ-
ees from accessing pornography, music, films,
and dating Web sites. However, ONI testing
found that Kazakhstan does not block any porno-
graphic content or sites related to drug and alco-
hol use.
Conclusion
The Kazakh government has harnessed efforts to
liberalize the IT sector, promote Internet use, and
encourage e-government in order to spur social
development. However, it has also put in place a
complex security system that is capable of state
surveillance of Internet traffic, and suppression of
undesirable Internet content. Given government
pressure on opposition media, self-censorship
may also be an issue among online media 
publishers and bloggers. The technical sophisti-
cation of the Kazakhstan Internet environment
and government’s tendency toward stricter
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Recent liberalization of the telecommunications
market in Kyrgyzstan has made Internet access
affordable for the majority of the population.
This access remains largely unfettered.
However, an emerging regime shift toward
more restrictive policy, dependence upon
Russian and Chinese Internet connections, and
political instability pose problems for clear and
continual access to Internet in Kyrgyzstan.
Background
In 2005 Kurmanbek Bakiev won the presidential
elections after the violent downfall of the 
fourteen-year authoritarian regime of former pres-
ident Askar Akayev. The new head of state vowed
to distribute more powers to the parliament,
encourage free speech, fight corruption, and
tackle poverty. However, this shift in power has
yet to result in significant economic improve-
ments in Kyrgyzstan, as two-thirds of the popula-
tion remains below the poverty line. International
observers predict that new civil conflicts may
erupt if the country does not adopt urgent eco-
nomic measures.1 The Internet is one of the few
free outlets for expressing public criticism in
Kyrgyzstan, and has been used as an instrument
to assemble people for protest against the gov-
ernment. Kyrgyzstan’s U.N. global ranking for e-
government (0.4417) has deteriorated; however,
it remains in second place on the central Asian
list, after Kazakhstan.2
Internet in Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan has one of the highest Internet pene-
tration rates in Central Asia (5 percent in 2005).3
Some local studies assert that the number of
Internet users is two times higher than reported in
the official data.4 However, personal computers
(PCs) remain unaffordable for the vast majority:
only 2 percent of the population owns a PC.5
RESULTS AT A GLANCE
No evidence Suspected Selective Substantial Pervasive









Cybercafés are the main Internet access
point in the country (for approximately 51 percent
of all users). Other important venues for public
access are workplaces (nearly 25 percent) and
educational institutions (24 percent). There are
approximately 150 public Internet access centers
in the country, including cybercafés and free
access centers sponsored by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). Development of the
Internet infrastructure targets only the two largest
cities, Bishkek and Osh. There are slightly more
female than male users, and 60 percent of all
users are aged between fifteen and twenty-five,
with an additional 20 percent aged twenty-six to
thirty-five. Russian language sites remain the
most visited among Kyrgyz Internet users (90
percent), compared with only 8 percent in Kyrgyz
and 2 percent in English.
The privatization of both telecommunica-
tions and services, driven by the foreign invest-
ment and financial assistance, has resulted in an
increasingly competitive Internet sector. This has
caused access fees to decrease to
USD0.30/hour, which in turn has made the
Internet affordable for the average Kyrgyz. In
2005 the number of ISPs increased to thirty-eight,
although only seven of these have an external
Internet connection. Two of the seven ISPs—
KygyzTelecom (KT) and SaimaTelecom—own the
infrastructure they use. The others rent lines and
cables from the state-controlled top-tier KT. The
state has a major stake (50 percent) in Elcat,
another top-tier ISP. The majority of ISPs connect
by satellite to the Russian portion of the Internet.
In addition to its major Russian connection,
KygyzTelecom has built external connection ports
to China and Kazakhstan.
The Internet Traffic Exchange Point (IXP),6
shared by the ISPs with external Internet connec-
tion, runs the local traffic. The international
Internet bandwidth in the country is 76 Mb/s,7
and the most popular means for Internet access
is through dialup connection. A private company,
AsiaInfo, controls the country’s top-level domain
“.kg”.8 There are around 1,500 top-level domain
names registered in the Kyrgyz Internet zone.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Internet and ISP activities are not directly regulat-
ed by sector-specific laws in the communications
sphere. Compared with its neighbor Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan does not compel local Internet
providers to work with the state-owned provider.
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tional connections. However, the state telecom
continues to enjoy exclusive rights to national
long-distance and international services, thus
thwarting mobile operators and ISPs from enter-
ing the market. A licensing regime exists for pro-
viding Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) servic-
es. To obtain a license, companies are required
to contribute twenty million som (approximately
USD517,000) to develop IT infrastructure. Once
an applicant obtains the license, it may resell
VoIP services to another company.
In 2002 the state declared ICT development
to be a priority by way of the National Strategy on
Information and Communication Technologies for
Development of the Kyrgyz Republic.9 Eager to
harness Internet capabilities to stimulate eco-
nomic growth, the government has encouraged
e-government, e-education, and the e-econo-
my.10 For example, under a joint program
between the government and international organ-
izations, 95 percent of central government bod-
ies, and 50 percent of local ones, have Internet
access and provide online information about
their services.11 However, the cyber presence 
of political opposition is limited. ONI detected
only three Kyrgyz Web sites belonging to political
parties.12
The main institution responsible for the sec-
tor is the national ICT Council. The presidential
administration has made efforts to introduce
restrictive measures to control Internet content. In
the spring of 2005 members of the government
proposed amendments to the law on mass
media that would have led to blocking all “.ru”
domain sites containing offensive information on
Kyrgyzstan. In turn, this would have limited
Kyrgyz access to sources solely on the “.kg”
domain, which is regulated by local authorities.
Although this proposal was rejected, it revealed a
shift in official attitudes toward Internet develop-
ment in the country. 
The National Communications Agency
(NCA) is directly responsible to the President. It
has taken over most of the responsibilities of the
Ministry of Transportation and Communication in
the telecommunication sector. The NCA regu-
lates and supervises postal and electronic com-
munication companies, issues licenses, and
monitors the Internet.13
Kyrgyz security laws do not explicitly apply
to Internet activities. However, the National
Security Law of 2003 provides for the creation of
specialized communication and information
security bodies within the structures of the
National Security Service. The Security Council
will be inter alia responsible for examining internal
and external policy questions in the field of infor-
mation security. In 2005, a government resolution
on the Program for Information Security was
adopted, but it lacked precise definitions for what
constitutes commercial secrets, state secrets,
and private information. This absence of clear
terminology may lead to variable interpretations,
which could create space for potential abuse.
Furthermore, the program does not exhaustively
list what types of information can be limited,
which again can allow for the broadening of the
scope of restricted information.
There is no legislation allowing the national
security services to organize surveillance over the
Internet. In fact, KT itself launched a technical
investigation to prevent “gray traffic.” Possible
surveillance exercised by state officials may take
place at the ISP level. In July 2006, the State
Agency for Intellectual Property proposed to cre-
ate an Inter-Departmental Commission on State
Regulation of the Kyrgyz Segment of Internet.
This institution, which follows an existing Russian
model, would coordinate the activity of the exec-
utive power bodies and organizations participat-
ing in the Kyrgyz segment of Internet. The imple-
mentation of restrictive measures by such an
institution would deter further development of
Internet in Kyrgyzstan.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted testing from various access
points on all seven first tier ISPs: Aknet, AsiaInfo,
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Elcat, KyrgyzTelecom, SaimaTelecom, Totel, and
Transfer. The testing did not detect activity that is
indicative of any deliberate or even selective pat-
tern of filtering. Some U.S. military sites were
inaccessible, but these are likely the result of
“supply side” blocking by U.S. authorities or poor
domain name propagation. Kyrgyzstan does not
block the sites of religious or extremist groups. 
Past work by ONI leads us to suspect that
there may be just-in-time or event-based tamper-
ing applied during politically sensitive periods.
This was the case during the 2005 parliamentary
elections, when ONI documented the extensive
use of DoS attacks against opposition and media
Web sites and Kyrgyz ISPs.14
Blocking of voice traffic is carried out in
order to limit access to non-Kyrgyz providers
offering IP-telephony service, to thereby compel
the use of local providers. Voice traffic is filtered
in all the standard ports on all popular non-
Kyrgyz providers of IP-telephony. Allegedly, Cisco
(Pix) and Huawei (EuDemon) products are used
for blocking voice content. Filtering also exists at
the enterprise level (NGOs, corporate clients) in
order to block access of content deemed irrele-
vant and to economize Internet traffic.
Conclusion
Kyrgyzstan does not officially engage in filtering
of Internet content. Although the government
generally encourages Internet development, a
shift toward greater restriction may be emerging.
The regime appears to be struggling to find a bal-
ance between maintaining control over the ICT
sector and allowing the necessary freedom for
spurring economic growth. Potential limits in
Internet freedom are posed by generally poor
access, the possibility of “in-stream filtering”
resulting from dependence on Russian and
Chinese connections, and the possibility of 
sporadic targeted filtering triggered by state
instability. However, Kyrgyzstan is an aid-
dependent country, and is therefore unlikely to
pursue open filtering of Internet content.
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Libya continues to block Internet content relat-
ed to political opposition, content critical of the
government, and Web sites that advocate the
rights of the minority group Amazigh (Berbers).
This censorship of political content persists
despite a trend toward greater openness and
increasing freedom of the press.
Background
Libya has undertaken a radical shift in policies
over the past few years. Formerly considered a
state sponsor of terrorism and an international
pariah, Libya moved to regain international
acceptance by formally renouncing support of
terrorism and dismantling their weapons of mass
destruction development programs in 2003.1 As
a result, the United States, the European Union,
and the United Nations lifted their respective
embargoes on Libya soon after.2 The United
States recently established an embassy in Libya
to further solidify relations between the two coun-
tries.3
Though much has changed, much has
stayed the same. As Reporters Without Borders
states, “despite Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi’s
recent pro-democracy pretensions, his regime
still keeps a very tight rein on news.”4 Human
rights watchdog groups still report serious 
violations, such as restriction of expression; pro-
hibition of political parties and independent
organizations; imprisonment of critics of the 
political system, the government, or its leader;
torture; and unresolved disappearances from
past years.5 The press laws from 1972 and 1973
impose large fines and up to two year prison sen-
tences for violations of a variety of press restric-
tions, including “doubting the aims of the revolu-
tion.”6 As a result self-censorship in the media is
widespread. Reporters Without Borders reports
that journalists rarely challenge the boundaries
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imposed by the government on content, espe-
cially those on topics relating to Gaddafi or his
family or to the plight of the Berber minority.7 The
press laws also make the formation of private
media illegal by restricting the right to publish to
only two public organizations.8
At the same time as the Libyan opposition
has increasingly used the Internet to spread its
message,9 the crackdown on journalistic free-
dom has moved into the realm of the Internet as
well. In the country’s most famous case, a fifty-
one-year-old bookseller named Abdel Razak Al
Mansouri was arrested in January 2005 and inter-
rogated about a number his posts on the Akbar
Libya Web site (www.akhbar-libya.com) that were
critical of the government. Though never charged
with a crime related to those posts, he was even-
tually charged, convicted, and sentenced to a
year and a half in jail for possession of a gun
without a license. He served a year before being
granted amnesty.10
Internet in Libya
Internet access officially came to Libya at the end
of 1998, but it was not widely available until early
2000.11 Internet penetration remains low, at
around 4 percent,12 at least in part because of
the long-term economic sanctions imposed on
the country.13 The primary means for people to
connect is through Internet cafés.14
The state-owned General Post and
Telecommunications Company (GPTC), run by
Gaddafi’s son, Mohamed al-Gaddafi,15 regulates
and operates Libya’s telecommunications infra-
structure, providing “international and local voice
services, digital leased lines, telex, fax, mobile
(through a partially owned subsidiary) and
Internet services.”16 The GPTC also owns the
country’s primary ISP, Libya Telecom and
Technology (LTT), which offers Internet services
via dialup, DSL, broadband, and satellite,17
though at least seven companies other compa-
nies are licensed. These competitors are effec-
tively subordinated to LTT, however, as LTT main-
tains a monopoly over the country’s international
Internet gateway.18
In October 2006 the government of Libya
reached an agreement with One Laptop per
Child, a nonprofit United States group developing
an inexpensive, educational laptop computer,
with the goal of supplying machines to all 1.2 
million Libyan schoolchildren by June 2008.19
As the country only contained 130,000 comput-




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........9,929 5.13
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................74 6.28
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................82 5.22
Human development index (out of 177) .................................64 5.98
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................144 3.54
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availability of information communications tech-
nology (ICT) technologies and the Internet.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Libya continues to maintain strict limits on what
can be said or written in the country. Libya’s
penal code, for example, punishes with life
imprisonment or death anyone convicted of dis-
seminating information that conflicts with the
constitutional principles or the country’s “funda-
mental social structures” or that tarnishes Libya’s
image abroad. Criticism of President Gaddafi is
punishable by death.21
Further, by the press laws mentioned earlier,
print and broadcast media are owned and strict-
ly controlled by the government, and expression
of opinions contrary to official policy is strictly for-
bidden. According to the Freedom House report,
the pervasive use of secret police, informants,
and arbitrary arrests intimidates citizens from
speaking out and renders independent and criti-
cal journalism virtually impossible.22
With the rising threat from the Internet to
government control over political information, the
Libyan government appointed one of Gaddafi’s
closest friends to monitor and limit the growth of
oppositional Web sites. Experts from Russia,
Poland, and Pakistan were summoned to Libya
to help handle the situation. One tactic that
emerged was to force owners of Internet cafés 
to place stickers on computers that warn 
visitors from logging onto Web sites deemed
oppositional.23
Beyond merely political content, the Libyan
official “.ly” registry rules mandate that “.ly”
domains “must not contain obscene, scan-
dalous, indecent, or contrary to Libyan law or
Islamic morality words, phrases or abbrevia-
tions.”24 ONI did not, however, find any social
blocking in its tests.
In 2006 Reporters Without Borders removed
Libya from their list of the Internet enemies after a
fact-finding visit found no evidence of Internet
censorship.25 ONI’s test results contradict that
conclusion, however, as noted below.
ONI testing results
In 2007 ONI ran tests on Libya’s three ISPs: Libya
Telecom and Technology (LTT), Modern World of
Communications (MWC), and Al-Falak. All three
ISPs were found to block oppositional content
such as the Web site of the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood (www.almukhtar.org) and the Libyan
Constitutional Union (www.lcu-libya.co.uk and
www.libyanconstitutionalunion.net).
The three ISPs also block Web sites con-
taining information critical of the Libyan regime.
For example, ONI found Libya for Ever
(www.libya4ever.com), Libya al-Mostakbal
(www.libya-almostakbal.com), and Libya Our
Home (www.libya-watanona.com) to be blocked.
Access to Web sites containing information
about the Amazigh (Berbers), including the
preservation and teaching of the Tamazight lan-
guage and culture, is restricted as well.
Examples in this category found to be blocked
are www.libyaimal.com, an Amazigh-related Web
site, and www.tawalt.com, a site run by a Libyan
Amazigh cultural foundation.
The filtering regime also targets content crit-
ical of the human rights situation in the country,
notably the Web site of the Libyan Union for
Human Rights Defenders (www.libyanhuman
rights.com).
Evidence from ONI testing reveals that Libya
employs IP blocking at the international gateway,
carried out by Libya Telecom and Technology
Company (LTT). Users who attempt to access
banned content are not served with a blockpage,
but rather encounter time-out messages.
Conclusion
Despite the general trend toward greater free-
dom and openness, Libya maintains an active
Internet filtration regime focused on Web sites of
political opposition groups, antigovernment news
and views, and content related to the minority
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group Amazigh (Berbers). The filtering regime
lacks transparency, as none of the three ISPs
admits filtering or serves blockpages. If current
trends hold, however, the government may
decide to decrease their filtration efforts in the
future.
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Hoping that an Internet unencumbered by cen-
sorship will spur growth in domestic informa-
tion technology industries, Malaysia has
pledged not to censor the Internet. There is no
evidence of technological Internet filtering in
Malaysia. However, pervasive state controls on
traditional media spill over to the Internet at
times, leading to self-censorship and reports
that the state investigates and harasses blog-
gers and cyber-dissidents.
Background
Malaysia has a long history of state censorship
and tight media controls. All four major newspa-
pers are pro-state, and any oppositional and
independent media outlets face the possibility of
harassment by police, extended legal wrangling,
detention, and imprisonment for publishing
speech critical of the state.1 As many as twenty
different Malaysian laws restrict speech, and free
speech activists contend that this leads to self-
censorship by journalists.2 The state also monitors
the content of Web sites, and independent news
Web site www.malaysiakini.com claims to have
been the subject of several police investigations
and an eviction notice as a result of publishing
content deemed defamatory or offensive.3
Internet in Malaysia
Since 1996, Malaysia has embarked on an inter-
national public relations campaign to draw tech-
nology research and development to its
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a high-tech
business center and communications infrastruc-
ture designed to help Malaysia become an inter-
national information technology leader.4
Developing Internet infrastructure in Malaysia is a
state priority, and consumers are encouraged to
purchase PCs and Internet access. By 2005,
Malaysia had approximately eleven million
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Internet users, and with a national Internet pene-
tration rate of 42 percent was third in Southeast
Asia behind Hong Kong and Singapore.5 The
state, recognizing the opportunities for e-com-
merce and for individuals to exchange ideas and
information,6 has strongly encouraged adoption
of broadband Internet throughout the country.7
Nevertheless, uptake has been slow as dial-up
remains the method by which most Malaysians
access the Internet.8 Broadband penetration
reached a mere 2 percent in 2006, far behind
other Southeast Asian regional leaders such as
Singapore and Hong Kong, which had broad-
band penetrations of nearly 16 and 24 percent,
respectively.9
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Malaysia’s constitution guarantees every citizen
the right of free speech and expression, but also
sets significant limitations on that freedom, as
Parliament may by law effect “such restrictions
[on free speech] as it deems necessary or expe-
dient in the interest of the security of the
Federation ….”10 Parliament has enacted numer-
ous laws enabling broad state control over the
media. Notable print and broadcast media regu-
lations include the Printing Presses and
Publications Act, which requires all print publish-
ers to seek annual renewal of a publication
license granted at the state’s discretion, and the
Sedition Act, which criminalizes the expression or
publication of words that tend to incite hatred or
contempt against any government.
The Communications and Multimedia Act of
1998 (CMA) and the Communications and
Multimedia Commission Act of 1998 (CMCA)
together directly govern Malaysia’s telecommuni-
cations, broadcasting, and Internet sectors,
including related facilities, services, and con-
tent.11 The CMCA establishes the Malaysian
Communications and Multimedia Commission,
which is empowered to regulate the information
technology and communications industries. The
commission takes the position that Internet con-
tent must be regulated and controlled for “rea-
sons of access, privacy and security and protec-
tion of individual rights.”12 The CMA empowers
the commission with broad authority to regulate
online speech, providing that “no content appli-
cations service provider, or other person using a
content applications service, shall provide con-
tent which is indecent, obscene, false, menacing,
or offensive in character with intent to annoy,
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Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................73 6.12
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................89 5.90
Human development index (out of 177) .................................61 6.06
Rule of law (out of 208).........................................................71 6.16
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................137 4.19
Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................59 5.89
Internet users (% of population) ..........................................42.4 7.04
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
Publishers of media content in violation of this
provision may face criminal penalties, including a
fine of up to RM50,000 and/or a maximum of one
year in prison.14 The CMA also establishes the
Content Forum, which formulates and imple-
ments the Content Code—voluntary guidelines
for content providers concerning the handling of
content deemed offensive and indecent.15
The CMA and other laws empower the state
with extensive media controls. To foster the
growth of the Internet market and the MSC, how-
ever, the state has generally refrained from directly
censoring the Internet. In its “Bill of Guarantees”
to approved MSC companies, the state pledges
not to censor Internet content.16 Nevertheless,
Internet content publishers in Malaysia operate
under constant risk that the CMA and numerous
other laws regulating speech and content on tra-
ditional media will be interpreted or amended to
extend to Internet publications.17
In January 2007, Malaysian Prime Minister
Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi made a
somewhat ineffectual distinction by stating that
while the government policy is not to censor the
Internet, bloggers are bound by laws on defama-
tion, sedition, and other limits on speech.18
Badawi’s statement was an official restatement
of the policy announced in August 2006 that
bloggers who publish seditious, malicious, or
defamatory content will be reported to the
police.19 In January 2007, the New Straits Times
(NST) newspaper and several of its executives
inaugurated the first known defamation suits
against bloggers. Jeff Ooi (www.jeffooi.com) and
Ahirudin Attan (www.rockybru.blogspot.com),
both prominent bloggers and the latter the
President of the National Press Club, were sued
simultaneously for both blog posts and reader
comments.20 The allegedly libelous content
included Jeff Ooi’s blog coverage of NST and its
editors’ roles in misrepresenting facts, publishing
a caricature of the Prophet Muhammad, and pla-
giarism in blog posts in 2006.21 Ooi had previously
been investigated by the Communications and
Multimedia Commission and the police concern-
ing comments a reader posted on his blog that
were deemed offensive to the official version of
Islam in Malaysia.22
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted during October and
November 2006 on two of the largest Malaysian
Internet service providers (ISPs), Jaring and
TMNet, and also on Macrolynx, a smaller
Malaysian ISP. The tests revealed no evidence of
filtering for any of the categories tested.
Conclusion
Malaysia retains strict control over traditional
broadcast and print media through a broad web
of vaguely worded regulations.23 To encourage
growth of Internet and new media technologies
and commerce in Malaysia, however, the state
has promised Internet companies that it will not
censor the Internet. ONI’s testing revealed no evi-
dence of technological Internet filtering. This does
not necessarily mean, however, that the Internet
environment in Malaysia is free of government
influence and control. Bloggers and independent
online news publishers report being investigated
and harassed by police on several occasions for
posting allegedly offensive or seditious content,
and the state media frequently run articles and
opinion pieces questioning whether the Internet
should be subject to tighter state controls.
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Internet users in Moldova enjoy largely unfet-
tered access despite the government’s restric-
tive and increasingly authoritarian tendencies
overall. Development of the Internet has been
rapid, propelled by a national ICT strategy that
is harmonized with the European Union as well
as the large diaspora population for whom
telecommunications and the Internet are
important channels of communication, and,
possibly, for the transfer of remittances.
Although filtering does not occur at the back-
bone level, both filtering and surveillance occur
at the places where most Moldavians access
the Internet: cybercafés and workplaces.
Moldovan security forces have developed the
capacity to monitor the Internet, and national
legislation concerning “illegal activities” is
strict.
Background
In the early 1990s, as a newly sovereign state,
Moldova experienced both political and econom-
ical turmoil. Separatist movements erupted in two
regions: Gagauzia, which later obtained autono-
my, and the unrecognized breakaway state of
Transdniester. The Transdniester region operates
as an independent (albeit unrecognized) state
with separate telecommunications and broad-
casting networks.
Moldova has one of the lowest Internet
development levels in Eastern Europe, and ranks
109th worldwide on the U.N. Global E-readiness
Survey of 2005.1 Yet the government has priori-
tized information communications technology
(ICT) as means for national development and
adopted a National ICT Strategy designed to
align the sector with EU norms and standards via
the EU-sponsored Electronic South Eastern
Europe initiative (eSEE). Certain aspects of 
“e-government,” such as the state registration
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database (registru.md) that acts as a central por-
tal for all government department and services,
are highly advanced and have been used as a
model for other Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) countries. Some human rights
groups have voiced concerns that the database
is too comprehensive and lacks oversight. Given
that the legal basis for protecting citizens’ rights
to privacy is not yet defined, the information held
in the database represents a risk for unwarranted
(and unprecedented) surveillance. The president,
a former internal ministry general, supports the
register, which is not surprising given that it was
originally developed within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. The telecommunications sector in
Moldova is formally liberalized, but the govern-
ment has faced problems privatizing the main
operator.
Internet in Moldova
Internet use in Moldova has tripled since 2002
and penetration currently stands at 10 percent of
the population.2 However, development is con-
strained by a lack of quality infrastructure, low
affordability, and the slow development of the
telecommunications sector. A national survey
indicates that 24.1 percent of the population
claim the Internet is very expensive and difficult to
afford.3 Ownership of personal computers is low,
with only 3 percent penetration (as of 2004).
Nearly half of users access the Internet from their
place of work, 33.6 percent use Internet at home,
and 8.1 percent use public access points.4
Moldova has seven tier-one providers:
Globnet, Moldtelecom, Telemedia, MDL.NET
(MegaDat), Dynamic Network Technologies
(DNT), Relsoft, and Riscom. A further eleven
Internet service providers (ISPs) provide access
to all regions of the country. International Internet
traffic is routed by way of providers in Europe.
The telecommunications market is dominated by
Moldtelecom, which retains its near monopoly
position in the market. Most of the other ISPs rent
infrastructure from Moldtelecom. All ISPs
exchange traffic via an Internet exchange point
located at Moldtelecom.
Fixed-line and mobile teledensity remain
underdeveloped, as do Internet and broadband
penetration; however, all have recorded solid
growth.5 According to the national telecom regu-
lator, dialup connections in the first nine months
of 2006 rose by 88.9 percent (375,500), while
broadband connections in this period tripled to
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country is 410 Mb/s for 2005.6 In 2006, mobile
phone ownership jumped to 32.2 percent. There
are more than fourteen operators providing
Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services on
the international voice market, although
Moldtelecom has retained the largest share.7
Operators need to obtain a license in order to
offer IP services.
Over 3,000 domain names are registered in
the country code top-level domains (“.md”).8 The
most popular languages accessed by Internet
users are Romanian, Russian, and English. The
most-visited local Web site is the news agency
site Azi (www.azi.md). The most-used search
engines are www.ournet.md, www.super.md, and
www.mail.ru.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
To meet requirements set by the World Trade
Organization, the telecommunications market
was liberalized on January 1, 2004. The main
operator decreased its tariffs on average by 25
percent, allowing other providers into the mar-
ket.9 However, low computer penetration rates
and inconsistent government policy remain major
impediments to Internet growth. The state has
officially committed to developing Moldova’s
information society, including promoting e-gover-
nance, although certain policies undermine with
these objectives. The main telecommunications
operator and top-tier ISP in the country,
Moldtelecom, remains under state control
despite large-scale criticism. ISPs rent access
from Moldtelecom’s well-developed infrastruc-
ture, which increases their costs and diminishes
their competitiveness.
The ISPs are licensed by the National
Agency for Telecommunications and Information
Regulation (NATIR),10 the main telecommunica-
tions regulator in Moldova. The law and corre-
sponding regulation do not require special
requirements for receiving a license. NATIR is
responsible for issuing and suspending licenses,
establishing license fees, and enforcing sanc-
tions where necessary. In addition it regulates the
management of the country’s highest-level
Internet domain (“.md”). NATIR was established
with an amendment to the Law on
Telecommunications, which introduced a licens-
ing regime for most Internet and telecommunica-
tions services. A new law on e-communications
entered the parliament in 2006 as part of an effort
to harmonize national legislation with European
standards. The drafted law envisions broader
rights for the final user and wider access to pub-
lic networks, and provides for more-efficient mar-
ket liberalization. The draft law also seeks to
establish a new independent body to regulate
telecommunications.
The Supreme Security Council (SSC), which
oversees implementation of the president’s
decrees related to national security, monitors
ministries’ and state agencies’ various activities
to ensure national security. The SSC Ministry of
Information Development carries out government
policies related to information and communica-
tions and encourages collaboration between
state and private organizations. The National
Security and Information Service is empowered
with broad authority to monitor and gather infor-
mation on Internet usage.
ONI testing results
ONI carried out testing on three of the tier one
ISPs: Globnet, Moldtelecom, and Telemedia. The
tests revealed no evidence of filtering for any of
the categories of content tested.
ONI research determined that some ISPs
perform a differentiated multilevel filtering as a
means of protection against various network
attacks and spam or viruses. There was, howev-
er, no evidence of ISP-level filtering based upon
sensitive political or social content. More com-
monly this type of filtering occurs at the level of
business workplaces and cybercafés. ONI
researchers performed a survey among more
than 600 businesses to determine the level of fil-
tering at work enterprises.11 The results indicate
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that filtering or surveillance of Internet exists in all
types of businesses. Some practice “sanitized”
access to Internet, where employees can access
only a limited number of sites directly related to
the work they perform. Other enterprises allow
employees to access the Internet, but filter out
sexual, “harmful,” and “entertainment” content.
In cybercafés access is limited more by sur-
veillance than by direct filtering. Specific content
is prohibited and, if accessed, the user is fined.
Approximately 56 percent of cybercafés’ admin-
istrators surveyed by ONI admitted to filtering
and surveillance activities. Other administrators
stated that they noted that some Web sites are
inaccessible, but would not confirm that they
used any specific filtering system in the cyber-
café itself.
Conclusion
Despite increasingly authoritarian tendencies, the
Internet in Moldova remains largely unaffected by
filtering, at least at the backbone level. At “edge”
locations, such as cybercafés and some enter-
prises, ONI research revealed filtering that
restricted access to certain content and services.
Given that over half (55 percent) of all Moldovans
access the Internet through their workplace or
cybercafés, this form of filtering has a significant
impact on the way in which Moldovans “experi-
ence” the Internet. ONI research also suggests
that Moldovan security forces have developed
mechanisms to monitor Internet content. Given a
relatively underdeveloped legislative base pro-
tecting citizen’s rights and privacy, there are few
checks and balances in place to prevent author-
ities from taking a more aggressive stance on
policing Internet content.
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Internet access in Morocco is, for the most part,
open and unrestricted. ONI testing revealed
that Morocco filters only a small number of
Web sites, mainly pro-Western Sahara inde-
pendence sites. A small number of Weblog
servers and anonymizers were also found to be
blocked. The filtration regime is not compre-
hensive—similar content can be found on other
Web sites that are not blocked.
Background
Morocco faces two major issues that inform its
actions regarding the press and human rights in
general: the status of Western Sahara and terror-
ism. As to the first issue, Morocco has vied with
the Polisario Front for control of Western Sahara
ever since Spain pulled out of the region in 1976.1
Morocco asserts a historical claim on the region,2
while the Polisario Front asserts the right of self-
determination.3 After decades of fighting, both
sides agreed to a UN-sponsored ceasefire in
1991 that required an eventual referendum on
independence in the region.4 As of yet, this refer-
endum has not been held.5 Despite the cease
fire, reports of overzealous suppression of
peaceful resistance to Moroccan rule persist.6
Journalism on the subject has been restricted as
well. In February 2006 a journalist from and the
managing editor of Le Journal Hebdomadaire
were fined 3.1 million dirhams (USD370,668) for
questioning the objectivity of a study run by the
European Strategic Intelligence and Security
Center on the Polisario Front.7 In October 2006
Morocco barred foreign journalists covering
human rights issues from entering Moroccan-
controlled Western Sahara,8 and continued its
crackdown on media coverage of the conflict by
arresting and expelling a Swedish photographer
found taking pictures of a pro-Polisario demon-
stration in Western Sahara in February 2007.9
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As to the second issue, terrorism, Casa-
blanca was the site of a major terrorist attack in
May 2003 when suicide bombers detonated five
bombs targeting a Jewish community center, a
Spanish restaurant and social club, a hotel, and
the Belgian consulate.10 According to Human
Rights Watch, “several hundred” suspects
remain detained in connection with the incident
and face “mistreatment, and sometimes torture,
while under interrogation, and then convict[ion] in
unfair trials.”11 An antiterrorism law passed soon
after the attacks placed further restrictions on the
press.12
Internet in Morocco
The Internet was first introduced in Morocco in
1995,13 and the country now has one of the high-
est degrees of connectivity in Africa. Maroc
Télécom is the largest Internet service provider
(ISP) in Morocco, with an estimated market share
in June 2006 in excess of 95 percent.14 The
majority of the remaining customers are with
Maroc Connect, which provides an ADSL service
through wholesale access agreements with
Maroc Télécom.15 Maroc Télécom offers whole-
sale services to other ISPs, following the
Reference Access Offer approved by Morocco’s
telecom regulatory body, the National
Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (ANRT),
in October 2006.16 In 2005 the total number of
Internet users in Morocco was 4.6 million, up
from 100,000 in 2000.17 This constitutes approxi-
mately 15.1 percent of the country’s population.18
Penetration remains low in absolute terms as a
result of cost, the country’s low literacy rate, and
a lack of infrastructure in rural areas. The mush-
rooming number of cybercafés, however, has
expanded access from the capital city of
Casablanca to Morocco’s smaller cities and vil-
lages. As of mid-2006, ANRT had granted over
10,000 licenses to ISPs and cybercafés.19
Internet service is also becoming faster and more
reliable; ADSL service was launched in Morocco
in 2003 and has attracted an increasing number
of subscribers. The ADSL market grew by nearly
300 percent in 2005, and the number of sub-
scribers topped 300,000 in mid-2006.20 Morocco
offers the cheapest DSL access in Africa; a
monthly broadband connection starts at USD17
per month.21
The growing Moroccan blogosphere now
includes over 10,000 blogs, mostly in French. As
a result of the more widespread availability of the




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........3,954 3.98
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................70 5.64
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................52 2.29
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................123 4.19
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................101 4.80
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................153 3.47
Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................78 5.44
Internet users (% of population) ..........................................15.2 4.48
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
the country’s first Arabic-language blog plat-
form.22 Though largely free of filtration, posters
generally avoid “red line” topics such as Western
Sahara, defamation of royal authority, and
defamation of Islam.23
In the last few years, the Moroccan govern-
ment has reportedly begun to block access to
Web sites run by fundamentalist Islamic groups
and Web sites that advocate for the independ-
ence of Western Sahara.24 This filtering regime
appears to be less than comprehensive, howev-
er, as many related sites go unblocked.
Furthermore, groups and individuals who are
unable to express their views in the traditional
media have increasingly turned to the Internet to
voice their opinions.25 However, there is growing
religious pressure to block explicit material such
as pornography.26
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Moroccan government held a monopoly on
the country’s telecommunications sector until a
privatization initiative that began in 1997.27 The
ANRT was founded in 1998 and has encouraged
private companies to offer competitively priced
services, including ISPs and cybercafés.28 The
ANRT grants licenses to companies that wish to
run ISPs, but individuals who want to obtain an
Internet account do not need to obtain
approval.29 The government does not yet appear
to have taken action against ISPs for account
holders’ activities or to monitor sites accessed by
account holders or customers of cybercafés.30
However, as mentioned earlier, Morocco is a
consistent censor of the independent media, fre-
quently fining newspapers and arresting journal-
ists who report on human rights, politics, or
Islam.31 Current laws criminalize criticizing the
monarchy or Morocco’s claim to Western
Sahara.32 The antiterrorism bill that was passed
following suicide bombings in Casablanca in
2003 grants the government sweeping legal
power to arrest journalists or to filter Web sites
that are deemed to “disrupt public order by intim-
idation, force, violence, fear or terror.”33 In recent
years, the Moroccan government appears to be
growing increasingly proactive about shutting
down newspapers and imprisoning reporters; in
January 2007, a newsweekly was ordered shut
down for two months after publishing jokes about
Islam and a reporter and editor were given three-
year suspended prison sentences.34
Restrictions on freedom of expression
reportedly have been extended to the Internet in
recent years. According to Reporters Without
Borders, in November 2005 the Moroccan gov-
ernment began blocking access to several major
Web sites that support independence for the
Western Sahara, a decision that was made either
by the country’s communications ministry or its
interior ministry.35 Shortly thereafter, Morocco
reportedly cut off access to www.anonymizer
.com, a Web site that allows Internet users to
access banned sites from within the country. It
has also been reported that the Web sites of
Islamic fundamentalist organizations have been
blocked, particularly those run by a fundamental-
ist group called the Justice and Charity
Organization.36
ONI testing results
ONI carried out testing of Moroccan Internet serv-
ice on the principal Internet provider, Maroc
Telecom, and a smaller ISP, MTDS. The results of
the testing found blocking of a small number of
sites. Blocking was found primarily on sites pro-
moting the independence of Western Sahara,
such as www.saadasahara.com and www
.sahara-occidental.com, as well as the Web sites
for the Union of Sahrawi Journalists and Writers
(www.upes.org), the Association of Families of
Sahrawi Prisoners and Disappeared (www
.afapredesa.org), and the General Trade Union of
the Western Sahara Petition (www.umdraiga
.com/eucoco2004/documentosytalleres/tallersin
dical.htm). Two blog hosting sites, www.haloscan
.com and www.livejournal.com, were blocked as
well. Finally, ONI also found that two anonymizer
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Web sites, www.anonymizer.com and www.multi-
proxy.org, were blocked.
However, a number of sites reported
blocked in the past were found to be accessible.
These include www.wsahara.net and www.arso.
org, both pro-Western Sahara independence
sites, as well as www.spsrasd.info, the Saharan
press service’s site, and www.aljamaa.info,
Justice and Charity’s site (though the title of the
site is Justice and Spirituality).
Conclusion
Morocco’s Internet filtration regime is relatively
light and focuses on Western Saharan independ-
ence, a few blog sites, and highly visible
anonymizers. The issues Morocco faces in
Western Sahara’s push for independence, the
specter of Islamist terrorism, and the protection
of the royal family and Islam from defamation
have led Morocco to crack down on free speech
and the press, but have not yet led it to signifi-
cantly censor the Internet. As Internet users can
find blocked material on other accessible sites, it
is clear that Morocco’s filtration regime is not
comprehensive. Relative to the region, Moroccan
Internet access is fairly free.
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Myanmar’s authoritarian military junta is slowly
expanding access to the Internet while main-
taining one of the world’s most restrictive sys-
tems of control. Despite the fact that less than
1 percent of Myanmar’s population access the
Internet, the government has targeted online
independent media and dissent with the same
commitment it has demonstrated to stifling tra-
ditional media and voices for reform.
Background
Myanmar’s abysmal human rights record wors-
ened in 2006,1 prompting increased pressure
from the United States, the EU, and ASEAN for
reform. In September the U.N. Security Council
approved the U.S. government’s proposal to put
Myanmar formally on the Council’s agenda.2
Leaders from the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) claim neocolonialists are infiltrat-
ing media technology on pretexts of protecting
human rights and countering drug trafficking.3
Other sensitive issues included political and con-
stitutional reform, separatist movements, reli-
gious and ethnic minorities, forced and child
labor, access by humanitarian organizations, and
the country’s first disclosed outbreak of bird flu.
The government suppressed reports on a wide
range of additional issues, from rising cement
and fuel prices to restrictions on private banks,4
and jailed two journalists who photographed the
new, remote capital at Pyinmana.5
Internet in Myanmar
The reported number of Internet users in 2005
ranged from 78,000 to nearly 300,000, at the
upper limit representing approximately 0.56 per-
cent of Myanmar’s population.6 Myanmar
remains one of thirty countries with less than 1
percent Internet penetration.7 Most users access
the Internet in cybercafés (starting at USD0.30
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per hour, down from USD0.75 in 2004 and
USD0.95–1.50 in 2003),8 which are said to be
present in five cities but are planned to reach 324
townships within three years.9 Connection
speeds are slow, however, as broadband is avail-
able primarily to government and businesses and
used mostly for Internet telephony via Voice-over
Internet Protocol (VoIP), though the government
pledged to bring ADSL to every township by the
end of 2006.10 There are only two Internet service
providers (ISPs) allowed in Myanmar: state-
owned telecom Myanmar Posts and Telecom
(MPT), which is the only source of new Internet
services,11 and Myanmar Teleport (MMT, formerly
Bagan Cybertech), which is reportedly the infra-
structure arm of Myanmar’s Internet system and
responsible for blocking content. In September
2005 the Ahaed Co. of Myanmar and the
Canadian ICT company Teleglobe reportedly
signed a memorandum of understanding to
establish a private ISP.12 Infrastructural reliability
is also an issue: in May 2006 the entire country
was disconnected for four days because of
alleged damage to an undersea cable.13
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Myanmar heavily regulates online access and
content via legal, regulatory, and economic con-
straints. As in other areas, however, the state’s
policies are difficult to assess because they are
rarely published or explained.
Network-ready computers must be regis-
tered (for a fee) with the MPT; failure to do so can
result in fines and prison sentences of seven to
fifteen years.14 Sharing registered Internet con-
nections is also punishable by revocation of
access and presumably similar “legal action.”15
Broad laws and regulations confer power upon
the SPDC, which is also involved in all judicial
appointments,16 to punish citizens harshly for any
activity deemed detrimental to national interests
or security. Regulations issued in 2000 subjected
online content to the same kind of strict filtering
that the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division
carries out (despite print media being almost
exclusively state owned):17 users must obtain
MPT permission before creating Web pages, and
they cannot post anything “detrimental” to the
government or simply related to politics. The MPT
can “amend and change regulations on the use




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........1,446 3.50
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................61 4.19
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................90 6.00
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................130 3.52
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................202 1.87
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................208 0.69
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................176 1.36
Internet users (% of population) ............................................0.1 3.07
Source (by indicator): IMF 2006; World Bank 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2004
Costs indeed limit access significantly: even
households that can afford a PC and long-dis-
tance connection fees outside the capital Yangon
(Rangoon) and Mandalay cannot pay
USD35/month19 for a broadband account. Dialup
access leaves them with state-monitored e-mail
(free services are blocked)20 and a small collec-
tion of pre-approved sites on the country’s
intranet, known as the Myanmar Wide Web.21 As
for cybercafés, promoted since 2002 by a “Public
Access Centers” (PAC) program for e-mail and
gaming purposes,22 the government has been
urging business owners to legally register as
PACs. This requires them to log user identities
and Web sites visited and send the information
back to the state-owned Myanmar Info-tech.23
There are reports, however, that many tech-savvy
users risk connecting to proxy servers abroad
and thereby access the entire Web undetected.24
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted on the two ISPs in
Myanmar, Myanmar Teleport (MMT) and
Myanmar Posts and Telecom (MPT). Both MMT
and MPT filtered extensively and focused over-
whelmingly on independent media, political
reform, and human rights sites relating to
Myanmar, as well as free Web-based e-mail serv-
ices and circumvention tools. 
Both ISPs blocked roughly the same num-
ber of circumvention tools, including Proxify,
Guardster, and Anonymizer (although only MPT
blocked www.anonymizer.com).
In June 2006 Gmail and Gtalk were made
inaccessible and Skype was banned25—a report-
ed attempt not only to censor communications
but also to preserve the government’s monopoly
over telephone and e-mail services as MPT’s rev-
enues dipped.26 ONI testing confirmed that
although no search engines (MSN, Google, and
so on) were blocked, Yahoo! Mail, Gmail,
Hushmail, and mail2web were blocked by both
ISPs, while MPT took the precaution of blocking
thirteen additional e-mail sites, including Hotmail
and Fastmail. Only MPT blocked Skype.
In addition to filtering Radio Free Asia
(www.rfa.org) and OhmyNews (www.ohmynews.
com), both MMT and MPT blocked many major
independent news sites reporting on Myanmar.
This included English language publications
such as the Irawaddy, Mizzima News, and
BurmaNet News (www.burmanet.org), as well as
sites in the national language (www.burma
today.net). Only MPT blocked the Voice of
America Web sites (www.voanews.com) in
English and Burmese, while MMT targeted
regional news sites such as the Times of India
and Asia Observer. 
Sites containing content on human rights
advocacy and democratic reform continued 
to be a priority for blocking. A number of 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) sites with
different levels of involvement in Myanmar human
rights issues were blocked (Open Society
Institute at www.soros.org; www.burmacampaign.
org.uk). Within this group were Web sites docu-
menting the persecution of ethnic minorities and
the personal Web site of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Other continuities in blocking included coalitions
for democratic change in Myanmar, such as the
Web site of the coalition government of the Union
of Burma (www.ncgub.net), opposition move-
ments (www.chinforum.org), and rights groups
(www.womenofburma.org).
There were significant differences in filtering
between the two ISPs. Of the sites found to be
blocked in Myanmar, less than a third were
blocked on both ISPs. The remaining blocked
sites were blocked on one ISP or the other, but
not both. MMT blocked almost exclusively sites
with ties to Myanmar, where the term “Burma” in
the URL was one of the common threads among
the filtered sites, from human rights groups
(www.burmawatch.org; www.hrw.org) critical of
the government to peripheral personal sites
(such as a site with photographs of Myanmar).
MPT filtered many more sites from the global list,
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blocking a large majority of the pornography Web
sites tested, while MMT filtered very few such
sites. 
Several curious results indicated that the
Myanmar government does not take an entirely
systematic approach to filtering. For example,
Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) was
blocked entirely on MPT, but MMT filtered only
several Amnesty reports on the country. Other
significant variations among the ISPs, including
the inconsistent blocking of pornography and
gambling sites that suggest distinct filtering
methods, are unusual given both ISPs are state-
run.
Conclusion
Although Myanmar does not deploy its filtering
regime with the same sophistication and breadth
as other countries with similarly repressive online
environments, the paranoid grip of the SPDC is
felt in the restrictions on access, the high cost of
services, and the frequently brutal clampdown on
information and expression in all other spheres of
Burmese life. This may be why there are not
many known cases of cyber-dissidents in cus-
tody, given that people have been arrested for
anything from publishing subversive poetry to lis-
tening to the BBC or Radio Free Asia in public.27
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Extremely unstable political conditions in Nepal
have at times led to harassment of journalists
and censorship of traditional media. In 2005
conditions deteriorated to the point where 
a week-long national media and Internet 
blackout was imposed. However, Nepal does
not filter the Internet on an ongoing basis.
Background
Nepal is among the world’s least-developed
countries. It has endured extreme political insta-
bility in recent years because of its transition from
absolute monarchy to democracy and because
of its years of struggle between the state and mil-
itant Maoist insurgents, who control large por-
tions of the countryside. Nepal was under the rule
of an absolute monarch until 1990, when popular
pressure forced the king to transition to a demo-
cratic system of parliamentary monarchy.1 Since
then, internal governmental collapse and parlia-
mentary dissolution have been common occur-
rences.2 During periods of extreme political
volatility, the state has clamped down on the
press and free expression. In 2005, citing deteri-
orating security conditions in Nepal from Maoist
violence, the king imposed authoritarian rule and
a week-long media blackout, during which the
country was cut off from the Internet.3 The state
and Maoist rebels both have a history of harass-
ing journalists and repressing media coverage.4
Nevertheless, with the exception of King
Gyanendra’s authoritarian rule in 2005–06, Nepal
has experienced tremendous growth of a
“vibrant” and largely free independent media
since parliament was established in 1990.5
Internet in Nepal 
Although through 2005 less than 1 percent 
of Nepal’s population of twenty-three million 
used the Internet, the Internet market in Nepal is
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growing rapidly—the result of a competitive
Internet service provider (ISP) market and low
Internet access prices.6 Thirty-one private ISPs
offer Internet access to businesses and con-
sumers, though two, Worldlink and Mercantile,
dominate the market with a combined share of
more than 70 percent.7 Cybercafés are important
sources of Internet access for Nepalis; the coun-
try is believed to have the highest concentration
of cybercafés in the world.8 Much of Nepal’s
Internet access is concentrated in the more-
developed Katmandu Valley region, as the moun-
tainous terrain and low income in remote regions
of the country make access more difficult.
However, one effort to bring Internet access to
rural populations—the Nepali Wireless
Networking Project—has already wirelessly con-
nected seven remote mountain villages to the
Internet, with plans to network twenty-one villages
in all.9
Although relatively few Nepalis presently get
their news from the Internet, it has nevertheless
become an important source of independent
news in Nepal.10 When King Gyanendra
assumed authoritarian control in 2005, for exam-
ple, traditional media were either shut down or
heavily censored to ensure the publication of only
favorable news about the monarch.11 Nepali
bloggers became an important political voice
and source of information to the world about the
situation unfolding inside the country.12
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Nepal’s legal system is in flux because of its
unstable political landscape and its new constitu-
tion. The most recent collapse occurred in
February 2005, when the king assumed control of
the government and armed forces.13 Mass civil-
ian protests followed, and he was forced to rein-
state parliament and ultimately relinquish all offi-
cial powers to the prime minister and parlia-
ment.14 The king sought to stifle the independent
media during his tenure, passing the repressive
Media Law, which prohibited criticism of the king
and royal family and the broadcast of news over
independent FM radio stations (an important
source of independent news in the country). The
Media Law also increased the penalties for
defamation tenfold. The law was repealed once
parliament was reinstated.15
In December 2006, seven political parties
and the Maoists agreed on a new interim consti-
tution that paves the way for the Maoists to join
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properties,16 leaving the fate of the monarchy up
to a general election.17 The interim constitution
guarantees certain social freedoms including
freedom of speech and expression, freedom to
protest, and freedom to establish a political party,
among others.18 The constitution also guaran-
tees the freedom to publish, including a specifi-
cally enumerated freedom to publish on the
Internet.19 It advises, however, that those who
publish information that causes social disruption
or disparages others may be subject to punish-
ment under relevant laws.20
One such law is likely the Electronic
Transaction and Digital Signature Act of 2004
(ETDSA), which regulates online commerce and
financial transactions and criminalizes certain
online behavior, including hacking and fraud.
ETDSA also provides criminal penalties, includ-
ing fines and up to five years in prison, for the
publication of “illegal” content on the Internet
(though it provides no definition of illegal con-
tent), or for the publication of hate speech or
speech likely to trigger ethnic strife.21 Similarly,
the National Broadcasting Act of 1993 and the
National Broadcasting Regulation of 1995 pro-
vide for fines and/or imprisonment for broadcast-
ing content likely to cause ethnic strife or social
unrest, undermine national security or moral
decency, or conflict with Nepali foreign policy.22
However, the extent to which any previously
existing laws will retain their force under the new
government is unclear.
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted from October 2006
through January 2007 on six Nepali ISPs:
Worldlink, Everest, Mercantile, Nepal Telecom,
Speedcast, and Websurfer. The tests revealed 
no evidence of filtering for any of the categories
tested.
Conclusion
Ongoing political instability remains a constant
threat to independent media in Nepal, as there is
a history of insurgents and the state harassing
journalists and clamping down on media free-
doms during times of political tension. In 2006
Nepal emerged from a particularly repressive
period: the king’s authoritarian rule was abol-
ished, parliament was reinstated, and a new
interim constitution was put into effect guaran-
teeing freedom of expression and of the press.
These freedoms do not, however, extend to
speech that is likely to incite social unrest or dis-
parage others, which are sensitive issues for the
state because of the ethnic and socioeconomic
strife underlying the struggle with the Maoists. At
present, however, Nepali journalists report virtual-
ly unconditional freedom of the press, including
the Internet, and ONI’s testing revealed no evi-
dence that Nepal imposes technological filters
on the Internet.
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Government restrictions on online content and
connectivity render the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea) a virtual “black
hole” in cyberspace.1 While shunning Internet
accessibility and functionality, Pyongyang has
opted for an isolated, domestic intranet con-
sisting of approximately thirty Web sites
approved by the government and available
only to a privileged minority.
Background
The North Korean regime does maintain a nomi-
nal presence on the World Wide Web through
sites promoting its ideology and agenda. As with
print and broadcast media, these sites largely
extol the nation’s leader Kim Jong Il, his father
Kim Il Sung, and the Juche Idea of national “self-
reliance,” while espousing the country’s stance
on reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Unlike
other media, however, North Korean Web sites lie
at some distance from Pyongyang. Because the
state lacks an active top-level domain (TLD), it
relies on servers in China, Japan, Germany, and
even Texas to host its official pages, including
www.korea-dpr.com (North Korea’s Web page)
and www.kcna.co.jp (the home page of the state-
run Korean Central News Agency). North Korea
has asked repeatedly for the country code TLD
“.kp”, but the U.S.-based Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has yet
to grant the request. 
Internet and Intranet in North Korea
The community of Internet users in North Korea
consists almost entirely of elites and foreigners. A
select few, including members of Kim Jung Il’s
inner circle, enjoy unfiltered Internet access via
satellite link to servers in Germany, thanks to a
2004 joint venture between Pyongyang’s Korea
Computer Center (KCC) and its Berlin-based
counterpart KCC Europe. Most Internet users,
however, are dependent upon Chinese service
providers for connectivity—and thus are subject
to China’s filtering regime. For years, these
providers could be reached only via international
dialup from exclusive hotels in Pyongyang. In
2002, optical cable connections between the
North Korean capital and Shanghai became
operational at the Internet PC Room—the first
Internet café in the country. Still, few North
Koreans can afford the hourly fee of USD10,
effectively limiting use of the PC Room to foreign
diplomats, businesspeople, journalists, and
tourists.
A growing segment of the North Korean
population is gaining access to Chinese net-
works via Web-enabled mobile phones smug-
gled in from China and sold on the black market.2
However, for most North Koreans, access to
online content is exceedingly rare and limited to
the few dozen Web sites that comprise
Kwangmyong, the nation’s domestic intranet.
North Korea
ONI did not carry out empirical testing for Internet filtering in North Korea for this report.
Content on Kwangmyong is chosen, and user
conduct monitored, by the government.
Information comes primarily from databases
maintained by the Central Scientific and
Technological Information Agency, the Grand
People’s Study House, and other repositories.3
This content is intended for use at select
research institutes, schools, and factories. Aside
from these establishments, only government
ministries and a handful of enterprises and indi-
viduals have the computers, telecommunications
capacity, and the authorization needed to utilize
the national intranet. 
Small, government-sanctioned businesses
offering public intranet access have been
observed in urban areas, but user fees are likely
prohibitive for the average North Korean. In 2005
human rights groups revealed photographs of
one such venue—called the Information
Technology Store—in the city of Chungjin. The
facility houses several terminals with intranet con-
nectivity and offers computer classes at the
steep price of 20,000 won per month—seven to
eight times the average monthly wage.4 Such
costs are believed to be mandated by the state
so as to deter ordinary citizens from using the
resources and services of these facilities.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The near absence of connectivity, even to the iso-
lated and heavily filtered Kwangmyong intranet,
is consistent with the North Korean regime’s
efforts to regulate all information and communi-
cation in the country. There are no independent
media in North Korea. Personal radios and televi-
sions must be modified to receive only govern-
ment stations and registered with the authorities.
A nationwide ban on mobile phones has also
been in place since May 2004.
It is the state’s command of institutions and
resources that allows it to achieve such pervasive
control over online media. The government allo-
cates available technologies to establishments
and authorizes user access as it sees fit. Legal
measures play only a subsidiary role in actualiz-
ing state control, and for citizens, they confer no
actionable rights vis-à-vis the state. Thus,
although Article 67 of the DPRK’s Socialist
Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and
of the press, there is no means of instituting a
legal challenge to the state’s dominion over
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The Sultanate of Oman engages in extensive
filtering of pornographic Web sites, gay and
lesbian content, and anonymizer sites used 
to circumvent blocking. Although filtering of
political content is highly selective, laws and
regulations restrict free expression online and
encourage self-censorship.
Background
Oman is a monarchy, with Sultan Qaboos bin
Said exercising absolute power and the bicamer-
al Majlis Oman (Council of Oman) acting in a
mostly advisory position. Although the govern-
ment is generally protective of human rights, it
has been criticized by international groups for
restricting free speech and assembly.1 In early
2005, thirty-one Omanis were imprisoned for
allegedly plotting to overthrow the government;
all were granted royal pardons later that year.2 In
July 2005, two Omani human rights activists were
arrested for criticizing the government: Taiba al-
Mawali was jailed for six months and Abdullah Al-
Riyami, who accused the police of torturing pris-
oners, was detained incommunicado for a
week.3
Internet in Oman
Oman’s communications infrastructure is well
developed.4 Oman Telecommunications Company
(Omantel), the country’s sole Internet service
provider (ISP), is owned by the government.
Omantel began providing full Internet service in
early 1997. As of October 2006, Internet sub-
scriptions numbered 92,126 (approximately 29
subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants).5 Approxi-
mately 14 percent (12,900) of these subscriptions
were to high-speed Internet (ADSL) services. The
majority of subscribers continue to rely on dialup
connections.6
The low number of Internet subscribers 
has been attributed to the paucity of personal
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computers, which in 2006 numbered 32 per
1,000 people.7 Prepaid Internet service cards
and Omantel’s “Log ‘N’ Surf” service provide
alternatives to regular subscriptions; neither
requires prior registration.8 Omantel is also work-
ing on a Wireless Local Loop (WLL) project to
extend telecom services to rural areas where
cable connectivity is either impossible or prohibi-
tively expensive.9
Oman’s government has plans to use the
Internet to increase e-government and e-educa-
tion. On January 9, 2007, Omantel launched the
Easy Learning Service to provide hundreds of
electronic training courses in accounting, sales,
marketing, and customer services.10 In February
2007 Omantel began offering sixty free hours of
Internet access to new subscribers, describing
the initiative as part of a larger plan to spread dig-
ital culture.11
The monarchy has also begun opening
Oman’s telecommunications sector to private
investors and competitors. In 2005, the govern-
ment sold a 30 percent stake in Omantel to local
investors. The move came shortly after the coun-
try’s second mobile-phone operator started
operations, offering for the first time a choice to
local consumers. The government has also
announced plans to offer licenses for fixed-line
telecom services in competition with Omantel.12
Legal and regulatory frameworks
On November 6, 1996, Sultan Qaboos bin Said
issued the Basic Law of the State (“The White
Book”), considered to be Oman’s first constitu-
tion. Article 29 of the White Book guarantees
“freedom of opinion and expression … within the
limits of the Law.”13 “Material that leads to public
discord, violates the security of the State or abus-
es a person’s dignity and his rights” may not be
printed or published.14 In July 2005 former parlia-
mentarian Taiba al-Mawali was arrested and sen-
tenced to eighteen months imprisonment for
insulting a public official and sending allegedly
libelous text messages that criticized government
actions.15 Her sentence was later reduced and
she was released on January 31, 2006.16
Arrest and search warrants are not required
by law, and the government can and does moni-
tor both written and oral communications, includ-
ing cell phone, e-mail, and Internet chat room
exchanges. Publications that contravene cultural
or political norms are subject to government cen-
sorship under the 1984 Press and Publication
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criticism of the sultan or government officials will
be censored and could lead to police question-
ing.17 Although some degree of criticism of the
government has been tolerated in practice, espe-
cially on the Internet, writers and publishers gen-
erally exercise significant self-censorship. In
November 2006, the Omani authorities briefly
detained the administrator and a number of mod-
erators of Oman’s most popular online discus-
sion forum (www.omania.net) after an article
about corruption in the country was posted in the
forum.18 The administrator and moderators were
banned from traveling outside the country, await-
ing charges of defamation under the publication
law, telecommunications law, and penal code.19
In February 2007 a note in Arabic was posted on
the Web site saying that the administrator was
found innocent. No other details were mentioned.
Internet use in Oman is regulated by
Omantel’s Terms & Conditions, which mandates
that users “not carry out any unlawful activities
which contradict the social, cultural, political, reli-
gious or economical values of the Sultanate of
Oman or could cause harm to any third party ….
Any abuse and misuse of the Internet Services
through e-mail or news or by any other means
shall result in the termination of the subscription
and may result in the proceedings of Criminal or
Civil lawsuits against the Customer.”20
To use the Internet, individuals, companies,
and institutions are asked to sign an agreement
not to publish anything that destabilizes the state;
insults or criticizes the head of state or the royal
family; questions trust in the justice of the gov-
ernment; creates hatred toward the government
or any ethnicity or religion; promotes religious
extremism, pornography, or violence; promotes
any religious or political system that contradicts
the state’s system; or insults other states. Users
must also agree not to promote illegal goods or
prescription drugs over the Internet.21
Omantel imposes additional physical
restrictions on Internet access in Internet cafés.
Individuals or companies wishing to open an
Internet café must submit a floor plan for the pro-
posed site. The plan must be designed so that
the computer screens are visible to the floor
supervisor. No closed rooms or curtains are
allowed that might obstruct view of the moni-
tors.22 Moreover, Internet café operators are
asked to install proxy servers to monitor and log
user activity.23
ONI testing results
Oman’s exclusive ISP, Omantel, was tested using
dialup, “Log ‘N’ Surf” service, and ADSL connec-
tions. As suggested by the text of Omantel’s
blockpage, results indicated extensive blocking
of pornographic Web sites. Some Web sites fea-
turing provocative attire were blocked as well.
There was also extensive blocking of gay
and lesbian sites, though sites relating to gay civil
rights and equality issues, such as www.glaad.
com and www.hrc.org, were largely accessible.
Omantel also blocked some dating Web
sites—probably because they contained either
sexually explicit images (www.adultfriendfinder.
com) or gay and lesbian content (www.gay
romeo.com).
Anonymizing and proxy circumvention tools,
such as Anonymizer and Proxify, were heavily
blocked. Some Web sites dealing with hacking
and cracking, such as keygencrack.com, 
were blocked. Only one of the many peer-to-peer
Web sites tested was blocked (www.hyper
torrent.com).
Although testing did not reveal the Web sites
of Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services to
be blocked, subscriber complaints suggest that
the functionality of Skype, a popular VoIP appli-
cation, has been crippled.24 Omantel sources
have reported to the media that past filtering of
Skype was unintentional and would be remedied,
but this statement has raised suspicions
because SmartFilter categorizes www.skype.com
as a “Web Phone” site, a category that Omantel
would have had to specifically activate.25 In
March 2007 Oman’s TRA openly banned the use
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of Internet telephony at Internet cafés and
warned Internet café operators against providing
basic voice service. The TRA also warned that
violators face punishments that include imprison-
ment and fines.26
Although all blog sites tested were found to
be accessible, some adult humor sites, such as
www.collegehumor.com, were blocked. The Web
site of the Arab-American newspaper Arab Times
(www.arabtimes.com) was blocked, as were its
Google cache copies. Unlike many states in the
region, Oman does not appear to block Web
sites that criticize Islam or that attempt to convert
Muslims to other religions.
Omantel uses the American-made commer-
cial filtering software SmartFilter. Omantel’s
blockpage states that the blocking of banned
sites is not a unilateral decision taken by the ISP,
but rather that “an overwhelming number of
requests from the subscribers made [Omantel]
rethink [its] strategy and conform to the popular
demand to block pornographic and certain hack-
ing sites that encourage hacking.”27 The block-
page also suggests that users submit an e-mail
link to a site if they feel it has been blocked unfair-
ly and that such a page should be re-categorized
and unblocked.
Conclusion
Filtering of pornography, gay and lesbian con-
tent, and circumvention tools is pervasive in
Oman. In addition to blocking Web sites, the
authorities impose legal and physical controls to
ensure that the Internet community does not
access or publish objectionable or unlawful
material. These laws and regulations give rise to
self-censorship among writers and publishers,
both off- and online.
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Building on past attempts to filter blasphemous
content, the Pakistan government expanded
and intensified its Internet censorship cam-
paign in February 2006, initiated in response to
the Danish cartoons that depicted images of
the Prophet Muhammad.1 In addition to the
Supreme Court ban on publishing or posting
sites deemed to be presenting blasphemous
material, the Pakistan Telecommunications
Authority (PTA) has filtered content determined
to be irredentist, secessionist, antistate, or anti-
military.
Background
Press freedom in Pakistan is restricted by the mil-
itary-run government, headed by General Pervez
Musharraf since 1999. In addition to applying mil-
itary control over the judiciary and the ruling party
in Parliament, print and electronic media have
been censored where the content is deemed to
be antigovernment or anti-Islamic. Government
repression of media is particularly acute with
regard to Balochi and Sindhi political autonomy,
content considered blasphemous, and other
antistate or antireligious content. A vibrant civil
society movement working against Internet cen-
sorship continues to operate within Pakistan and
monitors all developments in URL blocking.2
International human rights groups have reported
on the persecution of journalists at the hands of
the Pakistani military intelligence agency.3
Internet in Pakistan
Internet usage in 2005 was reported to be 10.5
million users, with a 6.8 percent penetration rate.4
According to September 2006 estimates, there
are approximately twelve million Internet users in
Pakistan, at a 7.2 percent penetration rate.5
Pakistan has experienced considerable growth in
its information communications technology (ICT)
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sector; in 2003 the government deregulated its
telecom market, opening itself up to corporate
competition in telephone, mobile, and Internet
services.6 Internet access is widely available at
cybercafés, which accommodate many lower-
income and casual users. Rates for usage range
from USD0.15/hour to upward of USD0.50/hour,
depending on location and amenities. Although
the Net Café Regulation Bill 2006 requires
Internet cafés to monitor their patrons, there is
currently no effective mechanism to verify com-
pliance or enforce this law.7 Athough Net café
managers are expected to monitor the activities
in their establishments, based on user experi-
ence these cafés appear to be unregulated by
the regular police.
Since deregulation the market has become
highly competitive, and there are currently over
thirty Internet service providers (ISPs) in Pakistan
of varying size and quality of service. The largest
ISPs in the country include Cybernet, Comsats,
Brainnet, Gonet, and Paknet (a subsidiary of the
Pakistan Telecommunications Company Limited,
or PTCL). Modem, DSL, and recently high-speed
Internet service are all available in Pakistan, but
the reliability of these connections remains low.
The majority of home Internet users are connect-
ed by modem, while cybercafés tend to split one
modem or DSL connection over many comput-
ers, reducing connection speed. High-speed
Internet service is currently accessible only to
wealthier patrons or businesses.
All Internet traffic in and out of Pakistan is
routed by the PTCL through its subsidiary, the
Pakistan Internet Exchange (PIE), with three inter-
national gateways at Islamabad/Rawalpindi,
Lahore, and Karachi, and small/medium points of
presence (POPs) in six other cities.8 Currently,
PIE handles 2,324 Mb/s of IP backbone traffic
that comes to Pakistan using SMT4s on SMW4
and STM1s on SMW3 connected with BT, France
Telecom, Telecom Italia, Verizon, and so on.9
Bandwidth through FLAG Telecom in collabora-
tion with PTCL is at 620 Mb/s. Domestic Internet
traffic is peered at the PIE gateways within the
country. The PIE’s Karachi exchange reportedly
processes at least 95 percent of Pakistan’s
Internet traffic.10
Bloggers across Pakistan objected to the
intermittent block on www.blogspot.com and the
temporary blocking of Wikipedia in 2006, and ini-
tiated a virtual civil society movement to repeal
the orders.11 This virtual civil society engages in




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........2,149 3.63
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................65 4.83
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................50 2.10
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................134 3.05
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................158 3.37
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................182 2.53
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................128 3.79
Internet users (% of population) ............................................6.8 3.70
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
Internet censorship through up-to-date blogs, as
well as by posting information on Wikipedia.
Through these sites, users share a multitude of
techniques to circumvent the URL block and con-
tinue to access their Web sites of choice. An
example of this is the use of www.pkblogs.com to
access and post on banned www.blogspot.com
sites.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Internet censorship in Pakistan is legally regulat-
ed by the PTA, under the directive of the govern-
ment, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and the
Ministry of Information Technology and
Telecommunications (MITT). The PTA imple-
ments its censorship regulations through direc-
tives handed down to the PTCL,12 of which the
Emirates Telecommunications Corporation
(Etisalat) took majority control in 2006.13
In February 2002 the PTA challenged the
legality of the use of Voice-over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) as a replacement for long-distance calls.
Because VoIP has achieved considerable popu-
larity as a cost-effective alternative to long-
distance calls, the PTCL banned VoIP and voice
chat Web sites in early 2002; the service was
undermining revenues for outgoing long-
distance phone calls to the United States.14
In January 2003 the MITT directed the PTCL
to block pornographic and blasphemous sites by
placing content filters at all Internet exchanges,15
an effort that was not entirely effective.16 In March
2004 the Federal Investigation Agency also
ordered all ISPs to block pornographic Web sites,
a task beyond the technical capability of the ISPs
at the time.17
On February 28, 2006, the PTCL issued a
blocking directive banning a dozen URLs deter-
mined to have posted controversial Danish car-
toons depicting images of the Prophet Muham-
mad.18 Within two weeks in March, in a series of
escalating instructions, the Supreme Court
directed the government to block all Web sites
displaying the cartoons; to explain why they had
not been blocked earlier; to block all blasphe-
mous content; and to determine how access to
such content could be denied on the Internet
worldwide.19 The Supreme Court also ordered
police to register cases of publishing or posting
the blasphemous images under Article 295-C of
the Pakistan Penal Code, where blasphemy or
defamation of the Prophet Muhammad is punish-
able by death.20 Desecration or derogation of the
Quran is punishable by life imprisonment.21
On September 2, 2006, the MITT announced
the creation of a committee to monitor content of
offensive Web sites. According to the Ministry
statement, “the committee, headed by the secre-
tary of the MITT, will examine contents of web-
sites reported or found to be offensive and con-
taining anti-state material.”22 To address the
grievances of Internet users with this censorship
body, the government set up a Deregulation
Facilitation Unit to deal with users’ complaints.23
ONI testing results
ONI field testing was conducted on Brainnet,
Cybernet, and Paknet ISPs. Testing results
showed that blacklisted URLs were blocked at
either the ISP or PIE level, or at both locations.
The PTCL has implemented a limited, perhaps
symbolic, block on pornography and religious
conversion sites. However, more aggressive
efforts have been made to target content regard-
ing Balochi independence movements, Sindhi
human rights and political autonomy move-
ments, material considered blasphemous,
antigovernment material, and anti-Islamic materi-
als, though a clear pattern or criteria for what is
filtered is lacking. Among these categories, Web
sites depicting blasphemous content or address-
ing Balochi political independence were the most
comprehensively blocked.
Because one of the twelve Web sites identi-
fied as depicting the Danish cartoons was hosted
on Blogspot, the PTCL used a blocking mecha-
nism that filtered the entire www.blogspot.com
domain. As a result of this strategy, thousands of
Country Summaries 357
personal blogs hosted on www.blogspot.com
were inadvertently filtered for most of 2006. Most
material relating to the Danish cartoon incident
was blocked by the ISPs; only one Web site con-
taining the cartoons that was reportedly blocked
(www.danishcartoons.ytmnd.com) was found to
be fully accessible through the testing process.
By April 2006 the PTA extended their block-
ing to antistate Web sites as well as those 
promoting Balochi human rights and political
autonomy.24 ONI testing confirmed that internal
security conflicts were a strong focus for filtering:
all Web sites tested relating to independence (for
example, www.balochunitedfront.org) and human
rights (for example, www.balochestan.com) in the
province of Balochistan were blocked, as well as
selected sites promoting Sindhi political autono-
my and human rights. Notably, though Balochi
and Sindhi independence and human rights sites
have been filtered, the few existing Web sites per-
taining to Pashtun secessionism were fully
accessible. This may be because the majority of
Pashtuns are illiterate in their local language, and
secessionist politics in the northwest frontier
province are significantly less potent than in
Balochistan and Sindh provinces. Therefore the
more politically organized Balochi and Sindhi
movements arguably pose a greater threat to the
central government than these selected pro-
Pashtunistan Web sites.
In addition to blasphemous, secessionist,
and human rights Web sites, a variety of blogs
and Web sites containing anti-Islamic and anti-
Pakistani content were blacklisted, such as Indian
militant extremist sites (www.hinduunity.com) 
and anti-Islamic blogs (www.jihadwatch.com). A
number of less polemical Web sites, including
personal blogs hosted on www.blogspot.com,
and Web sites dedicated to promoting religious
tolerance (www.faithfreedom.com) were also
blocked.
ONI testing showed that the majority of
newspapers and independent media, circumven-
tion tools, international human rights groups,
VoIP services, civil society groups, minority reli-
gious sites, Indian and Hindu human rights
groups, Pakistani political parties, and sexual
content (including pornography and gay and les-
bian content) were accessible on all three ISPs.
Pornographic content was largely accessible,
with only symbolic blocking of selected sites.
Civil society groups contend that all www.blog
spot.com sites have been blocked; however, ONI
testing found the site for the “Don’t Block the
Blog” campaign (www.help-pakistan.com) to be
accessible on all three ISPs.
The lack of technical sophistication of the
PTCL explains the comprehensive block on
Blogspot. The PTCL lacks the capacity to target
the specific URLs that contain offensive content
and simply blocks the entire IP address on which
the offending site was hosted. Although this 
filtering system has resulted in the collateral
blocking of entire domains such as www.blog
spot.com, the rudimentary nature of the blocking
mechanism also makes it easier for users to cir-
cumvent the block using proxy servers or other
bypassing methods.25 Not only is the PTCL
charged with blocking blacklisted URLs, but it
also hands down blocking directives directly to
the ISPs to implement. The ISPs then implement,
or attempt to implement, the blocking orders; the
results of the ONI testing show that this some-
times led to a redundancy in blocking at both the
ISP level and the central Internet exchange point.
Conclusion
Currently Pakistanis have unimpeded access to
most sexual, political, social, and religious con-
tent. However, the Pakistani government contin-
ues to use repressive measures against antimili-
tary, Balochi, and Sindhi political dissidents, and
it blocks Web sites highlighting this repression.
The government also filters high-risk antistate
materials and blasphemous content.
The Pakistani government does not current-
ly employ a sophisticated blocking system, nor
does the government have a coherent policy on
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what sites should be blacklisted. The recently
established ministerial committee will probably
contribute to the development of a comprehensive
framework for government censorship as methods
for implementing blocking directives are refined.
Civil society activists and cyber-dissidents con-
tinue to advocate for free expression and blog-
ging rights, which are curtailed by crude blocking
methods that have imposed blanket blocks on
entire domains such as www.blogspot.com.
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Saudi Arabia has filtered the Internet since its
introduction into the kingdom less than a
decade ago. The filtering regime most exten-
sively covers religious and social content,
though sites relating to opposition groups and
regional political and human rights issues are
also targeted.
Background
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected polit-
ical institutions.1 The ruling Al Saud family has
presided over the Islamic nation and accumulat-
ed a poor human rights record. At times there
has been increased discussion of sensitive sub-
jects, such as political reform and women’s
rights, but despite explicit promises to improve
the human rights situation, the government con-
tinues to maintain that such rights are subordi-
nate to Islamic law and tightly limits political and
religious freedom.2 Religious police, Mutawwa’in,
are charged with enforcing public morality. A
wide range of media, including books and films,
are censored or banned. Arbitrary arrests, pro-
longed detentions of political prisoners, corporal
punishment, and the denial of basic conditions
for fair trials make for a bleak judicial landscape.3
Journalism is strictly controlled and journalists
must exercise self-censorship in order to avoid
government scrutiny and dismissal.4 Most
Saudis get their information from foreign televi-
sion and the Internet, and—though officially
banned—dish receivers are becoming increas-
ingly common.5 Al-Jazeera, a Qatar-based Arab
satellite television station, is banned in the coun-
try, and foreign journalists are rarely granted
visas.6
Internet in Saudi Arabia
The belated arrival of the Internet in Saudi Arabia,
several years after its introduction into other Arab
RESULTS AT A GLANCE
No evidence Suspected Selective Substantial Pervasive









countries, was largely the result of the govern-
ment’s concerns about regulating content. Since
the year 2000, Internet usage has increased from
less than 1 percent to more than 10 percent (over
2.5 million users) of the population.7 Telecom
companies have begun taking advantage of the
still relatively low penetration rate by unveiling 3G
networks in the country.8 The government’s
Internet Services Unit (ISU), a department of the
King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology
(KACST), has been responsible for overseeing
Internet services in Saudi Arabia and for imple-
menting government censorship.9 As its Web site
explains, twenty-one licensed Internet service
providers (ISPs) and one more not yet in service
connect users to the national network.10 The ISU
manages the link from the national network to
international networks.11 In accordance with a
Council of Ministers decision, the Saudi
Communications Commission was renamed the
Communications and Information Technology
Commission (CITC) and took charge of licensing
and filtering processes previously managed by
KACST.
Blogging has grown as a medium for
expression in Saudi Arabia, with the number of
bloggers tripling to an estimated 2,000.12 Half of
these bloggers are women.13 In 2005 the govern-
ment tried to ban the country’s primary blogging
tool, www.blogger.com.14 However, after a few
days the ban was lifted, with the censors choosing
to block specific content on the blogging Web
site instead.15 Paralleling the increase in Internet
use has been a proliferation of Internet cafés. As
hourly rates can be too expensive for average
Saudis, some Internet cafés offer monthly sub-
scriptions that are more affordable.16 From time
to time, the authorities have shut down Internet
cafés for reasons such as “immoral purposes.”17
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The government of Saudi Arabia allowed public
access to the Internet only after it was satisfied
that an adequate regulatory framework could be
put in place. The authorities use Secure
Computing’s SmartFilter software for technical
implementation and to identify sites for block-
ing.18 Furthermore, the expertise of local staff and
input of ordinary citizens aid the filtering regime.
The government makes no secret of its filtering,
which is explained on a section of the ISU Web
site.19 According to this Web site, KACST is
directly responsible for filtering pornographic




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ......13,175 5.75
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................72 5.96
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................79 4.92
Human development index (out of 177) .................................76 5.74
Rule of law (out of 208).........................................................89 5.40
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................199 1.56
Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................72 5.56
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Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2004
request from “government security bodies.” The
Web site also has forms by which Internet users
can request that certain sites be blocked or
unblocked. It has been noted by a KACST official
that the majority of blocked Web sites contain
pornographic content, and over 90 percent of
Internet users have tried to access a blocked
Web site.20
In 2001 the Council of Ministers issued a
resolution outlining content that Internet users are
prohibited from accessing and publishing.21
Among other things, it forbids content “breaching
public decency,” material “infringing the sanctity
of Islam,” and “anything contrary to the state or
its system.”22 The resolution also includes
approval requirements for publishing on the
Internet and mechanical guidelines for service
providers on recording and monitoring users’
activities.23
A new law, approved by the Saudi Shoura
(Advisory) Council in October 2006, criminalizes
the use of the Internet to defame or harm individ-
uals and the development of Web sites that vio-
late Saudi laws or Islamic values, or that serve
terrorist organizations.24
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted on two ISPs: National
Engineering Services & Marketing (Nesma) and
Arabian Internet and Communications Services
(Awalnet). Both providers blocked the same Web
sites, as expected given the centrally adminis-
tered filtering system.
Testing indicates that the Web sites of Saudi
political reformist and opposition groups, such
as the Islah movement (www.islah.tv) and the
Tajdeed movement (www.tajdeed.net), are tar-
geted for blocking. In keeping with the Saudi gov-
ernment’s emphasis on protecting the “sanctity
of Islam”25—and the legitimacy of the regime—
sites relating to minority faiths or espousing alter-
native views of Islam are blocked. These include
the Web sites of a number of local Shiite groups.
The Web pages of a few global free speech
advocates, such as Article19 (www.article19.org)
and the Free Speech Coalition (www.freespeech
coalition.com), are blocked. However, filtering of
human rights content primarily targets Saudi or
regional organizations. All Web pages of the
Saudi Human Rights Center (www.saudihr.org)
are blocked. Although the main pages of the
Arab Human Rights Information Network and 
the Arabic rights organization Humum are 
accessible, the Saudi sections of the two 
sites, www.hrinfo.net/ifex/alerts/saudi and www
.humum.net/country/saudi.shtml, are not.
Most global media sites tested, including
Israel-based news outlets such as the daily
Haaretz (www.haaretz.com), were accessible.
However, the Arab-language news sites Al-Quds
Al Arabi (www.alquds.co.uk) and Elaph (www
.elaph.com) were blocked.
“Immoral” social content continues to be a
priority target for Saudi censors. Over 90 percent
of pornographic Web sites and most sites featur-
ing provocative attire or gambling that were test-
ed were blocked. Numerous sites relating to
alcohol and drugs, gays and lesbians, and sex-
education and family planning were also inac-
cessible. This pervasive filtering of social content
is achieved through the use of SmartFilter soft-
ware, which builds “blacklists” of sites from user-
selected categories, such as Drugs, Gambling,
Obscene, Nudity, Sex, and Dating. The substan-
tial filtering of Internet tools, including anonymiz-
ers and translators, in Saudi Arabia is also
achieved in this manner.
Conclusion
Saudi Arabia maintains a sophisticated filtering
regime. Social content and Web-based applica-
tions are extensively filtered using commercial
software. Additional political and religious sites
are individually targeted for blocking. The result
of this filtering system is consistent with the Saudi
government’s express commitment to censoring
morally inappropriate and religiously sensitive
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material online. More generally, Internet filtering in
Saudi Arabia mirrors broader attempts by the
state to repress opposition and promote a single
religious creed.
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The government of the Republic of Singapore
engages in minimal Internet filtering, blocking
only a small set of pornographic Web sites as a
symbol of disapproval of their contents.
However, the state employs a combination of
licensing controls and legal pressures to regu-
late Internet access and to limit the presence of
objectionable content and conduct online.
Background
Singapore’s government uses restrictive laws,
political ties to the judiciary, and ownership and
intimidation of the media to suppress dissenting
opinion and opposition to the ruling People’s
Action Party (PAP). Provisions of the Internal
Security Act (ISA), the Criminal Law (Temporary
Provisions) Act (CLA), the Undesirable Publi-
cations Act (UPA), and other statutes prohibit the
production and possession of “subversive”
materials and permit the detention of suspected
offenders without judicial review.1 Citizens,
including Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)
leader Chee Soon Juan, have been arrested for
speaking publicly without a permit,2 and foreign
activists from civil society organizations have
been detained, interrogated, and deported.3
Government plaintiffs have been able to levy civil
liability and heavy damages through defamation
suits against independent and critical voices,
including those of opposition politicians and of
regional publications with domestic circulation.4
Moreover, virtually all domestic newspapers and
television and radio stations are owned by cor-
porations with economic ties to the government;
hence they adhere closely to the PAP line when
reporting on sensitive issues.5 Taken together,
these economic and legal controls contribute to
a climate of pervasive self-censorship of political
commentary. These mechanisms of control and
influence allow the Singapore government to
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cripple basic freedoms of expression and
assembly under the guise of protecting public
security and preserving order. 
Internet in Singapore
In 2005, the number of Internet users in
Singapore reached 2.42 million, or 67.2 percent
of the population,6 giving the country one of the
highest Internet penetration rates in the world.
Home access is commonplace, with residential
dialup and broadband subscriptions totaling
more than 2.1 million.7 Over 70 percent of busi-
nesses use the Internet,8 and public access is
widespread and expanding. In December 2006,
a three-year national wireless service was
launched, providing laptop users with free Wi-Fi
Internet access in high-traffic areas across the
island.9 Terminals in cybercafés and libraries
supply the public with additional connectivity.
Three main Internet Access Service
Providers (IASPs)—SingNet, StarHub, and
Pacific Internet—serve as the “gateways” to the
Web, providing access to Internet service
resellers (ISRs) for sale to the public.10 Though all
three IASPs are public corporations, Temasek
Holdings (the government’s holding company)
remains the majority shareholder in SingNet and
StarHub.11
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Singapore’s Media Development Authority (MDA)
claims to have instituted a “light-touch” regulato-
ry framework for the Internet, promoting respon-
sible use while giving industry players “maximum
flexibility.”12 In addition to promoting self-regula-
tion and public education, the MDA maintains
license and registration requirements that subject
Internet content and service providers to penal-
ties for noncompliance with restrictions on pro-
hibited material. The MDA is charged with ensur-
ing that “nothing is included in the content of any
media service which is against public interest or
order, or national harmony, or which offends
good taste or decency.”13 The core of this frame-
work is a class license scheme stipulated by
national statute (the Broadcasting Act)14 and by
industry policies and regulations issued by the
MDA.
Under the class license scheme, all Internet
service providers (ISPs) and those Internet con-
tent providers (ICPs) determined to be political
parties or persons “engaged in the propagation,




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ......26,764 8.36
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................79 7.09
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................93 6.29
Human development index (out of 177) .................................25 7.31
Rule of law (out of 208).........................................................10 8.67
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................129 4.42
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Internet users (% of population) ..........................................57.9 8.50
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2004
issues relating to Singapore” must register with
the MDA.15 As licensees, ISPs and ICPs are also
bound by the MDA’s Internet Code of Practice.
The Code defines “prohibited material” broadly,
specifying only a few standards for sexual, vio-
lent, and intolerant content.16 Where filtering is
not mandated at the ISP level, the Code requires
that ICPs deny access to material if so directed
by the MDA. Licensees that fail to comply with
the Code may face sanctions, including fines or
license suspensions or terminations, as author-
ized under the Broadcasting Act. In 2005, one
Web site titled “Meet Gay Singapore Friends”
was reportedly fined USD5,000 by the MDA for
being in violation of the Code.17
Threats of civil and criminal liability under
other laws further deter Internet users from post-
ing comments or content relating to sensitive
issues. In May 2005 the state-funded agency
A*STAR accused Jiahao Chen, a Singaporean
doctoral student in the United States, of posting
“untrue and serious accusations against
A*STAR, its officers and other parties,” and
threatened Chen with “legal consequences
unless the objectionable statements were
removed and an acceptable apology pub-
lished.”18 Chen complied with A*STAR’s
demands and replaced the posts with an apolo-
gy, thereby avoiding a potential defamation
suit.19 The high-profile case prompted caution20
in the Singapore blogosphere and discussion21
on how to avoid suit under the nation’s defama-
tion laws.22
In October 2005 two men were jailed under
the Sedition Act23 for the first time in nearly forty
years. One received a one-month sentence and
the other a nominal one-day sentence and a
USD5,000 fine for posting racist remarks deni-
grating Muslims and Malays.24 In January 2006,
a twenty-one-year-old was also charged with vio-
lating the Sedition Act after he posted four car-
toons of Jesus on his blog. The charges were
eventually dropped, but not before Singaporean
authorities had confiscated the individual’s com-
puter and removed the cartoons from his blog.25
In November 2006 SDP activist Yap Keng
Ho was sentenced to ten days in jail after he
refused to pay a fine for speaking at an illegal
SDP rally, held in April 2006. Yap had posted a
video of the speech on his blog and was ordered
to remove it by a judge.26
The above incidents appeared to presage
further repressive legislation and policies against
Singaporean Internet users. In 2007 the Ministry
of Home Affairs (MHA) is expected to table
before parliament a slate of amendments to the
Penal Code. The proposed amendments expand
the scope of nineteen offenses to cover acts per-
petrated via electronic media, including “uttering
words with deliberate intent to wound the reli-
gious feelings of any person” (§298); defamation
(§499); and making “statements conducing to
public mischief” (§505).27 Section 298 is being
modified further to cover “the wounding of racial
feelings,” so that offenders may be prosecuted
under the Sedition Act or the Penal Code.28 The
MHA amendments also introduce nineteen new
offenses, including abetting “an offense which is
committed in Singapore, even if any or all of the
acts of abetment were done outside Singapore,”
as via Internet or mobile phone (§108B).29
ONI testing results
ONI conducted testing on Singapore’s two major
IASPs, SingNet and StarHub, and on a third ISP,
SysTech. A common perception of the
Singaporean Internet community points to the
existence of a list of 100 banned Web sites pur-
portedly maintained by the Media Development
Authority (MDA). ONI found that only seven Web
sites tested, all relating to pornography, were
blocked, including www.sex.com, www.play
boy.com, and www.penthouse.com. The blocking
of only these high-profile sites suggests that fil-
tering is indeed mandated for symbolic, rather
than preventative, purposes. Moreover, the seven
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sites blocked on SingNet and StarHub were all
accessible on SysTech.
Conclusion
The Singapore government implements a limited
filtering regime, relying mainly on nontechnologi-
cal measures to curb online commentary and
content relating to political, religious, and ethnic
issues. The purported purpose of these meas-
ures is “to promote and facilitate the growth of
the Internet while at the same time safeguarding
social values and racial and religious harmony.”30
The threats of lawsuits, fines, and criminal prose-
cution inhibit more open discourse in an other-
wise vibrant Internet community.
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Although South Korea has one of the highest
Internet penetration rates in the world, the state
imposes substantial legal and technological
controls over online expression. South Korea
filters a large amount of content that supports
or praises North Korea, South Korea’s histori-
cal political adversary, as well as a small num-
ber of sites devoted to gambling and pirated 
software.
Background
The Republic of Korea (also known as South
Korea) was established in 1948 and spent four
decades under authoritarian rule until a demo-
cratic system emerged in 1987.1 South Korean
foreign relations remain dominated by the state’s
relationship with its traditional adversary, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North
Korea), with which South Korea has technically
been at war since the two sides fought to a stale-
mate in 1953.2 Since that time, South Korea has
been largely intolerant of dissident views and
those espousing communism or supporting
North Korea; publicly praising North Korea has
been, and remains, illegal. Human rights groups
charge that, since its enactment in 1948, thou-
sands of South Koreans have been arrested
under the state’s anti-communist National
Security Law (NSL).3 Those arrested over the
years include students, publishers, trade union-
ists, political activists, professors, and Internet
surfers.4 Many have been arrested and jailed 
for peacefully expressing their political views.5
Some prisoners arrested under the NSL were
allegedly held for three to four decades, ranking
them among the world’s longest-held political
prisoners.6
Despite South Korea’s current “sunshine
policy” of diplomatic engagement with North
Korea, investigations and arrests continue for
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those publicly supporting North Korea and its
policies.7 In a recent celebrated case, a sociolo-
gy professor at Dongguk University was investi-
gated by authorities and suspended by the uni-
versity for posting an article on the Internet in
which he argued that North Korea’s invasion of
the South in 1950 should be interpreted as an
attempt to reunify the two Koreas.8 Overall, how-
ever, Korea’s human rights record has steadily
and markedly improved since the 1990s.9
Internet in South Korea
South Korea is one of the most connected coun-
tries in the world. By 2005 more than 89 percent
of South Korean households had Internet
access; 75 percent of these households used
broadband.10 South Koreans are connected to
the most advanced national network infrastruc-
ture in the world. Following the Asian financial cri-
sis in the late 1990s, South Korea invested heav-
ily in its broadband infrastructure, providing its
citizens with a national network that carries data
at speeds up to 50 megabits per second.11 A
majority of South Korean Internet users use the
Internet more than once per day.12 The vast
majority of users access the Internet from
home.13 Even so, playing video games and chat-
ting online remains a popular pastime in the
approximately 30,000 broadband “PC bangs”
(Internet cafés) throughout South Korea.14 Online
gaming, fueled by South Korea’s ultra high
speed broadband infrastructure, is a national
obsession, with as much as 35 percent of the
population playing online games regularly.15
By 2004, seventy-six different Internet serv-
ice providers (ISPs) were providing connection
services to South Korean Internet users.16 But
three South Korean ISPs control nearly 85 per-
cent of the market for Internet access, the largest
of which—KorNet—provides about half the ADSL
lines in the country, making it the largest ADSL
supplier in the world.17
In accordance with state ethics guidelines,
most South Korean search engines require users
to verify they are at least nineteen years old
(using a national identification number) before
allowing access to porn sites.18 Peer-to-peer file
sharing is a popular online activity in South
Korea,19 though authorities have begun to crack
down on peer-to-peer services and monitor 
them for pornography and other content deemed
harmful. Anecdotally, however, many users appear
able to circumvent the various technological




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ......19,560 6.98
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................77 6.76
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................98 6.78
Human development index (out of 177) .................................26 7.27
Rule of law (out of 208).........................................................58 6.45
Voice and accountability (out of 208).....................................67 6.48
Digital opportunity index (out of 180).......................................1 9.64
Internet users (% of population) ..........................................68.4 9.48
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a; U.S. Department of State 2007b; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c;
ITU 2006, 2005
access to pornography and other sites that the
state deems harmful or offensive.
Online citizens’ media has played an impor-
tant role in Korean politics and Internet culture in
recent years, led by www.ohmynews.com, a pop-
ular Seoul-based online newspaper that mostly
publishes articles written and submitted by ordi-
nary citizens.20 OhmyNews has been widely
acknowledged as strongly influencing the 2002
election of Korean President Roh Moo-hyun.21
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The primary regulation governing Internet speech
in South Korea is the NSL. First promulgated in
1948, the NSL was designed to prevent commu-
nist ideology and pro–North Korea sentiment
from penetrating South Korean society.22 The
NSL punishes pro–North Korea activists by crim-
inalizing “antistate” activities.23 The statute pro-
vides for up to seven years’ imprisonment for
“those who praise, encourage, disseminate or
cooperate with anti-state groups … being aware
that such acts will endanger the national security
and the democratic freedom.”24 The NSL provi-
sions are vague, permitting state actors broad
discretion in their application. The statute gov-
erns both print and online media, and has been
invoked against individuals attempting to engage
with North Korea or promote North Korea’s polit-
ical views. It has therefore been cited as having a
chilling effect on free expression in the media.25
Citing the NSL, the Ministry of Information and
Communication in 2004 instructed ISPs in South
Korea to block access to thirty-one Web sites
considered to be North Korean propaganda.26
The NSL is immensely controversial in South
Korean society and is a focal point of intense
debate between conservative leaders, who argue
the law is necessary to protect the nation from
threats posed by North Korea, and liberal politi-
cians, who argue the law is repressive, dictatori-
al, and outdated, and should therefore be
repealed.27 In 2004, the Korean Constitutional
Court upheld Article 7 of the NSL, which criminal-
izes the act of publicly praising and supporting
North Korea, as a constitutionally permissible
restriction on speech.28
Several other laws and decrees extend legal
liability to content posted on the Internet, includ-
ing the Telecommunications Business Act, which
makes it illegal to transmit over telecommunica-
tions lines any content that compromises public
safety, order, or morals;29 and the Election Law,
amended in 2004 to illegalize Internet dissemina-
tion of information that defames politicians during
their election campaigns and to empower author-
ities to review ISP records containing information
about suspected violators.30
The Korean Internet Safety Commission
(KISCOM), formerly the Information and
Communications Ethics Committee (ICEC), is an
independent body established in 1995 under the
Telecommunications Business Act to formulate a
code of communications ethics and inform state
policy aimed at “eradicating subversive commu-
nications and promoting active and healthy infor-
mation.”31 KISCOM is empowered to define
harmful content and recommend which Web
sites should be blocked.32 KISCOM also
employs a system to monitor the circulation of
“illegal and harmful contents on the Internet.”33 In
addition, KISCOM formulates and administers a
voluntary “Internet Content Rating Service” per-
mitting Web sites to self-evaluate their level of
appropriateness for minors, and provides to par-
ents and schools filtering software and related
technologies compatible with the rating service.34
ISPs have become increasingly responsible
for policing content on their networks. In 2001,
the state promulgated the Internet Content
Filtering Ordinance,35 which requires ISPs to
block as many as 120,000 Web sites on a state-
compiled list, and requires Internet access 
facilities that are accessible to minors, such as
public libraries and schools, to install filtering
software.36 The Youth Protection Act of 199737
makes ISPs officially responsible, as “protectors
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of juveniles,” for making inappropriate content
inaccessible on their networks.38
The 2001 ordinance also classified homo-
sexual Internet content as “harmful and obscene”
under the Youth Protection Act.39 The Ministry of
Information and Communications formally adopt-
ed this classification and immediately ordered a
large South Korean Web site devoted to issues of
homosexuality to classify itself in ICEC’s content
rating system as harmful and block minors from
accessing the site or face fines and imprison-
ment.40 Homosexual rights advocates chal-
lenged the order in court as an illegal restriction
on free speech. Although the court ruled in favor
of the ICEC, it seriously questioned the constitu-
tionality of ICEC’s ordinance classifying homo-
sexual content as harmful to minors.41 In 2003,
the Korean National Youth Protection Committee
removed homosexuality from the categories of
“harmful and obscene.” The reversal came in
response to a Korean National Human Rights
Protection Committee resolution finding that clas-
sifying homosexual content as harmful and
obscene is an unconstitutional restriction on 
individuals’ rights of expression and pursuit of
happiness.42
ONI testing results
In 2001, South Korea reportedly required its ISPs
to block as many as 120,000 sites on an official
list.43 When ONI conducted its testing at the end
of 2006, however, the evidence indicated that
Internet filtering in South Korea, although pres-
ent, is not as extensive as reports have suggest-
ed. Testing was conducted through residential
Internet access inside South Korea on the two of
the largest South Korean ISPs—KorNet and
HanaNet—between October 2006 and January
2007. The testing revealed that South Korea 
filters political and social content, specifically 
targeting sites containing North Korean propa-
ganda or promoting the reunification of North
and South Korea, as well as a handful of sites
devoted to gambling and two sites devoted to
pirated software (www.mscracks.com and
www.kickme.to/fosi).
ONI determined that a large majority of pro-
North Korea or pro-unification Web sites on ONI’s
testing list were blocked,44 along with a selected
number of gambling-related sites. The blocking
was extremely consistent across the two ISPs
tested, as in virtually every instance a Web site
that registered as blocked on HanaNet registered
as blocked on KorNet as well. On each ISP, ONI
detected two methods of blocking: IP (Internet
Protocol) blocking and domain name server
(DNS) tampering. IP blocking occurs at the router
level, between the South Korean ISP and the
Internet. The routers are programmed to stop
information coming from certain IP addresses.
DNS tampering prevents Internet domain names
from resolving to their proper IP addresses. Sites
blocked by KorNet through DNS tampering
resolve to a blockpage hosted by the police at
http://211.253.9.250/, which states that the page
has been lawfully blocked and lists the user’s
own IP address.
ONI’s tests suggested there is little blocking
of sensitive social content in South Korea,
despite KISCOM’s focus on cleansing the Web of
“harmful” social content. Besides two sites
devoted to pirated software, ONI’s testing regis-
tered no blocks in other social categories, includ-
ing pornography and gay and lesbian content.
South Korea does, however, attempt to restrict
minors’ access to pornography by requiring age
identification for entry to Korean porn sites.
Conclusion
Although South Korea is the world leader in
Internet and broadband penetration, its citizens
do not have access to a free and unfiltered
Internet. The state imposes a substantial level of
filtering for a free and democratic society. It
requires ISPs to block sites on government lists
and fosters a culture of self-censorship through
broadly worded laws that make individuals crimi-
nally liable for posting “antistate” content. The
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state also encourages Korean Web site opera-
tors to engage in a self-rating system, and
requires ISPs and other Internet access facilities,
such as cybercafés and schools, to self-police
for content deemed harmful to youths. Despite
reports that the South Korean government has
considered discontinuing its filtering of pro–North
Korean Web sites,45 ONI’s testing indicated that
the government still filters a large amount of con-
tent related to North Korea, as well as a handful
of Web sites devoted to gambling and pirated
software.
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Sudan openly acknowledges filtering content
that transgresses public morality and ethics or
threatens order.1 The state’s regulatory author-
ity has established a special unit to monitor and
implement filtration; this primarily targets
pornography and, to a lesser extent, gay and
lesbian content, dating sites, and provocative
attire.
Background
Since gaining independence from the UK in
1953, Sudan has been plagued by constant strife
and civil war, which have stunted the develop-
ment of both the economy and the government.2
Previously an authoritarian state with all effective
power vested in the president, Sudan is currently
in a period of transition following the historic sign-
ing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) in 2005.3 The CPA requires the sharing of
power and wealth between the rebel Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
and the Government of Sudan.4 The CPA has
prompted the drafting of an interim national con-
stitution that affords basic rights, including free-
dom of religion and of the press, and that pro-
hibits human rights abuses, including torture and
cruel punishment. In practice, however, violations
of these provisions by the government and its
security forces are numerous.5 Non-Muslims,
non-Arab Muslims, and Muslims from sects unaf-
filiated with the ruling party face discriminatory
policies and practices, as evidenced in the allo-
cation of government jobs.6 Killings of civilians in
conflict, abductions, life-threatening prison con-
ditions, arbitrary arrests and detentions (of politi-
cal opponents as well as journalists), and human
trafficking (often for sexual exploitation, forced
labor, or military conscription) constitute addition-
al human rights violations.7
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Violence and human rights abuses continue
in the Darfur region of western Sudan, in a con-
flict that has spread across the Chad border. In
February 2007, the government of Sudan denied
the U.N. Human Rights Council visas to enter
Darfur to conduct an impartial review.8 U.N. offi-
cials say that conflict in the region has resulted in
over 400,000 deaths and displaced approximate-
ly two million people.9
Internet in Sudan
Internet usage in Sudan is limited. Where infra-
structure does exist, access can be prohibitively
expensive. There are few locally produced Web
pages.10
The infrastructure in Sudan is not optimized
for high-speed data communications services,
and both the capability and reliability of domestic
data networks need improvement. Fifteen
Internet service providers (ISPs) operate in
Sudan (2006), but only two have direct connec-
tivity to the global Internet; the rest are consid-
ered by the Sudanese government to be operat-
ing illegally.11
The number of home Internet subscriptions
increased by a factor of ten between 2001 and
2005, rising from 50,000 to 500,000. During the
same period, the number of Internet cafés more
than doubled. However, Internet usage remains
concentrated in Khartoum, accounting for 95 per-
cent of Internet users. The majority of Internet
users in Sudan rely on dialup connections (59
percent), and very few have high-speed Internet
(19 percent). While 81 percent of universities in
Sudan are Internet-equipped, most (65 percent)
still use dialup connections.
The information and telecommunications
sector in Sudan is regulated by the National
Telecommunication Corporation (NTC). In 1993,
the state-owned Public Telecommunication
Corporation was transformed into the Sudan
Telecommunication Company (Sudatel), allowing
private investors to purchase a share in the enter-
prise. However, two-thirds of the shares of the
company remained in government hands while it
assumed exclusive operational control of the
sector.12
In 2001, the Sudanese government adopted
the National Strategy for Building the Information
Industry, with the goal of enabling “all sectors of
society to access information media in a way
leading to the widest dissemination and utiliza-
tion of information, all of which shall contribute to




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........1,924 3.59
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................57 3.55
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................61 3.17
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................141 2.79
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................201 2.03
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................202 1.32
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................142 3.02
Internet users (% of population) ............................................7.7 3.78
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
development, job opportunities, enhancement of
all-sector production rates and eradication of
poverty.”13 As a result of the Strategy, Sudatel’s
monopoly over mobile telephony ended in 2002
and competitive operators—including several
ISPs—in telecommunications were licensed.14
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Article 39 of the 2005 interim national constitution
of the Republic of Sudan states that “[e]very citi-
zen shall have an unrestricted right to the free-
doms of expression, reception and dissemina-
tion of information, publication, and access to the
press without prejudice to order, safety or public
morals as determined by law.”15 The same article
also states that the “state shall guarantee the
freedom of the press and other media as shall be
regulated by law in a democratic society.”16
However, in practice, these rights have been
severely restricted.17 Since emergency laws
(which had provided for official censorship) were
lifted on July 9th, 2005, the government has con-
tinued to censor print media.18 In 2006, the New
York–based Committee to Protect Journalists
(CPJ) voiced alarm over “increasing censorship
of opposition and independent newspapers in
Sudan.”19 Additionally, fear of reprisals has led to
self-censorship among journalists.20
The 2001 National Strategy for Building the
Information Industry called for filtering Internet
content that is “morally offensive and in violation
of public ethics and order, [and] that may pro-
mote corruption and deface traditional identity.”21
The NTC declares that, although it targets sever-
al categories, “[t]he most important is the porno-
graphic material, which accounts for over 95 per-
cent of the total volume of the censored materi-
als. Other categories include pages related to
narcotics, explosives, alcohols, sacrilege, blas-
phemy, and gambling.”22 Interestingly, the NTC
uses Western peer-reviewed research to support
its decision to block these materials in defense of
the public good. The NTC states that “[t]here is
no political site among the list of blocked sites,”
and admits that “some translation sites were
blocked as they were used to circumvent filter-
ing.”23
The NTC has set up a special filtering unit to
screen Internet media before it reaches users in
Sudan. The NTC asserts that sites are filtered
based on their contents rather than their names,
and that filtering is needed “to preserve noble
values and . . . safeguard the society against
evil.”24 According to the NTC, the Internet Service
Control Unit receives daily requests to add Web
sites to, or remove them from, the blacklist. The
NTC makes available on its Web site an e-mail
address for such requests.25
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted on two ISPs in Sudan,
Sudanet and Zina Net. Their blocking behavior
was identical.
Pornography was extensively filtered.
However, some online discussion groups that
facilitate the exchange of Arabic sex materials
were found to be accessible. There was also
some blocking of gay and lesbian, dating, and
provocative-attire Web sites. Those dating Web
sites that were blocked were those likely to host
sexually explicit (for example, www.adultfriend
finder.com) or gay and lesbian (www.gay
romeo.com) content. Other blocked gay and 
lesbian Web sites included a site addressing
domestic violence (www.lesbians-against-violence.
com) and a search portal (www.bglad.com),
which were filtered due to being miscategorized
as pornography by the commercial software
Smart Filter.
Also blocked were health-related sites 
pertaining to the alteration of body parts, such 
as www.circumcision.org and www.breast
enlargementmagazine.com. Similarly, most of 





Access to the feminist Web site www.femi-
nista.com was blocked.
Many of the tested sites that facilitate anony-
mous Web surfing or circumvention of Internet fil-
ters were blocked. Additionally, some Web sites
with hacking, cracking, or WAREZ content were
blocked. 
A small number of translation Web sites—
which the NTC argues are used to circumvent fil-
tering26—were blocked.
Only one tested blog, Boingboing, was
blocked. This may have been an unintentional
artifact of Smart Filter, which categorizes
Boingboing as a pornographic Web site.27 Still,
blogging is subject to scrutiny and can incur seri-
ous consequences. In October 2006, Sudan
expelled Jan Pronk, a top U.N. official, from the
country after he posted in his blog (www.jan-
pronk.nl) sensitive statements relating to the con-
flict in Darfur.28 ONI has monitored and verified
the blog’s accessibility from Sudan.
Some Web sites discussing Christianity or
criticizing Islam, such as www.islamreview.com,
were blocked.
The Arab Network for Human Rights
Information (www.hrinfo.org) reported that the
NTC blocked access to the Web site
www.sudaneseonline.com in 2004.29 This site
was not found to be blocked during ONI testing.
Conclusion
Online pornography is extensively blocked in
Sudan, as the government openly acknowl-
edges. Many anonymizer and proxy Web sites
are blocked, as are some sites related to
provocative attire, dating, and gay and lesbian
interests. Sudan is relatively transparent in its fil-
tering of the Internet compared with other Arab
states, and even provides an appellate process
for challenging the blocking of a site.
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In addition to filtering a range of Web content,
the Syrian government monitors Internet use
closely and has detained citizens “for express-
ing their opinions or reporting information
online.”1 Vague and broadly worded laws invite
government abuse and have prompted Internet
users to engage in self-censoring and self-
monitoring to avoid the state’s ambiguous
grounds for arrest.2
Background
Syria is among the most repressive countries in
the world with regard to freedom of expression
and information. Criticisms of the president and
reports on the problems of religious and ethnic
minorities in Syria remain particularly sensitive
topics.3 Human rights organizations have report-
ed exhaustively on political arrests and deten-
tions.4
In 2006 Reporters Without Borders ranked
Syria among the thirteen “enemies of the
Internet.”5 Although the government does recog-
nize the importance of the Internet as a source of
economic growth, it also admits to automatically
blocking pornographic Web sites6 and to censor-
ing “pro-Israel and hyper-Islamist” Web sites,
such as “those run by the illegal Muslim
Brotherhood, and those calling for autonomy for
Syrian Kurds.”7 In defense of these practices,
Minister of Technology and Communications Amr
Salem said, “Syria is currently under attack …
and if somebody writes, or publishes or whatev-
er, something that supports the attack, they will
be tried.”8
Internet in Syria
With a literacy rate of 80 percent,9 Syria’s main
barriers to Internet access are economic. Only
4.2 percent of the population own personal 
computers, with just 1 percent of Syrians 
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subscribing to Internet services.10 The prolifera-
tion of Internet cafés11 has helped raise the
Internet penetration rate to approximately 6 per-
cent,12 but many Syrians still find the cost of
these cafés prohibitive.13
In recent years, the government has
endeavored to expand Internet access by
installing hardware and telecommunications
capabilities in schools, by subsidizing the cost of
personal computers, and, most recently, by fos-
tering competition among Internet service
providers (ISPs).14
There are four ISPs that are neither owned
nor funded by the government. Still, the two gov-
ernment-affiliated ISPs,15 Syria Telecommuni-
cation Establishment (STE) and SCS-net (now
Aloola), continue to occupy the majority of the
market.16 Aya, one of the privately owned ISPs,
has close ties to the government.17
Legal and regulatory frameworks
In addition to maintaining regulatory control over
ISPs, the Syrian government imposes financial
and technical constraints on Internet users.
Syrian Internet subscribers wishing to use ports
other than port 80—the port most often used for
Web browsing—must apply for a special service
and pay a small monthly fee.18 Aya and other
ISPs offer plans that allow users to access the
Internet with a fixed IP address, which is neces-
sary to host sites, to use Virtual Private Networks,
and to bypass the ISP’s proxy server. They may
also pay for a special plan that allows them to
open otherwise blocked ports, such as those
used for Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and
video chat.19
Points of Internet access are also strictly
regulated and sometimes monitored. To open an
Internet café an owner must obtain a license from
the Telecommunications Department’s office in
the local governorate. To acquire a license, the
owner must follow the regulations in the
Conditions Manual, which include specifications
on the spacing between computers.20 Though
users at Internet cafés are not required to show
ID or give their names, some Syrians have report-
ed that plainclothes officials watch Internet cafés
and take note of the users.21
The Constitution of the Arab Republic of
Syria affords every citizen “the right to freely and
openly express his views in words, in writing, and
through all other means of expression,” while
also guaranteeing “the freedom of the press, of




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........3,437 3.88
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................74 6.28
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................80 5.02
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................107 5.05
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Internet users (% of population) ............................................5.8 3.60
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law.”22 In actuality, these freedoms are limited by
other legislative provisions. Article 4(b) of the
1963 Emergency Law authorizes the government
to monitor all publications and communica-
tions.23 That law also allows the government to
arrest those who commit “crimes which consti-
tute an overall hazard” or other vaguely defined
offenses.24
The Press Law of 2001 subjects all print
media—from newspapers, magazines, and other
periodicals to books, pamphlets, and posters—
to government control and censorship.25 Printing
“falsehoods” or “fabricated reports” is a criminal
offense under the Press Law, and writing on top-
ics relevant to “national security [or] national
unity” is forbidden.26 Violators may be penalized
with hefty monetary fines, lengthy prison terms,
or license suspensions or revocations.27
Furthermore, “periodicals that are not licensed as
political publications [are prohibited] from pub-
lishing ‘political’ articles”—a provision that
“amounts to blanket government censorship.”28
Thus, although the Internet has facilitated access
to unofficial information, that information is 
limited by the controls and threats codified in
Syrian law.
The government has demonstrated its will-
ingness to punish Syrians for writing and trans-
mitting information online.29 Authorities have
detained individuals for e-mailing an image or
article produced by another party, for voicing
complaints about the government, and for post-
ing original photographs of police crackdowns
on the Web.30 These incidents have engendered
caution and self-censorship across the Syrian
Internet as a whole and within the Syrian blogos-
phere, which nonetheless continues to grow and
to become more vibrant.31
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted on one of the main ISPs
in Syria, Aloola (formally SCS-Net). Although the
tests indicate that Syria now blocks fewer Web
sites than it has in the past, many sites remain
blocked.
The Web site of the Syrian branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood, www.jimsyr.com, was
blocked, though the Web site of the Egyptian
branch, the region’s largest, was available. 
Two Kurdish Web sites, www.tirej.net and
www.amude.net, were blocked, as was the Web
site of the United States Committee for a Free
Lebanon (www.freelebanon.org), which cam-
paigns for an end to Syrian influence in Lebanese
politics. The Arabic- and English-language sites
of the unrecognized Reform Party of Syria were
filtered, along with the Web sites of the Hizb al-
Tahrir (Liberation Party)—an Islamist group that
seeks to restore the Caliphate and that remains
banned in many countries.
ONI’s tests found that 115 Syrian blogs
hosted on Google’s popular blogging engine,
www.blogspot.com, were blocked, strongly sug-
gesting that the ISP had blocked access to all
blogs hosted on this service, including many
apolitical blogs. www.freesyria.wordpress.com, a
blog created to campaign for the release of
Michel Kilo, a prominent Syrian journalist impris-
oned for his writings, was also blocked.
In the past, Syria has reportedly filtered
access to popular e-mail sites. ONI testing found
www.hotmail.com to be blocked, along with two,
relatively small Web-based e-mail sites,
www.address.com and www.netaddress.com.
None of the Arabic-language e-mail sites ONI
tested were blocked, though the Arabic-
language hosting site www.khayma.com was.
Nearly one-third of the anonymizer sites
tested were blocked, indicating some measure of
effort to preempt circumvention.
Though most foreign news sites were
accessible, Web sites of some important Arabic
newspapers and news portals were found to be
blocked. Examples include the pan Arab,
London-based, Arabic-language newspapers,
Al-Quds al-Arabi (www.al-quds.co.uk) and Al-
Sharq al-Awsat, (www.asharqalawsat.com), the
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news portal www.elaph.com, the Kuwaiti news-
paper Al Seyassah (www.alseyassah.com), the
U.S.-based Web site of the Arab Times
(www.arabtimes.com), and the Islamically orient-
ed news and information portal www.islam
online.net. These publications frequently run arti-
cles critical of the Syrian government.
Web sites of human rights organizations
were generally available. Sites associated with
the London-based Syrian Human Rights
Committee (SHRC) marked an important excep-
tion; all URLs on the www.shrc.org.uk domain
were found blocked in this round of testing. As
indicated above, some blogs that criticize the
human rights record of Syria were also blocked.
Only three Web sites of the Web sites tested
with pornographic content were blocked:
www.playboy.com, www.sex.com, and www.net
arabic.com/vb (this last is a message board with
pornographic content).
Web sites that focus on lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, and transgendered issues were generally
available. One site, www.gaywired.com, was an
exception.
Unfortunately, an insufficient number of
Israeli Web sites were tested to confirm whether
or not Syria blocks the entire “.il” domain, as past
reports have suggested.32 However, the fact that
the Institute for Counter Terrorism’s Israeli Web
site (www.ict.org.il) was blocked—while the
Institute’s alternate URL (www.institutefor
counterterrorism.org), lacking the “.il” suffix, was
not—lends credence to such reports. Furthermore,
the Web site for the World Zionist organization
(www.wzo.org.il) was blocked.
Conclusion
The Web sites blocked in Syria span a range of
categories, with the most substantial filtering
occurring among sites that criticize government
policies and actions or espouse oppositional
political views. Repressive legislation and the
imprisonment of journalists and online writers for
their activities online have led many Syrians to
engage in self-censorship. Meanwhile, the gov-
ernment continues to promote the growth of the
Internet throughout the country.
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Internet access in Tajikistan remains largely
unfettered, although the run-up to the
December 2006 presidential elections produced
a documented case of event-driven filtering of
a political Web site. Overall Internet penetration
remains weak, and the telecommunications
sector is relatively unencumbered by regula-
tion—a consequence of the decentralized
nature of the government (itself a result of the
compromise that ended the civil war in 1997).
Background
The Internet in Tajikistan emerged as the country
was ending a bloody civil war that followed the
demise of Soviet rule in the early 1990s. The
resulting fragmentation of power also meant that
Internet services were developed largely without
state interference and the Ministry of
Communications played a weak role in the devel-
opment of the sector. Internet as well as telecom-
munications services remained fragmented up
until the end of the 1990s, with several compa-
nies failing to interconnect because of fierce (and
at times violent) competition. During the period of
instability, Internet service providers (ISPs) were
aligned with feuding political and economic inter-
ests that spilt over to the competition among the
ISPs themselves.
Internet use among Tajiks has been increas-
ing, but remains relatively low (1.19 percent)
despite government efforts to make information
communications technology (ICT) a pillar of
national development. Opposition media are not
actively exploiting the Internet’s potential largely
because of the low levels of penetration and the
lack of a mature critical mass of Internet users.
None of the registered opposition parties have
domain names registered in the “.tj” Internet
zone, and only one has its Web site available in
Tajik.1 The incumbent president, who recently
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started his third seven-year mandate,2 exerts a
degree of control over the independent media
while suppressing the opposition with prosecu-
tions based on broad and inconsistent interpre-
tations of the relevant laws.3
Internet in Tajikistan
The rate of Internet penetration in Tajikistan is
estimated between 0.075 percent4 and 1.19 per-
cent.5 Empirical data show the number of active
Internet users to be growing rapidly, with estimat-
ed total numbers that are higher than the Ministry
of Communications’ estimate of 26,000.6 The dis-
crepancy in figures probably arises from the hes-
itancy of most commercial ISPs to disclose accu-
rate user statistics in order to avoid a per user
charge. No official data exist on the number of
personal computers in Tajikistan. Khoma,7 a local
nongovernmental organization (NGO), estimates
that 1 percent of households own personal com-
puters and over 1 percent of those access
Internet from home, mostly using dialup technol-
ogy. Access via DSL and Wi-Fi technologies is
affordable only to a handful of companies.
Satellite connection is widely used and few ISPs
use Mach 6 technology to connect mountain
towns and district regions. The state-owned
telecommunications company Tajiktelecom built
a connection to the Trans Asia Europe (TAE)
fiber-optic highway passing through Uzbekistan;
however, ISPs prefer to use their own infrastruc-
ture. The Internet exchange point in Tajikistan,
managed by the Association of Tajikistani ISPs,
connects only four of the eleven ISPs.
Internet access remains largely unafford-
able, as the average monthly salary in the coun-
try amounts to USD30–40, while the minimum
salary drops to USD7. The price for one hour of
Internet access in cybercafés is USD0.41; unlim-
ited monthly traffic by dialup access costs
USD29.41 and limited ADSL access costs
USD25.8
Most Internet users are young and access
the Internet through cybercafés close to schools
and universities. In January 2006, the Ministry of
Communications estimated that some 400
cybercafés existed, most concentrated in large
cities. The cybercafés, operating as second-tier
ISPs, need to obtain licenses before starting their
activity. Although over 70 percent of the popula-
tion resides in rural areas, the Internet is mainly
accessible in urban areas because of poor infra-




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........1,173 3.45
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................64 4.67
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................99 6.87
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................122 4.33
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................173 3.02
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................175 2.66
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by CIPI shows that over three-quarters of Internet
users are male.9
Tajik is the official national language.
However, Russian is the most popular language
for Internet use. The most-visited Web site in
Tajikistan is www.mail.ru, and the most popular
search engines are www.rambler.ru, www.google.
com, www.yahoo.com, and www.yandex.ru.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Tajik top-level domain name was registered
with Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
in 1997 but the domain name was later suspend-
ed as it was used mainly for registering pornog-
raphy sites. In 2003 the domain name registration
was delegated to the Information and Technical
Centre of the President of Tajikistan Administra-
tion, a state entity that now supervises registra-
tions within the “.tj” domain.10
The Ministry of Communications requires all
ISPs to obtain licenses in order to operate.
Currently eleven first-tier ISPs are actively provid-
ing Internet service in the country.11 The ISPs do
not reveal information about their bandwidth
because these data are a legally protected com-
mercial secret. This protection extends to the
countries from which the connection originates.
ONI data reveal that most ISPs have two points of
access, one located in Russia and the other in
Western Europe. The majority of ISPs are eligible
to provide Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
services under an IP-telephony license.12 Recent
amendments require VoIP service providers to
obtain a special license from the Ministry of
Communications.
The main state entities regulating Internet in
Tajikistan are the Security Council (SC), the ICT
Council, and the Ministry of Communications.
The president of the republic, however, remains
the key authority, ratifying the main legal docu-
ments in the IT sector and directing ICT policy in
the country. The SC controls the implementation
of the State Strategy on Information and
Communication Technologies for Development
of the Republic of Tajikistan (E-Strategy). The SC
monitors telecommunications, including Internet,
for national security reasons. The ICT Council13 is
responsible for implementing and coordinating
work under the E-Strategy and advising the pres-
ident. The Ministry of Communications is the
main regulator in the telecommunications indus-
try and is empowered to issue licenses for any
related activities. The government adopted the
Conception on the Information Security,14 which
serves as a platform for proclaiming official
views, principles, and policy directions to pre-
serve state information security.
The government restricts the distribution of
information that contains state secrets and other
privileged data that intend to “discredit dignity
and honor of the state and the President,” or that
contain “violence and cruelty, racial, national and
religious hostility…, pornography… and any
other information prohibited by law.”15 The provi-
sions of this regulation are broad, allowing state
agencies wide discretion in their application. The
control over information security is assigned to
the Main Department of State Secrets and the
Ministry of Security.
Tajikistan does not have an official policy on
Internet filtering. However, state authorities have
been known to restrict access to some Web sites
at politically sensitive times by communicating
their “recommendations” to all top-level ISPs.
Prior to the 2006 presidential elections, the
Communications Regulation Agency issued a
“Recommendation on Filtering” advising all ISPs
that “for the purpose of information security” they
should “engage in filtering and close access to
those Internet sites that are directed to under-
mining the state policy on information sphere.”16
As a result, several oppositional news Web sites
hosted in Russia or Tajikistan were inaccessible
to Tajik users for several days.17 Although the offi-
cials offered unclear reasons for shutting down
the Web sites, independent media foresee that
the list of affected sites might grow in the future.18
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ONI testing results
ONI tested in Tajikistan on three key ISPs:
Babilon-T, Tajiktelecom, and Telecomm-Technology.
The tests revealed no direct evidence of filtering
for any of the selected categories. Nevertheless,
ONI did document the sporadic filtering of politi-
cal content during the 2006 presidential election.
Considered the most conservative Central
Asian country, with a predominantly Muslim pop-
ulation, Tajikistan does not technically filter
access to pornography sites. However, access-
ing such sites in public centers is illegal. Any
such access may be penalized with a fine rang-
ing from USD15 to 100 as provided in the
Administrative Code and may be prosecuted
under the Criminal Code. Based on ONI’s inves-
tigation, we concluded that currently most cyber-
cafés do not employ any filtering applications to
limit access to information. However, cybercafés
routinely monitor users to ensure they do not visit
forbidden sites.
Conclusion
Although the government has adopted a strategy
aimed at developing information society and
employing ICT potential for spurring economic
growth, it does not seek to encourage independ-
ent online publishers, journalists, and bloggers.
Media freedom is widely challenged and subject
to de facto censorship, although the constitution
provides that “state censorship and prosecution
for criticism are forbidden.”19 Filtering is unlikely
to be declared as an official policy since
Tajikistan depends on international aid. The Tajik
government, however, has in place policies and
instruments to maintain firm control over the dis-
tribution of information, particularly before elec-
tions. The government is engaged in developing
programs aimed at restricting citizens’ Internet
access, following on from President Rahmonov’s
message that “Western values aren’t always
applicable” to Eastern countries.20
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Amidst lingering political uncertainty,
Thailand’s censorship of the Internet continues
to be a contested and controversial policy
because the legal basis for filtering and actual
filtering practices are not transparent.
Background
In the aftermath of a military coup that followed
years of heightened fear and self-censorship, the
Internet community in Thailand continues to face
uncertainties created by censorship policies,
antiquated laws, regulatory reform, and the priva-
tization of state-owned telecoms. Considered by
many to have inaugurated Internet filtering in
Thailand, former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra pursued aggressive censorship poli-
cies and, through his family-owned Shin
Corporation, orchestrated a series of defamation
suits against his critics.1 After Thaksin was
deposed in a military coup on September 19,
2006, the interim government abrogated the
1997 Constitution, abolished the Constitutional
Court, and imposed a series of restrictions on
news reporting and political activity that threat-
ened national solidarity.2
Internet in Thailand
Internet usage in Thailand began with a small
base and has increased sixfold over the past five
years.3 Initially, rather than encouraging growth of
the Internet for all people, the government used
and developed it only for state academic institu-
tions and government agencies.4
The total number of Internet users in 2005
was estimated at 12,500,000, representing an
Internet penetration rate of approximately 19 per-
cent.5 However, homes and businesses in
Bangkok and other major cities make up most of
the penetration rate, and there is little Internet
connectivity in surrounding areas.6 In 2004,
about 15 percent of schools had access to the
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Internet.7 It is believed that more people may use
the Internet as content becomes available in local
languages rather than English.8 Although no sig-
nificant gender divide has emerged, over half of
Thai Internet users are between fifteen and twen-
ty-four years old.9 Of this group nearly 27 percent
use the Internet at cybercafés while 18 percent
access from home.10 Broadband Internet access
is available, but it is still undeveloped at less than
2 percent household penetration.11
Internet connectivity in Thailand is built
around education/research networks, commer-
cial networks (Internet service providers, or ISPs),
and government networks.12 CAT Telecom (CAT,
formerly the Communications Authority of
Thailand) and the Telephone Organization of
Thailand (TOT), the two big state-owned tele-
coms, each operate an international Internet
Gateway (IIG) as well as one each of three
domestic exchanges for twenty-one licensed
ISPs and four noncommercial Internet hubs.13
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Ministry of Information and Communications
Technology (MICT) and its subordinate bodies,
including the National Information Technology
Committee (NITC), CAT, TOT, and the National
Electronics and Computer Technology Center
(NECTEC), all regulate the Internet.14
Prior to the coup the constitution provided a
nominal legal basis for censorship, although the
precise authority for filtering Internet content
remains unclear. Under the abrogated 1997
Constitution, Thai citizens were guaranteed the
rights to express opinions; to communicate by
“lawful” means; and to access information with
certain limitations for state security, maintaining
public order or morals, and safeguarding others’
right to privacy and reputation.15 It remains
unconstitutional to criticize or level accusations
against the king.16
Broad claims associating criticism of gov-
ernment with injury to the king, or lèse majesté,
have also been used to enforce censorship.
Thailand is one of the few remaining countries in
the world to prosecute crimes of lèse majesté,
where individuals who insult, defame, or threaten
the Thai royal family can be sentenced to three to
fifteen years of imprisonment. Such allegations,
in spite of King Bhumibol’s own sanction of pub-
lic criticism of the Thai crown, are leveled infre-
quently but have targeted independent media
voices17 and been used as a “political tool to dis-
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Thailand involves a scope of expression far
broader than the actions of the king himself, has
begun to form the basis for the blocking and
removal of Web sites.19
In July 2003 Thailand became the first coun-
try to impose a curfew on online gaming.20 In
March 2006 a regulation enforced by the Culture
Ministry forbade persons under eighteen years of
age from entering Internet cafés between the
hours of 10pm and 2pm.21
The National Telecommunications Commis-
sion (NTC) was brought into operation in late
2004 as an independent telecom regulator and
given the exclusive authority to grant licenses for
telecom or IT services.22 Previously, an ISP could
obtain a concession contract only by giving a
free equity stake of about 35 percent to CAT
Telecom (formerly the Communications Authority
of Thailand) in exchange for a share of the profits
from the networks these companies built and
paid for.23 In March 2005 the NTC announced
that it would grant free licenses once permanent
guidelines were in place.24
In August 2003, Thaksin’s government
ordered ISPs to begin blocking a list of Web sites
that were compiled by CAT and hosted on its
server.25 The MICT’s Cyber Inspector team was
also charged with rooting out gambling and sex
sites.26 In late 2005 the government announced
its plans to block over 800,000 pornographic and
violent Web sites; ISPs would be ordered to take
down the sites, and those that did not follow the
order would have their licenses revoked.27 The
prime minister also formed a nine-member
Internet inspection committee, which met online
each morning to compile a list of sites for ISPs to
block.28 Although citizens were encouraged to
submit sites for blocking through various
forums,29 there has been a marked lack of trans-
parency in the government’s decision-making
process and execution of filtering. As a new con-
stitution is slated for 2007, the legal authority for
Internet filtering continues to be contested.
In the first days of martial law after the coup,
military leaders issued orders intended to restore
“normalcy,” demanding all political parties to
stop their activities, banning new political parties,
and requiring the cooperation of news media to
discourage the reporting of public opinion.30 The
MICT followed suit, enforcing a temporary ban on
political text-messaging and phone-ins, where
ISPs and authors would be held responsible for
offensive messages.31
Not yet enacted at the time of the coup, a
revised law laying out the terms and penalties of
computer crimes was approved in principle by
the newly installed National Legislative Assembly
on November 15, 2006. Sponsored by the MICT
and the interim military government, this bill in its
current form would punish the forwarding of a
pornographic e-mail with up to three years
imprisonment and the posting of online activity
posing a threat to “national security” as an
offense under the national security law.32
ONI testing results
The stated goal of blocking 800,000 pornograph-
ic and violent Web sites as a result of Thaksin’s
policy is only one of many reported figures of the
number of blocked sites in Thailand. For exam-
ple, in 2004 there were reportedly 1,247 blocked
URLs, most of which were pornographic sites,
along with a few sites devoted to online gaming
and one site belonging to a separatist move-
ment.33 This proportion remained relatively intact
in other accounts. Before it took down its public
reports, the Police Bureau on High Tech Crime
claimed to have blocked all of the over 34,000
“illicit” Web sites reported since April 2002, with
Thai and foreign pornography sites at about 56
percent of the total, sites that sell sex equipment
12 percent, and sites with content posing a
“threat to national security” at 11 percent.34 From
2002 to 2005 the MICT also blocked over 2,000
sites, reportedly mostly pornography sites.35 In
addition, multiple alleged block lists containing a
majority of pornography sites were “leaked.” It
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was common for prominent sites to be made
inaccessible, only to be unblocked after a period
of time.
ONI conducted testing after the coup on
three major ISPs: KSC, LoxInfo, and True. Of the
sites tested, only a small percentage were actu-
ally blocked. The Thai government does imple-
ment filtering and primarily blocks access to
pornography, online gambling sites, and circum-
vention tools. Outside these categories, only a
few sites were blocked by all three ISPs. Two of
these sites were inaccessible and suspected to
be blocked. One of these sites, the anti-coup
Web site www.19sep.com received significant
media coverage for being blocked six times over
a period of three months.36 The other, the Web
site of the Patani United Liberation Organisation
(www.puloinfo.net) considered by the govern-
ment to be a Malay Muslim separatist group,
appears to be a recent incarnation of the site
www.pulo.org that was also blocked and has
since been taken down.
Although it has long been declared a top pri-
ority of filtering in Thailand, a minority of the Thai-
related pornography sites ONI tested were actu-
ally blocked by all three ISPs. Only one pornog-
raphy site (www.sex.com) on the global list was
blocked by all three ISPs.
Filtering is demonstrated by redirection to
an MICT blockpage. Although it has been report-
ed that ISPs are required to block a list of banned
Web sites distributed by the NITC, ONI testing
found that filtering varies across ISPs. LoxInfo
and True showed significant overlap in sites 
filtered, blocking a substantial number of 
circumvention tools and anonymous proxies
(www.guardster.com; www.stayinvisible.com), as
well as pornography and gaming sites. A few
sites promoting human rights, such as the 
Patani Malay Human Rights Organisation
(www.pmhro.org), were also blocked by both
ISPs.
Only KSC appeared to address the issue of
lèse majesté, blocking a number of pages on
Amazon.com and other commerce sites featur-
ing biographies of the king. These present an
example of URL filtering in Thailand, as various
Amazon.com URLs were blocked but the domain
(www.amazon.com) remained available on all
ISPs tested.
Conclusion
The current official approach toward filtering is in
flux, especially in the face of questions about the
legal authority and procedures for censorship
after the abolishment of the 1997 Constitution.
However, evidence from ONI testing suggests
that targets for blocking have remained consis-
tent, with a strong focus on pornography and
lesser priorities made of gaming and circumven-
tion tools. Only a small number of sites with sen-
sitive political content, particularly about the Thai
monarchy and insurgents in the south, continue
to be inaccessible. It remains to be seen whether
the harsh legacy of censorship of all media cre-
ated by the former prime minister’s government
will be carried forward in post-coup Thailand. 
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Although Tunisia has actively sought to devel-
op its information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) infrastructure, the government
blocks a range of Web content and has used
nontechnical means to impede journalists and
human rights activists from doing their work.
This pervasive filtering of political content and
restrictions on online activity has prompted 
frequent criticism from foreign governments
and human rights organizations.1
Background
The Tunisian government curtails dissent, free
expression, and the flow of information into and
out of the country. The government relies on legal
and economic means to maintain effective con-
trol over the press and the broadcast media.2
State interference in assemblies is common-
place. In 2005 the government banned the first
congress of the Union of Tunisian Journalists and
shut down the offices of the Association of
Tunisian Judges.3 The government has dis-
patched the police to surround and disrupt meet-
ings of the National Council for Liberties in
Tunisia,4 and leveraged the courts to enjoin the
Tunisian Human Rights League from preparing
for its national congress.5 The government has
also reportedly threatened judges with assign-
ments to remote locations; tortured prisoners;
and arrested, harassed, and intimidated human
rights activists.6 In March 2005, for instance,
lawyer and human rights activist Radhia Nasraoui
was beaten by police on the way to a demon-
stration.7 Despite the release of eighty political
prisoners in March 2006, more than two hundred
are believed to remain in custody.8
Internet in Tunisia
The Tunisian Ministry of Communications 
established the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) to
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regulate the country’s Internet and domain name
system (DNS) services, which had formerly fallen
under the Regional Institute for Computer
Sciences and Telecommunications (IRSIT)’s
purview.9 The ATI is the gateway from which all of
Tunisia’s twelve Internet service providers (ISPs)
lease their bandwidth.10 Seven of these ISPs are
publicly operated; the other five—Planet Tunisie,
3S Global Net, Hexabyte, Tunet, and Topnet—are
private.11 These ISPs offer a range of options,
including hourly dialup access,12 broadband
access (with prices starting at less than USD25
per month),13 and satellite-based Internet.14
The government has energetically sought to
spread access to the Internet. The ATI reports
connectivity of 100 percent for universities,
research laboratories, and secondary schools,
and 70 percent for primary schools.15
Government-brokered “Free Internet” programs
that provide Web access for the price of a local
telephone call and increased competition among
ISPs have significantly reduced the economic
barriers to Internet access. Those Tunisians 
for whom personal computers remain prohibitively
expensive may also access the Internet 
from more than 300 cybercafés set up by the
authorities.16
Tunisia’s rapid growth in Internet capacity is
reflected in an increase in Internet use. In just five
years, Tunisia’s Internet penetration rate rose
from 1 percent (2001) to 9.3 percent (2006),17
and today there are roughly one million Internet
users in the country.18
Legal and regulatory frameworks
In addition to filtering Web content, the govern-
ment of Tunisia utilizes laws, regulations, and sur-
veillance to achieve strict control over the
Internet.
The Tunisian External Communication
Agency (ATCE), the government body responsi-
ble for media regulation, contends that fewer
than 10 percent of newspapers are under state
ownership and editorial control.19 However, the
ATCE uses its regulatory powers to help govern-
ment supporters and hamper detractors seeking
advertising space in the print media.20 The state
maintains direct ownership of all three of the
country’s television stations and all but one radio
station (which does not air news). Although the
Internet has unquestionably made it easier for
Tunisians to read news and opinions not found in
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media, legal threats exert pressures on content
providers operating within the country.
In 2001 President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali
removed prison sentences from the Press Law,
which criminalizes criticism of the government.21
However, rights groups have pointed out that
imprisonment and other harsh penalties are pre-
served in the Penal Code.22
ISPs are required to send the Ministry of
Telecommunications a current list of their sub-
scribers each month. 23 ISPs, Internet service
subscribers, Web page owners, and Web server
owners are responsible for ensuring that the con-
tent of the pages and Web servers that they host
conform to the Press Code’s prohibitions against
publications “likely to upset public order.”24 In
addition, these parties are “obliged to constantly
monitor the content of web servers operated by
the service provider so as to not allow any infor-
mation contrary to public order and good morals
to remain on the system.”25
These regulations also apply to Publinets,
government-sponsored Internet cafés. Café own-
ers are responsible for the activities of their
patrons.26 Computer monitors in Publinet cafés
visited by an ONI researcher were angled so that
the café owner could see the screens, and in one
case, the café owner commented when the
researcher attempted to access blocked sites.27
Tunisia achieves its filtering through the use
of a commercial software program, SmartFilter,
sold by the U.S. company Secure Computing.
Because all fixed-line Internet traffic passes
through facilities controlled by ATI, the govern-
ment is able to load the software onto its servers
and filter content consistently across Tunisia’s
twelve ISPs. Tunisia purposefully hides its filtering
from Internet users. SmartFilter is designed to
display a 403 “Forbidden” error message when a
user attempts to access a blocked site; the
Tunisian government has replaced this message
with a standard 404 “File Not Found” error mes-
sage, which gives no hint that the requested site
is actively blocked.28
ONI testing results
ONI testing in Tunisia revealed pervasive filtering
of Web sites of political opposition groups such
as the Al-Nadha Movement (www.nahdha.info)
and Tunisian Workers’ Communist Party (www.al
badil.org). Web sites that contain oppositional
news and politics were also blocked. Examples
include www.perspectivestunisiennes.net, www.
nawaat.org, www.tunisnews.com, and www.tune
zine.com.
Web sites that publish oppositional articles
by Tunisian journalists were also blocked. For
example, ONI verified the blocking of the French
daily Libération Web site in February 2007
because articles by Tunisian journalist Taoufik
Ben Brik critical of President Zine el-Abidine Ben
Ali appeared on the site.29
Also blocked are Web sites that criticize
Tunisia’s human rights records. For example, the
Web sites of the League for the Defense of
Human Rights (www.ltdh.org) and the Congrés
Pour la République (www.cprtunisie.net) were
blocked, along with the Web sites of Reporters
Without Borders (www.rsf.org), the International
Freedom of Expression eXchange (www.ifex.org),
the Islamic Human Rights Commission
(www.ihrc.org), and the Arabic Network for
Human Rights Information (www.hrinfo.org).
Although the home page of Human Rights Watch
(HRW) was accessible, the Arabic- and French-
language versions of an HRW report on Internet
repression in Tunisia were blocked.
Pornographic sites and anonymizers and
circumvention tools, such as Anonymizer
(www.anonymizer.com) and Guardster
(www.guardster.com), were filtered extensively.
Indeed, almost all of the tested sites belonging to
these categories were blocked.
A few sites that criticize the Quran (www.
thequran.com) and Islam (www.islameyat.com)
or encourage Muslims and others to convert to
Christianity (www.biblicalchristianity.freeserve.
co.uk) were blocked, though their small number
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points to limited filtering of religious content in
Tunisia.
Other blocked sites included several gay
and lesbian information or dating pages, sites
containing provocative attire, hacking Web sites,
and several online translation services.
Conclusion
Tunisia’s government continues to suppress criti-
cal speech and oppositional activity, both in real
space and in cyberspace. Unlike other states that
employ filtering software, Tunisia endeavors to
conceal instances of filtering by supplying a fake
error page when a blocked site is requested. This
makes filtering more opaque and clouds users’
understanding of the boundaries of permissible
content. Tunisia maintains a focused, effective
system of Internet control that blends content fil-
tering with harsh laws to censor objectionable
and politically threatening information.
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Access to Internet content in Ukraine remains
largely unfettered. However, despite a general-
ly liberal media and telecommunications policy,
the authorities have enlisted special bodies
and regulations to survey Internet content in
order to “protect national security” and limit
other forms of “undesirable” information con-
tent. These regulations embody the potential
for expanded formal and informal controls,
although such constraints are unlikely in the
near future.
Background
Among the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) countries, Ukraine is second only to
Russia in the size and strength of its IT establish-
ment. Ukraine was the birthplace of Soviet com-
puting and Kyiv remains a major center for IT
development. The county was an early adopter of
policies to support information communications
technology (ICT) for development as a pillar 
of national development, and the government
has invested in building out the country’s ICT
infrastructure.
The Ukrainian government recognizes 
the significance of the Internet for economic
development and for the development of infor-
mation society. The state has demonstrated the
political will to undertake vital reforms in the
telecommunications sector, although much
remains to be done to promote a favorable envi-
ronment for developing the Internet, fostering 
e-commerce, and introducing e-governance. The
World Economic Forum ranks Ukraine 76th out of
115 countries for 2005–2006 in the Internet readi-
ness index.1
The January 2005 “orange revolution”—
when opposition groups successfully challenged
the outcome of the November 2004 presidential
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elections that were thought to be unfair—high-
lighted the latent political power resulting from
the “convergence” of information infrastructures
(cell phones, Internet, and independent media)
and political mobilizaton. The opposition made
full use of these technologies to mobilize and
direct supporters in acts of civil disobedience, sit-
ins, and general strikes. Although the Internet did
not play a determining role in the success of the
“orange revolution,” its use by the opposition
helped to foster the perception that these tech-
nologies served an important strategic role in
organizing political opposition (which observers
have termed “hyper-democracy”). This percep-
tion, in turn, prompted neighboring authoritarian
governments such as that of Belarus to crack
down on Internet openness.
Internet in Ukraine
The partly liberalized Ukrainian telecommunica-
tions market is relatively undeveloped. Fixed-line
penetration remains low and the telephone sys-
tem requires modernization. The demand for
mobile services has expanded rapidly, to reach a
penetration of nearly 50 percent. The largest tele-
com and top-tier Internet service provider (ISP),
Ukrtelecom, has 92.9 percent state ownership.
The parliament has legalized its privatization,2
but this has been delayed in anticipation of the
company increasing in market value.3 The state
monopolies Ukrtelecom and Utel, which is con-
trolled by Ukrtelecom, together own 95 percent of
the long-distance and international calls market.4
State-owned Ukrtelecom is the largest ISP in
the country, but does not decisively control the
countries other major ISPs. As of June 2006
some sixty ISPs connected to six Internet traffic
exchange points.5 Recently the number of ISPs
offering broadband access services has rapidly
increased.6 The government, recognizing the
need for attracting foreign investment and stimu-
lating favorable Internet environment, has also
announced plans to introduce Wi-Fi and WiMAX
technologies.7
The Ukrainian national country code top-
level domain (“.ua”) is administered by the
Hostmaster Company, a specialized nonprofit
organization.
Internet penetration in the country was esti-
mated at 9.8 percent in 2005,8 well below the
European average of 36.1 percent. Several
obstacles compromise expansion, including high
access costs, poor infrastructure in the regions,




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........6,086 4.39
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................68 5.32
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................99 6.87
Human development index (out of 177) .................................77 5.70
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................136 3.80
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................125 4.49
Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................93 5.00
Internet users (% of population) ............................................9.8 3.98
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
computer (PC) ownership. The International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) 2005 estimates
show that only 4 percent of the population owns
a PC.9 Although ISPs have considerably reduced
their access costs (for example, by leasing out-
dated or redundant infrastructure from
Ukrtelecom) and a few providers offer free
access during the night, most Ukrainians cannot
afford to use the Internet: 46.8 percent of the
population identified themselves as poor.10 Men
are more frequent users than women (at 59.3
percent), and most users access Internet at the
office, cybercafés, or home. The most popular
search engines in Ukraine are Ukrainian
www.BigMir.net and www.Ukr.net, Russian
Yandex and Rambler, and Google.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The 2003 Law on Communications established
the National Communication Regulation
Commission, which regulates the IT and
telecommunications market. Under this law
telecommunications operators require a license
before starting activity.11 With the present gov-
ernment, the Internet enjoys a high degree of
freedom. Internet activity is not subject to licens-
ing or other forms of regulation. Liberalization of
the market has led to a rapid increase in the num-
ber of ISPs, which numbered 260 in 2006.
At present there are no controls on Internet
access or content. However, this may be chang-
ing as government figures have made public
calls for stricter regulation of the internet, citing
national security concerns.12 Suggested meas-
ures include licensing ISPs, registering Internet
resources, and monitoring content related to
obscene or harmful material. The threat of
Internet censorship was raised in 2005 when the
Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications
introduced, and subsequently withdrew, a decree
regulating registration of Web sites hosted in
Ukraine for the purposes of national security.13
An earlier Act to introduce mechanisms for
Internet monitoring (the 2002 Order of the State
Committee on Communications) required ISPs to
install a state monitoring system in order to pro-
vide Internet access to state organizations. The
purpose of this monitoring was to control
unsanctioned transmission of data containing
state secrets. However, a “state secret,” as pro-
vided in current regulations, lacks concrete defi-
nition, allowing authorities broad discretion in
interpretation. The difficulties in separating state
from nonstate users expose the latter to monitor-
ing. Human rights groups have suggested that
the Security Service has been intercepting mes-
sages and carrying out surveillance on over
approximately 50 percent of Ukrainian traffic.14
The Council of National Security and
Defense is the main governmental body respon-
sible for national security and defense; this body
is chaired by the president. The Council monitors
information security policy and coordinates the
work of the other executive bodies in this field.
The Security Service of Ukraine is empowered to
initiate criminal investigations and use wiretap-
ping devices on communications. Legislation
has not made clear either the circumstances that
justify interception of information from communi-
cation channels, or the time limits of any such
interception.15 The recently established State
Service for Special Communications and
Information Protection Service implements gov-
ernmental policy on protecting state information
and confidential communication, and exercises
control over cryptographic and technical informa-
tion security.16
The Law on Protection of Public Morals of
November 20, 2003, enacted during the term of
the previous government, is still effective. It pro-
hibits production and circulation of pornography;
dissemination of products that propagandize war
or spread national and religious intolerance;
humiliation or insult to an individual or nation on
the grounds of nationality, religion, or ignorance;
and the propagation of “drug addition, toxicolo-
gy, alcoholism, smoking and other bad habits.”
The National Expert Council for the Protection of
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Public Morals has authority to inspect media,
including the Internet, in order to start a 
procedure for revocation of the license in case of
violation. The National Expert Council, however,
has not issued any decision yet because it lacks
legal mechanisms for enforcement.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted testing on seven ISPs: Adamant,
Cornel, Elvisti, Ukrtelecom, Volia,
Goldentelecom, and Ukr.net. The testing did not
detect any filtering, although a few Web sites with
content related to alcohol and drugs, public
health, human rights, and minority faiths were
temporarily inaccessible.
Conclusion
Citizens of Ukraine enjoy an unfettered access to
the Internet. The country has an Internet infra-
structure oriented toward European providers,
and thus the ISPs are not influenced by the poli-
cies of Russian providers. However, the country
has built up an intricate system of bodies and
regulations that could be geared to surveillance
of information carried on telecommunications
networks, including the Internet.
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The government of the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) pervasively filters Web sites that contain
pornography or relate to alcohol and drug use,
gay and lesbian issues, or online dating 
or gambling. Web-based applications and 
religious and political sites are also filtered,
though less extensively. Additionally, legal con-
trols limit free expression and behavior, restrict-
ing political discourse and dissent online.
Background
The United Arab Emirates is ruled chiefly by a
Federal Supreme Council, consisting of the
hereditary leaders of the seven individual emi-
rates. Although the UAE Constitution provides for
judicial independence and guarantees freedom
of speech, of the press, and of assembly, politi-
cal interference and legal constraints undermine
these provisions. Rulings by Islamic and civil
courts are scrutinized by the government, and
the foreign nationals occupying most judicial
seats can be deported.1 Print and electronic
media are subject to the Press and Publications
Law, which permits censorship of content by the
state Media Council and prosecution under the
Penal Code—for example, for publishing materi-
al that causes someone moral harm (Article 372),
or for defaming someone without concrete 
evidence (Article 373). Journalists practice self-
censorship, and newspapers often rely on the
state’s Emirates News Agency for material.2
Although citizens can voice their concerns
through channels such as the open councils
(majlis), they do not have the power to transform
the government or national law and are prohibit-
ed from criticizing their leaders.3 Human rights
activists have been detained and academics and
critics barred from making their views public.4
The government also controls Sunni and Shi’a
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mosques and monitors sermons for political
commentary.5
Internet in the United Arab Emirates
The UAE is among the most highly Internet-con-
nected countries in the Middle East. The UAE
Yearbook for 2007 states that there are more than
578,000 Internet subscribers in the country.6
September 2006 figures on Internet penetration
place the number of Internet users at 1.40 million,
or 35 percent of the population,7 though Etisalat
(Emirates Telecommunications Corporation)—
the nation’s primary service provider—estimates
that more than 51 percent of the country is
online.8
Since 1976, nearly all telephone and Internet
service in the UAE has been furnished by the
government-owned Etisalat—either through
direct sale of subscriptions to customers or
through commercial resale of Etisalat services via
providers such as Dubai Internet City (DIC) tele-
com. With the release of the General Policy for
the Telecommunication Sector (GTP) in 2006,9
the UAE government moved to liberalize the
telecommunications market, though it remains to
be seen how competition will affect Etisalat’s
monopoly on telecom operations. The UAE
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA)
granted a twenty-year license to the Emirates
Integrated Telecommunications Company
(EITC)—more widely known under its traded
name “du”—to offer fixed-line, mobile, and
Internet services. Prior to liberalization, du served
the Dubai free zone and a few affiliated residen-
tial complexes, providing unfettered Internet
access in those areas, but acquisitions and part-
nerships with other telecom companies have
expanded du’s capabilities and customer base.
du now aims to capture 30 percent of the UAE
telecom market within three years.10
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Controls on Internet content in the UAE, actual-
ized through filtering and other forms of enforce-
ment, are geared toward safeguarding political,
moral, and religious values. According to Etisalat,
there is some evidence that these controls enjoy
popular support. A 2002 survey found that 60
percent of Etisalat subscribers surveyed favored
retaining the ISP’s automatic filtering system, with
51 percent saying that it protected family mem-
bers from objectionable content. In 2004, the
UAE cited the survey as indicating that the role 




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ......22,109 7.47
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................79 7.09
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................77 4.73
Human development index (out of 177) .................................49 6.44
Rule of law (out of 208).........................................................70 6.17
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................165 2.83
Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................36 6.88
Internet users (% of population) ..........................................31.1 5.98
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2004, 2006a, 2006b; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
material is considered to be an acceptable form
of censorship.”11
The mandate for technical filtering in the
UAE derives from the TRA and is executed at the
ISP level. Etisalat prohibits the use of its services
for any “criminal or unlawful purpose such as but
not limited to vice, gambling or obscenity, or for
carrying out any activity which is contrary to the
social, cultural, political, economical or religious
values of the UAE.”12 Emerging competitor du is
also moving toward compliance with the TRA’s
filtering policies. In January 2007, the company
defended its decision to block the use of Voice-
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) in the free zone, say-
ing that TRA rules and guidelines mandated the
ban.13 This decision heralded a comprehensive
plan to implement technical filtering throughout
the Dubai free zone in 2007.14
The UAE government has also issued a fed-
eral law on combating cybercrimes. Cyber-Crime
Law No. 2 of 2006 considers any intentional act
that abolishes, destroys, or reveals secrets, or
that results in the republishing of personal or offi-
cial information, to be a crime.15 Individuals may
be imprisoned for using the Internet to abuse
Islamic holy shrines and rituals, insult any recog-
nized religion, incite or promote sins, or oppose
the Islamic religion.16 Anyone convicted of “tran-
scending family principles and values”17 or set-
ting up a Web site for groups “calling for, facilitat-
ing and promoting ideas in breach of the general
order and public decency”18 may be jailed.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted tests on the UAE’s two ISPs:
Etisalat, which services most of the country; and
du, which (at the time of testing) serviced only
Dubai Media City, Dubai Internet City, and some
residential areas associated with the free zone.
To conduct the tests, ONI used dialup, broad-
band, and wireless connections. Access in the
Dubai free zone was unfettered, while consider-
able filtering behavior was exhibited on the
Etisalat ISP.
Testing in the UAE points to selective filtering
of Web sites that express alternative political or
religious views. www.UAEprison.com, a site host-
ing testimonials of former prisoners and critiques
of the government’s human rights practices, was
blocked, as was the site of the U.S.-based Arab
Times (www.arabtimes.com). Several sites pre-
senting unorthodox perspectives on Islam
(www.thekoran.com, www.islamreview.com,
www.secularislam.org) were blocked, along with
a handful of sites promoting minority faiths
(www.albrhan.org, www.ansarweb.net). Among
the few extremist sites filtered in the UAE 
were www.hinduunity.org, a site advocating
Hindu solidarity and resistance to Islam, and
www.kahanetzadak.com, a site devoted to the
founder of the militant Jewish Defense League.
Meanwhile, the state continued to deny access to
all sites on the Israeli country code top-level
domain “.il.”
Testing revealed pervasive filtering of porno-
graphic and gay and lesbian sites, which were
extensively blocked. Web pages relating to sexu-
al health (www.circumcision.org) and education
(www.sexualhealth.com) or containing provoca-
tive attire (www.lingerie.com) were filtered to lesser
degrees. Sites promoting alcohol and drug use
or facilitating online gambling or dating were also
blocked in large numbers.
ONI found substantial filtering of Internet
tools in the UAE, including translation (www.
systranbox.com), hacking (www.thesecretlist.com)
and anonymizer (www.surfsecret.com) sites.
Numerous VoIP sites (www.skype.com,
www.pc2call.com) were blocked in accordance
with the national ban on such applications. In
October 2006, the UAE unblocked access to
social networking and multimedia sharing sites,
including www.youtube.com, www.flickr.com,
www.metacafe.com, and www.myspace.com.
However, sections of these sites containing
objectionable material remain unavailable.
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Conclusion
The UAE prevents its citizens from accessing a
significant amount of Internet content spanning a
variety of topics, though the majority of sites fil-
tered appear to be those deemed obscene.
Outside the free zones, the state employs
SmartFilter software to block content such as
nudity, sex, dating, gambling, cults/occult, reli-
gious conversion, and drugs. Sites containing
anonymizer, hacking, translation, and VoIP appli-
cations are also filtered in this manner. The man-
ual blocking of the entire Israeli domain is indica-
tive of the government’s political opposition to
the Israeli state, rather than to the particular con-
tents of the Web sites hosted there. Though most
political sites and news sources are accessible
throughout the country, a handful are blocked. It
remains to be seen how severely the enforce-
ment of TRA policies in the free zone and affiliat-
ed residential clusters will hamper access to
Internet content and transform the traditionally
unrestricted information environment in those
areas.
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Among the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) countries, Uzbekistan is the undis-
puted leader in applying Internet controls.
Filtering is comprehensive and, until 2006,
largely undeclared with the government deny-
ing the existence of these practices. At present,
the government employs sophisticated multi-
layered mechanisms to exercise control over
the Internet, including adopting restrictive poli-
cies, applying technological measures, and
compelling self-censorship on the media.
Background
At present, and in spite of the formal separation
of powers enshrined in the Constitution of the
Republic of Uzbekistan, virtually all power is
invested in President Islam Karimov. During his
extended authoritarian rule the president has
demonstrated an active commitment to control-
ling the information environment in the country
and constraining the expression of dissident
viewpoints. The active opposition has been
forced to leave the country. For them, the Internet
often remains the only way to communicate with
Uzbek society. The complex series of laws and
regulations have resulted in self-censorship of
online publishers, independent journalists, and
bloggers. This, complemented with a restrictive
Internet filtering regime, significantly stifles public
discourse on political and human rights topics.
Uzbekistan’s control of the Internet embod-
ies the most pervasive regime of filtering and
censorship in the CIS. It stands in stark contrast
to the government’s official enthusiasm for infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT)
development and the Internet. Until 2001
Uzbekistan was a regional leader in the adoption
of the Internet and the prioritization of ICTs 
as a mechanism for national development.
Uzbekistan was among the first of the post-Soviet
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republics to establish a national agency respon-
sible for ICT development (UzInfoCom), to con-
tribute state resources to building a sizable aca-
demic and research network (UzSCINET), and to
launch an ambitious project to provide Internet to
the main government institutions (Cabinet of
Ministers and Presidency). After 2001 Uzbekistan
continued to receive sizable foreign support
aimed at developing its ICT infrastructure, includ-
ing a large network of Internet access points in
the regions. Uzbek government officials at all lev-
els were sent abroad to study e-government sys-
tems, and ICT was prioritized as a means for
national development. Until 2001–02 the Internet
remained open and free from filtering with the
exception of some limited filters for pornography
that were implemented on the academic and
research network (UzSCINET).
The turning point in the state’s relationship
to Internet freedom began following a series of
attacks in Tashkent in 2004 blamed on the Hizb-
ut-Tahrir (Hit) and the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan. These attacks have been generally
associated with a deepening crackdown in
Uzbek society and encompass all forms and
channels of dissent, including the Internet.
Internet in Uzbekistan
In 2004 the International Telecommunication
Union estimated some 880,000 regular Internet
users in Uzbekistan, or a 3 percent Internet pen-
etration rate.1 According to local surveys the total
Internet audience is approximately 1,820,000 as
of June 2006. In contrast to neighboring coun-
tries, Uzbek women use Internet at an almost
equal rate to their male counterparts, with a dif-
ference of only 3 percent.2 About 41.3 percent of
Internet users are sixteen to twenty years old.3
Access is most common from homes (42.7 per-
cent) and work (44.6 percent). Approximately 30
percent of Internet users also visit cybercafés.4
As of January 2005 there were 463 Internet
access centers in Uzbekistan; in January 2006
the number dropped to 344.5
Residential Internet services are unafford-
able for the majority of the population. The cost of
dialup services is USD0.37 per hour and unlimit-
ed access is USD67.14 per month. The cost of
ADSL access is significantly lower: on average, it
does not exceed USD15 per month and offers
speed of 128 Kbit/second. The quality of Internet
access and communications services in
Uzbekistan is rapidly improving.6 The bandwidth




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........1,812 3.57
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................67 5.15
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................99 6.87
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................113 4.82
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................193 2.38
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................200 1.48
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................111 4.34
Internet users (% of population) ............................................3.3 3.37
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006b; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2004
growth: as of June 2006 it totaled 160.2 Mb/s, up
from 44 Mb/s in July 2004.
The number of Internet service providers
(ISPs) in Uzbekistan has grown considerably,
from 25 in 1999 to 539 in 2005. Because of
increased licensing requirements the number of
ISPs dropped to 430 in 2006. There are seven
top-tier ISPs with connections to China, Russia,
Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. The country
also has a network of microwave radio relay lines
that provide for high-speed data transmission.
The sole Internet exchange point, used by the
seventeen aggregator ISPs, is located in Uzbek
Central Telegraph’s premises.7
The domain registration of the national “.uz”
zone was decentralized in December 2005 when
five operators were granted the status of regis-
trars. Created with foreign organizations’ sup-
port, the Computerization and Information
Technology Developing Center (UzInfoCom) is a
quasi-nongovernmental organization8 that devel-
ops computer and information technologies and
administers the country code top-level domain
name (“.uz”).9 According to the data of
UzInfoCom, as of October 2005 there were 2,704
second-level domains.
Russian is the most popular language
among Internet users (up to 70 percent), followed
by Uzbek and English. The most visited Web
sites in Uzbekistan are media sites and search
engines located in the Russian Internet zone
(“.ru”).
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Although the constitution of Uzbekistan guaran-
tees freedom of expression and prohibits censor-
ship,10 the Central Inspection on Protecting State
Secrets in the Press officially censored media
until 2002. Since then the government has
increasingly compelled self-censorship on online
media publishers, bloggers, and opposition lead-
ers through a variety of means.11 A recent exam-
ple is the newly adopted Mass Media Law.12
Discussions of its drafts were closed to the pub-
lic to minimize media criticism of restrictive provi-
sions. The Law holds media owners, editors, and
staff members responsible for the “objectivity” of
the published materials.13 Independent and for-
eign media, including online publishers, need to
register with the Cabinet of Ministers in
Uzbekistan. In addition, the Law forbids entities
with 30 percent or more foreign participation to
establish their own media outlets in the country.
Online versions of newspapers also fall within the
Law’s scope, and as such are subject to regis-
tration if their content differs from the printed
publication. In order to gain more control over
Internet content, the government has stated that
subsequent regulations will specify the type of
Web sites that need to be registered.14
The formal regulation of the Internet and
electronic mass media commenced with the
adoption of regulation no. 52 by the Cabinet of
Ministers,15 which established a National
Network of Information Transmission (UzPAK)
and ensured its monopoly on international
Internet connectivity for the purposes of preserv-
ing the national information security. The govern-
ment’s strict enforcement of this regulation result-
ed in several Web sites becoming temporarily
inaccessible.16 Regulation no. 352 abolished
UzPAK’s monopoly on the international connec-
tions and fostered a decentralization process in
the field of Internet providers. 17 However, more
than 80 percent of ISPs still run their connection
through UzPAK despite the high tariffs. A few
ISPs have their own international satellite con-
nections, which provide better service than
UzPAK, for lower fees. A growing trend among
ISPs is to use UzPAK’s lines to send messages
and satellite networks to view or download infor-
mation. This solution allows the providers to cir-
cumvent UzPAK’s monitoring network and the
channels’ low capacities.
UzPAK was set up within the Communi-
cations and Information Agency (UzACI),18 which
is the principal state agency regulating services
in the area of communications, including the
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Internet.19 Under Resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers No. 232 of 2002, UzACI provides infor-
mation security and coordinates providers’ activ-
ities in this field. All Internet service providers and
operators must obtain a license from UzACI.20
Under order no. 216 Internet providers and oper-
ators cannot disseminate information that inter
alia calls for the violent overthrowing of the con-
stitutional order of Uzbekistan, instigates war and
violence, contains pornography, or degrades and
defames human dignity.21 UzbekTelecom, the
national telecommunications operator, has dis-
cretionary power to oversee the ISPs’ obser-
vance of this order.22 In 2005 the ISPs in
Uzbekistan faced another regulatory hindrance in
the form of resolution no. 155 (Cabinet of
Ministers), which stipulated that only legal entities
should be entitled to provide licensed telecom-
munication services. Individuals have to register
as legal entities and obtain new licenses before
continuing to provide Internet services.
In 2004 the Cabinet of Ministers adopted
regulation no. 555, establishing a Center for
Mass Media Monitoring within UzACI. The
Center’s key objectives are to analyze the con-
tent of information disseminated through the
Internet and ensure its compliance with existing
laws and regulations.23 Another regulatory body,
the Uzbek Agency for Press and Information
(UzPIA), monitors the observance of media law,
issues registrations and licenses for media out-
lets.24 This agency has the power to suspend
media licenses for “systematic” breaches of
Uzbekistan’s restrictive media and information
laws.
The 2002 Law on Principles and Guarantees
on Access to Information reserves the govern-
ment’s right to restrict access to information
when necessary to protect the individual “from
negative informational psychological influ-
ence.”25 The government further controls infor-
mation streams by authorizing the use of politi-
cal, economic, or other measures when neces-
sary to counteract “threats in the sphere of infor-
mation security” or “ideas of terrorism and reli-
gious extremism.”26
Uzbekistan’s principal intelligence agency,
the National Security Service (SNB), monitors the
Uzbek sector of the Internet and thereby compels
ISPs, including cybercafés, to self-censor. Soviet-
style censorship structures were replaced by
“monitoring sections” that basically work under
the SNB’s guidance. There is no mandatory gov-
ernment pre-publication review, but the ISPs risk
having their licenses revoked if they post “inap-
propriate” information. On some occasions, the
SNB has ordered ISPs to block access to oppo-
sition or religious Web sites.27 The SNB’s censor-
ship is selective and often targets articles on gov-
ernment corruption, violations of human rights,
and organized crime. Usually this censorship
affects specific pages instead of top-level
domain names. The SNB regularly exchanges
data with Russian intelligence sources and
allegedly collaborates with the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Academy.
Paradoxically, Internet filtering in Uzbekistan
did not begin with the security forces but rather
with the academic and research network, whose
existence was funded with foreign development
assistance.28 UzSCINET was the first Uzbek ISP
to implement a filtering policy, using an open
source filtering product (Squid Guard) and pub-
licly available list of pornographic sites.
UzSCINET justified its position of filtering pornog-
raphy on the basis of being a provider to schools
and universities, as well as the need to conserve
bandwidth. However, UzSCINET lacked formal
legal status in Uzbekistan and as a result was
dependent on UzInfoCom, a quasi-government
agency for maintaining its license as a service
provider. As it happened, the formal “head” of
UzSCINET was also the director of UzInfoCom
and a deputy director of UzASCI, the government
communications agency and regulator. Simul-
taneously, he was also acting as an adviser to the
presidential Security Council. As a result pres-
sure was exerted on UzSCINET to cooperate with
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authorities, and over time the network became a
“testing ground” that security forces used to
develop a system for selecting and blocking
unwanted Web sites. As late as 2005 the system
was far from comprehensive, with previous ONI
research showing a great deal of divergence
among the access available on various ISPs,
where some comprehensively blocked content
while others allowed unfettered access. The sus-
picion is that some commercial ISPs had close
connections with Karimov’s inner circle and
hence were able to withstand pressure to imple-
ment filtering, which gave them a commercial
advantage (as users who wished to access such
content would pay to access the Internet through
these ISPs).
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted on five of the largest ISPs
in Uzbekistan: ROL, Sarkor, SHARQ, TPS, and
UzPAK. ONI detected a consistent and substan-
tial filtering system that re-directs users to anoth-
er Web site (www.live.com). Blocked sites includ-
ed numerous political sites and a wide range of
sites with human rights contents from both the
local and regional list. In general, online publica-
tions tackling political issues deemed subversive
or sensitive to the government were heavily fil-
tered. These Web sites are hosted outside of
Uzbekistan (www.ferghana.ru) because the ones
based in the country have been already forced to
shut down (www.uznews.net). Selective filtering
of Web sites displaying social topics was also
detected, including sites with religious, extremist,
porn, gay, and lesbian content. U.S. military Web
sites were largely inaccessible on some of the
ISPs, although this appears to be the rest of
“supply-side” blocking by U.S. authorities.
Several anonymizers, a few host URLs, and one
e-mail site were also within the list of blocked
Web sites.
Most of the cybercafés surveyed by ONI
researchers have announcements cautioning
users against visiting Web sites containing
extremist, obscene, sexually explicit, or porno-
graphic content, and some cybercafé adminis-
trators do carry out surveillance on a regular
basis. However, observations demonstrate that
this is unevenly applied. In some cases, users
enjoy relatively unfettered Internet access. In oth-
ers, notably during two visits by ONI researchers,
accessing an “unauthorized site” led to a swift
arrest by security forces who were summoned by
the Internet café owner. Regular visits by SNB
officers are reported at cybercafés in the Fergana
valley where they are said to manually check to
see if certain sites are accessible. Most cyber-
cafés use commercially available software that
allows them to manage and bill clients remotely
for time spent online. This software is easily
adapted to warn administrators when unautho-
rized content is being accessed, and also to
block access. 
Conclusion
Uzbekistan maintains the most extensive and
pervasive filtering system among tested CIS
countries. Although expressly banned in Uzbek
law, filtering is widespread and apparently grow-
ing. A large number of sites with political and
human rights content sensitive to the government
remain inaccessible to Internet users. The securi-
ty forces in Uzbekistan manually check Internet
access at “edge locations” (such as cybercafés)
and monitor users’ activities. The regulatory
framework is so intricately woven that, in most
cases, ISPs and Internet publishers are unaware
of the governing law. To avoid inflicting the wrath
of authorities, Internet actors frequently under-
take self-censorship.
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Internet use in Venezuela is currently not sub-
ject to extensive content restrictions, and ONI
testing found no evidence of Internet censor-
ship. However, the announced nationalization
of the country’s largest telecommunications
company, CANTV, and the restrictive general
media policies are fueling concerns that the
Chávez administration could institute Internet
filtering in the near future.
Background
The government of Hugo Chávez is in the
process of consolidating power after a number of
electoral victories and a failed coup in 2002. This
process has taken two forms: undermining judi-
cial independence and wresting greater control
over the media. Judges on the First and Second
Administrative Courts—the courts with jurisdic-
tion over complaints relating to the government’s
administrative actions—are kept as provisional
appointees. In 2005, six judges and their replace-
ments were fired from the two courts for report-
edly not passing performance tests.1 As a result,
these judges continue to be unable to pass judg-
ment without fear of government retribution. As to
the media, the Chávez government has recently
passed two laws meant to restrict freedom of the
press and of expression: the Law of Social
Responsibility in Radio and Television of 2004
and the Criminal Code Reform Law of 2005. The
first law delineates the standards for what is
acceptable to be aired on radio and television
within the country. Stations are threatened with
large fines and broadcasting license suspen-
sions for broadcasts that “condone or incite”
public disturbances or carry messages “contrary
to the security of the nation.”2
In January 2006, a Venezuelan court
accused ten media outlets of “obstruction of jus-
tice” and banned them from reporting on the
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investigation into the murder of Danilo Anderson,
the lead prosecutor in the investigation of the
failed 2002 coup. The state’s lead witness, a psy-
chiatrist, was labeled an imposter by members of
the media.3 The second law, the Criminal Code
Reform Law, expanded sections of the criminal
code relevant to “disrespect” of the government
and increased their penalties. A television jour-
nalist critical of Chávez, José Ovidio Rodríguez
Cuesta, was prosecuted in February 2006 under
these newly expanded statutes. One judge
rejected the case, but a Caracas court has since
reopened it.4
Internet in Venezuela
Between 1998 and 2002, the number of Internet
users in Venezuela grew from 207,000 to
1,585,000, but then decreased to 1,365,000 in
2003 for a current Internet penetration rate of 12.4
percent.5 The vast majority of personal comput-
ers are not connected to the Internet.6 The
Venezuelan government estimates that 50.4 per-
cent of the population have never used the
Internet and would not be interested in doing so,
while 28.9 percent are possible future Internet
users, primarily young, educated, middle-class
individuals.7 Though there are sixty licensed
ISPs, CANTV Servicios and Telcel control over 90
percent of the Internet market.8
Internet use is strongly concentrated among
young, educated city residents, with 76 percent
of users younger than thirty-five,9 67 percent having
schooling beyond high school,10 and more than
60 percent of users coming from Caracas.11
Approximately 26 percent of Internet users log on
daily. These users tend to be upper-class individ-
uals using home connections for educational or
work research and downloading. Over half of
Internet users connect between once and five
times per week, using cybercafés for e-mailing
and chatting. This group is generally male and
represents all socioeconomic levels with the
exception of the lowest income segment. A
smaller portion of users, 16.9 percent, connect
between once every other week and once per
month. These light users come from all econom-
ic strata except the lowest class, and they almost
exclusively use cybercafés for job search pur-
poses.12 Hotmail, Google, and Yahoo are by far
the most popular sites, followed by news sites
and other search engines.13
Despite programs promoting Internet use 
by poor and rural Venezuelans, access for this




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........5,842 4.34
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................74 6.28
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................93 6.29
Human development index (out of 177) .................................72 5.82
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Digital opportunity index (out of 180).....................................67 5.67
Internet users (% of population) ..........................................12.4 4.22
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
the total, is essentially nonexistent, and basic
public education does not incorporate Internet
technologies.14
In 2000, Venezuela had approximately 240
dot-com businesses, mostly business-to-busi-
ness rather than business-to-consumer.15 The
government has been attempting to automate its
processes and put its agencies and services
online, assisted by a newly created agency for
information technology,16 but these attempts
have not been consistent or thorough.17
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Venezuelan President Chávez has decreed the
promotion of Internet use as essential to devel-
opment.18 Correspondingly, the government pro-
motes use of information and communication
technologies (ICT) through a regulatory frame-
work designed to promote competition among
ICT businesses, but no special programs encour-
age such businesses directly.19 Personal Internet
use appears to be essentially unrestricted by cur-
rent law and regulation. Despite an erroneous
press release listing Venezuela among countries
with Internet censorship,20 the U.S. State
Department Report on Human Rights in
Venezuela states that “there were no government
restrictions on the Internet or academic free-
dom.”21 Individual reports of suspected filtering
are not backed by substantial evidence. 22
Fear of Internet regulation stems from
broader Venezuelan law restricting freedom of
press and speech. The Social Responsibility Law
opens citizens to punishment for disrespecting
authority and endangering children with improp-
er content; these laws have led to censorship in
the general news media.23 President Chávez’s
announcement on January 8, 2007, of re-nation-
alization plans for CANTV has heightened fears
of expanded regulation and content restrictions
as the government assumes more control of
Internet media.24 A recent article notes that
CANTV has held 83 percent of the Internet mar-
ket since the market’s privatization,25 so any
changes in filtering through a nationalized
CANTV will have a strong impact on Internet
users.
ONI testing results
Tests of Internet censorship were carried out in
late 2006 on the two major ISPs in Venezuela.
The testing covered a wide range of potentially
sensitive content, including sites dedicated to
political opposition, freedom of expression, and
anti-Chávez media, as well as sites centered on
controversial social issues such as minority reli-
gions, indigenous peoples, gambling, and
pornography. This assessment turned up no evi-
dence of filtering.
Conclusion
Despite fears to the contrary, ONI results give no
indication of Internet censorship. The nationaliza-
tion of CANTV and past censorship of different
media are causes for concern about future filter-
ing. However, current evidence indicates that
Venezuelan Internet access is restricted only by
initial socioeconomic, cultural, and geographic
barriers to entry and not by any subsequent
restraints on content once users are online.
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Vietnam currently regulates access to the
Internet extensively, both in the management of
Internet infrastructure as well as by restricting
access to country- and language-specific 
content.
Background
Now a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is
attempting simultaneously to promote the devel-
opment of information communications technol-
ogy (ICT) and e-commerce while struggling to
limit access to content that might destabilize the
communist state and undermine its control.
Although citizens are legally allowed to question
corruption, economic policy, and government
deficiencies, the line is drawn at political criticism
involving government leaders, political parties
and multiparty democracy, and sensitive social
and diplomatic issues. After a period of relative
openness and tolerance of independent voices
and criticism in 2006, where liberal publications
were established, the government clamped
down on what it considers unlawful usage of the
Internet. Authorities continue to detain a number
of individuals for Internet activities, such as dis-
cussing political reform over Voice-over Internet
Protocol (VoIP).1
Internet in Vietnam
Vietnam’s Internet system is growing and chang-
ing rapidly, and it is difficult to describe the situa-
tion “on the ground” with complete accuracy.
From 2005 to 2006, the number of Internet users
reportedly jumped from 9.2 million to 14.5 million,
yielding an Internet penetration rate of 17 per-
cent.2 Because more than half of the population
is under thirty and a significant portion of individ-
ual users use cybercafés for online gaming and
access to the Internet, control over these venues
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is an important priority for the state.3 Postal
offices are also important providers of Internet
access. VoIP is an increasingly popular means of
communication.4 Although the state affirmatively
seeks to enhance the competitive edge of
domestic enterprises, Vietnamese online servic-
es are still nascent, and there are few search
engines currently available to Vietnamese users.
State regulation determines how Internet
connectivity in Vietnam is organized and man-
aged, and facilitates Internet content filtering by
limiting external access points that must be con-
trolled.5
Only Internet exchange points (IXPs) can
connect to the international Internet, while online
service providers (OSPs) and Internet content
providers (ICPs) may connect to ISPs and IXPs.6
At the edge of the network, Internet agents, such
as cybercafés, connect to their contracted ISP.7
ISPs may connect with each other and with IXPs,
but private ISPs may not connect with each other
in peering arrangements.8 Currently, IXPs can
theoretically maintain independent connections
to the international Internet, but it is not clear 
how many do so in practice. Vietnam controls the
allocation of domain names under the country
code top-level domain, “.vn,” through the
Vietnam Internet Center,9 and is also planning to
implement a state-controlled Vietnamese-
language second-level domain.10
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Vietnam’s legal regulation of Internet access and
content is multilayered and complex, and can
occur at the level of National Assembly legisla-
tion, ministerial decisions, or through VNPT rules
created for the management of the Internet infra-
structure. Although Vietnam nominally guarantees
freedom of speech, of the press, and of assem-
bly through constitutional provisions,11 state
security laws and other regulations trump or elim-
inate these formal protections. Media in Vietnam
are state-owned, and they are under increasingly
tight control by the state. Effective July 1, 2006,
the Decree on Cultural and Information Activities
subjects those who disseminate “reactionary ide-
ology” including revealing secrets (party, state,
military, and economic), who deny revolutionary
achievements, and who do not submit articles for
review before publication to fines of up to thirty
million dong (USD2,000).12 These regulations
appear to target journalists, as criminal liability
already exists for some of the proscribed activi-




GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........2,739 3.75
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................70 5.64
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................90 6.00
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................109 4.97
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................121 4.11
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................192 1.80
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................123 4.01
Internet users (% of population) ..........................................12.7 4.25
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006a; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
All information stored on, sent over, or
retrieved from the Internet must comply with
Vietnam’s Press Law, Publication Law, and other
laws, including state secrets and intellectual
property protections.13 All domestic and foreign
individuals and organizations involved in Internet
activity in Vietnam are legally responsible for con-
tent created, disseminated, and stored. New
monitoring software issued by the Ministry of
Posts and Telematics in July 2006 requires ISPs
to record the identity and Internet behavior of
users at Internet kiosks, and to store the informa-
tion on their servers for one year.14 Relevant leg-
islation and administrative decrees may not be
consistently enforced—such as the requirements
to track IDs and record personal information as a
condition for access in cybercafés that appears
to be largely ignored in cities such as Ho Chi
Minh City and Hanoi.15 However, they do provide
the state with considerable authority and discre-
tion to control how citizens get online.
Just as ISPs and cybercafés are required to
install monitoring software and store information
on users, all users are also formally deputized to
report content that opposes the state or threat-
ens state security to the relevant authorities.16 It is
unlawful to use Internet resources or host materi-
al that opposes the state; destabilizes Vietnam’s
security, economy, or social order; incites oppo-
sition to the state; discloses state secrets;
infringes organizations’ or individuals’ rights; or
interferes with the state’s Domain Name System
(DNS) servers.17 Those who violate Internet use
rules are subject to a range of penalties, from
fines to criminal liability for offenses such as
causing chaos or “security disorder.”18 The
National Assembly enacted the Law on
Information Technology on June 22, 2006.19
Regulatory responsibility for Internet materi-
al is divided along subject-matter lines in
Vietnam. While the Ministry of Culture and
Information focuses on sexually explicit, supersti-
tious, or violent content, the Ministry of Public
Security monitors customers who access politi-
cally sensitive sites.20
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted from various access
points (including hotel, cybercafé, and wireless
connections) on two ISPs: FPT and VNPT. VNPT
returns a “blockpage” indicating that the request-
ed site was prohibited; FPT indicates that the fil-
tered site does not exist, suggesting a form of
DNS tampering where the listings for filtered sites
had been removed from its DNS server. Our test-
ing of Vietnam’s Internet filtering found that the
state concentrates its blocking on content about
overseas political opposition, overseas and inde-
pendent media, human rights, and religious top-
ics. Proxies and circumvention tools, the use of
which is illegal,21 were the major exception and a
substantial number were inaccessible on both
ISPs.
A large majority of blocked and inaccessible
content was specific to Vietnam—either in the
Vietnamese language or related to Vietnamese
issues, with a significant number of filtered sites
operating out of California. Sites only in English
or French, or from the global list, were rarely
blocked. For example, the domain for Radio Free
Asia (www.rfa.org) was blocked only on FPT,
although RFA’s Vietnamese-language home
page (www.rfa.org/vietnamese) was blocked by
both ISPs. At the same time, however, sites only
tangentially or indirectly critical of the govern-
ment, such as content focusing on local commu-
nities (www.nguoidan.net; www.vietnamdaily.
com) or world news aggregation (www.thongluan.
org; www.danchimviet.com/php/index.php) were
also blocked, along with sites voicing strong anti-
communist sentiments (www.conong.com;
www.vietnamvietnam.com). Although a large
number of overseas sites focusing on political
opposition and reform (such as the Free Vietnam
Alliance at www.lmvntd.org) were filtered, the
only human rights Web site on the global list to
be blocked by either (and in this case both) ISP
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belonged to the NGO Human Rights Watch
(www.hrw.org).
Certain religious content, such as pages on
religious freedom, Buddhism, and Caodai
(www.caodai.net) are blocked to a limited
degree. Some topics, such as the Montagnard
people who assisted the United States during the
war with Vietnam and who are commonly
Christians, overlap multiple categories (such as
the Montagnard Human Rights Organization
Web site www.mhro.org) and are filtered accord-
ingly.
Surprisingly, Vietnam does not block any
pornographic content (though it does filter one
site ONI tested with links to adult material),
despite the state’s putative focus on preventing
access to sexually explicit material. The state’s fil-
tering practices are thus in obvious tension with
the purported justification for these actions.
ONI has concluded that commercial filtering
lists are not being used in Vietnam for several
reasons: the pattern of blocking does not con-
form to any software product that ONI has stud-
ied, the observed pattern of deleting DNS
records for prohibited sites is inconsistent with
using Web filtering software, and the greater fil-
tering of Vietnamese-language sites on a given
topic compared with English-language sites.
However, VNPT may be using a commercial
product for filtering. Through multiple rounds of
testing, inconsistencies in filtering persisted and
evolved, also indicating that the Vietnamese 
state or Vietnamese ISPs are compiling their own
block lists. For example, the news site
www.saigonbao.com, blocked earlier in 2006 by
both FPT and VNPT, was inaccessible only on
VNPT when tested at the end of the year. VNPT
also filtered a range of sites that were accessible
on FPT, primarily independent media, human
rights (from the Vietnam Human Rights Network
to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Web sites), and overseas community (the
Vietnam American National Gala awards) and
political content. 
Conclusion
Vietnam’s filtering regime is multilayered, relying
not only on computing technology but also on
threats of legal liability, state-based and private
monitoring of users’ online activities, and informal
pressures such as supervision by employees or
other users in cybercafés. Over time, the state’s
online filtering has expanded, both in the content
blocked for a given topic and the number of con-
tent categories that are targeted. Although pur-
porting to protect national security and block
obscene content, Vietnam actually focuses on
blocking access to sites within an expansive def-
inition of political “opposition” that includes the
activities of Vietnamese communities overseas.
Although the Vietnamese state’s blocking of
access to certain content on the Internet can be
circumvented by users with technical knowledge,
ordinary users will likely continue to find that fil-
tering distorts their information environment.
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Internet filtering in the Republic of Yemen is rel-
atively broad in scope, with pornography a
principal target for blocking. Despite the wide
range of content censored, however, the depth
of filtering in Yemen is inconsistent; many users
of Yemen’s primary Internet service provider
(ISP) are not filtered when the user licensing
quota in the filtering software agreement is
exceeded.
Background
The press in Yemen operates under the careful
eye of a government hostile to independent
reporting on political and social issues.
Newspapers have been closed and journalists
have been arrested, interrogated, imprisoned,
fined, and banned from publication for their cov-
erage of sensitive topics; reports of threats and
physical attacks are also numerous.1
In 2005, the government and unidentified
parties thought to be associated with govern-
ment security forces intensified harassment of
journalists and political critics. Human rights
problems include limitations of citizens’ ability to
change the government, acknowledged torture,
significant restrictions on freedom of press and
assembly, and some restrictions on speech.2
Internet in Yemen
Yemen lacks a robust telecommunications and
information communications technology (ICT)
sector. The International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) estimates that less than 1 percent of
Yemen’s population uses the Internet (0.87 users
per 100 inhabitants) and that only 300,000 PCs
exist in the country (1.5 per 100 inhabitants).3
Many cannot afford and are simply unfamiliar
with the equipment and services needed to
access the Internet.4 Only 9 out of every 100
inhabitants is a telephone subscriber.5
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Yemen is serviced by two ISPs: YemenNet,
which is a service of the government’s Public
Telecommunication Corporation (PTC),6 and
TeleYemen’s Y.Net, which is part of the govern-
ment’s PTC but is managed by FranceTelecom.7
Businesses own 60 percent of Internet 
subscriber accounts, while government and edu-
cational institutions own only 3 percent of sub-
scriber accounts.8 Far fewer women than men
access the Internet, which may be because the
primary Internet access locations are Internet
cafés (61 percent) and work (24 percent), with
home Internet availability considerably less fre-
quent (13 percent). Only 2 percent access the
Internet from schools.9 By mid-2005, the number
of Internet cafés in Yemen reached 736.10
Legal and regulatory frameworks
The Ministry of Telecommunication and Informa-
tion Technology (MTIT) grants ISP licenses;11
PTC, a branch under the MTIT, is responsible for
the management and growth of telecommunica-
tions in Yemen.12
ISPs impose restrictions on the use of
Internet services, preventing subscribers from
accessing or transmitting certain content. The
terms and conditions set by TeleYemen (aka
Y.Net) state: “Access to applications which trans-
mit or receive live video or audio, or make similar
demands on the capacity of the network, consti-
tutes an unreasonable usage which may affect
the performance of the network, and is not 
permitted.”13 Also covered are customer respon-
sibilities, including prohibitions on “sending 
any message which is offensive on moral, reli-
gious, communal, or political grounds” (6.1.1).14
Additionally, TeleYemen reserves the right to con-
trol access “and data stored in the Y.Net system
in any manner deemed appropriate by
TeleYemen” (7.1).15 Finally, section 6.3.3 admon-
ishes subscribers that TeleYemen will “report to
the competent authorities, any use or attempted
use of the Y.Net service which contravenes any
applicable Law of the Republic of Yemen.”16
Yemen’s Press and Publications Law,
passed in 1990, subjects publications and
broadcast media to broad prohibitions and harsh
penalties.17 This law theoretically establishes a
press that “shall be independent and shall have
full freedom to practice its vocation,” but that
must operate “within the context of Islamic creed,
within the basic principles of the Constitution,





GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ...........920 3.40
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................61 4.19
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................49 2.00
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................150 2.52
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................181 2.81
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................164 2.86
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................124 4.01
Internet users (% of population) ............................................0.9 3.14
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006b; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2004
The Press and Publications Law further
states that local journalists must be Yemeni citi-
zens and must obtain Press Cards from the
Ministry of Information. Foreign journalists must
be accredited to receive Press Cards. Press
Cards can be revoked by the Ministry of
Information without any reason given, and this
revocation requires the former holder to leave
Yemen unless they have an independent reason
for residency.19
A recent example of the implementation of
this law is the conviction and fine handed down
in December 2006 to the editor of the Yemen
Observer for reprinting the Danish cartoons of the
Prophet Muhammad. The Yemen Observer’s
license was revoked and the newspaper was
closed down in February 2006 for three months
after republishing fragments of the Danish 
cartoons.20 Interestingly, the Web site of the
newspaper was not targeted or blocked by the
authorities.
A new draft of the law, proposed in 2005,
was rejected by the Yemen Journalists Syndicate
(YJS) as even more repressive than the existing
1990 law.21 Despite a promise by the Yemeni
president to reform the media laws and abolish
imprisonment penalty in publishing offenses,
Yemeni journalists are subject to violation by the
government, the ruling party, opposition parties,
and religious groups alike.22
The draft law “ignored the question of the
electronic media freedom, putting an end to the
state ownership and monopoly over broadcast
media. Rather, it went on controlling the websites
just like print media.”23
ONI testing results
ONI ran in-country tests in 2006 on Yemen’s two
ISPs, YemenNet and TeleYemen/Y.Net. We found
significant differences between the two.
Interestingly, YemenNet, the primary ISP, was
found to block very few Web sites. Because
these results were contrary to previous informa-
tion and ONI studies, we repeated the test runs
from different locations using different connec-
tions but got the same results, which showed that
YemenNet no longer filters as extensively as it did
in the past. We investigated further and found
that the ISP uses a Blue Coat integrated
cache/filter appliance to run Websense but pos-
sesses a limited number of concurrent user
licenses—not nearly enough to cover the
150,000-plus Internet users in the country. Thus,
when the number of subscribers accessing the
Internet at a given time exceeds the limited num-
ber of user licenses, the requests of users cir-
cumvent the filtering software.
The second ISP, TeleYemen/Y.Net, also
obtains its filtering software from U.S.-based
Websense. However, Y.Net was found to block
almost all of the Web sites containing pornogra-
phy, provocative attire, sex education materials,
and anonymizing and privacy tools. Search
strings containing the word “sex” are blocked, as
are some sites hosting gay and lesbian content,
hacking information, and non-erotic nudity. The
ISP also filters some religious conversion sites
and a limited number of Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) and circumvention sites.
The only political Web site found to be
blocked by Y.Net is www.soutalgnoub.com,
which is run by a Yemeni opposition group. Other
than this Web site, neither provider blocked any
of the other politically-related sites on the testing
lists. However, ONI monitored Web access in
Yemen during Yemen’s September 2006’s presi-
dential election and found that the government-
owned YemenNet did block access to several
independent news and political opposition sites,
including Nass Press (www.nasspress.com), Al-
Mostakela Forum (www.mostakela.com), and the
Yemeni Council (www.al-yemen.org).24
Conclusion
Extensive testing and analysis revealed no evi-
dence that the Yemeni state is currently prevent-
ing citizens from accessing news or political 
content online. The availability of such content
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should not, however, suggest tolerance for criti-
cism or dissent, as attested by the state’s treat-
ment of journalists and its timely blocking 
of oppositional media sites during the 2006 
presidential elections. The failures of the filtering
system installed on Yemen’s principal ISP like-
wise hint at the state’s limited capacity to control
content, rather than any willingness to allow infor-
mation to flow freely. In essence, the breadth of
content filtered should temper any optimism
about the evident ineffectiveness of filtering in
Yemen witnessed in this round of testing.
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Despite the country’s highly repressive regime,
ONI found no evidence of Web site filtration 
in Zimbabwe. Because of limited Internet
access and usage, the country’s efforts have
centered on regulating email.
Background
Zimbabwe’s government is tightly controlled by
President Robert Mugabe and the ruling
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF). They have dominated the political
landscape since the country’s independence
from Great Britain in 1980 and have manipulated
political structures to ensure that they stay in con-
trol.1 The ZANU-PF–controlled government is
known for its brutal repression and continuing
violations of human rights. The best example of
this is 2005’s “Operation Murambatsvina,” or
“Operation Tsunami,” as it is called locally.2
Officially described as an effort to eliminate illegal
housing and commerce, the “mass evictions and
demolitions” were,3 as reported by the U.N., “car-
ried out in an indiscriminant and unjustified man-
ner, with indifference to human suffering, and, in
repeated cases, with disregard to several provi-
sions of national and international legal frame-
works.”4 Though the actual motivations are
unknown, one theory is that the operation was
meant to be retribution toward regions in which
voters for opposition parties lived.5 Free assem-
bly is dramatically curtailed as the government
often violently breaks up peaceful protests under
the Public Order and Security Act.6 There have
been allegations of police abuse and the torture
of detainees.7 A severe press law passed in 2002
allows the Media and Information Commission to
crack down on dissent within the media by con-
trolling the licensing of journalists.8 And, finally,
the government jams a number of radio stations
critical of the government, such as Voice of
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America, Voice of the People, and SW Radio
Africa.9
Internet in Zimbabwe
The number of Internet users in 2005 was report-
edly 1,000,000, or approximately 8 percent of
Zimbabwe’s population.10 The number of Internet
service providers (ISPs) has risen from six in 2003
to twenty-seven in 2004, due to growing
demand.11 The Business Mirror in 2005 per-
formed a survey showing that Harare has over
thirty Internet cafés, up from about twenty, two
years prior.12 The Internet is a less expensive
means of communication than the telephone
service in Zimbabwe, fueling its growth. In 2004,
electronic messaging cost between ZIM $200
(USD0.04 by 2004 exchange rate) and ZIM $250
(USD0.05 by 2004 exchange rate) per minute,
while international telephone calls cost between
ZIM $3,800 (USD0.72 by 2004 exchange rate)
and ZIM $5,800 (USD1.10 by 2004 exchange
rate) per minute.13 However, because of limited
awareness of its capabilities, Internet use is
mostly limited to e-mail.14 The low level of Internet
penetration overall is likely the result of the
increasingly rapid decline of the economy and
quality of life in the country over the past seven
years. In January 2007, inflation rates reached a
staggering 1,593.6 percent.15 The government is
bankrupt, eight in ten Zimbabweans are desti-
tute, and workers in Harare see their bus fares to
and from work take up their entire salaries.16 In
such an environment, demand for luxury goods
such as computers and Internet use is low. In
September 2006, a large majority of the Internet
went offline when the international satellite com-
munications provider, Intelsat, cut service to the
country, following the failure of government-
owned telecommunications company, TelOne, to
pay its debts to the company. Service was
restored after the reserve bank paid the out-
standing debt.17
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Zimbabwe’s government mainly focuses its regu-
lation of Internet use on e-mail.18 The Post and
Telecommunications Act of 2000 allows the gov-
ernment to monitor e-mail usage and requires
ISPs to supply information to government officials
when requested.19 The Supreme Court, however,
ruled in 2004 that the sections of the law that per-





GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) ........1,832 3.57
Life expectancy at birth (years)..............................................37 0.33
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)......................................90 6.00
Human development index (out of 177) ...............................151 2.51
Rule of law (out of 208).......................................................199 2.07
Voice and accountability (out of 208)...................................194 1.69
Digital opportunity index (out of 180)...................................149 2.80
Internet users (% of population) ............................................8.4 3.85
Source (by indicator): World Bank 2005, 2006a, 2006b; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2006c, 2006c; ITU 2006, 2005
The government struck back with an initia-
tive in 2004 that requires ISPs to renew contracts
with TelOne, the government-owned telecommu-
nications company, with the stipulation that they
report any e-mail with “offensive or dangerous”
content.21 In essence, this requires ISPs to do
what the Supreme Court has ruled is unconstitu-
tional. As of yet, no ISPs have signed new agree-
ments.22
The government responded again with the
Interception of Communications Bill of 2006.
Under its provisions, the government would
establish a telecommunications agency called
the Monitoring and Interception of
Communications Center to monitor, among other
things, all telecommunications.23 The govern-
ment withdrew the bill in November 2006 over
constitutionality objections from the
Parliamentary Legal Committee and plans to
revise it.24 Even without explicit powers, the
authorities appear to be pursuing a crackdown
on e-mail dissent unabated. In 2005, for example,
authorities arrested forty people in a raid on a
local Internet café because an e-mail insulting
President Robert Mugabe allegedly was sent
from the location.25
ONI testing results
ONI testing of two Zimbabwean ISPs, Econet and
YoAfrica, revealed no evidence of a filtration
regime in the country. Despite the ZANU-PF
regime’s record of repression, this is not an unex-
pected finding. Internet use in Zimbabwe is
extremely low and, as mentioned earlier, is gen-
erally limited to e-mail rather than Web browsing.
As a result, Zimbabwe’s main efforts toward con-
trol of the Internet are e-mail focused. A large-
scale Internet filtration system in all likelihood
does not hold much value to the Zimbabwean
government relative to the price of its implemen-
tation.
Conclusion
Zimbabwe is a highly repressive country with a
failing economy and a poverty-stricken popula-
tion. Internet penetration is extremely low and the
Internet is mainly used for e-mail. As a result, the
government restricts its efforts toward Internet
control to e-mail monitoring and censorship.
Though its legal authority to pursue such meas-
ures is contested, the government appears to be
following through on its wishes to crack down on
dissent via e-mail. If Internet usage were to rap-
idly expand and increasingly spill over to Web
browsing, it is likely, given its history, that
Zimbabwe would move to Web site filtration.
Given the state of the country, however, this does
not appear imminent.
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